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ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on those factors which foster the long-run survival, or 
continued existence, of the small firm. Using fieldwork methods, new data were 
gathered in face-to-face interviews with 63 owner-managers of mature small firms in 
Scotland (average age of 25Vi years). An instrument incorporating novel ways of 
calibrating organisational change and performance was designed specifically for this 
study. The unique body of data enabled a number of new hypotheses to be tested in 
structural econometric models of small firm performance and growth. A mix of 
quantitative and qualitative data was also used to construct illustrative case studies of 
seven enterprise profiles.
New measures of flexibility and firm-specific turbulence are used to explain the 
performance of mature small firms, and Heckman sample selection estimation is 
undertaken of this performance equation. Performance was measured using an index 
constructed from Likert scales over 28 distinct attributes. It was found that firm- 
specific turbulence had a large negative effect on performance. Measures of flexibility 
(viz. agility and speed) enhanced the long run prospects of the mature small firm. 
Evidence of a trade-off relationship was found between measures of flexibility. Real 
options logic was found to be useful in interpreting the results. This evidence indicated 
that entrepreneurs should be alert to precipitators of organisational change, but should 
not act impulsively in responding to them.
The tendency of the long-lived small firm to remain small is considered using 
structural modelling techniques. In a three-equation simultaneous model, performance, 
size and a third variable (viz. market extent and size of competitive strategy space) are 
jointly determined. An array of system estimation techniques (e.g. 2SLS, 3SLS, 
H3SLS) was employed to estimate the behavioural models. A trade-off is found 
between firm size and performance, thus embedding this result in a larger structural 
model. It is found that small firms need to adjust downwards in size, and to cultivate a 
varied competitive strategy in niche or localised markets, to attain higher equilibrium 
values of performance and to promote longevity.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
This dissertation endeavours to make a significant contribution to the existing 
literature on small business economics, based on empirical evidence from primary 
source (interview based) data on mature small firms in Scotland. Within the field of 
small business economics, which is inextricably linked to the broad interdisciplinary 
area of entrepreneurship, a number of key research themes are addressed. The chief 
objective is to identify factors which foster the survival, or continued existence, of the 
long-lived small firm.
The study initially sets out to characterise the long-lived small firm and its 
growth and performance. The analysis is conducted using new data gathered in face-to- 
face interviews with the owner-managers of 63 mature small firms in Scotland. The 
survey instrument designed specifically for this study incorporated novel ways of 
calibrating organisational change and performance. A new measure of performance is 
proposed which captures the fitness of the small firm to survive over the long haul. 
This measure of performance is used in testing two new hypotheses. The first 
investigates whether flexibility enhances the long run prospects of the mature small 
firm. To date the theoretical development of the conception of flexibility in the 
literature has hindered its empirical development, see Carlsson (1989). This study 
focuses on the latter filling this void in the literature. New measures of flexibility (viz. 
agility and speed} were calibrated to test this hypothesis. Performance is explained 
using these measures of flexibility and a new measure of turbulence, firm-specific 
turbulence, in a Heckman sample selection model (see Lee, 1982, 1983; Heckman, 
1976, 1979; Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). The second hypothesis considers the 
tendency of the long-lived small firm to remain small. It is just as important to examine 
this hypothesis rather than the rival one which focuses on the characteristics of fast 
growing firms (see Delmar et. al, 2003; Almus, 2002; Briiderl and Preisendorfer, 2000; 
Birch, 1996; Storey, 1994, 1996; Seigel et al., 1993; Smallbone et. al, 1992, 1995; 
Leigh et al., 1991). This is explored in a three-equation, simultaneous equation model 
where size, performance and a third variable, for example, market extent are determined 
endogenously. An array of system estimation techniques is used to estimate the 
simultaneous equation models (e.g. 2SLS, 3SLS and H3SLS). Finally, seven new case
2
profiles of long-lived small firms are presented to illustrate key aspects of the 
quantitative results.
Long-lived small firms are defined in this study as firms which have been 
trading for more than 10 years.1 The firms examined were mature, 25% years on 
average; median age is 22. Technically, they were classified as ‘small’ at inception 
since they employed less than 100 people, though in feet, the small firms in the study 
were much smaller, typically having less than 10 employees at inception. Thus, 
according to the European Commission’s definition of a small firm, they were ‘micro­
enterprises’ at start-up (employing less than 10 full-time equivalent employees) (see 
Recommendation 96/280/EC). At the time of interview, the long-lived small firms had 
13 employees, on average, indicating some, but not substantial growth, since inception. 
Survival, or the continued existence of the firm, does not necessarily imply market 
success in terms of growth, but does not exclude this. Thus, both large and small, 
surviving small firms are examined in this study (see Kay, 1997). Only a small 
proportion of small firms grow to become large firms or ‘gazelles’ as denoted by Birch 
(1996), or ‘ten percenters’ as described by Storey (1996,1997, 1998a, b)1 2.
A positivist approach is undertaken in the testing of hypotheses. Thus, the 
existing hypotheses are challenged using new data on long-lived small firms. The thesis 
is divided into two volumes. Broadly, Volume I contains the main body of the thesis, 
whereas Volume II supplements the analysis in Volume I by presenting a copy of the 
survey instrumentation and seven enterprise profiles, which are discussed where 
relevant in the main body of the text. Volume I is structured into six parts as follows: 
Initially, this Part introduces the rationale, the contributions and the structure of the 
thesis. Part II presents relevant theory and evidence (see Chapters 2 and 3 respectively). 
Chapter 2 takes an interdisciplinary approach to develop a theoretical framework for 
examining organisational change. Chapter 3 examines theory and evidence on factors
1 Stewart and Gallagher (1986) find that amongst small firms older than 10 years, dissolution rates are 
roughly constant and a firm of 70 years’ standing has as much chance of dissolving as a comparative 
youngster of ten years of age.
2 A ‘gazelle’ is a company that had a minimum of $100,000 in revenues and managed to grow at least 
20% a year over four consecutive years (i.e. doubling in size over a four year period). According to Birch 
(1996), they represent 3% of firms in the US. Storey (1996) defined ‘ten percenters’ as independent 
companies, with annual turnover of between £5m and £100m, which grew their sales at a compound 
growth rate of 30% per annum over the pervious five years.
3
which foster small firm survival. In Part DI, the sample frame is described and a survey 
instrument is developed, for use in fieldwork (see Chapter 4). A unique body of 
evidence on factors which foster the longevity of the long-lived small firm was 
collected. Part IV characterises the long-lived small firm and its performance and 
growth (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Chapter 5 presents a picture of the typical mature 
small firm in the sample and its market environment. In particular, it examines patterns 
of adjustment in the scale of the mature small firm over its life. The empirical relevance 
of Gibrat’s Law is investigated as the small firm matures (see Sutton, 1997, 1998). 
Chapter 6 considers issues of performance measurement in a small firm context and 
proposes a new measure of small firm performance which is used later in econometric 
testing. Chapter 7 describes the evolution of the mature small firms strategy and 
internal organisation. Forms of key organisational change and features of end-games, 
such as family succession and trade-sale, are also discussed. Part V tests inferences 
with regard to the performance of the long-lived small firm. Chapter 8 utilises new 
measures of flexibility and performance to examine how small firms adapt, in the long 
run, to factors which impinge on it, in a way which promotes their survival and benefit. 
In Chapter 9, a new analysis of simultaneity between firm size, performance and other 
attributes, which potentially may inhibit growth, is developed. Part VI summarises the 
main findings of the thesis and indicates avenues for further research (see Chapter 10).
This Chapter presents information on the contributions and contents of the 
thesis. The development of this Chapter is as follows: Section 1.2 reports briefly on the 
background and the rationale for this study. Section 1.3 presents the structure and 
contribution of each Part of the thesis in greater detail. Specifically, the research 
objective(s), contributions) and data and methods applied (where relevant) are 
examined. Finally, Section 1.4 concludes this Chapter.
1.2 Background
This thesis sets out to contribute to a new emerging body of literature on small 
business economics. While the field of small business economics is a relatively new 
one, the original writings in the field of entrepreneurship to which it is inextricably
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linked can be traced back to those of Cantillon (1680-1734)3 and Say (1821)4. A 
number of other perspectives on entrepreneurship surfaced in the twentieth century. In 
short, Schumpeter (1934) viewed the entrepreneurial function as “carrying out new 
combinations” (p.66) and as a disequilibrating force, the source of “spontaneous and 
discontinuous change” (p.64) in the circular flow of income. Neoclassical economists, 
such as Knight (1921), viewed entrepreneurs as risk takers and profits as the 
compensation for bearing risk. In the same tradition, Marshall (1961) describes the 
entrepreneur as an “alert business man [who] strives to modify his arrangements as to 
obtain better results with a given expenditure” (p.355). In the Austrian school, the 
entrepreneur is an equilibrating force who “brings into mutual adjustment those 
discordant elements which resulted from prior market ignorance” (Kirzner, 1973, p.73) 
through “his alertness to hitherto unnoticed opportunities” (Kirzner, 1973, p.34). A 
more recent approach to entrepreneurship developed by Casson (1982) depicts the 
entrepreneur as a ‘coordinator’ that is someone “..who specializes in taking judgmental 
decisions about the coordination of scarce resources” (p.23). The Schumpeterian 
school considers the potential of the entrepreneur to create opportunities (i.e. new 
resources, goods, production techniques, organisational forms and markets), while the 
Austrian school considers the potential of the entrepreneur to realise profitable 
opportunities in the market. Though they diverge on the (dis)equilibrating role of the 
entrepreneur, features of these schools have greater relevance in the context of this 
study as they focus on the entrepreneur as the initiator of change.
Even though these perspectives on entrepreneurship emerged during the course 
of the twentieth century, the field of entrepreneurship was largely ignored in
3 Cantillon (1775) recognised three classes of economic agents: land owners, entrepreneurs and 
employees. A Cantillon entrepreneur is someone who exercises business engagements in the face of 
uncertainty. According to Cantillon, "The farmer is an undertaker who promises to pay to the landowner 
a fixed sum of money ....without assurance of the profit he will derive from this enterprise", (see 
Cantillon, 1775, p.47). In this description, the entrepreneur is not the resource owner. His profit is 
uncertain and of a residual nature because costs are fixed and income is not.
4 Say (1821) described the entrepreneur as the person who shifts economic resources out of an area of 
lower, and into an area of higher, productivity yield. In this description, Say (1821) did not only stress 
the importance of change and innovation within the economic system, but he described the entrepreneur 
as the agent of change.
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mainstream economics, as neoclassical models5 let little room for the role of the 
entrepreneur, see Wennekers and Thurik, (1999) and Ripsas (1998). Renewed interest 
in the role of the entrepreneur only arose following empirical evidence that small firms 
were generating new jobs (and as found later they were innovating) see Birch (1981, 
1987), Brock and Evans (1986, 1989), Acs (1992), Barnes and Haskel, (2002). The 
study of the formation and growth of small firms became synonymous with that of 
entrepreneurship even though growth in the number of new small firms is a weak 
indicator of the level of entrepreneurship, see Wennekers and Thurik, (1999). Small 
firms are just one vehicle in which entrepreneurship thrives (see Drucker, 1985, 
Stopford and Baden Fuller, 1994). Contemporary writings in entrepreneurship extend 
more than ever across a number of disciplines namely, management, psychology, 
sociology and history (see Ripsas, 1998). Thus, the new emerging field of small 
business economics is interdisciplinary in nature. Certainly, in developing a theoretical 
framework for examining organisational change in Chapter 2 writings in management 
(viz. contingency theory, stages of growth models and real options logic) are 
considered.
In the field of small business economics, it is important to characterise long- 
lived small firms, as they are a stable source of employment within communities. They 
have passed the long run economic test of survival, which is no easy task. Only 
approximately two fifths (39.8%) of new small firms survive in the U.S. after six years, 
according to Phillips and Kirchoff (1989). A slightly higher proportion (41%) survived 
for ten years or more in the sample frame of small firms considered in this study (see 
Table 4.3). This subset of survivors has many direct and indirect linkages with local 
economies for a sustained period of time. In contrast, non-survivors are net destroyers 
of jobs whose links with local economies are ephemeral. Davis et al. (1996) and Barnes 
and Haskel (2002) show that small firms have higher job creation rates than large firms 
but also have higher job destruction rates. Yet to date there has been little empirical 
work in the small firms. literature characterising the subset of small firms, which
5 In the neoclassical tradition, changes are external to the model, whether they be changes in resources, 
preferences or technology. Individual agents have complete information. All markets are implicitly 
assumed to work perfectly well and are cleared at an equilibrium set of prices effectively eliminating the 
need for the behavioural function of entrepreneurship.
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generate employment over a prolonged period of time. Empirical work has tended to 
concentrate on examining the determinants of firm formation, growth and dissolution 
(Evans, 1987a, b; Hall, 1987; Dunne et al., 1989a) and small firm survival post entry 
(Mata and Portugal, 1994; Mata et al., 1995; Audretsch, 1995). Isolated works by 
Smallbone et al. (1992, 1995), North et al. (1992) and Leigh et al. (1991) for the U.K. 
exist but are few in number. North et al. (1992) explored differences in characteristics, 
aims, products and markets of long-lived survivors and non-survivors. Smallbone et 
al.’s (1992) study descriptively examined some dimensions of organisational change 
and adjustments undertaken by low performing firms to survive. Leigh et al. (1991) 
undertook a similar analysis for high growth firms. Smallbone et al.'s (1995), using 
statistical tests, considered the influence of organisational adjustments on real turnover 
growth and, in a brief way, on change in employment. However, these studies focused 
on mature manufacturing firms (thereby neglecting the much larger services sector) and 
undertook no formal econometric testing. A gap therefore presented itself in the 
literature, which represented a natural means to extend existing knowledge in this area.
Evidence that policies aimed at increasing the birth rate of firms in Scotland 
have not been entirely successful was a further impetus for this research (cf. Fraser of 
Allander Institute, 2001). Such policies increase the level of churning in firm formation 
and dissolution rates in regional economies (i.e. birth rates and rates of failure are 
higher). On the one hand, Storey and Johnson (1986) argue that higher birth rates 
increase competition making it more difficult for existing local firms to generate profits 
and overcome the struggle for survival. Johnson (2003), in a similar vein, argues that 
support for new firms may displace existing businesses, not because they are more 
efficient, but because of policy measures which favour new businesses over existing 
businesses. On the other hand, Gallagher and Botham (1998) argue that increased 
churning leads to higher overall growth rates and that the evidence shows the quality of 
new starts is not the problem (in regional economies like Scotland) but the number. In 
their view, policies aimed at increasing the overall birth rate of a region and the 
promotion of high growth (or higher quality) new starts are compatible concurrent 
strategies. However, given the weak success of policies to try to increase the birth rate 
of new firms in Scotland, an alternative (or additional, rather than mutually exclusive)
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approach focusing on reducing small firm death rates and extending the life of the new 
small firm start-ups may prove more successful as proposed by Beesley and Hamilton, 
(1984). Greater knowledge of the characteristics of the long-lived small firms and 
factors, which promote the longevity of these firms, is required to embark on this path. 
The results of this study should fill this void.
Further, access to the known samples of small firms which had matured since 
earlier interviews undertaken by Professor Gavin Reid, Director of CRIEFF, Centre for 
Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm at the University of St. 
Andrews, (and his research workers) provided a means of identifying long-lived 
surviving firms in the field. The sample frame of ninety surviving firms, (or long-lived 
small firms), were extracted from three ‘parent’ samples of Scottish small business 
enterprises, namely Leverhulme (1985-1988), Telephone Survey (1991) and 
Leverhulme (1994-1997). They provided an opportune set of known sources upon 
which fieldwork could be built and a means of developing work initiated by Prof. Reid 
(see Jacobsen, 1986; Reid, 1993; Reid et al., 1993; Reid, 1996; Smith, 1997a; Reid, 
1999; Reid and Smith, 2000a). Advantageously, data were also available on non­
survivors, as well as survivors, gathered in earlier interviews with firms from the three 
parent samples between 1985 and 1997 (see respective time periods in parentheses 
above). This enabled estimates of the specified performance equation to be corrected 
for sample selection bias using Heckman’s sample selection model (see Chapter 8).
The quantitative analysis of the thesis develops by examining the influence of 
the flexibility on the performance of the small firm. Mills (1984), Mills and Schumann 
(1985), Das et al., (1993) and Zimmermann (1995) argue that small firms survive 
alongside large firms because of the relative flexibility. However, there has been a lack 
of empirical work in the field of small business economics and industrial organisation 
on small firm flexibility, see Carlsson (1989). The use of growth in new firm start-ups 
as a measure of entrepreneurship does not necessarily take into account entrepreneurial 
actions or innovative activities of small firms undertaken post entry. Early studies were 
preoccupied with characterising industries in which large firms had a relative innovative 
advantage and similarly, industries in which small firms had a relative innovative 
advantage, see Acs and Audretsch (1987, 1988), Acs et al. (1994). However, the
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process by which small firms adapt and revitalise their firms in response to factors, 
which impinge on it, deserves further study. Intrapreneurship or corporate 
entrepreneurship mainly examined in the realm of large enterprises, with theories of 
corporate venturing, strategic renewal or “mimicking smallness” (Drucker, 1985; 
Stopford and Baden Fuller, 1994), is also relevant in the context of long-lived small 
firms. The flexibility of the firm in response to organisational change and the 
implications of this for the long-run prospects of the mature small firm are examined in 
Chapter 8.
Finally, the tendency of the long-lived small firm to remain small is considered 
in Chapter 9 since few small firms grow to become fast growth firms or gazelles (see 
Birch, 1996; Storey, 1994, 1996). To date much of the empirical work has concentrated 
on the characteristics of fast growth firms rather than on the tendency of the vast 
majority of small firms to remain small-scale operations (see Birch, 1996; Storey, 1996, 
1997, 1998a, b; Leigh et al., 1991; Smallbone et al., 1992). To analyse this hypothesis, 
the relationship between size and performance and third variable inhibiting growth was 
considered in a three equation simultaneous model.
It is observed from above that a variety of reasons motivated the initiation and 
direction of this study. In general, the thesis provides an in-depth and thorough, 
treatment of issues of longevity, and factors which foster the survival of the long-lived 
small firm which are discussed in greater detail below.
1.3 Contributions and Form of Thesis
Volume I of this dissertation is divided into six Parts. In short, Part II discusses 
the relevant literature and Part III outlines the fieldwork methods applied in the course 
of this study. Parts IV and V analyse the data gathered on the long-lived small firms. 
Specifically, Part IV presents the results of an exploratory data analysis and Part V 
reports on the results of inference testing (viz. flexibility analysis, simultaneous 
equations analysis). Part VI concludes this study. Appendix material (e.g. survey 
instrument and seven enterprise profiles) is included in Volume II. The discussion 
below concentrates chiefly on the contents and contributions of Volume I.
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1.3.1 Theory and Evidence
Part II comprises of two chapters, Chapters 2 and 3, which consider theory and 
evidence on small firm longevity respectively. Chapter 2 develops a framework to 
examine how small firms respond to forces of organisational change in order to survive 
over the long haul. Chapter 3 examines theory and evidence on factors which foster 
small firm survival.
Chapter 2 is interdisciplinary in nature. Contingency theory (see Donaldson, 
1994) and stages of growth models (Greiner, 1972; Churchill and Lewis, 1983) 
developed in the management literature are considered to shed some fight on drivers of 
change within the firm. The most appropriate organisational form of the firm is viewed 
as circumstantial or contingent on precipitators of change such as the environment, 
strategy, size etc. Generally, these theories were developed to portray organisational 
change in large firms. They are rarely considered in a small firm context (see Reid and 
Smith 2000b; Hall 1995). It is contended that small firms survive alongside larger firms 
because of their relative flexibility in responding to changes in their environmental (see 
Brock and Evans, 1989; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Acs et al., 1990). This Chapter 
examines the development of the concept of flexibility in the literature, building on the 
analysis of Carlsson (1989), in order to identify the factors underpinning this 
unobservable concept and to extend our framework for analyzing change in small firms. 
Carlsson’s (1989) notion of strategic flexibility is influential in formulating our 
measures of flexibility in Chapter 8. The logic of real options developed in financial 
economics and extended in the management literature is adopted as a means of valuing 
strategic flexibility (see Bowman and Hurry, 1993; McGrath, 1999). The application of 
real options theory to value flexibility in undertaking organisational change in a small 
firms context is a innovative approach and useful extension to the framework for 
analysing organisational change. Even though higher performance is associated with 
firms which are more flexible (Stigler, 1989; Oi, 1961; Aiginger and Weiss, 1998) and 
which are active in making adjustments (Smallbone et al. 1992, 1995) it is argued in the 
literature that there is a limit on the rate of expansion (Slater, 1980; Marris, 1964; 
Richardson, 1964; Penrose, 1959). To complete the framework, barriers to 
organisational change are examined (viz. growth profitability trade-off, barriers to
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growth and path dependence). In its entirety, the eclectic mix of theories presented in 
Chapter 2 together form a useful and novel framework for analysing how small firms 
respond to organisational change.
Chapter 3 examines theory and evidence on small firm survival and growth. In 
the mainstream literature, small firm survival has been treated as an aside issue to the 
literature on the determinants of firm growth (Evans, 1987a,b; Hall, 1987; Dunne and 
Hughes, 1994; Heshmati, 2001). Relatively recently firm survival has been given a 
more thorough treatment in the literature on post entry performance (Audretsch and 
Mata, 1995). Forces influencing post entry performance are examined at industry level 
(Audretsch, 1991, 1995) and firm level (Mata and Portugal, 1994; Mata e/. al., 1995; 
Boeri and Bellman, 1995; Doms et. al., 1995; Storey and Wynarczky, 1996; Mahmood, 
2000; Fotopoulos and Louri, 2000a) as well as on an economy wide level (Audretsch 
and Mahmood, 1995; Fotopoulos and Louri, 2000a; Boeri and Bellmann, 1995). The 
account in Chapter 3 is illustrative rather than exhaustive. Empirical studies were 
selected for inclusion in Chapter 3 to highlight the effect of the forces, referred to 
above, on firm prosperity and longevity. This thesis challenges some of the hypotheses 
raised by these studies with new data on long-lived small firms in Parts IV and V.
In summary, Part II contributes to the overall aim of this study by firstly 
developing a theoretical framework for examining organisational change in small firms 
and secondly by collating evidence on factors which foster the survival of the small 
firm.
1.3.2 Fieldwork
Part III, Chapter 4 reports on the methodology adopted in fieldwork activities 
undertaken, as part of this study. It discusses the extraction of a sample frame of long- 
lived small firms to be interviewed. The design of the survey instrument and the data 
collection process is also outlined. To finish the design of the quantitative and 
qualitative databases in SPSS6 is discussed in a brief way. The design of the survey 
instrument represents a significant contribution of this study and the vast majority of 
Part III, Chapter 4 concentrates on the latter. In Volume II the survey instrumentation 
and the data dictionary are presented as appendices to this Chapter.
6 Statistical Package for the Social Sciences abbreviated.
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The sample frame of ninety long-lived small firms were extracted, as stated 
above, from three “parent” samples of Scottish small business enterprises, namely 
Leverhulme (1985-1988), Telephone Survey 1991 and Leverhulme (1994-1997). Table
1.1 below presents summary information on the extraction of the parent sample from 
these three sub-samples. In total, the survey instrument contained 83 numbered 
questions and 5 show cards. Theory and evidence presented in Chapters 2 and 3 was 
influential in developing the questions. Measures were constructed to extract 
information on the characteristics of the mature small firm, including changes in the 
scale and scope of its operations, pivotal changes in the running of the firm, factors 
which fostered the survival of the firm and the level of innovativeness and the 
technological progressiveness of the firm. Two unique design features include a multi­
dimensional scale where owner-mangers self appraise factors, which they believed, 
influenced the survival of the firm and an innovative way of calibrating strategic 
responses to forces of organisational change. Most of the measures included in the 
instrument are quantitative in nature but qualitative measures were gathered on the 
vision of the founders, strategies for longevity and on key organisational changes to 
inform the quantitative testing of inferences. After piloting the instrument, Professor 
Reid and the author traveled to firm sites in many regions of Scotland to meet and 
conduct face-to-face interviews with 63 owner-managers of long-lived small firms in 
Scotland between October 2001 and February 2002.7 Almost all sectors by Standard 
Industrial Classification Code, henceforth SIC code, were represented, from agriculture 
(01) to domestic services (99), in the sample of 63 long-lived small firms interviewed. 
The geographic scope of this sample was extensive: Firms were located in rural 
regions, such as the highlands and islands, and urban regions, such as Glasgow and 
Edinburgh (see Subsection 5.2.1)
7 Professor Reid interviewed nine firms in the sample and the author interviewed the remaining fifty-four 
firms.
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Tabic 1.1: The Extraction of the Sample8
r Parent Extracted Survivors
Survivors Non
survivors
Total Non
response
Interviewed I
Leverhulme (1985-1988) 86 25 61 86 5 20
Telephone Survey (1991) 160 50 63 113 20 30
Leverhulme (1994-1997) 150 15 5 20 2 13
8 Total 396 90 129 219 27 63 |
The chief contribution of Part IK involved the collection of an original body of 
evidence (quantitative and qualitative). Detailed data on many of the measures 
contained in the instrument were not gathered previously for a sample of long-lived 
small firms. As a result these firms can now be characterised and it is possible to get a 
novel insight into factors, which are important for their survival, growth and 
performance.
1.3.3 Quantitative Analysis
Part IV reports on the results of a general analysis of the data collected using the 
survey instrument. It is divided into three chapters, namely Chapter 5, 6 and 7. 
Appropriate univariate (e.g. measures of central tendency and dispersion) and bivariate 
measures (e.g. measures of association and tests of difference in means) are examined in 
the course of this analysis.
Specifically, Chapter 5 characterises the long-lived small firm and its market 
environment. It provides a more complete statistical picture of the growth experienced 
by these small firms over their life. A number of different measures of growth (e.g. 
growth in full-time employment and turnover) are used to examine the flexibility of the 
scale of operations of the small firm over long time horizons. Labour productivity, 
approximated by turnover (in pounds sterling) generated per fulltime equivalent 
employment, is also examined. Models inspired by Gibrats Law (“The Law of
8 The fieldwork for Leverhulme (1985-1988) gathered data via face-to-face interviews with the owner 
managers of 86 new business starts in the late eighties. Of these 86 firms, 25 (29%) survived and 20 of 
these agreed to be re-interviewed for this study. Data on the second sample frame of 160 mature firms, 
members of the Federation of Small Business, in Scotland, were collected by telephone in 1991. At that 
time, 113 firms agreed to be interviewed. Fifty, out of the 113 firms, in this parent sample were still in 
business in 2001 (a survival rate of 44%). Thirty of these firms agreed to be reinterviewed. From 
Leverhulme (1994-1997), the third parent sample of 150 firms, 20 long-lived small firms aged 10 years or 
more were identified. This sample of firms consisted of new business starts, which were interviewed
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Proportionate Effect)* 9 are estimated in the classical form (Sutton, 1997, 1998). The 
results resolve conflicting empirical evidence in support for Gibrat’s Law. The Law 
tends to hold for large firms (see Hart and Oulton, 1996) however, among small firms 
evidence of a clear negative relationship between firm size and growth has been found 
(see Mansfield, 1962; Hall, 1987; Evans, 1987a, b; Dunne et al., 1989a; Dunne and 
Hughes, 1994). The results provide empirical support for Reid’s (2001) conjecture that 
the small firm growth process stabilises and tends to a long run equilibrium value even 
though small SBEs10 11grow faster than larger SBEs at start-up phase. After 
approximately the first 5 years of trading, there is a shift in the growth process and 
SBEs grow at the market rate (i.e. independent of firm size) from that point on.
Chapter 6 examines the measurement of long run performance as it relates to 
the small firm. The Chapter discusses difficulties with using traditional accounting 
measures of performance in a small firm context (i.e. accuracy of accounting records, 
difficulties in distinguishing profit from income and failure to value intangible assets). 
To overcome the difficulties apparent in traditional accounting measures, Chapter 6 
outlines the creation of a novel multidimensional measure of performance where owner- 
managers self-appraise the firm’s performance based on 28 distinct attributes 
incorporating aspects of the firm’s competitive environment, financial management, 
organisational structure, and business strategy (e.g. debt, skills, quality). The reliability 
of this measure of performance is assessed and factor analytic techniques11 are adopted 
to examine the underlying constructs of this self-appraised measure of performance. 
Finally, the validity of this measure is considered through an examination of correlates 
with financial measures of performance and other attributes of the firm.
originally using face-to-face interviews from 1994 -1997. Fifteen out of twenty firms, aged 10 or more, 
were still trading (a survival rate of 75%). Thirteen of these agreed to be re-interviewed.
9 Much of the small firms literature has focused on the relationship between growth and firm size 
originating in Gibrat’s Law states that growth rates are independent of firm size and its past growth 
history. All firm growth (large and small firms) occurs at the same rate (market rate) over an interval of 
time regardless of their initial size.
10 SBE is an abbreviation for Small Business Enterprise.
11 Factor analysis is a multivariate statistical tool that can be used to examine the underlying patterns of 
relationships among a larger number of variables and to determine whether or not the information can be 
summarised into a smaller set of constructs or attributes underlying performance (Child, 1970; Loehlin, 
1992). To cope with this kind of investigation methodologists recommend the use of a statistical 
procedure, which comprises: (1) exploratory factor analysis; (2) reliability test; and (3) confirmatory 
factor analysis for validating measures (Gerbing & Andersen, 1998; Hair et al., 1995).
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Chapter 7 challenges existing hypotheses on entrepreneurial intentions, market 
positioning, size of competitive strategy space, product and process innovation, internal 
organisation and information technology using new data on long-lived small firms. It 
examines the evolution of the owner-manager’s aims for the business, its competitive 
strategy and internal organisation. The level of product and process innovation and uses 
of information technologies is also discussed. New evidence on the number, type, 
timing and strategic importance of key organisational changes, which occurred in the 
operations of small firms over its lifetime is presented. Essentially, key organisational 
changes are interpreted as ‘pivotal points’ or ‘crossroads’, rather than crisis points. 
Typically, they are strategic in nature, and at one step removed from the more routinised 
decisions undertaken by the mature small firm on a day-to-day basis. Examples of 
organisational changes examined include changes in ownership, technology, location, 
cashflow, line of business, capacity, market positioning, diversification and 
management. To conclude this Chapter, potential end-games (e.g. trade-sale, family 
succession, employee buyout, disposal of assets) of the owner-managers are analysed. 
Attributes of planned end-games of long-lived small firms have only received scant 
attention in the past (Tajnikar and Dosenovic, 2003). Existing evidence focuses on 
family succession rather than other potential end-games (Bjuggren and Sund, 2002; 
Lotti and Santarelli, 2002; Kimhi, 1997; Morris et al. 1997; Lansberg, 1983; Beckhard 
and Dyer, 1983). To the best of the author’s knowledge comprehensive evidence of this 
nature has not been previously presented for a sample of long-lived small firms.
Part V comprises of Chapters 8 and 9, which test inferences on performance. 
Chapter 8 calibrates two new measures of flexibility {Agility and Speed} and a new 
measure of turbulence, referred to as firm-specific turbulence. It then tests the 
hypothesis that flexibility enhances the long run prospects of the small firm using 
Heckman’s sample selection model to correct for selectivity bias [Lee 1982, 1983; 
Heckman, 1976, 1979; Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993]. Sample selection bias exists 
as the measures of performance, firm-specific turbulence and flexibility are only 
observed for long-lived small firms and not for non-survivors. In general, the measures 
of flexibility (viz. Agility and Speed) were, found to raise the performance of the firm.
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The analysis was extended to examine the appropriateness of real options logic 
for explaining how the long-lived small firm responds to precipitators of organisational 
change (see Miller and Folta, 2002; McGrath, 1997,1999; Luehrman, 1997,1998; 
Bowman and Hurry, 1993). Non-linearities between measures of speed and agility in 
explaining performance were examined. To conduct a test for non-linearities, 
interaction terms were included in the Heckman sample selection model and the 
direction, magnitude and significance of their coefficients are interpreted. In this unique 
way, the empirical relevance of real options logic is considered. Specifically, the value 
of two guiding principles of real options reasoning which raise the flexibility of the firm 
are investigated: 1) The value of staging resource commitments to organisational 
change, limiting irreversibilities in event of withdrawal; and 2) The value of holding 
teal options until uncertainties are resolved and the value of waiting is at its lowest (i.e. 
adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach) (see Ingersoll and Ross, 1992; McDonald and 
Seigel, 1986).
It has been observed that few small firms grow to become fast growth firms or 
‘gazelles’ (see Storey, 1994, 1996; Birch, 1996) so there is a tendency for small firms to 
remain small-scale operations. The emphasis in the literature to date has been to study 
the characteristics of these fast growing firms rather than to examine the tendency of 
small firms to adjust downwards in size (see Almus, 2002; Storey, 1996, 1997, 1998a,b; 
Birch, 1996; Seigel et al., 1993; Smallbone et. al, 1992, 1995; Leigh et al., 1991), 
which is the focus of Chapter 9. Whilst, the growth and profitability trade-off has 
received both a lot of theoretical development (Penrose, 1959; Marris, 1964; 
Richardson, 1964; and Slater, 1980) and extensive empirical testing (Cubbin and Leech, 
1986; Dobson and Gerrard, 1989; Cowling, 2004), even in a small firms context (see 
Reid, 1993, 1995, 1998) suggesting, though not conclusively, that there are diminishing 
returns to increasing small firm size. The implied trade-off between size and 
performance is examined in a more inclusive model in this Chapter for a sample of 
mature small firms. Earlier models are extended, to include other sources of 
endogeneity which may explain the tendency of the small firm to remain small such as 
the size of the market for its product (e.g. local service) and the level of differentiation 
of the product (e.g. customised). The joint determination of each of these attributes
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with size and performance is considered. Durbin-Wu-Hausman type tests of exogeneity 
are employed to test for endogeneity. The results of a number of system estimation 
techniques (e.g. seemingly unrelated regression models, iterated three stage least 
squares and GMM) are reported. Chapter 9 shows that there is a tendency to stay small 
or reduce in size over time to attain improvements in performance. Generally, to attain 
higher levels of performance a varied competitive strategy needs to be adopted (e.g. 
differentiating its service, producing specialist products etc.) within a niche or localised 
market.
1.3.4 Qualitative Analysis
Volume II illustrates the results of the quantitative analysis by presenting seven 
case profiles of mature small firms, which took part in the study. Whilst econometric 
and statistical analysis is crucial to a scientific understanding of flexibility and 
performance in the small firm, it is helpful to augment this analysis with qualitative 
evidence of the processes of change within such firms. The seven cases profiles were 
chosen for this purpose. Given the wealth of qualitative evidence available on the 
mature firms, which participated in this study, case analysis is a powerful tool to capture 
the evolution of these firms and to examine the practical relevance of the results 
founded in this study. Thus, these case profiles aid the triangulation of the quantitative 
results and are referred to in the body of the text in Volume I.
1.3.5 Conclusion
Volume I, Part VI summarises the main findings and contributions of this study 
and indicates directions for future research. It draws together the observations from the 
work as a whole and suggests, as appropriate, strategies or courses of action that 
promote the longevity of small firms and assist the firm in achieving higher 
performance. In a very brief way, the work also concludes with some suggestions as to 
how business advisors may support long-lived small firms.
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1.4 General Conclusions
A number of studies show the contribution of small firms to employment 
creation and new small firm formation in the United States (Davis et al., 1996; Murphy, 
1996; Birch, 1987), the U.K. (Storey, 1994; Hart and Oulton, 1996, 1998; Barnes and 
Haskel, 2002), Ireland (Hogan & Foley, 1996, Gudgin et al., 1995; and Hart et al., 
1993) and in other European countries (Wagner, 1994). As a result, the continued 
growth and survival of the small firms sector is increasing in importance for the 
competitiveness of economies and in tackling unemployment. Even if the long-lived 
small firms in this study are not high performing, fast growth, firms it is important from 
a policy development viewpoint to investigate these firms and to characterise them, as 
they continue to hold direct and indirect links with their communities for sustained 
periods of time. They are the bedrock of small business enterprise.
This study gathers a unique body of evidence on long-lived small firms using a 
novel survey instrument. Using this evidence, it sets out to characterise the long-lived 
small firm, its market, strategy, and internal organisation. Potential end-games are also 
examined. A significant proportion of the analysis examines organisational change and 
the flexibility of the firm in responding to precipitators of change. New measures of 
flexibility and firm performance are calibrated for this analysis. The tendency of the 
long-lived small firm to remain small is demonstrated. Performance, size and other 
attributes are estimated jointly in a simultaneous equations framework. A positivist 
approach is undertaken in testing inferences on the performance of the long-lived small 
firm. Based on the findings, this thesis concludes by summarising the findings. So- 
called paths which entrepreneurs can follow to foster the longevity of the small firm are 
suggested. Although the main aim of the thesis is positivist, the evidence presented 
should also enable policy makers to support and educate small businesses on attributes 
influencing their long run survival, growth and performance. Thereby, they will be 
fostering economic and industrial development and sustaining linkages between small 
firms and their local or regional economies.
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CHAPTER 2 ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE AND SURVIVAL
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2.1 Introduction
The flexibility of the small firm in response to environmental change has often been 
cited as a competitive advantage of the small firm (see Brock and Evans, 1989; Piore and 
Sabel, 1984; Acs et al., 1990). This thesis sets out to examine whether the flexibility of the 
small firm in responding to environmental change raises the long run prospects of the small 
firm (see Chapter 8). The aim of this Chapter is to develop a theoretical framework for 
examining organisational change in a small firm context. A complete theory for examining 
organisational change in response to environmental change does not exist. Thus, a number 
of related theories are examined (viz. stages of growth models, contingency theory, real 
options logic etc.) which together provide a unified method of examining how small firms 
act in response to change in their environment. By integrating these theories to form a 
theoretical framework to analyse organisational change in a small firms context, this 
Chapter fills a gap in the literature. Further, an interdisciplinary approach is undertaken to 
recognise the value of theories developed in the management literature where similar 
theories may be lacking, or underdeveloped, in the economics literature.
Initially, the concept of survival in the economics literature is defined (Section 2.2). 
A definition of firm survival in a long-run context is sought because the firms examined in 
this study are long-lived. Many of them have survived longer than their founders. Thus, a 
definition of survival, which allows for changes in ownership, is required (see Chandler, 
1977). Over its life, the small firm is likely to have undergone a number of changes. 
Organisational lifecycle theories of the firm (or stages of growth models) and contingency 
theory developed by management theorists are outlined in Section 2.3 to provide some 
insights on the drivers of change in the organisational form of the firm. Stages of growth 
models examine internal organisational change as the firm grows in size (Greiner, 1972; 
Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Scot and Bruce, 1987). Contingency theory, on the other hand, 
was developed to explain differences that were observed in the structure of organisations in 
response to changes in factors such as technology, size, strategy and the environment of the 
firm (Donaldson, 1994). Contingency theory is perhaps a more appropriate model of 
organisational change because it does not assume the synchronous progression through life
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cycle stages as the stages of growth models do. The relative merits of both theories are 
examined below.
In Section 2.4, we trace the development of the notion of flexibility in the 
economics literature. Early writings examined flexibility as a means of coping with 
fluctuations in demand (Stigler, 1939; Hart, 1950; Oi, 1961; Mills, 1984 and Mills and 
Schumann 1985). Later writings extended the scope of the concept to other strategic 
choices such as research and development and the portfolio of assets (see Marschak and 
Nelson, ■1962; Klein, 1984 and Jones and Ostroy, 1984). In this thesis, Carlson’s (1989) 
notion of strategic or long-term flexibility is examined. This is concerned with how the 
firm positions itself with respect to a larger set of potential future positions.
Following an examination of the development of the concept of flexibility in the 
literature, the logic of real options is considered. Real options logic was developed in the 
area of financial economics (Black & Scholes, 1973; Myers 1977) but was extended in the 
management literature as a means of valuing strategic flexibility (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; 
Luerhman 1997, 1998; and McGrath, 1997, 1999). The principles of real options logic are 
adopted to show how a manager can retain flexibility and raise the performance of the firm 
by holding portfolios of options until uncertainties regarding their value are resolved or the 
value of waiting to exercise an option(s) is low. There are clear links between Carlsson’s 
(1989) notion of strategic flexibility and the application of the real options logic in 
decision-making.
Section 2.5 examines barriers to organisational change. This Section examines 
seminal works on the growth profitability trade-off as a limit on the expansion rate of the 
firm (Richardson, 1964; Penrose, 1959). It examines other constraints on the firm’s rate of 
growth such as lack of motivation by management, lack of finance, shortage of skilled 
labour etc. (Barber et al., 1989). Further, it examines constraints which are the result of 
previous choices or paths traveled by the firm. These choices have long lasting effects due 
to irreversibilities and indivisibilities (Antoneilli, 1997). Finally, Section 2.6 concludes this 
Chapter by drawing together the elements of the various theories developed. Together they 
form a useful and insightful theoretical framework for analysing how small firms respond 
to organisational change.
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2.2 Firm Survival
The concept of survival in the literature is explored in this Section to define what is 
meant by the term ‘survivor’ and as a natural consequence what is meant by the term 
‘failure’. This analysis is developed ftirther in Chapter 3 where the determinants of firm 
growth, survival and post entiy performance are examined. The theoretical definition of 
firm survival is examined in this Chapter for clarity at this juncture since varying 
definitions have been proposed in the literature and adopted in empirical studies.
Alchian (1950) defines survivors as those firms, which realise profits. “Those that 
realize positive profits are the survivors; those who suffer losses disappear ”(pl6.) They 
are relatively more efficient than competitors in serving customer needs. He stated, “the 
crucial element is one’s aggregate position relative to actual competitors, not some 
hypothetical perfect competitors” (p.16). Non-survivors are those firms, who suffer losses. 
They disappear or cease to trade and, as such, may be regarded as relatively less efficient in 
serving customers needs. Survival is determined by luck or chance factors (“the result of 
fortuitous circumstances”, p.16) and also by a systematic component, which is their relative 
ability to serve customer needs. This view of survival encapsulates the economist’s basic 
assumption that in the long run, firms which are loss-makers will exit the industry, whereas 
profit makers will continue in business. In the short run, however, those loss-makers which 
are able to cover variable costs, and make a contribution to fixed costs, may also survive.
The realisation of positive profits, as seen above, is the main driver of the decision of 
the firm to continue, or to cease, trading. If firms are earning non-negative profits over the 
long run they will continue to operate. According to Scherer and Ross (1990), “over the 
long pull, there is one simple criterion for a business enterprise: profits must be 
nonnegative ... failure to satisfy this criterion means ultimately that a firm will disappear” 
(p.48). This non-negative level of profit corresponds to Schumpeter’s (1939) idea of 
normal business.
"A firm has a normal year if it has succeeded in earning enough to cover 
expenditure, depreciation, contractual interest on its debt plus remuneration 
of the owners’ services and capital as is sufficient and not more than 
sufficient to induce them to go on without ever increasing or decreasing 
their investment. ” (p. 4)
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The general business situation is called normal if it allows all firms, not working under 
advantages or disadvantages peculiar to them, to earn about enough to cover its material, 
labour and capital costs. If they fail to earn a normal level of income under satisfactory 
conditions they will cease to trade.
Penrose (1959) in defining continuity in the history of the firm stated that a firm may 
change location, products, management, owners and legal form, yet can still be considered 
the same firm. She stated,
“In practice a firm may change its managing personnel and its owners may 
change, the products may change, its geographical location may change, its 
legal form may change and still in the ordinary course of events we would 
consider it to be the same firm and could write the story of its life" (p.22)
According to Penrose’s (1959) definition, a firm may be taken over by new ownership, or 
experience changes in management, yet continue to be the same firm, but may be unable to 
survive a merger. She states that the firm “cannot survive the dispersal of its assets and 
personnel nor complete absorptions in an entirely different administrative framework” 
(p.23). According to Penrose (1959), a merger may be classed as an expansion of the 
acquiring firm or the merger may be classed as leading to a new firm, depending on how 
the new administrative framework has been reorganised.
The definition of survival in the context of diversification and mergers is discussed 
by Kay (1997). He uses Chandler’s (1977) definition to explain the survival of the firm, 
where survival is treated as to mean non-extinction; the firm “has not been liquidated, 
dissolved or discontinued” (Chandler, 1977, p.371). By this definition survival 
encompasses a firm merging with, or being acquired by, another firm. Chandler (1977) 
justifies this on three grounds: (1) that a merger or acquisition means that the firm has value 
as a going concern; (2) the perpetuation of existing personnel, hierarchies and the activities 
of the firm; and (3) hostile takeover bids do not lead to the demise of the firm who is the 
object of these bids - such firms are not necessarily poor performers. If survival is taken to 
mean continuity of existence, therefore, the merger preserves continuity and constitutes a 
survival strategy. The second condition above may be infringed in the case of a trade-sale 
of a small firm, as the owner-manger may no longer be an employee of the firm. However,
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this is a little infringement as it is most likely that the activities of the firm will be 
perpetuated. Firm death therefore constitutes the discontinued existence of the small firm.
Chandler’s definition of what constitutes a survivor is slightly broader than Penrose’s 
definition. Once a firm is realising positive profits, and represents a going concern, it will 
be classed in this study as a survivor. Thus, both mergers and trade-sales are included in 
the definition of survival. Consequently, the survival of the firm, and the choice of the 
owner-managers, are divorced. This is at odds with theories of entrepreneurship which link 
firm entry and exit to the owner-managers decision to set up, or dissolve, a firm based on 
changes in the relative prices of three states employment, unemployment and self 
employment (see Holmes and Schmitz, 1990). A study of long-lived small firms requires a 
broader definition of firm survival than studies of new firm entry and exit. Otherwise, 
constraints are placed on the long run survival of the firm to that of the survival of the 
owner. Firms can survive longer than their owners in the long run, yet their activities are 
perpetuated and they continue to serve customer demand. Thus, the firm can undergo a 
number of organisational changes such as changes in ownership, changes in products, 
changes in location etc. and still survive. The next section looks at theories of 
organisational change.
2.3 Organisational Change
The aim of this Section is to examine the determinants of organisational change 
within the firm. Theories of entrepreneurship examined in Chapter 1 alluded to the 
entrepreneur as the main agent of change within the economy whether from a 
Schumpeterian perspective or an Austrian perspective. This Section relies on 
organisational lifecycle theories of the firm (or stages of growth models) and contingency 
theory, developed by management theorists, to provide some insights into the drivers of 
change in the organisational form of the firm. Marshall (1890), according to Loabsy 
(1990), emphasised that firms go through a lifecycle (birth, growth and dissolution). 
Managerial theorists such as Greiner (1972) and Churchill and Lewis (1983) developed 
stages of growth models or lifecycle models of the firm to illustrate internal organisational
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change as the firm grows in size. Contingency theory was developed to explain differences 
that were observed in the structure of organisations. The appropriate form of organisation 
was contingent on, for instance, the technology, size, strategy and environment of the firm 
(Donaldson, 1994). A firm will change over the course of its life in response to changes in 
these contingency factors, rather than following any development pattern such as proposed 
by lifecycle theories. Initially, this Section will outline seminal works, and more recent 
papers on stages of growth models and contingency theory, before forming some 
conclusions on the determinants of organisational change.
2.3.1 Stages of Growth Models
Stages of growth models were developed by managerial theorists to describe the 
developmental sequence (or organisational lifecycle) of a new small firm (see Greiner, 
1972; Churchill and Lewis, 1983; and Scott and Bruce, 1987). These models examine 
internal changes that will occur over the lifecycle as the firm grows in size. Such models 
can be used prescriptively by owners of businesses to assess the stage at which their 
companies are operating and to use these frameworks to cope better with both existing, and 
anticipated problems. These models are based on the clinical experience of their 
developers, the extant literature and their empirical research. Churchill and Lewis’s (1983) 
and Greiner’s (1972) models are the two best-known models and will be discussed below. 
It should be noted that Scott and Bruce (1987) develop this literature further with a five- 
stage model embodying features of Churchill and Lewis (1983) and Greiner (1972), in 
which transition from one stage to another is also accompanied by crisis, but limits of space 
preclude its discussion here.
In stages of growth models, the firm is visualised as passing through a sequence of 
growth stages as it grows in size. Churchill and Lewis (1983) proposed a fairly typical five- 
stage growth model. They labeled the stages existence, survival, success, takeoff and 
maturity. Each stage is characterised by an index of size, diversity and complexity and is 
described by five management factors: managerial style, organisation structure, extent of 
formal systems, major strategic goals and the owner’s involvement in the business. In the 
existence stage, the firm tries to stay alive by attempting to gain customers for the products 
of the firm. Within a simple organisational structure, the owner-manager performs most
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tasks, from supervising employees, to minimal levels of planning. The owner provides 
most of the capital with the support of relatives and friends. In the survival stage, the 
emphasis shifts from merely trying to stay alive, to trying to breakeven, so as to raise 
cashflow, to stay in business, and to finance growth. In this context, the owner-manager is 
still heavily involved in the business. Few formal systems are implemented. Firms can 
stay at this stage for a long time, earning just marginal returns until the firm closes, 
following the retirement of the owner-manager. In the success stage, the owner-manager 
must choose between ‘growing on’ the business and keeping the company stable and 
profitable, so that the owner-manager can take up other pursuits (e.g. starting other 
companies). If the firm chooses the latter, the firm can stay in business as long as 
environmental changes do not destroy its market niche. Such a firm is characterised by: the 
recruitment and development of functional management and systems; healthy cashflow; 
and the gradual withdrawal of the owner-manager from the business. Alternatively, the 
owner-manager can actively choose to expand the business. In this case, he installs 
operational and strategic planning systems, and gathers the financial resources to ‘grow’ the 
business. In the take off stage, the firm must improve the managerial effectiveness of the 
firm by delegating responsibility to subordinates, and by generating sufficient cash to 
finance growth. This is a ‘pivotal’ time in the life of the firm, where the firm can grow into 
a substantial business or, if not, it can be sold at a profit. Any weaknesses of the owner- 
manager are tested to the limit in this stage. To succeed, the owner-manager must delegate 
a significant number of tasks to competent management. The operational and planning 
systems are refined and the firm becomes partly divisonalised. The founder is reasonably 
separate from the business and may be replaced either voluntarily or involuntarily by the 
company’s investors or creditors. In the fifth and final stage, the firm has succeeded in 
becoming a force to the reckoned with in the market. It has the advantages of financial 
resources, managerial talent and size. All management, strategic planning and operational 
systems are extensive and refined. It is a challenge of entrepreneurship to maintain the 
flexibility and spirit of a small entrepreneurial firm, or to risk ossification [“lack of 
innovative decision-making and avoidance of risks'” Churchill and Lewis, (1983), p.40].
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Growth is the main driver of internal change. Few references are made to the 
influence of the environment on internal change in this model. Only in stage III (‘success’) 
the success of the strategy to keep the firm profitable rather than expand hinges on 
environmental change not destroying its market niche. Flexibility is also an important 
capability of the firm in stage V (‘maturity’). Experience of each stage is important. 
Whilst a franchisee may skip the existence and the survival stage, failing to experience 
these stages may affect their success in growing through managing multiple units. The 
stages in this model are not inevitable. Firms may decide not to move onto a successive 
stage (like in stage III ‘success’) or fail to move on (like in stage II ‘survival’). These 
interpretations improve on Greiner’s (1972) model, where there is a certain inevitability 
about moving through successive phases of growth, as the firm ages and grows in size.
Greiner (1972) builds a model of organisation development based on five key 
dimensions: age of organisation; size of organization; stages of evolution; stages of 
revolution; and growth rate of the industry. Greiner (1972) distinguishes between 
evolutionary and revolutionary periods. Evolutionary periods are characterised by “long 
periods of growth where no major upheaval occurs in the organisation practices” whereas 
revolutionary periods are characterised by “periods of substantial turmoil in organisation 
life” (p.38). The speed at which the organisation experiences periods of evolution and 
revolution depends on the speed at which the firm’s industry environment is growing. 
Greiner maintains that firms move through five phases of growth: creativity, direction, 
delegation, coordination and collaboration. According to Greiner (1972), each stage, other 
than the first, is both the effect of the previous phase, and a cause of the next phase. Signs 
of impending crisis herald all phases. The creative phase ends with a crisis of leadership; 
the direction phase with a crisis of autonomy; a crisis of control follows the delegation 
phase; and a crisis of red tape follows the phase of coordination. In each of these phases “a 
major solution in one time period becomes a major problem at a latter date” (p.40). Each 
management problem must be resolved before growth can continue. However, Greiner 
argues that “evolution is not an automatic affair, it is a contest for survival”^ Firms
must move forward introducing new solutions, they cannot move backwards. He argues 
that since each phase is strongly influenced by the previous one, management with an
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understanding of the firm’s history can anticipate and prepare for these developmental 
crises and turn these into opportunities for growth. Hall (1995) notes that Greiner’s (1972) 
model is really about changes in response to growth and that most of the crises Greiner 
describes would not occur if the company had maintained stable sales and grown older.
Hall (1995), in appraising the relevance of lifecycle models of organisations such as 
those proposed by Greiner (1972) and Churchill and Lewis (1983), stated that (a) only the 
early stages of these lifecycle models are of relevance to small firms; (b) other influences 
than growth such as age, internal politics or factors external, but not reflected in their 
growth rates, may be contributing influences of organisational change; and (c) such models 
make too broad generalisations concerning the combinations of factors that will be found 
together in firms experiencing the same stage of development. The synchronous 
progression of life stages (and associated development formalisation), and 
institutionalisation of systems and policies that is portrayed in stages of growth models, 
seems to be a more conspicuous phenomenon among the fast growth, often high tech, or 
more glamorous firms (Eggers et al., 1994; Kazanjian, 1988a, b) than more modest growth 
service firms (e.g. retailers), the modal type of business in this study.
O’Farrell and Hitchens (1988) criticise stages theories of growth from many 
perspectives. First, they argue that they seem little more than “heuristic classification 
schemes’'' rather than “conceptualizations of the processes underlying growth” (p.1371). 
Second, they contend that empirical evidence that firms often stay the same size for a 
number of years is inconsistent with the view that the small business will either grow and 
pass through all stages, or tail in the attempt. Third, the model fails to capture the early 
stages in the origin and growth of the company. Fourth, it is unclear whether the passage of 
a firm through a sequence of growth stages is a necessary progression or whether the firm 
under certain conditions could skip a stage. Fifth, the studies typically only rely on one 
size measure (i.e. company sales) rather than the wide number that are available. Sixth, 
most stage growth models are ‘aspatial’. Seventh they hold that the body of literature is 
discursive and wisdom based. Finally, they state that there is a lack of empirical testing of 
the corporate lifecycle or stages of growth models which is often presented as having an 
assumed validity.
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While Miller and Freisen (1982, 1984) found some support for organisational 
lifecycles, Drazin and Kazanjian (1990), Kazanjian (1988a, b), Birley and Westhead (1990) 
and Dodge et al. (1994) only found limited support. Rather than examining the 
applicability of each stage of these models, the underlying theme is that as the firm grows 
in size, it feces new challenges or crisis, which need to be overcome by internal changes to 
manage this growth. Models proposed by Churchill and Lewis (1983) and Greiner (1972) 
recognise that firms experience pivotal points or periods of transition, whether as a result of 
growth in size, or otherwise. Contingency theory described in the next section is a theory 
of organisational change, which does not rely on the synchronous progression through life 
stages.
2.3.2 Contingency Theory
Contingency theory, with its foundations in management theoiy, originated in the 
writings of Bums and Stalker (1961) and Woodward (1965). It was developed to explain 
differences which were observed in the structure of organisations. Contingency theory 
holds that the most effective organisational structure would vary according to the situation 
of the organisation (see Donaldson, 1994 p.xi). The organisation reacts in predictable ways 
to the conditions which surround them, adjusting their purpose and shape to meet market 
and other environmental characteristics (see Miles and Snow, 1978). A number of these 
conditions have been identified and are called contingency factors. The structure of the 
organisation is contingent, or dependent upon the contingency factor or factors. Prominent 
contingency factors in the literature, according to Donaldson (1994), include task 
uncertainty, size, decline, strategy and environment. Figure 2.1 below presents an 
illustration of a basic contingency framework, adapted from Andersen and Lanen (1999). It 
shows, in a brief way, how contingencies or ‘precipitating influences’ within the firm (e.g. 
technology, organisational culture) and in its environment (e.g. competition and 
environmental uncertainty) affect the firm’s strategy, organisational structure and 
performance.
Early studies examined features of task uncertainty. Bums and Stalker (1961) 
interviewed key people in 20 industrial firms in the UK operating across a number of 
sectors, ranging from electronics producers, to a rayon manufacturer and a large
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engineering firm. They examined how the pattern of management practices varied with the 
characteristics of the firm’s external environment. Burns and Stalker (1961) identified a 
continuum of organisational forms, ranging from mechanistic to organic, in which the 
appropriate organisational form varied with the level of environmental uncertainty. The 
mechanistic form was more appropriate for stable environments and was characterised by 
defined hierarchy, set tasks and functional roles. In the organic form, more flexible forms 
of organisation were required to deal with changing environment (e.g. tasks were redefined 
continually, communications between personnel run laterally as well as vertically, and 
omniscience could no longer be imputed to the head of the firm).
Figure 2.1: A Basic Contingency Framework
Exogenous Other Factors
Woodward (1965), in the study of manufacturing firms from South Essex (greater 
than 100 employees), detected a relationship between technology and the structure of 
successful organisations. Different technologies, according to Woodward (1965), imposed 
different demands on organisations and on individuals. These demands may only be met 
by different organisational structures. Woodward developed a technological scale, which 
grouped firms according to their techniques of production and the complexity of their 
production systems. This scale ranged from unit or small batch (e.g. special purpose 
electronic equipment and custom tailored clothing), through to large batch or mass
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production (e.g. standardised electrical components, standard gasoline engines), to 
continuous process production (e.g. chemicals and oil refining). The successful firms in 
each of these three broad groupings were found to follow similar management practices. 
She concluded that a mass production technology requires a highly functionalised structure 
and a large administrative component, with a wide span of control, whereas a unit 
technology is usually accompanied by a flexible organisation structure that has a small 
administrative component, and a moderately broad span of supervising control.
Subsequently, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) gave precision and refinement to the 
general idea that certain organisations need to be more organic and flexible than others, 
suggesting that the degree of flexibility required varies from one organisational sub-unit 
(e.g. sales, research and production) to another. They studied high- and low performance 
organisations in the standardized-container industry, the food industry and the plastics 
industry, which were respectively experiencing low, moderate and high rates of growth, 
technical change and market change. They found that successful firms in uncertain 
environments (e.g. the plastic’s industry) required an organic organisational form (with 
high differentiation and more elaborate integrative mechanisms to coordinate subunit 
activities), and success in more stable environments (e.g. the container industry) required 
more mechanistic forms (less differentiation and less elaborate integrative mechanisms). 
The subsystems were differentiated from each other in terms of subsystem formal 
structures, the member’s goal orientation, the member’s time orientation (long or short term 
view) and member’s interpersonal orientation.
While the above studies dealt with task uncertainty, Chandler (1962) illustrated 
through comparative analysis of case histories of pioneering firms, like DuPont, General 
Motors, Standard Oil (New Jersey) and Sears Roebuck, that organisational structure 
follows from, and is guided by, strategic decisions. New strategic choices arose from 
environmental changes in population, income and technologies. Different kinds of 
organisation were seen as appropriate for different types of circumstances. For example, 
Chandler (1962) found that as companies move from being undiversified to being 
diversified in their product range, they move from being organized along functional lines to 
the product divisional form. He shows that organisations may delay adoption of structural
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change until poor performance prompts structural adaptation, Donaldson (1987) 
formalises this theory of mal-adaptation in his SARFIT (Structural Adjustment to Regain 
Fit) model where he describes a cycle of change in strategy (or another contingency factor) 
leading to ‘mismatch’ or ‘misfit’ and low performance, which is then rectified by structural 
adjustment to achieve a closer fit between the contingency factor and structure.
Miller (1987), in reviewing a number of studies on the contingency of size, shows 
that the ‘size-bureaucratization relationship’ holds across a variety of organisations and 
countries. The larger the size of an organisation, in terms of number employees, the more 
likely it was to adopt a bureaucratic structure. Thompson (1967) held that the environment 
shapes the firm’s organisational structure. The more variable and unpredictable the task 
environment, the more flexible the organisational structure must be. Donaldson (1994) 
provides examples of mechanisms by which a firm can influence its environment, such as 
through merging with another organisation or through selective appointment of outside 
members to the board of directors of the organisation. The scope of the contingency theory 
continues to be expanded, for example, to management accounting systems and practices 
(Mitchell et al., 2000; Andersen and Lanen, 1999; Hayes, 1977; Gordon and Miller, 1976), 
to entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996), to strategic planning and 
organisational learning (Kloot, 1997), to reward systems (Boyd and Salamin, 2001) and 
export venture creation (Ilbeh, 2003).
The earlier studies were static, in that they overemphasised reactive adaptation to 
contingencies, and ignored the opportunity firms have to influence their environment. It 
was Child (1972) who explicitly argued for a less rigid view of the interaction between 
organisations and their environment. Child (1972) argued that individuals have the power 
to reshape their environment. He called for a strategic choice approach to organisation- 
environment relations. Volberda (1998) outlines a dynamic contingency theory, relaxing 
the unrealistic assumption that agents are incapable of shaping their environment. This 
theory of dynamic contingency is characterized as one that (1) views managerial choice or 
strategic choice as the primary link between organisation and environment, (2) focuses on 
management’s ability to create, learn about and manage an organisations environment and 
(3) encompasses multiple ways in which organisations interact with their environment
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through a process of mutual adaptation between the organisation and its environmental 
domain. According to Volberda (1998), from this perspective, flexibility does not result in 
suboptimal firm resources, thus leaving the firm vulnerable to competitors with cost focus 
or differentiation focus strategies. Rather, it stabilises firm performance and increases the 
probability of firm survival when the environment is changing and uncertain.
Support has been found for contingency theory in a small firms context. Reid and 
Smith (2000b) found evidence of the applicability of contingency theory for a body of 
small firms data. They found evidence that the timing of contingencies such as a cashflow 
crisis, funding shortage and innovation correspond to the timing of information system 
development such as cost management and computer applications. They found evidence 
from cluster analysis of three types of firm described, as ‘adaptive’, ‘running blind’ and 
‘stagnant’, which are characterised by their decision making style, the uncertainty of their 
environment and organisational structure. For example, the adaptive firm functions in a 
dynamic environment where decision-making is correspondingly dynamic and its 
organisational structure is decentralized. At the other end of the continuum, the stagnant 
firm operates in a stable environment, its decision making style is conservative, and its 
organisational structure is strongly centralized. They also demonstrate that organisational 
development, as proxied by a weighted headcount measure, can be explained by a range of 
contingent variables (e.g. based on production systems, business strategy and market 
environment).
2.3.3 Conclusions
The lifecycle models and contingency theory describe internal change in the 
organisational form of the firm. In the lifecycle models, this is driven by firm growth in 
size. The firm reaches a crisis point or a pivotal point in its growth cycle, which 
precipitates changes in the how the firm is organized. Examples include more formal 
operational and planning systems or the delegation of tasks, so that the firm can grow or 
progress to the next stage. These pivotal or crisis points are periods of major upheaval or 
transition in the life of the firm. Empirical evidence has called into question the relevance 
of the sequential development pattern proposed by stages of growth models, but has not
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questioned the feet that firms experience periods of internal change or transition. In these 
lifecycle models, growth is the chief precipitator of organisational change.
Size is also an important precipitator of internal change in contingency theory, but it 
is not the only precipitator. Other precipitators include the environment, task uncertainty, 
strategy etc. Static contingency theory views the firm as reactive to changes in these 
contingency factors rather than dynamic contingency theory where the organisation has the 
ability to shape its environment or these contingency factors. The main point of this body 
of knowledge is that the most appropriate organisational form for the firm is circumstantial 
or contingent. Contingency theory is a broader theory of internal change than stages of 
growth theories and thus it is more applicable to examining organisational change within 
the small firm. It has also been shown to have empirical relevance in the context of small 
firms.
Given the arguments in the literature examined thus far, it is assumed in this study 
that internal organisational change takes place at pivotal or crisis points in the firm’s 
lifecycle. However, the synchronous progression through lifecycle stages is not given 
much weight. The emphasis is placed on a contingency theory of organisational change, 
where the organisational form of the firm is contingent on its environment, its strategy, its 
size etc. The organisational form changes in response to changes in contingency factors, or 
precipitators of change, so that there is a closer fit between the organisational form and its 
environment. If change in a precipitator lags behind change in the organisational form, the 
risk of poor performance causes the firm to adapt.
A more flexible or organic organisational form is required if the firm is operating in 
an uncertain environment or if its production technology is unit batch or bespoke. The 
technology of small (as opposed to large) firms is more likely to be characterised by unit 
batch rather than mass production. According to the findings of contingency theorists, a 
more flexible or organic organisational form seems to be most appropriate for the small 
2 firm operating in such uncertain environments. The next Section examines the
development of the concept of flexibility and its value in organisational decision-making.
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2.4 Flexibility
This Section examines the development of the concept of flexibility in the 
economics literature and identifies clear links between aspects of firm flexibility and real 
options reasoning. Carlsson (1989), in his survey of the literature, breaks it down into two 
branches of thought. The first, and possibly the largest, examines aspects of flexibility 
which concern the ability of firms to cope with fluctuations in demand for their output 
(Stigler, 1939; Hart, 1950; Oi, 1961; Mills, 1984 and Mills and Schumann 1985, Das et al., 
1993; Zimmermann, 1995). The second, extends the applicability of the concept of 
flexibility to other strategic choices (e.g. choice of research and development, plant and 
portfolio of assets) that influence the cost moving from one position to a larger set of 
potential future positions (see Marschak and Nelson, 1962; Klein, 1984 and Jones and 
Ostroy, 1984). It is the later notion of flexibility which visibly relates to real options 
reasoning (Bowman and Huny, 1993; Luehrman, 1997, 1998; McGrath, 1997, 1999). 
Following an examination of the development of the concept of flexibility in the literature, 
the development of the logic of real options is examined as a means of valuing strategic or 
long-term flexibility (see Carlsson ,1989).
2.4.1 Concept of Flexibility
Initially, the notion of flexibility as a means of coping with fluctuations in demand 
for output is examined before wider conceptualisations are outlined. Stigler (1939) 
introduced the notion of flexibility into the literature. He defined flexibility as those 
attributes of a production technology which accommodate to greater output variability. He 
stated, "Adaptability can ..be built into a plant, and entrepreneurs in trades where 
fluctuations are frequent and great will endeavor to secure flexibility in their operations" 
(p. 310). According to Stigler (1939), a firm’s choice of cost structure determines its level 
of flexibility. The shape of the cost curve determines how responsive output decisions are 
to price changes. Therefore, Stigler (1939) argued that flexibility is greater with flat- 
bottomed average cost curves, and flat or gently inclined marginal cost curves, in the 
context of U-shaped cost curves. However, Stigler (1939) holds that flexibility is not a free 
good, it comes at the expense of higher unit costs: "A plant certain to operate at X units per 
week will surely have lower costs at that output than will a plant designed to be passably
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efficient from X/2 to 2X units per week" (Stigler, 1939, p. 311). Mills (1984) examined this 
cost tradeoff between flexibility and static efficiency where the choice of flexibility in the 
cost curve is endogenous. He demonstrated that firms laced with price variability in their 
market would prefer greater flexibility, even at the expense of lower static efficiency. 
Conversely, with little or no price variability in a market, he argued that the firm would opt 
for a cost curve that is less flexible and allows more static efficiency.
Central to Stigler’s notion of flexibility is the idea that expected profit will increase 
with greater flexibility in the presence of demand uncertainty. Oi (1961) illustrated that 
expected profits are greater with higher variability of prices in a single product firm with 
increasing marginal costs. Further, Aiginger and Weiss (1998) found, for a sample of US 
4-digit manufacturing industries, that flexibility of labour demand has a positive influence 
on price cost margins suggesting that it pays to be flexible. Thus, these findings suggest 
that the more flexible a firm is, the higher its expected performance. The marginal gain is 
greater the higher is environmental uncertainty (Hart, 1950). Greater flexibility is preferred 
to less flexibility, when the environment is uncertain. The latter is likely to be relevant to 
small entrepreneurial firms.
Mills and Schumann (1985) developed a model where the existence of available
technologies affords a tradeoff between static efficiency and flexibility so that in market
environments with fluctuating demand it is possible for firms with higher minimum
average cost to survive if they were sufficiently flexible. Technologically diverse firms are
able to compete with each other by relying on offsetting cost advantages as a result of this
tradeoff. This technological diversity was associated with smaller sized firms because they
use variable factors of production more rigorously than large firms. Larger firms adopted
more static technologies to avail themselves of economies of scale. Therefore, Mills and
Schumann (1985), allowing for larger diversity between rivals, associated the notion of
greater flexibility with smaller, rather than larger firms. He stated,
"small firms are able to compete successfully with large firm, more static 
efficient producers by absorbing a disproportionate share of industrywide 
output fluctuations. This is possible because small firms use production 
technologies that are more flexible than those chosen by large firms. Large 
rivals own the comparative advantage of lower minimum average costs due 
largely to scale economies, while small competitors have an offsetting
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advantage in their superior responsiveness to cyclical or random swings in 
demand' (p.766)
This source of flexibility enables small firms to thrive in uncertain environments. Mills and 
Schumann (1985) showed empirically that there existed an inverse relationship between 
flexibility and firm size using a measure of sales variability and employment variability 
over time to approximate flexibility1. More recent empirical applications by Das et al. 
(1993) and Zimmermann (1995) also show that small firms are more flexible than larger 
rivals.
The scope of the notion of flexibility was widened to cover other choices sets than 
strategies to cope with fluctuations in demand. An early study by Marschak and Nelson 
(1962) extended the applicability of flexibility beyond the choice of production technology 
to all sources of uncertainty. They developed three alternative definitions for flexibility. 
The first definition examined the size of the choice set of the firm. They held that "a highly 
flexible initial action preserves many choices" (p. 45). In other words, a more flexible 
initial action enables more choices for action in fiiture periods. The second definition 
focused on marginal cost. According to Marschak and Nelson (1962), an initial action is 
more flexible if it is less costly for a flexible plant to move toward another position in the 
future. The final definition emphasised marginal expected profit. It argues that an initial 
action is more flexible if a more flexible plant generates more profits or smaller losses in 
moving to the next position. The first definition should not contradict the second and third 
definitions. Thus, initial actions should be chosen such that they open up more fiiture 
choices in a cost effective and revenue maximising manner. Marschak and Nelson (1962) 
also argue that more flexible initial actions should be chosen if there is greater uncertainty, 
as these will yield higher expected profit. Their approach anticipates the real options 
approach, as they focus on flexibility as that “characteristic of early decisions in a 
sequential chain which permits the decision-maker to adjust and take advantage of the 
information he receives as time elapses” (p.56-57). *
’ This was taken as the standard error of regressions adjusted for serial correlation where the natural logarithm 
of annual sales (or employment) from 1970 to 1980 for a sample of 856 manufacturing firms was regressed 
onto a constant and a linear time trend. See Mills and Schumann (1985).
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Jones and Ostroy (1984), building on Marschak and Nelson’s concept of flexibility, 
held that "One position is more flexible than another if it leaves available a larger set of 
future options at any given cost level” (p. 13). They also argued that, in the face of greater 
uncertainty, a firm will choose an option which offers greater flexibility “the more variable 
the decision maker's beliefs the more flexible is the position he -will choose." (p.13). They 
claimed that this is particularly the case when: (1) there will be opportunities to act after 
further information is received; and (2) when current choices influence either the 
attractiveness, or availability, of future options. This logic is clearly in line with real 
options reasoning where firms retain flexibility in their decision-making, holding real 
options until uncertainties regarding their value are resolved.
Klein (1984) demonstrated that there are strong links between risk and uncertainty 
and two types of flexibility. Type I flexibility was risk related. In this case, firms 
positioned themselves to cope with foreseeable events. For example flexibility built into the 
production processes enables production lines to produce a number of types of products in 
response to fluctuations in demand. Type II flexibility is related to uncertainty. It concerns 
the ability to make good use of newly disclosed opportunities such as new product ideas. 
Newly disclosed opportunities are not predictable. Thus, entrepreneurs are required to be 
alert to new ideas and feedback from existing processes. Klein (1984) argues that a firm 
which is flexible according to Type I flexibility, is unlikely to be flexible according to Type 
II flexibility. A firm which is an efficient producer of a given set of products is likely to be 
slow to respond to fundamental product change.
Carlsson (1989) operationlised the concept of flexibility based on in-depth
interviews with plant managers of 13 manufacturers in the metalworking industry in the
U.S. He questioned them on three typologies of flexibility namely, operational (short
term), tactical (medium term) and strategic (long term) to bridge the gap between abstract
theories and empirical fact. He defined these three types of flexibility as follows:
"A company which is flexible in an operational sense is one which has the 
inbuilt procedures which permit a high degree of variation in sequencing
and scheduling, etc..... [where as] tactical flexibility is built into the
technology, i.e. the organization and production equipment of the firm and 
enables it to deal e.g. with changes in the rate of production or in product 
mix over the course of the business cycle, as well as moderate changes in
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design....[and strategic flexibility] reflects how the firm positions itself with
respect to a menu of choices for the future." (Carlsson 1989, p-186-187)
A firm is operationally flexible if in the short run the firm has the ability to alter daily 
routines (e.g, scheduling, sequencing, processing etc.). Tactical flexibility is inherent in the 
production facility and technology. A firm is flexible in a tactical sense, if the production 
technology is designed so that it enables the firm to respond to changes in demand and 
moderate changes in product design. The entrepreneur chooses a production technology 
based on his expectations about variation in fiiture demand for products, the prices of 
inputs, capacity requirements and the actions of competitors etc. Strategic flexibility 
reflects how the firm situates itself to avail of fiiture opportunities, challenges, new game 
plans or real options. It includes the ability to introduce new products quickly and cheaply, 
to accommodate basic design changes and a willingness to accept change and risk by 
employees.
There is not an exact correspondence between Carlsson’s (1989) three typologies of 
flexibility and other definitions in the literature. Carlsson’s outline of tactical flexibility is 
similar to Stigler’s (1939) notion of flexibility and other conceptualisations on which this 
notion was based, see Hart, (1950), Oi (1961), Mills (1984) and Mills and Schumann 
(1985). Operational and tactical flexibility are mainly designed to insure against 
foreseeable events and therefore are more similar to Klein’s (1984) type I flexibility. 
Strategic flexibility hedges against unforeseeable events and thus, most likely corresponds 
to Klein’s type II flexibility. One way to hedge against unforeseeable events is to hold a 
portfolio of real options (McGrath, 1999).
This thesis chiefly examines the degree of the strategic flexibility of the small firm 
rather than tactical and operational flexibility because the organisational changes examined 
are strategic in nature rather related to the production technology of the firm or the daily 
routines of the firm (see Subsection 4.3.3). In examining flexibility in the theoiy of the 
firm, Carlsson (1989) argued that flexibility is not necessarily inherent in small firms. 
Rather, it arises from the ability of small firms to immobilise variable factors of production 
to mount a quick response to detected changes in their environment because of the
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existence of few organisational barriers to change in small firms. Relevant to Carlsson’s 
perspective on strategic flexibility is Ghemawat’s (1991) view on the source of firm 
flexibility. Ghemawat (1991) claims that flexibility arises from the expected added value, 
which the firm can generate from revising its strategy. It does so by being equipped to 
adopt alternative courses of action, as the outcomes of uncertain events unfold. Although 
Ghemawat (1991) developed the idea in a corporate context, it is also entirely applicable to 
the small firms’ case. Thus, it is as true for small firms, as for large firms, that the value 
added created by flexibility arises in some sense from ‘the degree of preparedness’. 
Specifically, this refers to the ability of the firm to commit the necessaiy resources to 
pursuing different courses of action. Flexibility, in this sense, arises not from the 
optimisation of strategy, but rather from the selection of strategies that can be adapted to a 
range of critical outcomes (i.e. holding a portfolio of real options) and from staging 
commitments to these strategies. The logic of real options underlies many recent 
conceptualisations of the notion of flexibility, particularly notions of strategic flexibility. 
The next Sub-section discusses how the logic of real options when applied in decision 
making can raise the strategic flexibility of the firm.
2.4.2 Logic of Real Options
With its micro foundations in financial economics (Black & Scholes, 1973; Myers 
1977; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Brealey & Myers, 1996), real options theory was developed 
in the management literature as a means of valuing strategic flexibility (Bowman & Hurry, 
1993; Luerhman 1997, 1998; and McGrath, 1997, 1999). The latter argue that firms can 
retain flexibility in their decision-making, particularly in the face of uncertainty, by viewing 
decisions through a real options lens. In this Sub-section, the logic of real options is used 
to explain how an owner-manager may raise the performance of the firm by adopting such 
an approach to decision making.
Options contracts were developed in order for individuals to retain the right to 
future investment choices, without being obliged to invest immediately, when uncertainties 
exist regarding the fiiture value of assets (Cox and Rubinstein, 1985). An option is a right, 
but not an obligation, to buy or sell a specified asset at a pre-specified price (or the exercise 
price) on a specified date (Brealey and Myers, 1996). Call options (or options to buy) and
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puts options (or options to sell) are familiar examples of contracts that allow investors to 
hold a choice open, at the risk of losing only the small investment made to purchase the 
option. The ability to delay the decision about whether to buy, or not to buy, an asset until 
the maturity date of the option introduces flexibility into this financial instrument. By the 
time the maturity date arrives, uncertainties regarding the true value of the asset may be 
resolved. In any case, increased volatility of the underlying asset increases the value of the 
option, because the potential gains are greater while the costs to access them remain the 
same. The upside becomes greater, but the potential losses become no worse (Fama & 
Miller, 1972).
In early writings, Black and Scholes (1973) developed stock option valuation 
formulas, while Myers (1977), recognising the similarity of stock options and 
organisational resource investments, extended the valuation process to include investments 
in organisational resources. The latter form of option was referred to as a real option, 
because typically it involved investments in real strategic assets. It provides the firm with 
the same kind of flexibility that a stock option provides someone investing in stock. The 
owners of real options have the right, but not the obligation, to expand or contract their 
investment in a real asset at some future date. Examples include a manufacturing plant, a 
distribution centre, or a firm's reputation. All of these assets are real but none are traded in 
liquid markets. This makes it difficult to calculate the variance in the price of the 
underlying asset. Furthermore unlike financial options, real options do not usually have 
prespecified exercise prices and maturity dates. Rather the exercise price and maturity date 
are factors that are at least partly under control of the firm that is creating the real option. 
Traditional stock valuation formulas relied on assumptions that the underlying asset on 
which the option is written must be priced, this price must be known and the asset must be 
continuously tradable (Black & Scholes, 1973). These assumptions do not hold in the case 
of real options. The price of a real option is not known because it is not continuously 
tradable. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) illustrate how the value of a real option can be
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approximated by finding a twinned traded asset which has the same risk profile as the 
project and using the implied cost of capital.2
Real options theory was developed to explain how the value of a project, or new 
investment, could be augmented by valuing flexibility in the entrepreneurial decision­
making process (Luerhman 1997, 1998). Flexibility, by allowing the firm to add value by 
building on good fortune or mitigating bad, increases the value of a project. Bowman and 
Hurry (1993) use an options approach to show how strategies emerge from an 
organisation’s resources and unfold over time in different ways. According to Bowman 
and Hurry (1993), “options came into existence when existing resources and capabilities 
allow preferential access to future opportunities” (p.762). They describe an incremental 
choice process where the firm first recognises the existence of a shadow option through 
retrospective sense making and then adopts a ‘wait and see’ policy until the option 
materializes [see Figure 2.2 reproduced from Bowman and Hurry (1993) p.764]. During 
this ‘wait and see’ period any uncertainties are hopefully resolved. The firm also uses the 
time to develop the skills to exploit the option. This may involve small investments. On 
maturation of the option, the firm makes a much larger investment to fully activate the 
option. Once the option is struck, new options for future exercise arise. Bowman and 
Hurry (1993) hold that the sequential striking of a chain of options forms a strategy, as each 
option which is exercised provides preferential access to the next option in the chain. They 
categorise these options into incremental options and flexibility options. Incremental 
options are calls (options to invest) and puts (options to abandon). Flexibility options 
represent choices to switch investment streams or change strategy. This incremental choice 
process describes a pattern of staged investment to a strategy where firms minimise 
downside risk by 1) waiting until a real option is ‘in the money’ (NPV>0) to exercise the
2 According to Luerhman (1997) the key to valuing a corporate investment opportunity as an option is the 
ability to discern a simple correspondence between project characteristics and option characteristics. “The 
potential investment to be made corresponds to the options exercise price, the operating assets the company 
would own assuming the investment was made are like the stock one would own after exercising a call option. 
The length of time the company can wait before it has to decide is like the call options time to expiration. 
Uncertainty about the future value of the operating assets is captured by the variance of returns on them; this 
is analogous to the variance of stock returns for call options. " (p. 137) The real option is mapped to a simple 
option like a European call option. A simple option-pricing model such as Black-Scholes’ (1973) model will 
give the value of the call option.
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Figure 2.2: The Option Chain
Strategy Continued
43
option, by 2) providing the firm with the inbuilt flexibility to abandon options which are 
‘out of the money’ (NPV<0) and by 3) providing the firm with the ability to revise strategy 
by exercising a flexibility option.
Bowman and Huny (1993) also put forth a number of propositions in order to 
suggest some fundamental insights of option theory. First, they argue that organisations, 
which hold better-developed bundles of options, fare better during economic upturns and 
downturns. Second, they contend that organisations should hold options during periods of 
higher environmental uncertainty and exercise them during stable periods. Third, they 
claim that it is more valuable to adopt a strategy of making small investments in options 
followed by large investments to limit downside risks. Fourth, superior performance is 
attainable if an option is recognised early and exercised when the valued of waiting is at its 
lowest. Finally, they argue that it is more valuable to hold a portfolio of options than to 
hold a single option on an asset portfolio. These insights show the value of holding a 
portfolio of options and adopting an incremental approach to investment until uncertainties 
regarding the value of the options are resolved. By adopting such a strategy the firm is 
building on good fortune, and mitigating against bad fortune, and as a result downside risks 
are minimised.
Luerhman (1998) also viewed strategies as chains of real options. He stated,
“Executing a strategy almost always involves making a sequence of major 
decisions. Some actions are taken immediately, while others are deliberately 
deferred so that managers can optimize as circumstances evolve. The 
strategy sets the framework within which future decisions will be made, but 
at the same time it leaves room for learning from ongoing developments 
and for discretion to act based on what is learned” (p.90)
He uses a garden metaphor likening real options to tomatoes, the owner-manager to the 
gardener and the tomato garden to the firm. He argues that some options should be 
exercised immediately, analogous to tomatoes ripe for picking, while other options should 
never be exercised (i.e. rotten tomatoes). In between, there are options or tomatoes, which 
need to be cultivated before they are ripe. Active managers, or gardeners, Luerhman argues 
“are doing more than merely making exercise decisions. They are monitoring the options
44
and looking for ways to influence the underlying variables that determine option value and, 
ultimately outcomes” (p. 90)
Leurhman (1998) locates options in so called option space based on two metrics -
value to cost3, S/X and volatility, CT-yjt. The value to cost metric is defined as the value 
of the underlying assets the firm intends to buy, S, divided by the present value of the
expenditure jr = g[£,/(i+fr)'] required to build or buy them, where k is the
risk free rate of return, E is the exercise price and t is the time to expiration. Volatility is 
based on the variance per period asset returns, a, which depends on how risky or uncertain 
fiiture returns to assets are and the time to expiration, t, which is based on how long the 
firm can defer the decision to invest. Using the traditional net present value (NPV) metric 
and these two metrics, Luerhman (1998) divides option space (or the garden) into six 
possible areas for action (See Figure 2.3 reproduced from Luerhman, 1998). Options with 
a value cost metric greater than one, and NPV >0 and low volatility represent ripe tomatoes 
and should be invested or picked immediately. At the other extreme, options with a value 
cost metric less than one, and NPV <0 and low volatility represent rotten tomatoes and 
never should be exercised. In between these two extremes are four other types of options 
which vary in their attractiveness namely, ‘maybe now’ (NPV>0, value to cost >1 and 
volatility =medium), ‘probably later’ (NPV<0, value to cost >1 and volatility =high), 
‘maybe later’ (NPV<0, value to cost <1 and volatility =high), ‘probably never’ (NPV<0, 
value to cost <1 and volatility =medium). Deciding on whether to invest early requires a 
case-by-case comparison of the value of investing immediately with the value of waiting a 
bit longer. According to Luerhman (1998), predictable losses in value, by deferring the 
investment, such as pre-emption by competitors, or a pending change in regulation, may 
cause the owner-manager to exercise the option earlier than expected. Miller and Folta 
(2002), Folta and Miller (2002), Arthur (1994), Ingersoll and Ross (1992), Lieberman and 
Montgomery (1988) and McDonald and Seigel (1986) also highlight the risks of deferring
3 When the value cost metric is between zero and one, the assets, which the real option refers to, are worth 
less than its costs. If the value cost metric is greater than one the assets are worth more than the present value 
of what it costs (see Luerhman, 1998).
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Figure 2.3 Option Space
investment (e.g. regulatory changes, network externalities, risk of pre-emption, loss of 
market share etc.). Further, Luerhman (1998) argues that the owner-manager should 
actively try to influence the variables underlying the three metrics to ‘move’ options (e.g. 
those in the ‘probably later’ category can be moved into the ‘maybe now’ category or the 
‘invest now’ category). Price or volume increases, tax savings or lower capital 
requirements can influence the value cost metric. The volatility of the option can fell over 
time as uncertainties are resolved. Whereas the passage of time reduces volatility, it also 
reduces the value cost metric, which the owner-manager needs to counteract through 
actively cultivating the options.
Luehrman (1998) also describes how chains of options are nested, which is similar 
to Bowman and Hurry’s (1993) view that strategy emerges through the incremental striking 
of options in a chain.4 He shows how it is possible to increase the value of early options in 
a sequential chain by raising the value of later options. The approach of Luerhman (1998)
4 Miller and Folta (2002) refer to nested options as compound options.
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can be likened to one of portfolio management where the owner-manager is constantly 
striving to improve the value of the portfolio. Luerhman’s (1998) approach builds on 
Bowman and Hurry’s (1993) approach by illustrating practically how the portfolio of 
options can be valued and managed. Unlike Bowman and Hurry (1993) he does not 
concentrate on the recognition of options.
McGrath (1997), like Luerhman (1998), examines ways in which the firm can 
improve the value of an option. Specifically, she outlines a number of ways in which the 
value of a technology positioning option can be altered by the firm making “amplifying 
preinvestments” to reduce uncertainties. McGrath (1997) holds that the firm can act to 
shape contingencies in its favour, and reduce uncertainty, through making idiosyncratic 
investments to increase revenue streams or reduce the costs of commercialisation. For 
example, the firm can attempt to find ways to reduce risks, or costs, to the customer of 
trying a new product in order to increase the speed of adoption of the new product (e.g free 
trial samples etc.). This should increase the revenue stream, as a slow speed of adoption 
reduces the cumulative returns, and consequently the value of the option. Further, a firm 
can engage in counter blocking strategies to try and gain access to inputs, customers and 
markets prior to investing in the technology option.
McGrath (1999) likens entrepreneurial initiatives to real options whose value is 
fundamentally influenced by uncertainty. She argues that the investment made in one real 
option may pay off by resolving issues surrounding other real options, even if the first was 
a failure. She states, “complete accounting of a real option's worth requires an 
understanding of the other options in play” (pl5). This is in line with Luerhman’s (1998) 
view that options are nested. McGrath (1999) claims that for one to have a more balanced 
view of entrepreneurial failure, one must value options as part of a bundle, recognising that 
uncertainty is the key to the value of an option, that failure can have positive consequences, 
and that preventing failure may mean sacrificing opportunity. She argues that “the key is 
not avoiding failure hut managing the cost of failure by limiting exposure to the downside 
while preserving access to attractive opportunities and maximizing gains” (p.16). 
According to McGrath (1999), seeking success and avoiding failure can introduce errors in
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learning and interpretation processes, making failure more expensive than it need be. She 
argues that firms should learn from failures.
McGrath (1999), through developing a number of propositions, shows how an 
options perspective allows more of the possible benefits of failures to be valued and the 
most egregious of its costs to be contained. Primarily, she argues that entrepreneurs should 
seek options with higher variance, because this raises the value of real options. She holds 
that firms should contain the costs of failure by staging investments, particularly 
investments that are irreversible in nature. Adopting this strategy, plus putting in place 
appropriate monitoring systems, should increase the bundled value of a portfolio of options. 
She states, “By funding sequentially, and then putting in place, mechanisms to spot signals 
of adverse changes in future value, and adjusting expenditure patterns accordingly, the 
price of a real entrepreneurial option may be contained'' (p.24). In addition, she contends 
that firms should hedge their bets and further contain the cost of failure by investing in a 
number of options rather than a single option. Finally, she holds that entrepreneurial 
activity will increase in an economy if entrepreneurship is rewarded and if the social cost of 
failure is reduced.
In general, McGrath (1999) is making similar points to Luerhman (1998) and 
Bowman and Hurry (1993). She recognises the importance of Bowman and Hurry’s (1993) 
notion of incremental investment to strategy, making small investment initially, before 
making large investments to contain losses in event of failure or bad news. The importance 
of investing in a portfolio of real options rather than a single option is also clearly in line 
with Luehrman’s (1998) views. McGrath (1999) did not discuss the active management of 
the portfolio as earlier in McGrath (1997), but she alluded to the importance of monitoring 
adverse changes in investments in real options.
Real options logic was developed in financial economics and applied to resource 
allocation decisions as a way to understand the importance of valuing flexibility in strategic 
choices under uncertainty. Folta and Miller (2002) applied the logic to equity partnerships, 
Miller and Folta (2002) to market entry and McGrath and Nerkar (2004) to research and 
development decisions in the pharmaceutical industry. Developed in the context of large 
firms, the logic is applied in this thesis to resource allocation decisions or strategic choices
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within a small firm context. With fewer resources and capabilities, the small firm may 
have a smaller portfolio of options available to it in comparison with larger firms. Yet the 
core principles of real options logic are as relevant to small firms, as they are to large firms. 
Thus, the examination of real options reasoning in empirical models of small firm 
flexibility in Chapter 8 is a useful extension of this literature.
2.4.3 Conclusions
This Section has examined the notion of flexibility in the economics literature, 
tracing its early developments from a means of coping with fluctuations in demand to a 
means of coping with other forms of uncertainty affecting the choices of the firm. The 
notion of flexibility, which is most relevant from the perspective of this thesis, is Carlsson’s 
(1989) notion of strategic flexibility, that is, how the firm situates itself to avail itself of 
future opportunities, challenges and new game plans. The firm faces a lot of uncertainty 
regarding these choices, but can use real options logic to value the strategic flexibility of 
the portfolio of choices available to the firm.
In short, real options logic holds that firms should seek, and hold, options with 
higher variance because the potential gains are greater while the cost to access them is the 
same. The firm should then contain the cost of these options by adopting strategies to 
minimise downside risk. In other words, the entrepreneur should hold options until 
uncertainties are resolved and the value of waiting is at its lowest. The entrepreneur should 
make small investments initially and larger investments when the option matures or 
materialises. This limits the sunk costs in the event of a withdrawal. The entrepreneur 
should also monitor signals in its environment, which alter the value of the option. He 
should also actively try to influence the value of the option where possible by making 
‘amplifying preinvestments’. By following these guiding principles, the flexibility of the 
firm is increased. For example, the firm has the ability to revise its strategy based on new 
information at low cost, building on good news and mitigating against the consequences of 
bad news.
In uncertain environments, expected profits increase with greater flexibility. The 
marginal gain in profits is greater, the higher is environmental uncertainty. This thesis 
examines whether increased flexibility in responding to key organisational change raises
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the performance of the firm (see Chapter 8). These key organisational changes are crises or 
pivotal points in the firm’s life, as discussed in Section 2.3. The thesis also examines 
empirically whether the logic of real options, as described above, adds value in explaining 
the behaviour of small firms undertaking organisational change in response to precipitators 
of change or contingency factors (see Chapter 8). Few empirical tests of the logic of real 
options have been undertaken in a large firm context (e.g. Kogut, 1991; Kim and Kogut, 
1996; Folta and Miller, 2002; McGrath and Nerkar, 2004), never mind in a small firm 
context (e.g. Calcagini and Iacobucci, 1997; Laamanen, 1999). Empirical evidence 
provided in Chapter 8 attempts to fill this evident gap in extant research, specifically with 
respect to small firms behaviour. Besides, small firms may experience barriers to change or 
growth preventing them from exercising real options. The literature on barriers to 
organisational change is examined in the next Section.
2.5 Barriers to Organisational Change
Smallbone et al. (1992, 1995) found that mature small firms, which had been most 
active in making adjustments, were most successful in terms of growth in real turnover, 
employment and survival. It was also pointed out in section 2.4.1 that, in the presence of 
uncertainty, a firm which is more flexible will perform better than an a firm which is less 
flexible (i.e. The marginal gain in expected profitability is greater the larger the 
environmental uncertainty). Even though higher performance is associated with firms 
which are more flexible (or active in making adjustments), it is argued in the literature that 
there can be restrictions on the rate of expansion. Seminal works by Penrose (1959) and 
Richardson (1964) argue that firms (both large and small) may sacrifice higher profits for 
growth. Later studies argued that there were constraints on the growth of the small firm. 
Notably, Barber et al. (1989) in their study of Barriers to Growth in the Small Firm 
summarised the literature on this topic under the headings of management and motivation, 
resources and market opportunities and structures. More contemporary theories have been 
put forth by Ghemawat (1991) and Antonelli (1997). Ghemawat (1991) argues that history 
matters in commitments to a strategy because of causal processes, which, in his
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terminology, have features of lockin, lockout, lags and inertia (See Subsection 2.5.3). In a 
similar vein, Antonelli’s (1997) also holds that history matters, in his description of the 
economics of path dependence. He states, “Path-dependence defines the set of dynamic 
processes where small events have long-lasting consequences that economic action at each 
moment can modify yet only to a limited extent” (p.643-644). This section begins by 
examining seminal works on constraints on growth before considering modem views on 
this issue.
2.5.1 Growth Profitability Trade-off
Early work by Penrose (1959) and Richardson (1964) stressed that the main 
limitation on a firm’s growth rate is a managerial one. Penrose (1959) did not explicitly 
state that a growth profitability trade-off existed but did highlight that if the firm grew too 
quickly that “the efficiency of the firm will suffer” (p.47). The argument starts with the 
premise that there is a physical limit to the number of things managers or the management 
‘team’ in a firm can undertake. According to Penrose (1959), “the capacities of the existing 
managerial personnel of the firm necessarily set a limit to the expansion of the firm in any 
given period of time ” (p.45-46). Of course, the firm can hire new management, but these 
new managers are not substitutes for existing management. Management is seen as a team 
effort in which individuals collectively coordinate the activities of the firm based on 
specialised functional skills and team specific skills. The knowledge underlying these 
specific skills is tacit, and can only be learned through experience and direct instruction 
from existing managers. Therefore, as the firm expands the existing management needs to 
not only to recruit, but to train, new managers. The time of existing managers is diverted 
towards this instructional activity. This reduces the efficiency of the firm. The reduction in 
efficiency is greater, the more rapidly the firm expands. Thus, there is a growth efficiency 
trade-off, which is otherwise known as the ‘Penrose effect’.
Richardson (1964) extended Penrose’s (1959) line of reasoning. In interviews with 
sixteen businessmen, over three years, he identified four principal constraints on a firm’s 
expansion rate, namely a shortage of labour or physical inputs, a shortage of finance, lack 
of suitable investment opportunities and lack of sufficient managerial capacity. To evaluate 
the potential significance of each of these constraints Richardson (1964) asked the
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respondents for their views. Richardson (1964) reported, “A very striking number of guests 
expressed the view without hesitation that the availability of suitable management had 
been, and was, the operative check on expansion” (p-10). Rather than a shortage of good 
managers, which would lead to rising prices for managerial talent, Richardson found that 
the chief problem was one of adverse selection. He stated, “To hire an outsider is to invest 
in assets of uncertain yield; the rate of new recruitment, at least at higher levels, may 
therefore be limited by considerations of risk.” (p. 11). According to Richardson (1964), 
existing management or “insiders” were easier to assess than “outsiders”. This involved a 
problem of information asymmetry (viz. adverse selection). He also advanced a similar 
argument to Penrose (1959) that new managerial recruits services can only be developed 
through ‘on the job’ experience. He argued that on taking up a position “newcomers are at 
an inevitable disadvantage to established personnel in terms of experience of the firm’s 
products, markets and internal organisation” (p. 11) and that “their services can be 
developed fully only after experience of the particular circumstances of their job” (p.l 1). 
Thus, new recruits require instruction. This can take a considerable length of time. As a 
consequence, Richardson (1964) argued that a growth efficiency trade-off existed. He 
stated “there is afunctional relationship between the ‘organisational efficiency’ of a firm 
and its rate of growth and that the former will decline, after a point as the latter rises’"’ 
(P-11)
Richardson (1964) assumed that the strain upon organisational efficiency depended 
not only on the size of the expansion but also on the direction of expansion. Expansion into 
new markets was more likely to reduce organisational efficiency than expansion within 
existing markets. Thus firms, which actively pursue opportunities in new markets, are 
“most likely to stress the managerial and organisational restraint on expansion” (p.l2). 
Rather than narrowly conceiving the managerial function as influencing the costs of 
production, Richardson (1964) conceived the managerial function as affecting profits. He 
concludes, “managerial difficulties, associated with an unduly high rate of growth will 
show up not just in costs, but in all of the determinants of profitability” (p.14). The 
managerial function effects profits, as it is “part of their [the managers] job to decide upon 
the precise character of the product, or products, to be made, and to find a market for
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them The significance of this is that the growth efficiency trade-off outlined above also 
implies a profitability/growth tradeoff According to Richardson (1964), “If an increasing 
rate of growth causes, after a point, decreasing organizational efficiency then this should 
show up in profits” (p.14)
Penrose’s (1959) argument was formalised by Slater (1980) who showed that 
increases in marginal cost would arise from rapidly recruiting managers when the firm is 
expanding quickly. Weak empirical evidence of a negative relationship between growth 
and profitability was found by Cubbin and Leech (1986) and Dobson and Gerrard (1989). 
Cubbin and Leech (1986), for sample of leading British companies from 1951-1977, and 
Dobson and Gerrard (1989), for firms in the engineering sector in Leeds, found that profits 
had a negative (though insignificant) influence on growth but that growth had a positive 
(and insignificant) influence on profits using a two stage least squares estimator (2SLS). 
Similarly, Cowling (2004) found that growth had a positive influence on profits for a 
sample of independent unquoted firms over the period 1991-1993. He did not present 
estimates of the growth equation.
By contrast, Reid (1993, 1995, 1998) found clearer evidence of a growth 
profitability tradeoff for a sample of small business start-ups using iterated three stage least 
squares estimates, arguably a superior estimation method (see Davidson and MacKinnon, 
1993). The rate of profitability was found to negatively effect growth and the rate of 
growth was found to negatively effect the rate of profitability. He argued that this trade-off 
between growth and profitability supported a managerial view of growth. Managers of 
small businesses push growth beyond that a point, gi, on the growth profitability possibility 
frontier, where growth maximizes profits, to a point, g2, where the firm sacrifices profits for 
growth. Point g2 is on the segment of the growth profitability possibility frontier, which has 
a negative slope, implying a tradeoff between growth and profitability (see Marris, 1964). 
Reid (1995) argued that managers sacrifice profits for growth when invading new market 
niches so that they can get a ‘toehold’ in the market. Reid (1994, 1998) also found evidence 
that as the firm moves from a simple organisational form of a sole proprietorship to a more 
complex organisational form found in private companies, it does so, in the short run, at the 
sacrifice of profits. Increasing tiers of hierarchy, in more complex organisational forms,
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were found to limit the firm’s growth rate, thus implying a growth efficiency tradeoff. This 
is a way of explicitly calibrating the notion of organisationally induced costs of growth.
2.5.2 Barriers to Growth in the Small Firm
According to Barber et al. (1989), barriers to growth are a more complex issue than 
simply a lack of finance. They state,
“Growth implies much more than the ability to invest in best practice 
facilities. It requires an ability to adapt and change, to be aware of markets 
and technological developments arising outside the firm, to make use of 
internal resources and to combine them effectively and continually with 
resources drawn from the environment. If these growth barriers are not 
overcome, then no matter how efficient the firm and how attractive its 
products it will remain of limited economic significance. ” (p.2)
In summarising the various findings of the contributors to the study they describe a number 
of fundamental barriers to growth ranging from internal factors such as a lack of motivation 
on the part of owner-managers to external factors such as poor access to skilled labour, 
finance and technology.
More specifically, Barber et al. (1989) hold that a desire of owner-managers to 
retain control of the key decision-making within the firm limits the firm’s ability to grow. 
The latter requires a formal approach to management with the delegation of responsibilities 
and decision-making for various functions of the business. With respect to access to 
finance it is argued that the fundamental barrier is not necessarily the availability of funds 
for growth, but the availability of funds at a price and conditions on which the borrower 
and lender agree. With respect to access to skilled labour it is argued that there are two 
types of shortages. The first being an actual shortage due to the failure of the small firm to 
recruit and train skilled labour to meet the current or planned activities of the firm. The 
second is a latent shortage, which exists because the firm avoids hiring skilled staff by 
employing lower level technologies and growing slowly. Access to external technology is 
not seen as a barrier to innovation and growth in the small firm. However, the internal 
capability of the small firm to seek out and make use of the available sources of 
technologies is seen as a barrier to growth. Barber et al. (1989) hold that the existence of 
barriers, which limit the firms’ access to resources, is not necessarily the sole reason for the
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lack of growth of the small firms. They argue that the small firm must be willing and able 
to exploit the available resources.
Other factors which were examined in the account of Barber et al. (1989) were the 
influence centralised purchasing, the impact of merger activity and competition policy and 
market structure. Centralised purchasing was believed to represent a barrier to the growth 
of the small firm. The impact of merger activity and competition policy on the growth 
prospects of the small firm was found to vary with the circumstances of each case. With 
respect to market structure, the problems faced by the firm were held to be largely internal 
in terms of the technical skill base, the management systems and processes, the appropriate 
organisation structures and the availability of skilled managers.
The barriers outlined by Barber et al. (1989) represent factors internal and external 
to the firm, which can constrain the growth of the firm. The next Sub-section, on path 
dependence, examines how strategic options exercised in the past influence the strategic 
options, which can be exercised in the fiiture.
2.5.3 Path Dependence
This Sub-section examines factors which cause economic actions to have long- 
lasting effects. Ghemawat (1991) describes a number of causal processes which cause 
strategies to persist over time whereas Antonelli (1997) defines path dependence and its 
underlying determinants. These are described in turn below.
Ghemawat (1991) defines commitment as the tendency for strategies to persist over 
time. According to Ghemawat, this concept of commitment gains ‘concreteness’ from the 
causal processes that it rests on, namely processes that involve lock-in, lock-out, lags and 
inertia. These processes drive the persistence of strategies within the firm. A firm may be 
locked into a strategy because of considerable investments made in the past, which were 
durable, specialised and untradeabie in nature. These factors are referred to as ‘sticky’ by 
Ghemawat (1991). For example, intangible factors such as relationships and information 
are untradeabie, as opposed to tangible items such as fixed assets. Lock-out, according to 
Ghemawat (1991), is a mirror image of lock-in. Lock-out stems from opportunities 
foregone as a result of exercising one particular strategic option rather than another. It 
refers to the difficulties of reacquiring and deploying investment opportunities or sticky
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factors. Both of these factors lead to the persistence of strategies. Strategies also persist 
over time because it takes time for strategies to be implemented or to unfold (i.e. there are 
lags involved). Ghemawat (1991) argues that there are “lags in adjusting the 
organization’s stock of sticky factors to desired levels’'’ (p.22). Finally, Ghemawat (1991) 
holds that organisations are also prone to preserve the status quo and thus have an inbuilt 
bias to inertia, which is part of the culture of the organisation. This also leads to the 
persistence of strategies over time.
In describing path dependence, Antonelli (1997) defines it as a set of dynamic 
processes where the consequences of small actions can perpetuate for a long time. Once 
action is undertaken it is difficult to modify. This is because of what Antonelli (1997) calls 
“overlapping irreversibility, indivisibility and the structural action of agents’’ (p.634). 
Irreversibility implies that a difficulty exists in changing a given behavior or choice. Once 
structural action (intentional or unintentional) is undertaken by the firm, this creates 
switching costs and sunk costs, which are incurred in revising these strategic actions. Sunk 
costs are not only present in fixed capital, but also in reputation, research and development 
activities, marketing outlays etc., and are difficult to replace or utilise in different 
circumstances. Indivisibility means that an input cannot be scaled down below a certain 
minimum size, even when the output level is very small. Indivisibilities are a paramount 
source of economies of scale and scope.
Antonelli (1997) argues that historic time matters as a source of uncertainty about 
the consequences of each action and because of irreversibility. For example, he states that 
the sequence of growth stages cannot be reversed and that the time profile of each action 
has important effects. It affects the selection processes. Even though Antonelli (1997) 
argues that historic time matters, he notes that ‘path dependence is not past-dependence’ 
because it cannot be folly anticipated on the basis of the original events. Path dependence 
accommodates the consequences of action at each point in time. He states, “Path- 
dependence analysis is systemic and dynamic because it focuses attention on the process of 
change that generated the interaction of a plurality and variety of agents whose behaviour 
is constrained by the localization of time’’  (p.644). He shows how path dependence can
56
provide a general framework to understand and model the effects of historic time on the 
behaviour of agents which are able at each point in time to modify their evolution.
Both Ghemawat’s (1991) notion of the persistence of strategies and Antonelli’s 
(1997) notion of the long lasting consequences of strategic choices are similar. They both 
note the significance of irreversibilities in undertaking strategic action or exercising 
strategic options. Irreversibilities lock a firm into a particular strategy and lock out 
opportunities foregone. They have long lasting consequences for the firm because they 
represent factors, which are durable, specialized and untradeable. Long-lived small firms 
are likely have a large stock of these untradeable factors which lock them into strategies 
they undertook in the past and lock them out of foregone opportunities. Consequently, 
these factors may act as barriers to organisational change.
2.5.4 Conclusions
Barriers to organistional change are described in this section as being derived from 
three sources. First, the expansion of the management team limits the rate of growth, as 
existing management must instruct new managers. This reduces efficiency leading to an 
efficiency growth trade-off. Not only does efficiency suffer, according to Richardson 
(1964), but profits suffer also. Thus there is a growth profitability trade-off where the firm 
sacrifices profits for greater growth in the short term at least. Evidence of this trade-off was 
found by Reid (1993, 1995, 1998) within a small firms context. Second, other sources of 
barriers to growth are highlighted by Barber et al. (1989) in their study of barriers to 
growth in the small firm. They describe constraints on the firm’s rate of growth which are 
internal such as the attitudes and motivation of management and which are external such as 
access to finance or skilled labour. These limit or slow down the rate of growth in the 
small firm. Barber et al. (1989) do highlight the fact that the owner-manager must be 
willing and able to overcome these constraints to grow. The third and final argument 
presents more contemporary theories on the constraints that previous choices place on 
future choices. In other words, it is argued that because ireversibilities and indivisibilities 
exist that actions taken have long lasting effects and are difficult to modify. They lock the 
firm into a pursing a particular strategy and lock the firm out of opportunities foregone. 
This can act as a barrier to organisational change. This barrier is likely to be considerably
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higher for a long-lived small firm than a new entrant assuming that the stock of 
irreversibilities increases as the firm ages. Elements of these three arguments are used to 
explain why small firms tend to remain small in Chapter 9. These factors can act as 
barriers to growth in the size of the small firm. The small firm may also be unwilling to 
trade-off performance for increases in the size of the firm.
2.6 General Conclusions
This Chapter outlined key theoretical frameworks for examining organisational 
change and the effect of increased flexibility on the long run performance or survival of the 
small firm. An interdisciplinary approach was taken relying on contingency theory, stages 
of growth models and the logic of real options, which were mainly advanced in the 
management literature. The key elements of the framework are presented in a more unified 
form below.
Survivors are seen as firms, which realise profits through serving the needs of 
customers more efficiently than competitors. The realisation of a normal level of profit is 
the main driver of the decision of the firm to continue trading. Over its life a firm may 
change in many ways such as its location, its products, its ownership, its legal form but is 
still seen as the same firm. Once the firm represents a going concern, and has not been 
liquidated, dissolved or discontinued, it is treated as a survivor. Thus, Chandler’s (1977) 
broader definition of what constitutes a survivor is adopted. This definition has 
consequences for the identification of survivors in the sample frame of Scottish small firms 
in Chapter 4.
The determinants of organisational change within the firm were examined from two 
perspectives. The first perspective viewed the firm as progressing through a number of 
lifecycle stages as it grew in size and characterised each stage by variables such as the 
managerial style, the organisational structure, the extent of formal systems, the major 
strategic goals and the owner’s involvement in the business. The second perspective holds 
that the most effective organisational structure is contingent or dependent on factors in its 
environment, its task, its size, strategy etc. The relevance of synchronous developmental
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pattern proposed by stages of growth models was questioned for the small firms examined 
in this study. However, these models are useful as they do propose that the firm 
experiences periods of internal change or upheaval as it grows in size. Growth is seen as an 
important precipitator of change. Contingency theory is a broader theory of internal change 
in the organisation, which treats the appropriate organisational form as circumstantial. 
Support for this theory has also been found in a small firms context (see Reid and Smith 
2000b). Organisational change is precipitated by a number of lactors other than growth. 
The organisational form changes in response to changes in contingency factors or 
precipitators so that there is a close fit between the organisational form and its environment. 
From this point of view, the small firm is reactive to its environment (or other precipitators 
of change). Under dynamic contingency theory the firm can actively seek to change the 
environment (Volberda, 1998). This is not ruled out, but it is generally thought that the 
small firm has little scope to engage in such acts. This view of organisational change was 
influential in the design of the survey instrument described in Chapter 4.
Contingency theory suggests that a more flexible, organic, organisational form is 
most appropriate for the small firm operating in uncertain environments. This Chapter 
traced the development of the concept of flexibility from a means of coping with demand 
fluctuations to wider conceptualisations such as Carlson’s (1989) notion of strategic or 
longterm flexibility. The latter conception of flexibility was thought to be most appropriate 
for examining the flexibility of the small firm in response to pivotal organisational change. 
This study does not examine flexibility in the sequencing or scheduling of production 
(operational flexibility) or inherent in the production technology (tactical flexibility) but 
flexibility which allows the firm to introduce new products quickly and cheaply, to 
accommodate basic design changes, to change legal form, management style etc. (i.e. 
strategic flexibility).
Chapter 8 of this thesis sets out to examine whether the flexibility of the small firm, 
in responding to environmental change, raises the long run prospects of the small firm. 
Inherent in Stigler’s (1939) traditional notion of flexibility is the idea that expected profit 
will increase with greater flexibility in the presence of demand uncertainty. The more 
flexible is the firm in such environments, the higher its expected performance. It should be
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noted that Stigler’s notion of flexibility is closer to Carlson’s concept of tactical flexibility. 
This thesis examines whether strategic flexibility increases the performance of the firm. 
Thus, it considers whether the increased profit expectation transcends to this long term 
measure of flexibility
The guiding principles of the logic of real options developed in the management 
literature as a means of valuing strategic flexibility would suggest that greater strategic 
flexibility raises the performance of the firm. The firm raises its strategic flexibility by 
holding portfolios of real options, which have high variance. The entrepreneur is advised to 
adopt ‘a wait and see’ strategy, only exercising the options when uncertainties are resolved 
and the value of waiting is at its lowest. By following this strategy the entrepreneur builds 
on good fortune and mitigates against bad fortune. The entrepreneur can also minimise 
downside risk by staging the firm’s investment to a particular strategic option, making 
small investments initially and larger investments when the option matures. In this 
instance, the entrepreneur reduces sunk costs in the event of abandonment of the option. 
While this logic was developed in a corporate context its relevance is examined in this 
thesis for the long-lived small firm. Chapter 8 formally tests the relevance of these guiding 
principles in a model of the performance of the firm. It examines whether the logic adds 
value in explaining the behaviour of firms in undertaking organisational change in response 
to precipitators of change or contingency factors.
The final Section of this Chapter examined barriers to organisational change. Seminal 
works by Penrose (1959) and Richardson (1964) discuss how difficulties in extending the 
management team as a result of growth leads to a growth/efficiency or a 
growth/profitability trade-off. The small firm sacrifices profits for increased growth. 
Evidence of this trade-off was found by Reid (1993,1995, 1998) within a small firms 
context. In Chapter 9 rather than examining the growth profitability trade-off an analysis is 
undertaken of a size performance tradeoff to try and explain the small firms tendency to 
remain small. Other sources of barriers to growth highlighted by Barber et al. (1989) could 
also be explaining this tendency as wdll as more modem theories of the constraints that 
previous choices place on future choices. These constraints are due to irreversibilities and
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indivisibilities, which mean that even small actions can have long lasting effects and are 
difficult to modify.
While this Chapter was conceptual in nature, Chapter 3 considers empirical literature 
examining factors which foster the growth and survival of the small firm.
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CHAPTER 3 FACTORS WHICH FOSTER SURVIVAL: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE
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3.1 Introduction
This Chapter examines theory and evidence on factors, which foster the survival or 
longevity of small firms. Small firm survival was not examined in a detailed manner in 
the literature in industrial economics until the nineties, and thus is a relatively new area 
of study (Audretsch, 1991, 1995). Previously, small firm survival was examined as an 
auxiliary concern of an extensive literature on the determinants of firm growth, since it 
was only surviving firms that could grow (Evans 1987a, b; Hall, 1987; Dunne et al., 
1989a). Models of firm survival and growth were estimated jointly to overcome issues 
of selectivity bias in testing Gibrat’s Law of Proportionate Effect. Selectivity bias arises 
from a general tendency of lower growth small firms to cease trading (Mansfield, 1962). 
More recently, firm survival established an independent position in literature in the 
writings on the determinants of post entry performance (Audretsch, 1995; Audretsch 
and Mahmood, 1995, Mata et al. 1995; Boeri and Bellman, 1995; Doms et al. 1995). 
The influence of variables, defined at the industry, firm and economy wide level, in 
explaining variation in firm exit and growth rates of new entrants, are examined in this 
body of literature.
While the literature on post-entry performance examined factors, which fostered 
the survival of small firms after entry, the vast majority of the literature concentrated on 
the formative years of these firms rather than on these firms in the mature stage of their 
lifecycle. Few studies, with the exception of Smallbone et al. (1992, 1995), North et al. 
(1992), Leigh et al. (1991) and Lotti and Santeralli (2002), examined the performance 
of the small firms in their latter years. Lack of data on cohorts of entrants in their latter 
years is most likely the primary reason for this. There was more data available on firms 
in their formative years. This study collects data on small firms in the latter years of 
their life filling this gap in the literature.
The main body of this Chapter has two substantial sections. The first Section 
examines the extensive literature on the determinants of firm growth, which has 
received considerable attention in small business economics because of its clear links 
with job generation, a concern of industrial policy makers. Survival was treated as a 
side issue in this branch of the literature. The focus of this literature was on the 
relationship between growth and firm size, or Gibrat’s Law. The interpretation of the 
stochastic models was improved initially with the inclusion of age as an explanatory
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variable (see Evans, 1987a, b) and later with other explanatory variables to account for 
heterogeneities across firms other than size and age (Liu et al., 1999). Econometric 
developments to cope with problems of sample censoring, heteroskedasticity and the 
specification of the functional relationship were also undertaken (Hall, 1987, Heshmati, 
2001).
The second substantial Section collates evidence from studies on post entry 
performance. The aim of this Section is to analyse the determinants of firm survival or 
longevity following entry into a market. Early studies solely used industry explanatory 
variables to explain post entry growth and survival (Audretsch, 1991). It was not until 
the mid nineties that firm specific variables were incorporated into models, following 
evidence from Mata (1994) on the importance of accounting for firm heterogeneities, as 
well as industry variation. Lack of data at the plant or establishment level was the most 
likely reason for this. In this Section, the most celebrated factors influencing the 
survival and growth of the firm are examined. Heterogeneities at the firm (e.g. age, 
size, ownership status etc.), industry (e.g. economies of scale, technology conditions, 
growth) and economy level (e.g. unemployment, interest rates) are discussed. Studies 
are chosen to illustrate the influence of these variables on firm post-entry, growth and 
survival. After considering these two branches of the literature, some final comments 
are presented in the conclusion to this Chapter.
3.2 Growth
Much of the literature on the formation and growth of firms has focused on the 
relationship between growth and firm size, originating in the Law of Proportionate 
Effect (or Gibrat’s Law), which states that growth rates are independent of firm size and 
its past growth history. All firm growth occurs at the same rate over an interval of time 
regardless of initial firm size (see Hart and Prais, 1956; Simon and Bonini, 1958; 
Hymer and Pashigan, 1962; Sutton, 1997, 1998). According to Mansfield (1962), the 
law states that “the probability of a given proportional change in size during a specified 
period is the same for all firms in a given industry - regardless of their size in the 
beginning of the period" (p.l 030). Such a law generates a lognormal size distribution 
of firms. This distribution closely resembles distributions of firms observed in practice, 
with few large firms and many small firms, see Hart (1962).
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Three testable hypotheses arose with respect to the law of proportionate effect: (A) 
that firms of different size classes have the same average growth rate; (B) that the 
dispersion of growth rates about the common mean is the same for all size classes; and 
(C) that the rate of growth of the firm in one period should be independent of its growth 
rate in subsequent periods, (i.e. there should be no serial correlation in the growth rates). 
Early studies by Simon and Bonini (1958) and Hymer and Pashigian (1962) for the 
U.S. and Hart and Prais (1956) for the U.K. found evidence in support of Gibrat’s Law 
of proportionate effect. They found no relation between the size of the firm and the 
mean growth rate (Le. firm size was independent of firm growth). Simon and Bonini 
(1958) and Hart and Prais (1956) also found no relationship between the size of the firm 
and the standard deviation of the firm’s growth rates but Hymer and Pashigian (1962) 
found evidence to the contrary. Thus, even in these tests of Gibrat’s Law on sample 
sizes of larger firms (rather than the complete size distribution of firms) contradictory 
evidence was evident.
This Section examines farther evidence on the appropriateness of Gibrat’s Law in 
the literature, by initially considering early evidence, and then examining evidence in 
the context of the U.S., and then the U.K., before more recent extensions are examined. 
Early studies concluded that a sample selection problem existed in testing Gibrat’s Law, 
because of a general tendency for low growth small firms to cease trading (Mansfield, 
1962). Later studies for the U.S. and the U.K. set out to correct this problem, and also 
to improve the interpretation of the models, by including age as an explanatory variable. 
More recent studies included variables other than age and size to account for 
heterogeneities across firms. Each of these is examined in turn and a summary of the 
main studies examined in this survey of the literature is provided in Table 3.1.
3.2.1 Early Studies
Early evidence, which directly investigated Gibrat’s Law by looking at firm size 
and growth over successive years in a panel of firms, cast doubt on the idea that 
proportional growth rates were independent of firm size. In particular, Mansfield 
(1962) found that Gibrat’s Law did not hold up empirically for the steel, petroleum and 
rubber tyre industries in the U.S. He held that the law may hold if the issue of 
censoring firms which exited could be controlled for. Mansfield stated that the law
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Table 3.1 Review of studies of Determinants of Firm Growth
Study Sample
Period
Sample frame Sample
Size
Size
measure
Hart and
Prais (1956)
1885-1950 Firms quoted on 
London stock
exchange
60-2,103 Market
valuation
Net assets
Simon and
Bonini
(1958)
1954-1956 500 largest 
manufacturing firm 
in the US
500 Sales
Hymer and
Pashigan
(1962)
1945-1955 1,000 largest 
manufacturing firm 
in the US
1000 Net Assets
Mansfield 1916-1954 US data on steel, - Capacity
(1962) 1921-1957 petroleum and - Capacity
1937-1952 rubber tyre industries - Employment
Singh and
Whittington
(1975)
1948-60 UK companies in 
Manufacturing, 
Construction, 
Distribution and 
Miscellaneous
Services
1955 Net Assets
Hall (1987) 1972-1979
1976-1983
Compustat
Publicly traded 
manufacturing firms 
in the US
1349
1098 
(962 
in both)
Employment
Evans
(1987a)
1976-82 US Small Business 
Database, firms in 
Manufacturing
Aged < 7 years
7-20 years
21-45 years 
> 45 years
4343
6124
5412
1520
Employment
Evans
(1987b)
1976-82 US Small Business 
Database, firms in 
Manufacturing
Aged < 7 years 
> 7 years
9221
24244
Employment
Dunne
(1989a)
1967-1977 US Census of 
Manufacturers 
(Plant data)
219,754 Employment
FitzRoy and 
Kraft (1991)
1977-1979 Metalworking Sector 
in West Germany
51 Sales
Employment
Variyam and
Kraybill
(1992)
5 year 
period
Manufacturing and 
Services sectors
25 counties in
Georgia
<500 employees
422 Employment
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Study Sample
Period
Sample frame Sample
Size
Size
measure
Reid (1993) 1985-1988 Scottish Small 
business enterprises 
<100 employees
67
39
Net Assets 
Sales
Dunne and
Hughes
(1994)
1975-80
1980-85
U.K. Exstat 
companies
Financial and non 
financial
1172
1696
Net Assets
Hart and
Oulton
(1996)
1989-93 U.K. OneSource 
Database, 
independent 
companies all 
industries
29,230
34,774
55,098
Employment
Sales
Net Assets
McPherson
(1996)
Data on MSEs in 
South Africa,
Swailand, Lestho, 
Botswana and 
Zimbabwe
South Africa (244), 
Swailand (277),
Lestho (599),
Botswana (206) and 
Zimbabwe (345)
Employment
Hart and 1986-89 U.K. OneSource 8103 Employment
Oulton 1989-92 U.K. OneSource 8103 Employment
(1998) 1992-95 U.K. OneSource 8103 Employment
Liu et al. 
(1999)
1990-1994 Taiwan
Annual
Manufacturing Plant 
Survey
Electronic and 
electricity industry
915 Employment
Heshmati
(2001)
1994-1998 Sweden’s Market
Manager’s Database, 
Micro and small 
firms
(1-100 employees) 
Gavleborg region 
Turnover >lm SEK
7884 Sales
Employment 
Net Assets
failed to hold because “the probability that a firm will die is certainly not independent 
of its size” (p.l031). Smaller firms were more likely to exit. This raises a problem 
because if small slow growing firms are more likely to fail than large slow growing 
firms, then an analysis of growth rates by size of firm, based on survivors alone, will be 
biased towards finding an inverse size growth relationship. Despite the issue of 
censoring, Mansfield (1962) also rejected Gibrat’s Law because “smaller firms often 
tend to have higher and more variable growth rates than larger firms.” (p.l 033)
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[rejection of hypothesis (B)]. Given this evidence Mansfield (1962) believed that 
Gibrat’s Law was an unreliable base on which to rest theories of the size distribution of 
firms.
In contrast, Singh and Whittington (1975) found a positive relationship between the 
rate of growth and size of the firm indicating that larger sized firms grew more rapidly 
than smaller sized firms for U.K. companies in manufacturing, construction, distribution 
and services [rejecting hypothesis (A) but in the opposing direction]. This contradicted 
Mansfield (1962) findings. Singh and Whittington (1975) also found that the dispersion 
of growth rates declines with an increases in firm size [rejecting hypothesis (B)] and 
that there was some evidence of persistence in growth rates of firms over the period 
[rejecting hypothesis (C)]. The latter findings are incompatible with Gibrats Law of 
proportionate effect in its strongest sense.
Rather than suggesting a positive relationship between growth and size, as found 
by Singh and Whittington (1975), a number of later empirical studies agreed with 
Mansfield (1962) and suggested a negative relationship between growth and size 
indicating that smaller firms have higher and more variable growth rates (Half 1987; 
Evans 1987a,b; Dunne et aL, 1989a; Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Hart and Oulton, 1996, 
1998). These studies found evidence which failed to corroborate the law of 
proportionate effect, even after solving for econometric issues, such as the problems of 
sample censoring, the specification of an appropriate functional relationship and the 
problem of heteroskedasticity. Given the lack of support for Gibrat’s Law and the 
mechanistic nature of the model, these studies included age as an additional explanatory 
variable, to test a rival approach based on the writings of Jovanovic (1982).
3.2.2 Studies in United States
Hall (1987) tried to tackle directly such econometric problems, and, in 
particular, the problem posed by sample selection bias, using a sample of publicly 
traded manufacturing firms in the U.S. She found an inverse relationship between size 
and growth even when the growth equation was corrected for sample selection bias, 
heteroscedasticity and functional specification [rejecting hypothesis (A)]. These 
econometric problems had no appreciable effect on the results even though size was 
found to be significantly positively related to survival. However, she did find that 
Gibrat’s Law was closer to holding for large firms than for small firms. In addition,
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Hall (1987) included the logarithms of capital and R&D expenditure as additional 
explanatory variables. She found that expenditure on R&D was a stronger predictor of 
growth than expenditure on capital, but that these variables did very little to reduce the 
variance of growth rates. Firms which did no R&D, grew on average about 1-2% more 
slowly than those that did undertake R&D.
Hall (1987) did not include age as an additional variable, but other studies 
(Evans 1987a, b; Dunne et al., 1989a) did include age as an additional variable, to 
improve the economic interpretation of Gibrat’s model based on Jovanovic’s (1982) 
lifecycle hypothesis. To explain the discrepancy between the theory of Gibrat’s Law of 
proportionate growth and empirical evidence, Jovanovic (1982) proposed a theory of 
“noisy” selection. This theory emphasises managerial efficiency and learning by doing 
as the factors determining a firm’s growth dynamics1. The general argument is that 
following entry into a market owner-managers learn about their efficiency (or their true 
costs) overtime. Efficient firms grow and survive, while inefficient firms decline and 
fail. Size differences are explained not only by the fixity of capital, but also by the 
productive efficiency of the firms. Firm growth and survival are linked to the firm’s 
size, age and initial production efficiency, implying that younger firms tend to grow 
faster than older ones. Based on this approach, the role of age was incorporated into 
models as an additional variable to capture lifecycle effects in tests of Gibrat’s Law. 
Jovanovic (1982) rejects Gibrat’s Law for young firms but suggests that firm growth 
rates may be independent of size among mature firms; “growth rates are to be equal 
among mature firms'” (p.65).
The contribution of U.S. studies by Evans (1987a, b) and Dunne et al. (1989a) 
lay in the data and the inclusion of age and number of plants as additional variables.1 2
1 Parkes and Ericson (1998) sought to test the Jovanovic’s, (1982) passive learning model in competition
with their own active learning model. The test (on Wisconsin State data) suggest that the passive learning 
model fits the retailing sector well, while manufacturing shows patterns that suggest active learning. 
According to Caves (1998), the test is skillful and suggestive but also suffers in that passive and active 
learning are not mutually exclusive: “opportunities for both could be abundant in one industry and scarce 
in another'XyA95T). -
2 Many investigations of Gibrat’s Law used Evans (1987b) empirical model given by S(t’)=[G(A(t), 
S(t))]TS(t)e(t) where S is firm size, G is a growth function, A is firm age, t is time where t’>t, T=t’-t, and e 
is a lognormally distributed error term (see Liu et al, 1999; Reid, 1993; Variyam and Kraybill, 1992). 
This equation suggested the following regression framework;
(Ln Sf-Ln St) /t = Ln G(At, S,) + u,
where ut is normally distributed with mean zero and independent of A(t) and S(t). The latter was 
normally estimated using a second order expansion of Ln G(Ab St) yielding
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Both databases covered the full range of sizes and ages (see Table 3.1). These studies 
unraveled the roles played by firm age and firm size as determinants of growth, while 
also correcting for sample selection, functional form and heteroscedasticity. The studies 
of Evans (1987a, b) and Dunne et al. (1989a) suggested a number of statistical 
regularities. First, they found that the probability of survival increases with firm (or 
plant) size. Second, they found that an inverse relationship existed between the 
proportional rate of growth of a firm (or plant) and firm size, conditional on survival. 
Third, they found that an inverse relationship between the proportional rate of growth of 
the firm (or plant) and age for any given size of firm (or plant). Finally, they found that 
the probability of survival of the firm (or plant) was found to increase with age for any 
size of firm (or plant). The implication of this is that older and larger firms have lower 
growth rates but are more likely to survive and vice versa. Thus, these studies rejected 
Gibrat’s Law and supported Jovanovic’s (1982) lifecycle hypothesis. In addition, Evans 
(1987a) rejected Gibrat’s Law for mature firms defined as firms older than age 7, 20 or 
45. Therefore, he found no evidence supporting Jovanovic’s (1982) special case, stating 
that firm growth is independent of size for mature firms.
3.3.3 Studies in the United Kingdom
Evidence for the U.S. firms found by Hall (1987), Evans (1987a,b) and Dunne et 
al. (1989a) was supported by Reid (1993), Dunne and Hughes (1994) and Hart and 
Oulton (1996, 1998) using data for U.K. firms. Using data on small business 
enterprises in Scotland employing less than 100 employees, Reid (1993) found an 
inverse relationship between firm size and firm growth when size was measured by net 
assets and by sales. Age was also found to be inversely related to the rate of growth. 
These findings support Jovanovic’s (1982) rival hypothesis. Reid (1993) held that 
sample selection bias was not a problem for his sample of Scottish small businesses 
because a large proportion of the firms in the sample survived over the period 
examined. He found that sample selectivity had no appreciable effect on the results, as 
the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio was not significant in estimates of the growth 
equation. The inverse Mills ratio was obtained from estimates of a probit model of 
small firm survival.
Ln G = Po +piLn S +p2 Ln A +p3 (Ln S)2 +p4(Ln A)2 + p5 (Ln S)(Ln A) + u.
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By contrast, Dunne and Hughes (1994) found that smaller firms, which grow 
more slowly, were more predisposed to exit than larger companies, which grow more 
slowly, in a sample of quoted and unquoted U.K. companies. They specifically account 
for sample selection bias by re-estimating their ordinary least squares size-age-growth 
model within a maximum likelihood sample selection model framework employing a 
probit analysis of survival by size and age. They show that smaller companies grew 
faster than larger companies amongst quoted and unquoted UK companies in the period 
1975-1985 [rejecting hypothesis (A)].3 The variance of small companies growth rates 
was also higher relative to larger companies [rejecting hypothesis (B)]. Despite little 
persistence being found in growth rates from one period to another [accepting 
hypothesis (C)], in general Gibrat’s Law did not hold for smaller firms. However, there 
was some support that it did hold for larger firms. They found evidence of threshold 
effects in net assets, where small firms are adjusting upwards towards some minimum 
efficient scale of production, whilst firms at, or above, the threshold scale have 
essentially stochastic growth properties (Davies and Lyons, 1982; Simon and Bonini, 
1958).
Dunne and Hughes (1994) also found age to be negatively related to growth, 
supporting Jovanovic’s (1982) model. They argued that age, rather than smallness per 
se, produced higher variance of growth rates.4 This result was found to hold in fifteen 
out of nineteen industries. Young firms are perhaps inexperienced and make more 
mistakes. Older, and larger, firms have greater stability in growth as these firms have 
more precise knowledge of their cost structures and efficiency levels, and are 
consequently less likely to revise their investment plans. Dunne and Hughes’s (1994) 
results are not an artilact of sample selection bias, which is consistent with the findings 
of U.S. studies. Dunne and Hughes’s (1994) examination of death rates shows that 
smaller firms had the largest death rates but that the smallest, and largest, firms were 
less subject to takeover.
Hart and Oulton (1996) examine the size and growth of surviving companies in 
a large database covering over 80,000 independent UK companies. They find that 
growth was negatively related to initial size for the sample as a whole. This result was
3 Very small firms were underrepresented in Dunne and Hughes’s (1994) sample.
4 Hart (2000) believed that the influence of age was weakening as firms can travel down the learning 
curve much quicker given the greater diffusion of knowledge.
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found using a Galtonian regression towards the mean for one, two and four years 
between 1989-93 and measuring size using employment, sales and net assets. However, 
when the sample was broken down by size group, Hart and Oulton (1996) found that 
regression towards the mean only occurred for very small firms (i.e. those with eight 
employees or less). They found no relationship between size and growth for larger size 
classes. They qualify their findings by stating that the results could be due to transitoiy 
factors such as poor reporting of accounting data by small firms, turbulence, failure to 
account for sample censoring etc. In a further study, Hart and Oulton (1998) in 
examining 8,103 survivors over three cyclical phases, 1986-89 (boom), 1989-92 
(recession) and 1993-1995 (recovery) found that small firms grew fester than larger 
firms over each cyclical phase. This result held when the data were disaggregated by 
S.I.C. (Standard Industrial Classification) codes. Younger firms were also found to 
grow fester than older firms, over each phase studied.
3.3.4 Recent Developments
The empirical literature has undergone a number of developments in recent 
years. In particular, in specifying the growth equations and survival models researchers 
have included firm characteristics other than size and age. Examples include ownership 
structure (Dunne et. al 1989a; FitzRoy and Kraft, 1991; Variyam and Kraybill, 1992), 
R&D, innovative activities or new technology (Hall, 1987; FitzRoy and Kraft, 1991; 
Doms et al. 1995; Liu et al. 1999), financial structure (Heshmati, 2001), human capital 
embodied in the proprietor (Heshmati, 2001; McPherson, 1996; Liu et. al, 1999) and 
export activities (Liu et. al, 1999; FitzRoy and Kraft, 1991).
As regards ownership structure Dunne et al. (1989a) and Variyam and Kraybill 
(1992) found that smaller firms that are part of a larger multiple establishment firms 
have significantly higher growth rates than single establishment firms. On a different 
vein, FitzRoy and Kraft (1991) found that capital ownership by top management had a 
positive but insignificant influence on firm growth for a sample of West German metal­
working firms. On the other hand, profit sharing by employees had a positive and 
significant influence on growth. Many researchers have emphasised the role of R&D 
on firm growth, finding that more innovative firms tend to grow faster (see Hall, 1987). 
FitzRoy and Kraft (1991) also found that innovation was positively correlated to 
growth. Doms et al. (1995) found that capital intensive plants, employing advanced
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technology, have higher growth rates, and are less likely to fail (see section 3.4.2.6 
below). Liu et al. (1999) found that plants that undertook R&D or imported technology 
tended to grow faster than those that did not. They found no significant growth 
differences between exporters and non-exporters, but higher labour productivity was 
found to increase plant growth. Heshmati (2001) found that indebtedness negatively 
(positively) affects the growth rates of assets (sales) while it has no impact on 
employment. Log profitability was found to have a positive impact on sales growth and 
labour market and human capital variables showed little positive impact on the growth 
of firms. By contrast, FitzRoy and Kraft (1991) find that the proportion of workers with 
higher education had a positive and significant effect on firm growth. Furthermore, 
McPherson (1996) found for a sample of medium sized enterprises in developing 
countries in Africa that human capital embodied in the entrepreneur had a positive 
influence on employment growth.
More detailed specifications of survival equations were also developed. 
Heshmati, (2001) included the debt to equity ratio, a measure of capital intensity, 
profitability, average length of education, age and the percentage with higher education. 
In the survival equation, Heshmati (2001) found age to be positively related to the 
survival probability, but at a decreasing rate. Capital intensity, and share of the 
population at working age, have negative associations with the survival probability of 
firms, while degrees of indebtedness, profitability and average length of education are 
found to have a positive effect on the survival probability. Time effects were also 
included and were negative indicating a lower survival probability over time compared 
to the reference period, 1995.
Advances have also taken place in the estimation methods used to test Gibrat’s 
Law. In general, the results of the relationship between growth, size and age 
relationship were sensitive to the method of estimation adopted. For example, Liu et al. 
(1999) accounted for unobserved heterogeneity among plants other than size, age, 
capital labour ratios and labour productivity, by estimating a fixed effects model. The 
plant specific constant term captured the difference in growth processes among plants 
with the same observed characteristics. The results of this estimation differed from the 
ordinary least squares estimation, in that the strong impact of R&D and technology 
imports was no longer statistically significant. The sign on the age regressor changed
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from negative to positive. In addition, for micro and small firms in Sweden between 
1993 and 1998, Heshmati (2001) found the results of the relationship between growth, 
size and age of firms was very sensitive with respect to not only the method of 
estimation (5 methods5) but also to the functional form (three different specifications) 
and the definition of growth and size (whether employment, sales or assets). For 
example, in the GLS estimation, the relationship between growth and size was found to 
be negative in the employment model, while it was positive in the sales models. The 
size effect in the assets model was insignificant. The negative relationship between age 
and growth of firms predicted by Jovanovic (1982) was found to hold in the 
employment model, while it was positive in the assets and sales growth models.
3.3.5 Conclusions
From this survey of the literature on firm growth, it is seen that firm survival 
was treated as a secondary issue. Firm survival was raised as an issue by Mansfield 
(1962) in tests of Gibrat’s Law, as it was found that small, slow growing, firms were 
more likely to fail than large, slow growing, firms. By implication, an analysis of 
growth rates, by size of firm, based on survivors alone, would be biased towards finding 
an inverse size growth relationship. Researchers such as Hall (1987) for the U.S. and 
Dunne and Hughes (1994) for the U.K. explicitly corrected for sample selection bias, 
but found that it had no appreciable influence on the results. In general, Gibrat’s Law 
was found not to hold at least for small firms in the U.S. and U.K. Size was found to be 
inversely related to growth, implying that smaller firms grew by more than larger firms. 
Age was also found to be inversely related to growth, supporting Jovanovic’s (1982) 
rival hypothesis. Younger firms were more likely to grow fester than older firms. In 
survival models, age and size were found to be positively related to survival. In recent 
years, studies have accounted for sources of observed heterogeneities among firms, and 
also, through advances in estimation techniques, sources of unobserved heterogeneities. 
In any event, Gibrat’s Law was rejected, at least for small firms. There is some 
rudimentary support that it may hold for large firms (see Hall, 1987; Dunne and 
Hughes, 1994, Hart and Oulton, 1996). In general, Heshmati (2001) found the results to 
be sensitive to the estimation method, the functional relationship and the measure of 
size adopted. Given that Gibrat’s model has not been found to hold, Cloughan (1995)
5 The estimation methods adopted include pooled ordinary least squares, between, within, generalised 
least squares and a dynamic adjustment model.
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called for researchers to build augmented models consistent with facts already 
generated, rather testing the validity of the law of proportionate effect.
3.3 Post Entry Performance
According to Audretsch and Mata (1995), understanding the post entry 
performance of firms is important, because it sheds light on the selection process of 
markets, enabling some firms to survive and grow while others stagnate, and ultimately 
exit. They state, “ To understand accurately the process by which new firms become 
established in an industry, as well as the influence they exert upon that industry, it is 
apparently important to focus on the post-entry performance of firms as well as the 
process of entry itself” (p. 415). The literature on post entry performance to date has 
examined factors which determine the probability of firms exiting from the market for 
cohorts of new entrants. It examines whether similar factors govern post entry growth. 
The maturation process of the new entrant is also investigated, to analyse whether, for 
instance, barriers to survival are weakened, and whether factors which once were 
barriers to survival, now aid in the promotion of the small firm’s survival. Other studies 
examine whether firm specific variables such as location (Fotopoulus and Louri, 
2000a), networks and local environment (Litunen, 2000), use of advanced technologies 
(Doms et al., 1995) effect small firm survival and/or growth.
It has been found that variables specific to the firm, as well as variables specific 
to the industry, affect the hazard faced by new entrants and their subsequent growth and 
performance. Early studies examined solely industry specific factors, because of the 
lack of availability of longitudinal datasets on cohorts of new entrants (see Audretsch, 
1991). Longitudinal databases of cohorts of new entrants were analysed in the mid 
nineties following evidence from Mata (1994) on the importance of accounting for 
variation at the industry and firm levels. Mata (1994) rejected the null hypothesis that 
there were no industry and firm specific effects, using a firm fixed effects model. Mata 
(1994) argued that lailure to take firm specific effects into account could lead to biased 
estimates of the effect of size on growth rates. Subsequent studies have included firm 
specific attributes to model producer heterogeneity in hazard and growth models (Mata 
and Portugal, 1994; Audretsch, 1995; Mata et al. 1995). At the firm level, size, 
ownership status, life cycle stage, location, technology employed and financial structure
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are among the most renowned determinants of firm survival. At the industry level, 
entry barriers affecting industry contestability and technology conditions were found to 
play a significant role in determining hazard rates. The role played by macroeconomic 
conditions in facilitating, or obstructing, survival was also examined.
This Section examines the role played by industry specific, firm specific and 
macroeconomic conditions, in empirical studies examining post entry survival, growth 
and performance. Where relevant, the Section refers to how the strength of these factors 
in influencing the survival of the small firm has changed as the firm matures. It begins 
by examining industry variables in Sub-section 3.3.1, then examines firm specific 
variables in Sub-section 3.3.2 and finally examines variables capturing the economic 
cycle in Sub-section 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Industry Effects
This Sub-section analyses the influence of the more celebrated industry 
variables on post entry growth and performance. Early studies on the survival of small 
firms solely deployed explanatory variables defined at the industry level, such as 
industry concentration, industry growth, capital intensity, innovation rate and measures 
of economies of scale. Greater availability of longitudinal data at industry level (rather 
than at the plant or firm level) enabled researchers to analyse whether certain industry 
factors encouraged or others negated the survival of firms. Two main studies 
concentrated on the effects of industry variables on firm survival, Audretsch (1991), and 
Audretsch (1995). Both of these hypothesised that variation in the survival across 
industries was a result of differences in the underlying technological conditions and 
industry specific characteristics (e.g. the innovation rate, the extent of scale economies, 
growth). Audretsch (1991) used logit estimation to examine differences in the 
likelihood of survival, as a result of variation in industry conditions. A limitation of this 
study is that it could not link the characteristics of establishments or plants to survival or 
post entry performance. Audretsch (1995) advanced this earlier study by including firm 
specific variables, namely firm size and a dummy variable for multiplant ownership. 
Audretsch (1995) focused on systematic variation in post entry growth rates of 
surviving entrants as well as survival rates, through testing a hypothesis posited by 
Geroski (1995, p.435) that
“the growth and survival prospects of new firms will depend on their ability to 
learn about the environment and to link changes in their strategy choices to the
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changing configuration of that environment... (t)he more turbulent is the market 
environment, the more likely it is that firms will fail to cope. If the process of 
entry continually throws up new aspirants for market places then slow learning 
coupled with a turbulent environment means that high entry rates will be observed 
jointly with high failure rates. ”
In this hypothesis, learning and adaptation to changes in the firm’s environment are 
seen as vital for success, in terms of growth and survival. Opportunities for new firms 
to innovate influence the ability of the newcomer to survive and grow.
This Sub-section examines the findings of these two studies and also collates 
evidence from other studies, which included variables defined at the industry level as 
well as variables controlling for attributes of the firm and the economic cycle (see Mata 
and Portugal, 1994; Mata et al. 1995). The findings are examined under three 
subheadings namely, scale economies, technological regime and industry growth.
3.3.1.1 Scale Economies
Audretsch (1991) argues that most new entrants are small and tend to operate at 
a sub-optimal scale of output, at least in capital-intensive industries. Small firms face a 
larger cost disadvantage in industries where economies of scale play an important role. 
The larger the minimum efficient scale in the industry, the more difficult it is to attain it, 
and the less likely is the firm expected to survive. He qualifies this argument by stating 
that if price exceeds minimum average cost of the most efficient firms in these 
industries, the probability of newly established firms, which are operating at a 
suboptimal scale, surviving will be higher. He argues that small firms enter at a sub­
optimal scale because they are uncertain about their true ability, which they only learn 
through operating in the market (Jovanovic, 1982). The greater the cost disadvantage of 
the firm, the faster it will exit unless it can innovate, or find some other vehicle to grow.
Audretsch (1991) found evidence that the (ten year) survival rate was negatively 
influenced by the extent of scale economies and capital intensity. Scale economies were 
measured using the Comanor-Wilson (1967) approach6 and capital intensity by capital 
to labour ratios. Higher capital-to-labour ratios were associated with high economies of 
scale because capital equipment investment is lumpy in nature, and the use of larger 
machines tends to reduce unit costs, due to increased specialisation or greater utilisation 
rates. Despite evidence of a negative effect for the ten-year survival rate, Audretsch
6 Minimum efficient scale is measured as the mean size of the largest plants accounting for one half of the 
industry value of shipments.
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(1991) found that a high minimum efficient scale had a positive influence on survival 
over the short run (four year survival rate). He argued that this was a fimction of 
perhaps elevated price cost margins enabling new and sub-optimal sized firms to 
survive in the short run. In the long run, a high minimum efficient scale hampers the 
survival of the firm.
The relationship between economies of scale and survival is complex and 
perhaps non-linear. Audretsch (1995) found that the conditional likelihood of surviving 
an additional two years, for entrants that have already survived the first eight years, is 
unaffected by the extent of scale economies. Scale economies did not exert any 
influence on the likelihood of survival an additional two years, given that the firm 
survived in the early years. Such firms had perhaps overcome the barriers to survival; 
“/ZAe/ effect had dissipated within eight years subsequent to entry” (p. 454). Thus, 
Audretsch (1995) found that the determinants of survival are quite different, depending 
on the length of the period across which survival is measured.
Mata and Portugal (1994) included a measure of minimum efficient scale, and 
suboptimal scale, in an estimation Cox’s proportional hazards model for a sample of 
Portuguese manufacturing firms. Minimum efficient scale and sub-optimal scale were 
found to be insignificant. Mata and Portugal (1994) surmised that the variable firm 
start-up size, which was also included as a regressor in the hazards model, might be 
already capturing the effect of technological conditions on firm duration.
Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), in estimating Cox’s proportional hazard 
model, found that the coefficient on capital intensity was positive, indicating that the 
likelihood of survival tends to be lower in industries where economies of scale play an 
important role. This confirms Audretsch (1991) findings over the long-run and 
Audretsch (1995) findings for the formative years of trading. Audretsch and Mahmood 
(1995) do argue that the firm can reduce its exposure to the hazard risk by increasing the 
start-up size of the firm thereby closing the gap between the firm’s start-up size and the 
minimum efficient scale.
In general, the findings indicate that newcomers in industries where economies 
of scale play a role face a lower likelihood of survival. This risk can be reduced through 
entry at a higher start-up size, or if price-cost margins are higher, enabling smaller firms 
to survive in the short run. The effects of economies of scale are weakened once the
78
firm has survived the formative years of trading. At this stage, they no longer act as a 
barrier to survival.
3.3.1.2 Technological regime
The ability of a newcomer to innovate is influenced by what Nelson and Winter 
(1982) term as the ‘underlying technological regime’: "An entrepreneurial regime is 
one that is favourable to innovative entry and unfavourable to innovative activity by 
established firms; a routinised regime is one in which conditions are the other way 
around' (Winter, 1984 p.297). Gort and Klepper (1982) argued that the relative 
advantage between newly established firms and incumbent firms depends on the source 
of information leading to the innovation. If information based on nontransferabie 
experience in the market is an important input in generating innovative activity, then 
incumbent firms will tend to have the innovative advantage over new firms. This is 
consistent with Winter’s (1984) routinised regime. In this regime, the accumulated 
stock of non-transferable information is important, as it is not available to firms external 
to the industry. By contrast, when information outside of the industry is relatively 
important, newly established firms can have an innovative advantage over incumbent 
firms. This type of information can be used to gain an innovative advantage in an 
entrepreneurial regime. Given these characteristics of relative innovative advantage in 
the both regimes, age plays an important role (see Audretsch, 1991). The longer a firm 
survives in a routinised regime, the greater the probability of the firm gaining an 
innovative advantage. The longer the firm operates in an entrepreneurial regime, the 
lower the probability of the firm gaining an innovative advantage. The hypothesis 
introduced by Winter (1984) and Gort and Klepper (1982) was that technological and 
knowledge conditions determine the relative ease with which new firms were able to 
innovate and therefore survive.
While the concept of the technological regime is difficult to measure accurately, 
Acs and Audretsch (1987, 1988) found that the existence of the regimes could be 
inferred from the extent to which small firms are able to innovate in an industry, relative 
to the total level of innovative activity in that industry. They found that if the small 
firm innovation rate was high, relative to total innovation, that this reflected an 
entrepreneurial regime whereas a low small firm innovation rate, relative to total 
innovation, was more likely to reflect a routinised regime.
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Audretsch (1991) found considerable support for the hypothesis that new firm 
survival is influenced by technological regime for a sample of US manufacturing firms. 
In logit estimates of the survival equation (ten year survival rate), he found that the 
small firm innovative rate was positive and significant, holding the total amount of 
innovative activity constant. A higher ability of the small firms to innovative led to a 
higher survival rate (in entrepreneurial regimes). The converse is also true: a lower 
ability of the small firms to innovative, leads to a lower survival rate (a routinised 
regime). Over a short time frame (four year survival rate) Audretsch (1991) found that 
technological regime had no significant influence on survival.
In industries where innovative activity of small firms plays an important role, 
Audretsch (1995) found that the likelihood of new entrants’ surviving over a decade is 
lower than where innovative activity is less important. He found that small firms, 
which were able to survive, exhibit higher growth rates. At the same time, having 
survived the first few years, he found entrants, by operating in an innovative industry, 
actually raise their likelihood of survival. Therefore, the evidence suggests that a highly 
innovative environment wields a disparate effect on the post-entry performance of new 
entrants. Those firms which are able to adjust, and offer a viable product experience 
higher rates of growth and a greater likelihood of survival. However, entrants and 
certainly new firms that are not able to adjust and produce a viable product are faced 
with a lower likelihood of survival in highly innovative environments. Audretsch (1995) 
did find that a highly innovative environment constituted a barrier to survival in the 
years immediately post entry but that its effect diminishes over time. In fact, Audretsch 
(1995) found that the conditional likelihood of surviving an additional two years, for 
entrants that have already survived the first eight years, is actually greater in highly 
innovative industries. An environment which once constituted a barrier to survival now 
promotes the survival of the remaining firms and may provide a “haven of opportunities 
and a mechanism for compensating for scale and other size related disadvantages” 
(Audretsch, 1995, p. 455)
Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) also found that exposure of new establishments 
to risks tends to be greater in highly innovative environments (i.e. the coefficient on 
total innovation rate was positive and significant). The coefficient of the small firm 
innovation rate is negative indicating that higher levels of small firm innovation are
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associated with reduced hazard rates. The small firm can try to reduce its exposure to 
risks in innovative environments by raising its innovation rate. However, the 
coefficient on the small firm innovation rate was not statistically significant.
In general, it seems that a higher ability of the small firms to innovative leads to 
a higher survival rate. However, small firms only have an innovative advantage in 
entrepreneurial regimes. It is more difficult for a small firm to gain a foothold in a 
market characterised as a routinised regime. Innovative environments constitute a 
barrier to survival immediately post entry but if the firm survives, this barrier will 
become a mechanism, which will promote the survival of the firm.
3.3.1.3 Industry growth
In fast growing industries, market penetration can be achieved without causing 
much harm to competitors, and thus the likelihood that new entrants survive in such 
environments is higher. Post entry survival is more difficult in mature industries, which 
tend to be highly concentrated, because the risk of retaliation from incumbent firms, as 
the newcomer penetrates the market, is higher. On the other hand, it is during the first 
stages of the industry lifecycle that industries grow faster and that conditions in the 
industries are more unsettled, leading to the highest turnover rates (Gort and Klepper, 
1982). In this stage, firms enter the market by introducing new product innovations. 
Following the launch of new products, some firms survive and prosper, others fail and 
leave the market.
Audretsch (1991) and Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) found that industry 
growth positively influences survival, but its coefficient was not significant. On the 
other hand, Audretsch (1995) found that industry growth had a significant positive 
influence on survival and on growth. This effect did not dissipate with time. Audretsch 
(1995) argued that if industry growth is positive, and unanticipated, that it will result in 
higher price cost margins, thus facilitating the higher likelihood of survival than would 
other wise be the case. Elevated price cost margins attract newcomers into the industry, 
as they tend to compensate for size related cost disadvantages. However, high price 
cost margins were found by Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) to raise the hazard rate of 
new entrants in Cox’s proportional hazard model. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) 
explain this result by referring to fact that industries with elevated price cost margins
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tend to be concentrated. In these industries, it is easier for incumbents to detect and 
punish new entrants thus, lowering the probability of survival.
At the industry level, Mata et. al. (1995), in a Cox proportional hazards model, 
controlled for market dynamics by including the entry rate, the rate of growth and an 
interaction term between the two as explanatory variables. They found that new plants 
are more likely to live longer if they entered growing industries, or industries with little 
entry activity and visa versa. However, they also found that in industries cumulatively 
characterised by fast growth and high entry rates (captured by the interaction term) the 
expected duration of plants is shorter. This is consistent with Gort and Klepper (1982) 
findings.
Mata and Portugal (1994) found industry growth had a negative effect on the 
hazard rate, implying that firms which enter industries with faster growth rates have a 
higher likelihood of survival. This effect was found to be significant even after other 
measures of turbulence were controlled for. Mata and Portugal (1994) included a 
measure of industry size to capture the relationship between the extent of entry and 
market size. The coefficient on industry size was negative and significant indicating 
that a larger industry size lowered the hazard rate. Higher entry was found to raise the 
hazard rate whereas a higher entrant’s size was found to lower the hazard rate. Thus, 
high entry rates again here reduce the likelihood of survival of the firm.
In general, it was found that new plants are more likely to live longer if they 
entered growing industries. However if the industries are cumulatively characterised by 
fast growth and high entry rates (the interaction term) the expected duration of plants is 
shorter.
3.3.1.4 Conclusions
Economies of scale had a negative effect on the long-run survival of the new 
entrants, and therefore constituted a barrier to survival, although its effect (in the short 
run) may be negated because of the presence of high price cost margins. Scale 
economies have little influence on the continued survival of the surviving firms once 
they overcame these in the early years of trading. In the later years, they can actually 
promote the survival of the small firm. At this stage, the probability of surviving is 
higher in industries characterised by economies of scale than otherwise. New firm 
survival was also influenced by the technological regime. A higher ability of the small
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firm to innovate led to a higher survival rate and visa versa. Thus, newcomers entering 
industries, which are characterised as entrepreneurial, face a higher likelihood of 
survival, and a lower hazard rate, than in industries characterised by routinised regimes. 
Innovative activity is important for the survival of the small firm. Firms which 
successfully innovate, survive and grow. Firms which fail to innovate successfully, face 
a higher probability of exit. In general, newcomers who enter fast growing industries, 
or industries with little entry, have a higher likelihood of survival. When fast growth is 
combined with high rates of entry, newcomers have a shorter life expectancy.
3.3.2 Firm Effects
In the last ten years, researchers have gained access to a number of longitudinal 
databases on small firms, which enable them to identify cohorts of entrants and monitor 
their post-entry performance at the plant level (Mata and Portugal, 1994; Audretsch, 
1995; Boeri and Bellman, 1995). This enabled these researchers to identify firm exit, 
firm growth and alterations in firm specific attributes over time, following entry. The 
aim of this Sub-section is to recount the influence of firm-specific factors on the growth 
and survival of the small firm. Through surveying the existing literature on post-entry 
performance the main firm specific characteristics referred to include size, lifecycle 
stage, ownership status, location, technology employed and financial structure. 
Evidence on each of these is provided in turn below.
3.3.2.1 Size
As discussed in Section 3.2, Evans (1987a, b), Hall (1987) and Dunne et al. 
(1989a), using US data, found that the likelihood of survival is positively related to 
initial size but that growth rates (at least for small or young firms) tend to be negatively 
related to initial size. Subsequent studies for Canada (Baldwin, 1995), the UK (Dunne 
and Hughes, 1994), Portugal (Mata and Portugal, 1994; Mata et al., 1995) and Germany 
(Wagner, 1994) have confirmed that these relationships are not specific to the U.S. 
Start-up size was empirically established to exert a significant negative effect on the 
hazard rate and thus, a positive influence on survival, because the larger this size, the 
less distance is to be covered by newcomers, in approaching an industries minimum 
efficient size (see Mata and Portugal, 1994). New starts, with a larger initial size, were 
arguably less handicapped when compared with more cost effective incumbent firms. 
Furthermore, a larger initial size signalled greater prior expectations of success (see
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Mata and Portugal, 1994). Such firms had greater access to finance and more able 
management.
Mata et. al. (1995) argued that current size should be a better predictor of failure 
than initial size, because it indicates the small firm’s current level of efficiency and 
whether the small firm grew post entry. Firms, which grow post entry are assumed to 
have better expectations about their efficiency and are assumed to have a lower 
likelihood of exit in subsequent periods. Their findings indicate that current plant size 
is an important determinant of the chances of survival. A higher current plant size was 
found to improve the chances of survival in the estimation of Cox’s proportional 
hazards model, for the sample of Portuguese manufacturing firms. This gives some 
support to Jovanovic’s (1982) model, which emphasises post-entry learning as an 
important determinant of survival.
Mata et. al. (1995) argue that, after taking current size into account, past growth 
should not matter. In accordance with Jovanovic’s (1982) model, current size should be 
a sufficient statistic for predicting survival at each age. However, they found that after 
controlling for differences in current size, the coefficient on initial size was still found 
to be significant, thereby suggesting that past growth matters for survival. Mata et. al 
(1995) explain this result by stating that current size may differ from desired size, 
whereas in Jovanovic’s model both of these variables coincide. Small firms may not be 
able to adjust instantaneously in response to observed market criteria. A partial 
adjustment process for firm size in the post entry period is suggested, due to the 
existence of adjustment costs. The coefficient on initial size was positive, which at first 
sight is counterintuitive. However, according to Mata et al. (1995), this indicates that 
for firms of a given size, those which started smaller, laced a higher probability of 
survival. They experienced fester post entry growth
Agarwal and Audretsch (1999) offer evidence that refines the stylised regularity 
that "firm size is correlated with the survival of entrants" (Geroski, 1995, p.434). 
Consistent with Jovanovic’s (1982) model, they find that, in the formative years, smaller 
firms have a lower likelihood of survival, but that in the mature stage of the firm’s 
lifecycle, the small firm can overcome size disadvantage, by occupying a market niche. 
They found no evidence of a positive relationship between size and survival, in the
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latter stage of the lifecycle. An important implication of this view is that firms do not 
necessarily need to grow to survive.
In general, size was found to be positively related to survival and negatively 
related to growth. The larger the small firm’s initial size, the higher its chances of 
survival. This is particularly true in the formative years of the life of the firm. In the 
latter years, the small firm can occupy a market niche, thereby protecting itself from 
size related disadvantage. Current size was also found to a good predictor of survival 
but initial size was still found to matter, arguably because adjustment costs exist in 
adapting size to new information about the firm’s level of efficiency.
3.3.2.2 Age
Boeri and Bellman (1995) finds that the single most important determinant of 
exit is age, when they examined the relationship between growth and exit of entering 
cohorts, and aggregate business fluctuations, for West German manufacturing firms. 
This evidence is consistent with previous studies in other contexts, which found that 
exit probabilities were strongly declining with age (see Evans, 1987 a, b; Dunne et al. 
1989a; Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Heshmati, 2001) and that age was inversely related to 
growth (Evans 1987a, b; Liu et. al., 1999; Reid, 1993; Dunne et. al. 1989a, Variyam 
and Kraybill, 1992; Dunne and Hughes, 1994). An observation of a clear positive 
correlation between survival and age is in harmony with learning models of the firm 
(Jovanovic, 1982; Parkes and Ericsson, 1998) where the firm accumulates basic 
competitive assets, skills and knowledge about its efficiency over time. Such models 
predict that the oldest units have a lower probability of exit and grow less than young 
plants, which is consistent with a large body of empirical literature. Age influences the 
probability of exit directly from this perspective.
Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman (1995) examine the maturation process of firms that 
enter an industry by constructing new plants in Canada between 1970-1982. They 
investigate the extent to which improvements in the performance of an entry cohort are 
the result of a selection process, which weeds out the most inefficient entrants, or a 
learning process, that allows survivors to improve their performance, relative to 
incumbent firms. According to Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman (1995), the formative years 
of trading differ from the latter years, because the small firm is playing a game of catch­
up (in size, wages, labour productivity and profitability) with incumbent firms. Weaker
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firms are being culled over this period. In industries where a new firm's ability to close 
the gap is important, evolutionary learning7 plays a significant role, whereas in 
industries where initial conditions are more important, selection8 plays a more 
significant role. Selection was found to dominate evolutionary learning at birth (in 
labour productivity). The market selects the strongest and most efficient firms (superior 
products, management etc.). Then survivors grow (through learning) to close the gap 
with incumbents. Thus both selection and evolutionary learning are found to affect 
post-entry performance. Selection intensity was found to be more closely related to 
survival rates, whereas evolutionaiy learning was found to be related to survivor 
growth. Together they both affect the entry cohorts post entiy growth though in 
different ways.
The relationship between age and survival is not linear because inter­
generational effects were found to have an impact on the lifecycle behaviour of mature 
small family firms. According to Lotti and Santarelli (2002), small Italian family firms 
in manufacturing, retailing and the hospitality sector face a higher risk of sudden exit 
after their thirtieth year (one generation). Thus, as the firm ages (approaches its thirtieth 
year) the likelihood of exit increases, particularly in the context of small family firms, 
for which there may be little or no trade-sale market.
Another example of potential sources of non-linearities in the age survival 
relationship, in newly established businesses, was found by Mahmood (2000) who 
relied on theoretical arguments from organisational ecologists9. He finds support for the 
‘liability of adolescence’ hypothesis, which states that new firm hazards rates follow an 
inverted U pattern, using a log-logistic model. Organisational ecologists argue that the 
hazard rate is low for the initial period, as newly founded organisations have a stock of 
initial resources to help them to survive; the organisation establishes itself during 
‘adolescence’ with these resources. At the end of ‘adolescence’, when these resources 
are used up, a final evacuation is made, marked by a hazard maximum. After this point
7 Evolutionary learning occurs in industries where exit is more or less random, or at least where it is not 
based on initial efficiency conditions and where substantial progress is made on the part of the surviving 
entrants in closing the initial gap that entrants have with incumbents (e.g. wage cost, labour productivity, 
profits etc)
8 Learning here is essentially accomplished by selection, that is, firms learn about their relative abilities at 
birth via the selection process, see Jovanovic (1982).
9 See Stinchcombe (1965) writings on the liability of newness which hypothesised an age dependent 
decline in organisational death rates.
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the hazard rate declines monotonically, and the usual decline in death rates apply as the 
firm ages. Mahmood (2000) finds that disaggregation of industries matters in his 
analysis, using U.S. data, and that considerable differences exist in the length of 
‘adolescence’ amongst industries.
Age generally has a positive effect on survival, and a negative effect on growth, 
indicating that older firms are expected to live longer and grow at a lower rate. Sources 
of non-linearities have been found in the relationship between survival and age early in 
the life of the firm, and in the latter years when the owner-manager is retiring from the 
business. Mahmood (2000) argues that once the start-up capital has been used up in the 
formative years, the firm feces a maximum hazard, whereas Lotti and Santerelli argues 
that the firm faces a sudden risk of exit in the thirtieth year of its life, due to 
intergenerational effects. There is perhaps a similarity in the timing of Mahmood’s 
liability of adolescence, and the intensity of selection noted by Baldwin and 
Rafiquzzaman (1995). The latter argue that, at birth, the hazard rate is high, because 
market selection criteria cull out weaker firms. If the firm survives the selection 
process, then evolutionary learning plays a stronger role, in which the firm plays a game 
of catch-up with incumbent firms.
3.3.2.3 Financial Structure
Brito and Mello (1995) develop a model examining the relationship between 
financial constraints, and post entry performance. In this model, firms finance 
production by using internally generated funds and external loans. There is asymmetric 
information between those that own, and those that control the assets of the firm and the 
banks. The banks are uncertain about the small young firm’s quality and output price, 
so external loan finance at this stage in the lifecycle is only available at a higher cost for 
these firms. As time evolves, the banks learn about the firm, and adjust the terms of the 
loan contract. As a consequence, firms do not have equal access to credit. Small young 
firms fece greater binding debt constraints than more mature firms with well-known 
prospects. Credit is perhaps rationed to smaller firms (Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990) 
due to asymmetric information between lenders and smaller firms (Berger and Udell, 
1998). As a result, lenders wish to limit their exposure to perceived riskier projects (see 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Petersen and Rajan, 1994).
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The existence of liquidity constraints forces firms to start smaller than 
unconstrained firms (see Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994 for some evidence on this effect). 
These firms operate at cost disadvantage, because they are short of cash. They are less 
able to sustain unexpected losses, even for a limited period. Both these reasons make 
them more likely to die. Among survivors, however, growth is likely to occur. On the 
one hand, accumulated profits can be used to finance expansion. Furthermore, access to 
external finance can be improved, because the banks get better signals of the firm’s 
abilities (see Brito and Mello, 1995).
In examining the survival of small business start-ups, Reid (1991) found that 
gearing had a significant negative effect on small firm survival.10 This is consistent 
with Fotopoulus and Lord’s (2000a) findings for Greek firms. A higher level of 
leverage (defined by the ratio of current and medium to long-term liabilities over total 
assets) was found to raise the firm’s hazard rate. Reid (2003) found that the optimal 
strategy for highly geared small firms, given that debt is more expensive than equity, is 
to retire debt early in its lifecycle. Later in the firms lifecycle many forms of capital 
could be appropriate to the long-run survival of a specific firm, if equity finance is a 
cheaper source of finance capital. However, in general, for a higher level of external 
liabilities, a lower level of performance is expected.
There is evidence that owners of small firms have a clear preference for sources 
of financing that minimise intrusion into their business. According to Lopez-Gracia and 
Aybar-Arias (2000), financing is based on: firstly, personal savings and resources 
generated internally; secondly, short or long term debt; and thirdly, least preferred of all, 
new share issues that dilute control. This corresponds to the pecking order theory of 
optimal capital financial structure as proposed by Myers (1984). Chittenden et al. 
(1996) also test, and show the relevance of, this theory in a small firm context and 
highlight the tendency for control aversion in small medium sized enterprises.
In general, small young firms were found to face more binding debt constraints 
than more mature small firms whose prospects were well known by lenders. This limits 
the growth of small firms early in their life, and forces them to start smaller than
10 Heshmati (2001) found that the debt to equity ratio had a positive effect on survival for a sample of 
micro and small Swedish firms. This contradicts Reid’s (1991) findings. Heshmati (2001) found that the 
debt to equity ratio negatively (positively) affects the growth rate of assets (sales), while it has no impact 
on employment.
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unconstrained firms. Highly geared firms were found to face a greater risk of failure, 
and, as a result, small firms tend to retire debt early.
3.3.2.4 Ownership
Mata et al. (1995) classify a new plant according to the parent company, and the 
firm’s pervious experience in the industry. De novo entrants were split into two 
categories: single plants; and multiple plants. Plants which were created by already 
established firms were classified as ‘experienced entrants’ and ‘diversifying entrants’. 
Experienced entrants were established by parents who were already operating in the 
industry, whereas diversified entrants were established by a parent who had no activities 
in the industry. Mata et al. (1995) found that de novo entrants (especially single plants) 
exhibited lower failure rates than experienced entry, and more diversified entry, using a 
model estimated by Cox’s proportional hazards model, for cohorts of Portuguese 
entrants. Experienced entrants displayed the next lowest failure rates, followed by 
diversified entrants, which were most likely to close. This did not conform to 
descriptive evidence for the US, which indicates that de novo entrants experience higher 
failure rates than diversified entrants (see Dunne et al., 1988). Moreover, using Cox’s 
proportional hazards model, Mata and Portugal (1994) found that multi-plant firms had 
a lower hazard rate than independent entrants for Portuguese data.
However, Mata et al. (1995) had findings which were consistent the findings of 
Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), and with explanations put forth by Baden-Fuller 
(1989) and Reynolds (1988) regarding the closure of plants by multi-plant firms. 
According to Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), the hazard confronting branches of 
multi-plant firms, subsidiary firms, and firms participating in other firms is higher than 
that of single-plant entrants. Baden-Fuller (1989) found that multi-plant firms have 
higher likelihood of closing plants, due to their greater efficiency in re-employing their 
labour and productive facilities. Reynolds (1988) suggested that multi-plant firms are 
more likely to close plants because, unlike single unit firms, their remaining plants 
benefit from the reduction in the number of suppliers.
As regards firm growth, Mata et al. (1995) found evidence that the ownership 
status of new entrants mattered. They found that de novo entrants grew faster than 
plants created by established firms and that diversified entrants experienced the lowest 
post entry growth. The latter were found to stay the same size as they were at start-up.
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Mata et al. (1995) argue that de novo entrants are expected to grow faster than plants 
created by established firms, because they start smaller at birth (due to cash constraints 
or uncertainty about the firms efficiency) and thus should receive larger marginal 
benefits from learning. These findings contrast with those of Dunne et al. (1989b), 
which report that among survivors in each cohort, new plants operated by previously 
established firms grew considerably fester than de novo entrants. Dunne et al. (1989a) 
found that the expected growth rate declines with size for single plant firms but 
increases with size for plants owned by multi-plant firms.
Here, there is conflicting evidence on the effect of ownership structure on the 
hazard rate, and on growth rates between earlier studies by Dunne et al. (1988, 1989a, 
b) and Mata and Portugal (1994), and later studies by Mata et al. (1995) and Audretsch 
and Mahmood (1995). Later studies hold that independent firms face a lower hazard 
rate, and grow fester, in comparison with multi-plant firms, whereas the opposite was 
found in earlier studies.
3.3.2.5 Location
According to Smallbone et al. (1993) and Storey (1994), there is a strong 
con-elation between a firm’s location and its growth. Storey (1994) found that firms 
located in urban and remote rural areas of the United Kingdom are likely to grow least 
rapidly than firms located in more accessible rural areas. However, Storey (1994) also 
found that geographical areas with high rates of new firm formation are also those with 
the highest death rates. According to Storey and Wynarczky (1996), the buoyancy of 
the locality is of great significance in explaining the survival or non-survival of young 
firms. Fotopoulos and Louri (2000a) introduce a spatial dimension to the analysis of 
firm survival, by examining whether the hazard facing new firms is significantly 
different, between major hubs and non-metropolitan areas. Fotopoulos and Louri 
(2000a) found that the location of Greek manufacturing firms in the capital (Athens), 
versus the rest of the country, affects survival positively, especially where smaller firms 
are concerned. In large metropolitan areas, the firms are close to suppliers, customers 
and skilled labour. In contrast, Littunen (2000) found that location did not influence the 
survival of the small firm in the early years of trading, for a sample of Finnish firms.
Overall, the evidence for location is mixed. In the U.K., firms located in a 
buoyant locality, or accessible rural areas, experience the highest growth rates. In other
90
European countries, a firm’s location either had no effect, or firms located in major hubs 
had a higher rate of survival.
3.3.2.6 Technology Employed
Doms et al. (1995) extend the empirical literature on plant growth and failure, 
by controlling for producer heterogeneities, arising from differences in the level, and 
type, of capital equipment used in the plant. They argued that capital usage was likely 
to have independent effects on the growth, and failure, of plants because of its fixed and 
sunk nature. They also argued that the use of advanced manufacturing technologies 
may directly increase plant productivity, and thus the likelihood of survival, and may be 
a proxy for unobserved managerial ability. Doms et al. (1995) control for variation in 
capital labour ratios, and differences in the number of advanced technologies (e.g. 
robotics, lasers, computer controlled equipment), in estimations of exit probabilities and 
post entry growth equations, for a sample of US manufacturing plants. The influence of 
the number of advanced manufacturing technologies used, rather than the intensity of 
usage, is examined. They find that capital-intensive plants, and plants employing 
advanced technology, have higher growth rates, and are less likely to fail. The effects 
are present after controlling for plant productivity and age. However, the measure of use 
of advanced manufacturing technologies is sensitive to the inclusion of size variables, 
particularly in the estimation of exit probabilities. When these variables are included in 
the exit equation, the influence of advanced manufacturing technologies employed on 
exit probabilities is severely weakened. Doms et al. (1995) argue that this is not 
surprising, given that technology usage is strongly positively correlated with size. In 
the estimation of plant growth equation, technology usage measures had a larger 
positive effect on growth when plant size was controlled for indicating a potentially 
important role for the nature of capital equipment in the growth process. Small US 
manufacturing plants were underrepresented in this study, thus the applicability of the 
results across the complete size distribution is unknown. Overall, plants employing 
advanced technologies were found to have higher growth rates, and to be less likely to 
fail, after differences in size, age and productivity were controlled for.
3.3.2.7 Conclusions
Having examined the effect of the more celebrated firm specific lactors which 
influence the survival and growth of the firm, this Sub-section summarises the
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influences of these factors on post entry performance. In general, firm size and age 
were positively related to firm survival, but negatively related to firm growth. 
However, nonlinearities were found to exist between age and the probability of exit, due 
to the liability of adolescence and the sudden risk of exit, once family firms reached 
their thirtieth year of operation. Diversified and experienced forms of entrants were 
found to be more likely to exit than de novo entrants. De novo entrants were also found 
to grow more quickly than other forms of entrants. This evidence however was not 
conclusive as it was found in some studies that multiplant firms have a lower hazard 
rate than single plant entrants (Dunne et al., 1988, 1989a, b; Mata and Portugal, 1994). 
Firms have greater access to finance as they age. However, liquidity constraints, due to 
credit rationing early in the lifecycle of the firm, may negatively impact upon the 
survival and growth of young small firms. Plants employing advanced technologies 
were found to have higher growth rates and to be less likely to foil. The effect of 
location was inconclusive. Evidence was mixed on the favourableness of urban and 
rural environments.
3.3.3 Economy
The effect of wider economic conditions on new firm survival has been dealt 
with in just a few papers. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) explicitly include variables 
such as the rate of unemployment and the real interest rate, which capture 
macroeconomic conditions. The rate of unemployment and the real rate of interest 
capture the link between the business cycle and exposure to risk of failure. These 
variables were expected to elevate the hazard rate. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) 
provide evidence that the hazard rate for new establishment is higher in downturns, as 
indicated by higher unemployment rates. A rather counterintuitive result in this study is 
the negative effect of interest rates on the hazard confronted by new firms. The 
explanation provided is that most firms in the US are not crucially dependent on 
external capital. Other explanations of this result were the length of the database. Five 
time periods may not have been sufficient to disentangle complicated links between the 
macroeconomic and the microeconomic environment at the level of plant establishment. 
Multicollinearity between the macroeceonomic growth rate and the real rate of interest 
may also have resulted in this counter intuitive finding.
92
Fotopoulos and Louri (2000a) also found evidence of the sensitivity of the 
hazard confronting new firms to the economic cycle. The evidence provided 
demonstrates that Greek firms established closer to economic downturns have an 
increased exposure to failure, probably because of the adverse market conditions that 
less experienced firms are laced with. However, while Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) 
and Fotopoulos and Louri (2000a) found that the economic cycle affected the hazard 
rate Boeri and Bellman (1995) on the other hand suggest that exit (aggregate hazard) in 
German manufacturing is not responsive to the economic cycle. Boeri and Bellmann 
(1995) examined the relationship between growth and exit rates on the one hand, and 
aggregate business fluctuations on the other, for a sample of West German plants. The 
period covered by the data was characterised by two cyclical peaks (1979 and 1990- 
1991) and one cyclical trough (1982-1992). According to Beori and Bellmann (1995), 
the finding that exit is not responsive to the cycle is at odds with views of recessions as 
times of cleansing, where creative destruction processes occur. They found that the 
number of jobs generated at start-up was lower for a cohort established during an 
economic downturn, than a cohort established in favourable economic conditions, but 
the employment performance of various cohorts after entry is not. However, in 
estimating the hazard fimction, the dynamics of aggregate unemployment was either not 
significant in affecting the exit probability, or entered the equation with the wrong sign. 
Hazard rates were procyclical (rather than increasing) during downturns, and decreasing 
during upturns. Two explanations were provided for this counter intuitive result: 1) 
High correlation between entry and exit rates may mean that firms in older cohorts are 
displaced by competition from newcomers; and 2) Heterogeneity in the performance of 
various industries with regard to economic cycles (e.g. some sectors may expand during 
economic downturns and visa versa).
The growth of survivors also displayed little cyclical sensitivity, but tends to 
become more responsive to aggregate business fluctuations as the cohorts of West 
German firms age (Boeri and Bellman, 1995). As plants get older, their performance is 
more and more influenced by aggregate business fluctuations. Older plants are more 
likely to shrink in response to exogenous shocks, as they are larger than new entrants, 
which are more likely to exit. This would render older firms more sensitive to the 
economic cycle. Boeri and Bellman (1995) put forward two further explanations for the
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role played by age on the post entry performance: 1) The product specialisation of 
young with respect to older units implies that new entrants tend to occupy market niches 
and gradually expand their market specialisation. In market niches, younger firms are 
more protected from exogenous shocks, whereas older expanded units may be more 
affected by cyclical conditions; and 2) Cost asymmetries between young and old firms, 
as a result of technological indivisibilities and irreversible investment in physical 
capital, arguably impose capacity constraints on young units. As a consequence, young 
units may not be in a position to expand production, in response to positive demand 
shocks. Older firms should have instead accumulated more physical capital over time, 
and may be operating below capacity when the shock occurs. They can therefore 
accommodate output expansion by adjusting their labour input only.
In general, there is some evidence to support the inclusion of variables, which 
measure the economic cycle in models of firm survival and post entry growth. 
Evidence was mixed on the sensitivity of hazard rates to the economic cycle. On the 
other hand, growth rates of young surviving firms were found to be insensitive to the 
economic cycle, whereas those of older firms were found to be sensitive to the cycle. In 
other words, sensitivity to the economic cycle was found to grow stronger as firms 
aged.
3.3.4 Conclusions
This Section sheds light on the post entry performance of firms. It explicitly 
examined the influence of variables defined at the industry, firm and economy level on 
the survival of the firm. The effect of these variables on post entry growth was also 
examined. Variables specific to the firm, industry and the economy were found to 
influence firm survival and growth. Broadly speaking, factors which fostered the 
survival of the firm at the industry level included industry growth and entry into 
entrepreneurial regimes, and, at the firm level, included age, size and use of advanced 
technologies. Factors which raised the probability of exit included, at the industry level, 
economies of scale and entry into routinised regimes; and at the firm level included 
credit rationing; and finally at the economy level included high unemployment. The 
influence of factors such as ownership structure and location were inconclusive. The 
negative effect of barriers to survival, such as economies of scale and credit rationing, 
weakens as the firm matures. Also, as the firm gets older, its rate of growth becomes
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more responsive to the economic cycle. It also faces a greater hazard risk as the firm 
approaches its thirtieth birthday.
The studies undertaken are comprehensive in that they account for 
heterogeneities defined at the firm, industry and economy level. However, the vast 
majority of these studies concentrate on factors which foster the survival of firms 
immediately post entry rather than on these firms in the mature stage of their lifecycle. 
There is a lack of data on long-lived small firms. This study gathered data on small 
firms in the latter years of their life to fill this evident gap in the literature. Existing 
hypotheses are challenged, using new data on long-lived small firms. Variables defined 
at the industry, firm and economy levels discussed above feed into the design of the 
survey instrumentation in Chapter 4. They were useful in identifying factors which aid 
the firm’s survival over the long haul (e.g. for the development of the long run 
performance indicator). To a lesser degree, they were useful in identifying precipitating 
influences of change and consequential adjustments.
3.4 General Conclusions
This Chapter examined evidence on factors which fostered the survival of small 
firms. In this regard, it considered two substantial branches of the literature. The first 
discussed the determinants of firm growth. The second discussed post entry 
performance. In the literature on the determinants of firm growth, survival was treated 
as a secondary issue. The problem of censorship increased the likelihood of finding an 
inverse relationship between growth and firm size, because small slow growing firms 
were more likely to fail than large slow growing firms. Models of firm survival and 
firm growth were estimated jointly, to overcome this issue of selectivity bias. It was not 
until the nineties that firm survival was examined in its own right, to shed light on the 
post entry performance of small firms. Initially, the effect of industry variables on firm 
exit and firm growth were examined, before sources of observed firm specific and 
economy wide variables were considered. This survey of the literature identified a 
number of factors at the firm, industry and economy level which fostered the survival of 
the firm. Relevant changes in these factors, as the firm matured, were also examined.
This thesis extends this literature in a number of ways. First data are gathered on 
mature small firms. These firms are older than those examined in the vast majority of
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studies considered in this survey of the literature, and thus they allow existing 
hypotheses to be challenged using this new data. Chapter 4 outlines features of the 
design of the survey instrumentation used for this study and presents the fieldwork 
methods adopted in gathering data on these long-lived small firms. Second, Chapter 5 
estimates models inspired by Gibrat’s Law over the life of the firm to resolve 
conflicting empirical evidence in support for this law outlined in Section 3.2. In 
addition, the measures gathered as part of the survey are related to firm growth and 
performance, in an exploratory data analysis presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The post 
entry performance of these firms is examined over a longer period (over 25 years on 
average). As the data available on non-survivors is limited, these Chapters are chiefly 
examining the post entry performance of the long-lived surviving firms. Fourth, 
Chapter 8 investigates whether small firm flexibility raises the performance of the firm, 
using a Heckman sample selection model (Lee 1982, 1983; Heckman, 1976, 1979; 
Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). Therefore, in this regard, it estimates a simple 
survival equation, examining factors which influence survival over an average of 
twenty-five years. Chapter 9 also examines a performance equation in a simultaneous 
equation system, which sheds light on endogeneities between long run performance, 
size and other attributes of the small surviving firms, such as market extent and 
competitive strategy. The cases profiles presented in Volume II, Appendix 5 also 
characterize the long-lived-small firms in the sample. They present qualitative evidence 
on the post entry performance of these firms. They illustrate how the small firm 
developed post entry to become a long-lived small firm.
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CHAPTER 4 FIELDWORK
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4.1 Introduction
The aim of this Chapter is threefold. First, this Chapter sets out to analyse the 
composition of the sample frame of long-lived small firms. This is followed by a 
discussion of the design of the survey instrument used in fieldwork and finally, the 
fieldwork methods adopted in this study are outlined. The contribution of each of these 
core elements is conveyed, briefly, before each element is examined comprehensively in 
the main body of this Chapter.
As explained in Chapter 1, a sample frame of 90 long-lived small firms was 
extracted from three “parent” samples of Scottish small business enterprises, namely 
Leverhulme (1985-1988), Telephone Survey (1991) and Leverhulme (1994-1997), for 
exposition purposes (see Table 1.1). Prof. Gavin Reid and co-researchers (Dr. Lowell 
Jacobsen, Dr. Margo Andersen and Dr. Julia Smith) interviewed the owner-managers of 
these small firms in the 1980s and 1990s. In this thesis, we recognise the value of re­
interviewing these firms after an extended period of time. The process of identification 
of the sample frame of ninety surviving small firms from the three parent samples is 
discussed in Section 4.2. The composition and representativeness of this sample frame 
are also explored. Identifying long-lived small firms from known sources, as 
undertaken here, ensures that data is available on non-survivors, which is useful in 
correcting performance estimates for sample selectivity bias (see Chapter 8).
A novel survey instrument was designed comprising of 5 sections1. Questions 
were constructed to extract information on the characteristics of the mature small firm, 
changes in the scale and scope of its operations, pivotal changes in the running of the 
firm, factors which fostered the survival of the firm and the level of innovativeness and 
the technological progressiveness of the firm. Two unique features of the design 
include: 1) an innovative way of calibrating organisational change; and 2) a 
multidimensional scale on which owner-managers self appraise the influence of items 
on the long run prospects of the firm. New measures of firm flexibility (see Chapter 8) 
and performance (see Chapter 6) are developed using the variables derived from these 
attributes of the instrument design. Section 4.3 provides a comprehensive explanation 
of the design of the survey instrument. Some amplification is also provided on the
1 Enterprise Ireland generously funded the survey on which this research is based under the International 
Collaboration Programme 2001 to 2002.
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usefulness of new measures in testing hypotheses. A copy of the survey instrument is 
presented in Volume II, Appendix 1.
The survey instrument was used to collect data in face-to-face interviews with 
owner-managers of long-lived small firms. Data on the measures included in the survey 
instrument have not been gathered previously for a sample of long-lived small firms, or 
in some instances, for any sample of firms. The quality of fieldwork methods applied is 
explored in Section 4.4. The survey instrument was carefully piloted. Data were 
collected in face-to-face interviews with owner-managers rather than through telephone 
interviews to improve response rates and the value of the data. The data were coded, 
entered into SPSS2 and cleaned prior to inferential analysis. A database was designed to 
ensure flexible analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data. A detailed data 
dictionary is provided in Volume II, Appendix 4.
The unique design of the survey instrument, and the data gathered using this 
instrument, is an important contribution of this study. Detailed data, of this nature, has 
not been gathered previously on long-lived small firms. It enables an in-depth analysis, 
of the characteristics of the mature small firm, and of the factors which influence their 
performance.
4.2 Sample Design
Long-lived small firms are defined in Section 1.1 as firms which were classified 
as small firms at inception, that have been trading for more than 10 years and still 
continue to trade. Similar definitions of maturity have been adopted by Smallbone et al. 
(1992,1995). Changes in the ownership, scale, principal activities and management of 
small firms do not alter this definition (or selection criterion). As discussed in Section 
2.2, firms can undergo a number of organisational changes and still be viewed as the 
same firm (i.e. the activities of the firm perpetuate). Firm death constitutes the 
discontinued existence of the small firm.
Long-lived small firms were identified for inclusion in the sample frame from 
three ‘parent’ samples of Scottish small business enterprises, Leverhulme (1985-1988), 
Telephone Survey (1991) and Leverhulme (1994-1997). The firm survival rates were 
found to be relatively low in two of the three parent samples [i.e. in Leverhulme (1985-
2 SPSS is an acronym for Statistical Package for the Social Scientist.
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1988) and the Telephone Survey (1991) samples]. Therefore, to obtain a larger sample 
of long-lived small firms for analysis, surviving firms from three parent samples needed 
to be combined (see Table 1.1 or Table 4.1 below). As Prof. Reid and his co-workers 
contacted the firms in the three parent samples previously, they provided a convenient 
set of known sources upon which fiirther fieldwork could be built In total, there were 
396 firms3 in the three parent samples combined. However, only 219 met the necessary 
criteria for selection (Le. age >10 years). Eighty-six firms from the Leverhulme (1985­
1988) sample, one hundred and thirteen from the Telephone Survey (1991) and twenty 
firms from the Leverhulme (1994-1997) sample were extracted (see Table 4.1).
Long-lived small firms (or the surviving firms), which were at least ten years 
old, were identified from the sample frame of 219 firms. These firms were traced 
through searching through the Yellow Pages. The search engine at 
http://www.yell.co .uk was used to trace firms of the same, or similar name, operating 
from the same premises, or in the same region (as when they were contacted previously 
by Prof. Reid). Using this mechanism, firms of the same name and operating from the 
same business premises were identified immediately. A quick telephone call was 
necessary to establish that a firm of the same name, but which had altered its location, 
was in feet the same firm. It was more difficult to identify survivors when the name of 
the business was changed. It is likely that the name of a business could be modified 
following changes in ownership of that business. In this instance, firms with similar 
names, or those that perform similar activities, in the same location, were contacted by 
telephone to confirm whether they were currently, or previously, owned or managed by 
the original owner-manager. The owner-manager of a competitor was generally able to 
confirm if a firm had ceased to trade, or if it had been sold and was currently trading 
under a new name. A small firm was classified as a non-survivor if all efforts to contact 
the owner-manager of the business were exhausted without success. This occurred 
when a similar firm (with the same name or different name) could not be found 
operating either in the same premises or in the surrounding region.
3 This comprised of 86 firms in the Leverhulme (1985-1988) sample, 160 firms in the Telephone (1991) 
sample and 150 firms in the Leverhulme (1994-1997) sample.
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Table 4.1: Description of the Parent Samples
Parent
Sample
Phase Dates Method Number
of
Cases
Extracted Survivors
Survivors Non­
survivors
Total Non­
response
Interviewed
Leverhulme
(1985-1988)
Phase 1: Participant Observation 
(December 1983 to July 1984)
Qualitative
Unstructured
Fieldwork
25 61 86 5 20
Administered Questionnaire: 
(April to October 1985)
Field
Structured
Interview
86
Semi-Structured Interview:
(July to October 1985)
Field Interview 
Agenda
Sub-Sample
17
Phase 2: Administered Questionnaire: 
(July to September 1998)
Field
Structured
Interview
Survivors
47
Telephone 
Survey (1991)
Cross-
sectional
Administered Questionnaire: 
(1991)
Telephone
Survey
160 50 63 113 20 30
Leverhulme
(1994-1997)
Longitudinal Administered Questionnaire: 
(Annual basis from 1994 - 
1997)
Field
Structured
Interview
150 15 5 20 2 13
Total 396 90 129 219 27 63
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A summary of the fieldwork methods adopted, the numbers of cases in, and the 
numbers of traced survivors from, the three parent samples are presented in summary 
form in Table 4.1. The information conveyed in this table is described further in 
Section 4.2.1 below. Subsection 4.2.2 examines the representativeness of the three 
parent samples. This has consequences for the representativeness of the sample frame 
of long-lived surviving firms. Initially, the advantages offered by an approach, which 
extracts long-lived small firms from known parent samples of Scottish small business 
enterprises, are considered.
Extracting the long-lived small firms from known sources was found to be a 
superior approach to that offered by the use of independent sources, such as Dun and 
Bradstreet for two reasons. Firstly, by proceeding in this way, data are available on 
non-survivors, which would not be the case if a sample of firms were obtained from 
Dun and Bradstreet. Data on non-survivors and survivors allow the strategies adopted 
by non-survivors to be compared to those adopted by survivors which is useful in 
highlighting differences between these two groups. An analysis of differences between 
survivors and non-survivors is only undertaken in a small way in this thesis, but could 
be a fruitful source for fiiture comparative research. Secondly and importantly, this 
approach allows estimates of long run performance relationships to be corrected for 
sample selection bias. Such a correction was undertaken in the econometric estimation 
of the relationship between measures of flexibility, firm-specific turbulence and 
performance in Chapter 8, using Heckman’s sample selection estimation method.
4.2.1 The Parent Samples
The three parent samples, from which the sample frame of ninety surviving 
firms (or long-lived small firms) was extracted, are described in a brief manner below. 
The reader is referred to earlier works by Prof. Reid and his co-workers. Survival rates 
in the three parent sample are considered, as well as the type and nature of the data 
gathered from each. This has consequences for the type of data which are available for 
the Heckman sample selection estimation in Chapter 8. As it happens, only a few 
measures are common across the three parent samples. Examples include variables 
such as age, sector, employee size and turnover. Variables such as number of product 
groups and gearing are common to two of the three parent samples [i.e. the Leverhulme
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(1985-1988) and Leverhulme (1994-1997) parent samples]. Few common measures 
exist between the three parent samples, because as outlined below, data gathered on the 
Telephone Survey (1991) parent sample was different in nature, and narrower in scope, 
to that gathered on the other two parent samples. Let us proceed with a short 
description of the three parent samples.
4.2.1.1 Leverhulme (1985-1988)
The fieldwork for Leverhulme (1985-1988) gathered data, both quantitative and 
qualitative, via face-to-face interviews with the owner-managers of 86 new business 
starts in two phases. This sample was chosen by field contacts, normally Directors of 
Enterprise Trusts, from a typical sample of their caseloads (see Reid, 1993). 
Quantitative data was collected on firm characteristics, pricing, costs, competition and 
finance in the first phase of data collection. Qualitative data were also collected on the 
competitive forces facing the firm, the firm’s competitive strategy and the firm’s 
defensive strategy in this phase for a sub-sample of 17 firms. In phase two, survivors 
were re-interviewed. Information was gathered on profitability, size, changes in 
competitiveness, changes in product line, gearing, skill shortages and owner-manager 
opinions on Scotland’s enterprise culture. A detailed description of this parent sample, 
the instrumentation and fieldwork methods adopted is provided by Jacobsen (1986), 
Reid et al. (1993) and Reid (1993). Of the 86 firms in this sample, 25 (29%) survived 
and 20 of these agreed to be re-interviewed for this study.
4.2.1.2 Telephone Survey (1991)
This second sampling frame comprised of 160 mature small firms that were 
members of the Federation of Small Business, in Scotland. The firms were interviewed 
by telephone in 1991. At that time, 113 firms agreed to be interviewed. The survey 
instrument gathered data on financial aspects of the mature small firms, including 
funding shortages, forms of external finance, relations with banks and perceptions of the 
venture capital market Thus, the scope of the instrumentation for this study was 
comparatively, narrowly focused. The composition of this sample was examined in 
Reid and Andersen (1992) and Reid (1996). Fifty, out of the 113 firms in this parent 
sample, were still in business in 2001 (a survival rate of 44%). Thirty of these firms 
agreed to be re-interviewed.
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4.2.1.3 Leverhulme (1994-1997)
From Leverhulme (1994-1997), the third parent sample of 150 firms, 20 long- 
lived small firms aged 10 years or more, were identified. The owner-managers of these 
new business starts were interviewed annually in a face-to-face manner between 1994 
and 1997. The instrument gathered data on the finance, costs, business strategy, human 
capital, internal organisation and technological progressiveness of the businesses (see 
Reid 2003; Reid and Smith, 2000a; Reid, 1999; Smith, 1997a; and Smith, 1998). 
Fifteen out of twenty firms, aged 10 years or more, were still trading (a survival rate of 
75%). Thirteen of these agreed to be re-interviewed.
4.2.2 The Representatives of the Sample Frame of Long-lived Small firms
The primary objective of this Sub-section is to examine the representativeness of 
the sample frame of long-lived small firms, which were extracted from the three parent 
samples. In this regard, the sectoral composition and geographic distribution of the 
extracted sample is compared, where appropriate, with that of the population of small 
firms in Scotland and in the U.K. Survival rates within sectors, and geographic regions, 
are also examined. In a brief way, differences in the age and scale of long-lived 
survivors and non-survivors (at the initial interview) by parent sample are highlighted. 
The latter provides greater insights on the differences in the characteristics of extracted 
survivors and non-survivors across the three parent samples.
4.2.2.1 Sectoral Composition
Table 4.2 presents detailed information on the sectoral composition of the 
sample frame (Nt=219) and the sub-sample of long-lived small firms (Ns=90) (where N 
is the number of firms extracted). It also provides comparative figures, for Scotland and 
the U.K. as a whole, in order to assess the sectoral representativeness of the sample of 
long-lived small firms. Survival rates within sectors are also calculated. In assessing 
the sectoral representativeness of the sample of long-lived small firms, the percentage of 
firms operating in manufacturing (SIC 01-60) and services (SIC 61-99) sectors are 
examined initially.4 Then, the representativeness of individual sectors in the sample of 
long-lived small firms is considered.
Manufacturing firms represent 34% of the stock of firms registered for V.A.T. in
4 SIC is an abbreviation for Standard Industrial Classification codes. In Table 4.2, SIC codes 01-60 
includes agriculture, heavy manufacturing, light manufacturing and construction. SIC codes 61-99 
include the remaining categories running through from wholesales and retail to other services.
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Scotland, whereas the remaining 66% are service-based. These percentages differ 
somewhat from the percentage of manufacturing and services firms registered for 
V.A.T. in the U.K. at 28% and 72% respectively. This perhaps reflects the slow 
progression of the Scottish industrial economy to a service base economy (particularly 
in agriculture, see sectoral breakdown for the UK and Scotland in Table 4.2 below). Of 
the ninety long-lived small firms extracted from the three parent samples, the principal 
activities of over a third (36%) of the mature small firms were in manufacturing, while 
the principal activities of the other two thirds (64%) were in services. These were 
remarkably close to their representation in the Scottish population of small medium 
sized enterprises. This was particularly fortunate because the Leverhulme (1985-1988) 
parent sample had a high proportion of manufacturing firms. Over half (60%) of the 
firms in the Leverhulme (1985-1988) parent sample were based in 
extractive/manufacturing sectors (SIC codes 01-60), reflecting the caseloads of the 
Enterprise Trusts and similar institutions at the time. Reflecting its membership 
constituency, however, services firms were over-represented in the Telephone Survey 
(1991) compared to national proportions. Eighty percent of firms in the Telephone 
Survey (1991) sample operated as services firms (SIC codes 61-99), (see Table 4.2). 
When firms from the Leverhulme (1985-1988) sample were combined with firms from 
the Telephone Survey (1991) sample and the Leverhulme (1994-1997) sample (which 
was not prejudiced in any direction), the distribution of long-lived small firms in 
manufacturing (SIC 01-60) and in services (SIC 61-99) reflected that in the Scottish 
population of small medium sized enterprises.
As seen in Table 4.2, when the three parent samples are combined into one large 
sample frame (Nt=219), most sectors, from agriculture to other services, are 
represented. Similarly, all sectors are broadly represented in the subset of long-lived 
small firms (Ns=90), identified from this sample frame. By comparing the percentages 
in different sectors for the subset of long-lived small firms (Ns=90), with the 
percentages registered for V.A.T. in various sectors in Scotland in 2001, it is found that 
sectors such as agriculture (2%), construction (3%) and other services (20%) were
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Table 4.2: Sectoral Composition
Classification Extracted Sample (Allfirms) Extracted Sample (Survivors) Survival
rates
%
Scotland6
2001
U.K> I
2001Frequency Percentages Frequency Percentages
LI Tel lh Total LI Tel LH Total LI Tel LH Total LI Tel LH Total
Agriculture 1 3 - 4 1.2% 2.6% - 1.8% - 1 - 1 - 2% • 1.1% 25% 20,005
(17%)
151,240]
(9%)
Heavy manufacturing 16 1 i 18 18.6% 0.45% 11.1% 8.2% 10 - - 10 40% - - 11.1% 56% 8,350
(7%)
149,325
(9%)Light manufacturing 31 13 7 51 36.0% 12.0% 33.3% 23.3% 6 7 5 18 24% 14% 33.3% 20% 35%
Construction 4 6 - 10 4.7% 5.3% - 4.6% - 3 - 3 * 6% 3.3% 30% 12,135
(10%)
171,680
(10%)
Wholesale & retail 8 45 2 55 9.3% 39.8% 11.1% 25.1% 2 20 2 24 8% 40% 13.3% 26.7% 44% 24,680
(21%)
380,045
(23%)
Hotel and catering 1 13 - 14 1.2% 11.5% 6.4% 1 7 8 8% 14% 8.9% 57% 10,275
(9%)
107,270
(6%)
Repairs, transport & storage 4 16 - 20 4.7% 14.2% - 9.1% 1 7 • 8 4% 14% • 8.9% 40% 4,860
(4%)
75,325
(5%1
Other Services 21 16 10 47 24.4% 14.1% 44.4% 21.4% 5 5 8 18 20% 10% 53.3% 20% 38% 38,385
(32%)
629,485
(38%)
Total 86 113 20 219 100% 100% 100% 100% 25 50 15 90 100% 100% 100% 100% 41% 118,690
(100%)
1,664,370
(100%)
Manufacturing (SIC 01-60) 52 23 8 83 60% 20% 40% 38% 16 11 5 32 64% 22% 33% 36% 39% 34% 28%
Services (SIC 61-99) 34 90 12 136 40% 80% 60% 62% 9 39 10 58 36% 78% 67% 64% 43% 66% 72%
Notes:
“ LI’ is an abbreviation for Leverhulme (1985-1988), ‘Tel’ is an abbreviation for Telephone Survey (1991) and ‘LIT is an abbreviation for Leverhulme (1994-1997). 
b The stock of V.A.T. registered enterprises represents the number of enterprises registered for V.A.T. at the start of the year with the Inter-Departmental Business 
Register (I.D.B.R.). This is an indicator of the size of the business population. Since over 99 percent of registered enterprises employ fewer than 50 people, it is also 
an indicator of the small business population. Coverage of enterprises will be poorer in V.A.T. exempt areas such as Health, Education and Public administration and 
of the very smallest on person businesses operating below the threshold for V.A.T. (from 1st April 2001 the V.A.T. threshold was an annual turnover of £53,000 
sterling.)
Source: Small Business Service, April 2001
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under-sampled, whereas heavy (11.1%) and light manufacturing (20%) sectors were 
markedly over-sampled. This is also true of the sample frame (Nt=219) of firms.
Similar percentages of firms survived in manufacturing (SIC 01-60) and in 
services (SIC 61-99), at 39% and 43% respectively. This is in line with Phillips and 
Kirchoff s (1989) findings for the United States (Le. two out of five new firms survive 
at least six years). From Table 4.2, it is observable that there was some variation in 
survival rates within sectors. Survival rates were low in agriculture (25%) and 
construction (30%), and high in hotels and catering (57%) and heavy manufacturing 
(55%). Under-sampling of agricultural and construction firms may explain the low 
survival rates in these sectors. Low survival rates may also reflect a shorter lifespan of 
small firms in particular industries (i.e. for instance in the construction industry, see 
Hall, 1995; Phillips and Kirchoff, 1989). The strategies of the particular small firms 
extracted might also have influenced these survival rates.
4.2.2.2 Geographic Distribution
As seen in Table 4.3, the geographic scope of the three parent samples combined 
(Nt=219) is extensive. The Leverhulme (1985-1988) sample was primarily drawn from 
the Lothian (66%), Fife (20%) and Strathclyde (12%) regions of Scotland. On the other 
hand, the Telephone Survey (1991) had a high representation of firms from the 
Highlands and Islands. Almost a quarter (27%) of the firms sampled were located in 
this region. Other regions which were represented in this study include Grampian 
(12%) and Strathclyde (39%). The Leverhulme (1994-1997) sample was mainly drawn 
from Lothian (25%) and Strathclyde (60%).
The geographic distribution of the three parent samples combined (N-j—219), 
influenced the geographic distribution of the sample frame of long-lived small firms 
(Ns=90). Of the sample of ninety long-lived small firms extracted from the combined 
three parent samples, almost a fifth (18%) were located in the Highlands and Islands, 
nearly a third (30%) in Lothian and in Strathclyde and approximately a tenth (9%) in 
Grampian. Lothian and Strathclyde include two major urban hubs of Scotland, namely 
Edinburgh and Glasgow cities, where there are a high stock of firms registered for 
V.A.T. (see Table 4.4). The rates of new firm formation are high in these areas also. 
Stirling and Edinburgh have comparative rates of new firm formation with average rates
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Table 4.3: Geographic Distribution
Classification Extracted Sample (Allfirms) Extracted Sample (Survivors) Survival
rates
%
Frequency Percentages Frequency Percentages
LI Tel Ln Total LI Tel lh Total LI Tel LH Total LI Tel LH Total
Highlands and Islands - 30 - 30 - 27% - 14% - 16 - 16 - 32% - 18% 53%
Grampian - 14 2 16 - 12% 10% 7% - 6 2 8 - 12% 13% 9% 50%
Tayside 1 7 - 8 1% 6% - 4% 1 3 1 5 4% 6% 7% 6% 63%
Central - 4 1 5 - 4% 5% 2% - 2 - 2 - 4% - 2% 40%
Fife 17 1 - 18 20% 1% - 8% 2 - - 2 8% - - 2% 11%
Lothian 57 8 5 70 66% 7% 25% 32% 20 2 5 27 80% 4% 33% 30% 39%
Strathclyde 10 44 12 66 12% 39% 60% 30% 1 19 7 27 4% 38% 47% 30% 41%
Borders 1 1 - 2 1% 1% - 1% 1 - - 1 4% - - 1% 50%
Dumfries and Galloway - 4 - 4 - 4% - 2% - 2 - 2 - 4% - 2% 50%
[Total 86 113 20 219 100% 100% 100% 100 25 50 15 90 100% 100% 100% 100% 41%
Notes:
a'U’ is an abbreviation for Leverhulme (1985-1988), ‘Tel’ is an abbreviation for Telephone Survey (1991) and ‘LH’ is an abbreviation for Leverhulme (1994-1997).
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Table 4.4: Regional Distribution of Small Medium Sized Enterprises in Scotland
SCOTLAND
Stock
2001
%of
Total
Per resident 
adult (16+)
Aberdeen City 5890 4.96 0.03
Aberdeenshire 9675 8.15 0.05
Angus 2870 2.42 0.03
Argyll & Bute 3210 2.71 0.04
Clackmannanshire 820 0.69 0.02
Dumfries & Galloway 5370 4.53 0.05
Dundee City 1980 1.67 0.02
East Ayrshire 2490 2.10 0.03
East Dunbartonshire 1785 1.50 0.02
East Lothian 1890 1.59 0.03
East Renfrewshire 1405 1.18 0.02
Edinburgh, City of 10780 9.09 0.03
Eilean Siar 1015 0.86 0.05
Falkirk 2485 2.09 0.02
Fife 6340 5.34 0.02
Glasgow City 10060 8.48 0.02
Highland 7995 6.74 0.05
Inverclyde 1095 0.92 0.02
Midlothian 1385 1.17 0.02
Moray 2460 2.07 0.04
North Ayrshire 2480 2.09 0.02
North Lanarkshire 4900 4.13 0.02
Orkney Islands 1410 1.19 0.09
Perth & Kinross 4750 4.00 0.04
Renfrewshire 3095 2.61 0.02
Scottish Borders, The 4100 3.46 0.05
Shetland Islands 1295 1.09 0.07
South Ayrshire 2605 2.20 0.03
South Lanarkshire 5880 4.96 0.02
Stirling 2790 2.35 0.04
West Dunbartonshire 1320 1.11 0.02
West Lothian 3015 2.54 0.02
Total 118640 100% 1
Source: Small Business Service, April 2001
in the U.K. (see Fraser of Allander Institute, 2001). Rates for Glasgow city are slightly 
lower. The sample (Ns=90) also represents areas where the stock of firms is low, but 
where the proportion of small medium sized enterprises per resident is high, such as in 
the Highlands and Islands. For example, the stock of firms registered for V.A.T. on 
Orkney island is 1,410, just over 1% of the total stock of firms in Scotland. Orkney,
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however, has the highest proportion of SMEs5 per resident adult (+16 yrs) at 0.09 (see 
Table 4.4). Furthermore, Orkney and the Shetland islands had the highest number of 
V.A.T. registrations between 1994 and 1999 in Scotland (see Fraser of Allander 
Institute, 2001).
From an examination of the survival rates across geographic regions presented 
in Table 4.3, it is observable that firms located in Tayside had the highest survival rate, 
almost two thirds (63%) of the firms survived. Survival rates are also relatively high in 
remote regions such as the Highlands and Islands, where over half (53%) of the firms 
survived. In areas where the stock of firms registered for V.A.T. is high, such as 
Strathclyde and Lothian (which contain Glasgow and Edinburgh cities respectively), the 
rates of survival are relatively lower. Approximately, two fifths of the small firms 
survived in these regions. This is tentative evidence in support of Westhead and 
Birley’s (1993b) and Gallagher and Botham’s (1998) findings that geographical areas 
with high rates of new firm formation are also those which have the highest death rates. 
The region of Fife is another example. It has the lowest survival rate (11%) in the 
sample frame (Nt=219), even though 5.34% of the stock of small medium sized 
enterprises registered for V.A.T. in 2001 were located in this region.
4.2.2.3 General Characteristics of the Extracted Sample
To extend the analysis above, summary statistics for the age and scale of 
extracted firms by parent sample, at the initial interview are presented in Table 4.5. 
Full-time equivalent employees and real turnover at constant 2001 prices measure the 
scale of these firms. This data is also broken down by survivor status.
On average, the mature small firms extracted from the Telephone Survey (1991) 
sample were older at the original interview than those extracted from the other parent 
samples [Fstat(li 2i8) = 87.908 at p-value = 0.0001]. Thus, firms extracted from this 
parent sample are indeed long-lived. Generally, the extracted firms were micro-firms 
close to inception, employing on average less than 10 full-time equivalent employees.6 
Long-lived small firms (or surviving firms) were bigger in size as measured by real 
turnover than non-survivors [Fstafri, 2i8) = 4.114 at p-value = 0.044] but not based on 
full-time equivalent employees [Fstat(i, 218) = 0.113 at p-value = 0.737]. Moreover,
5 SMEs is an abbreviation for small medium sized enterprises.
6 An outlier case raised the average size of the non-survivors in the Leverhulme (1994-1997) sample (i.e. 
A cleaning firm with eighty-five full-time equivalent employees).
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Table 4.5: Mean Age, FTEs and Real Turnover of the Extracted Sample at time of Initial Interview, according to Survivor Status and 
Parent Sample
Sample All Firms 
(Nt=219)
Survivors
(Ns=90)
Non-Survivors
(Nns=129)
Age FTEs Real
Turnover*
Age FTEs Real
Turnover8
Age FTEs Real
Turnover8
Leverhulme (1985-1988) 5
(4)
7
(10)
280,044
(274,928)
7
(8)
9
(7)
409,320
(326,194)
3
(3)
6
(10)
234,079
(241,991)
Telephone Survey (1991) 15
(11)
7
(10)
382,681
(371,251)
15
(11)
7
(8)
436,171
(447,705)
15
(11)
7
(11)
358,908
(333,743)
Leverhulme (1994-1997) 4
(2)
8
(19)
400,777
(609,389)
4
(1)
3
(3)
439,886
(699,862)
6
(3)
21
(36)
299,096
(301,562)
Notes:
aReal turnover (reflated to constant 2001 prices) 
Standard deviations are in parentheses
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there was no difference in the age of survivors and non-survivors [Fstat(i 2i8) — 0.661 at 
p-value = 0.417].
4.2.3 Conclusion
Identifying long-lived small firms from previously interviewed (i.e. known) 
sources is advantageous. It provides the researcher with information on non-survivors. 
This information is useful in econometric estimation as corrections can be made for 
sample selection bias. Heckman’s sample selection estimation procedure is undertaken 
in Chapter 8. Data gathered earlier in the life of long-lived small firms also enriches 
case analysis (see enterprise profiles in Volume II, Appendix 5). The advantages of this 
approach outweigh those of more probabilistic sampling methods. In the latter instance, 
there would not be data available on non-survivors. In any case, there is no guarantee 
that a probabilistic sampling design would have led to a more representative sample (i.e. 
from a geographic and sectoral perspective) than the non-probabilistic method adopted 
here. There is sampling error associated with all sampling methods. As the firms in the 
three parent samples were known sources, the likelihood of obtaining a high response 
rate was raised. The significance of this cannot be underestimated. For example, in 
relation to the Leverhulme (1985-1988) sample, Reid (1993) pointed out that if it wasn’t 
for the respect the owner-manager had for the aid of the Enterprise Trust or Federation 
of Small Business, the response rate might not have been as high Additionally, a low 
response rate would increase survey error (see Groves, 1989). The risk of low response 
rates is considerably higher when contacting firms cold. This is likely to be the case 
when using probabilistic designs.
4.3 The Design of the Administered Survey Instrument
The survey instrument was designed to address three general research 
objectives:
■ To characterise the mature small firm and factors which influence its 
performance, scale and scope;
■ To analyse the flexibility of the mature small firm in undertaking key 
organisational change;
■ To examine behavioural relations between size, performance and other attributes 
of the mature small firm.
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The survey instrument consists of 5 sections, 83 numbered questions and 5 show cards, 
which were colour coded to distinguish them from the main body of the instrument 
(refer to Volume II, Appendix 1 to view a copy of the survey instrument). Measures 
were constructed to extract information on the characteristics of the mature small firm, 
including changes in the scale and scope of its activities, pivotal changes in the running 
of the firm, factors which promoted the survival of the firm and the level of 
innovativeness and technological progressiveness of the firm. Guidelines for designing 
questions set out by Converse and Presser (1986) and Fowler (1995) were adhered to 
and are referred to below, where appropriate.
Two unique features of the design of the instrument include 1) a multi­
dimensional scale where owner-mangers self appraise factors, which they believed 
influenced the survival prospects of the small firm and 2) a novel way of calibrating 
attributes of organisational change. The multidimensional scale is used to create a novel 
measure of performance, which is similar in form to a scorecard measure (see Section 
6.3). The innovative way of calibrating processes of organisational change enables new 
measures of flexibility and firm-specific turbulence to be computed (see Section 8.2).
Most of the instrumentation was designed to gather numerical data, but 
qualitative measures were also included in the survey instrument, to amplify and 
illustrate the quantitative testing of inferences. For example, ‘open-ended’ questions 
were included on the vision of the founders, the nature of key organisational changes 
and factors which fostered the longevity of the mature small firm. This mixed design of 
the survey instrument facilitates methods of triangulation; thus qualitative evidence is 
useful for explaining quantitative results and for suggesting patterns of convergence 
between both these forms of evidence, see Tashakkori & Teddlie (1998). The 
qualitative evidence is presented in the form of detailed case studies in Volume II, 
Appendix 5.
The survey instrument was designed specifically to gather data on long-lived 
small firms and represents a significant contribution of this study. Each section of the 
survey instrument is discussed below to clarify the purpose and innovative features of 
the design of key measures. Let us proceed with a detailed analysis of the measures 
contained in each section of the survey instrument.
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4.3.1 General Characteristics of the Business
The function of this section of the survey instrument is to produce a general 
picture of the typical long-lived small firm in the sample and to identify changes that 
occurred in the general characteristics of the firm and its competitive environment over 
time. Data were gathered on the long-lived small firm at two points in time; at 
inception and at the time of interview. As the sample frame of long-lived small firms 
was identified from three separate sources, gaps exist in the data gathered on these firms 
at earlier points in their lifecycle. Data were gathered on each of the three parent 
samples for different purposes and generally merely a few measures were consistent 
across the three studies (see Sub-section 4.2.1). As stated earlier, the Telephone Survey 
(1991) was brief and focused on funding shortages, (see Reid, 1996). This section of 
the instrument provided an opportunity to redress this issue by gathering data on the 
characteristics of the long-lived small firms at inception, retrospectively. The 
characteristics of long-lived small firms at extreme points such as ‘inception’ or at the 
time of interview (Le. ‘maturity’) are salient events or attributes in the life of the firm. 
This eases the owner-manager’s ability to recall the information (Eisenhower et al., 
1991). As data were gathered on the three parent samples at different points in time, 
and at different points in their lives, the collection of data at ‘inception’, and the use of 
this as a reference point should improve the overall quality of the data.
A series of questions was designed on the characteristics of the mature small 
firm, the extent of competition in its main market, its business strategy and its financial 
position. General questions on the mature small firm examined its main line of 
business, legal status (i.e. sole proprietor, partnership and private company) and the 
number of products7 and product groups it offered. The main line of business was 
identified using a list of the standard industrial classification (SIC) codes on a show 
card (see Show card 1.2, Volume II, Appendix 1). Owner-managers were specifically 
asked to identity the three most relevant SIC codes, according to sales, as many firms 
supply products to different industries. The original list of SIC codes adopted in Reid 
(1993) and Smith (1997a) were used rather than the updated 1992 classification. This 
was for consistency purposes and to enable changes in the main line of business to be
7 Everywhere the word ‘product’ is mentioned in the survey instrument the word ‘service’ was substituted 
for service companies in the interview. The same convention is adopted in the text here so the term 
product encapsulates tangible (physical products) and intangible (services) goods.
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identified over time. The task of identifying the number of different products is more 
difficult than identifying the number of product groups or ranges (i.e. too numerous to 
count in a large retail shop or for bespoke products). However, with the wide use of 
computers in these small firms it is easier to obtain accurate information.
In examining the extent of competition in the mature small firm’s main market, 
questions were included to assess the firm’s market reach (whether it was local, 
regional, Scottish, British or International), the number of rivals (major and minor), its 
market share, the intensity of competition, the existence of excess capacity and the level 
of product differentiation (whether competitor’s product offerings were identical, 
similar or different). This was complemented by a question on the market positioning 
of the small firm (i.e. low end, middle or top end of the market) to analyse how the firm 
strategically positions itself in its competitive environment. Finally, financial data were 
gathered on net profits for the last trading year (net of depreciation and director’s 
remuneration), the book value of assets at the time of interview and at inception (or the 
most recent estimate), a count of the forms of debt (bank loan, overdraft, hire purchase 
etc.) and whether outside equity finance was employed. This financial data were used 
to generate objective measures of performance (e.g. asset growth, rate of profitability 
etc.).
Changes in the general characteristics of the firm and the competitive 
environment in which it operates were measured by proceeding in the following 
manner. The respondent, for example, was asked to describe the intensity of 
competition in their market at the time of interview using the response options provided 
in question 1.12.1, reproduced in Table 4.6 from Volume H, Appendix 1. The 
respondent was then asked if a change had occurred in the intensity of competition since 
start-up by asking as in 1.12.2 “Has this changed since start-up?” If the respondent 
replied affirmatively, they were further prompted to describe the manner of this change 
in consistent response options to those in question 1.12.1. So if a respondent stated that 
competition is intense in every aspect at the time of interview (coded as 1) but was less 
intense at start-up, they were prompted to say whether it was strong but weak in some 
aspects (coded as 2), generally weak but strong in some aspects (coded as 3) or 
generally weak in all aspects (coded as 4). Their retort could then be recorded 
numerically in the database. Three variables were created in the database. These
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recorded the intensity of competition at the time of interview, whether a change 
occurred and the intensity of competition at inception. Using this approach, Sign’s test 
for two related samples, which compares the number of positive or negative differences 
between scores and Wilcoxon’s matched pairs signed rank test for two related samples, 
which also takes account of the size of the difference in the ranks could be conducted 
(see Chapter 5). These tests assess whether the mature small firms in the sample have 
changed in similar manner over time. Questions on market extent (question 1.8.1 -
1.8.2) , market share (question 1.9.1 - 1.9.2), product differentiation (question 1.10.1 -
1.10.2) and market positioning (question 1.11.1 — 1.11.2) were all asked in a similar 
manner (refer to survey instrument in Volume II, Appendix 1).
Table 4.6: Survey Instrument - Questions 1.12.1 —1.12.2
1.12.1 How would you describe competition in your main market?
Intense in eveiy aspect (price, quality rivalry etc) □
Strong but weak in some aspects (for example absence of price n
competition but strong quality competition and inter-rivalry)
Generally weak but strong in some aspects □
General^ weak in all aspects □
1.12.2 Has this changed since start-up?
Yes □ In what way?
No □
The format of question 1.12.1 and the response options are identical to the 
questions which Reid (1993) and Jacobsen (1986) posed to the Leverhulme (1985-1988) 
parent sample. This is a fiirther feature of the design. Given that the data was gathered 
on the Leverhulme (1985-1988) sample in a consistent manner, it enables a longitudinal 
analysis of the data, or comparisons of the measures over time. Further, as the 
questions are worded consistently over time, the validity of collecting data 
retrospectively can be examined for this parent sample. For example, retrospective 
answers on the intensity of competition at inception (question 1.12.2) and similar retorts 
gathered on the Leverhulme (1985-1988) parent sample close to inception should be 
highly correlated. Moreover, these questions were already tried and tested on the
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Leverhulme parent sample earlier in their life. At the time, the owner-managers 
understood and were able to answer these questions.
Sources of error may arise in the measurement of these questions from changes 
in perception of events over time. Errors may also arise where the respondent may 
never have had the information, such as in the case of a change in ownership or 
management. There is a large literature comparing self-reporting with proxy reporting 
(see Moore, 1988). There are occasions when it appears that people can report for 
others, as they do for themselves (e.g. family succession). However, unless questions 
pertain to relatively public events or characteristics as in the retrospective questions 
here, others will not know the answers. It is recognised that across all topics, self­
respondents are better reporters than proxy respondents.
Prior to the interview, data was already gathered on general characteristics such 
as the age of the long-lived small firms in the sample because the sample frame consists 
of known sources. Information was also available on changes in ownership status (e.g. 
whether the firm is now run by a new owner following a trade-sale, or has been 
acquired by another firm, or whether another family member runs the firm). Changes in 
ownership status were known prior to the interview itself due to initial contacts with 
firms. The occurrence and the timing of these events were recorded on the cover of the 
survey instrument prior to interviews and discussed later in sections three and four of 
the interview.
The measures obtained in this section of the survey instrument are used to 
characterise the long-lived small firm and its market (see Chapter 5 and 7) and to 
analyse broad changes in these characteristics over time. It aims to construct a picture 
of the typical long-lived small firm in the sample, prior to undertaking further 
inferential analysis (viz. flexibility analysis and the simultaneous equations analysis) in 
Chapters 8 and 9. It is shown how the ‘market reach’ variable, measured in this section 
of the survey instrument, is determined jointly with size and performance in a three- 
equation simultaneous equations system in Chapter 9.
4.3.2 The Scale and Scope of the Firm
The objective of this section of the survey instrument was to examine changes in 
the scale and scope of the long-lived small firm over time. This is examined in the light 
of the owner-manager’s objectives and vision for the business at start-up, his
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expectations for the scale and scope of the business at inception, and his expectations of 
the nature of competition. Changes in the scale and scope of the small firm are 
considered because much of the extant small firms literature has focused on the 
relationship between growth and firm size, originating from the Law of Proportionate 
Effect (or Gibrat’s Law), which states that growth rates are independent of size (see 
Sutton, 1997, 1998 and section 3.2 for a survey of the literature). This law was rejected 
in Reid (2001, 1995, 1993) for the case of the small firm. Reid (2001) concluded that 
smaller, small firms grow faster than larger, small firms but that this growth process 
stabilises and tends to a long run equilibrium value. Given that the firms interviewed in 
this study are long-lived, rather than close to inception, whether they have reached this 
equilibrium size needs to be investigated This lifecycle hypothesis is examined in Sub­
section 5.2.5.3.
In this section of the survey instrument, owner-managers were asked a series of 
questions on four issues. First, the aspirations of the long-lived small firm at inception 
and at the time of interview were examined. Second, the owner-managers were 
questioned on the expected, and actual, trajectory of turnover and frill-time equivalent 
employees over the life of the firm. Then, the dimensions by which the small firm 
competes were considered and finally, changes in the administrative organisation of the 
firm from inception were explored. The section was structured in this manner, such that 
the scale and scope of the firm were examined in the light of the objectives of the 
owner-manager for starting the business (Le. to improve the flow of questions). These 
series of questions are examined in turn below.
A number of questions were included initially on the aspirations of the owner- 
managers, on the length of the planning horizon for the firm, and on the expected 
lifetime for the business. Decision-making within very small firms is often closely 
linked to the personal aspirations of the owner-manager (Krueger et al., 2000; 
Bamberger, 1983; Miller and Toulouse, 1986). Empirically, a distinction is made 
between positive motives (e.g. profit, growth etc.), and negative motives (e.g. 
alternative to unemployment, lifestyle etc.) (see Storey, 1994). The hypothesis explored 
is that those individuals starting a business with a positive motive are more likely to 
establish a business which subsequently grows, than those who start a business with a 
negative motive.
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At the beginning of section 2 of the instrument, the owner-managers were 
presented with a list of possible aims for starting a business (i.e. positive and negative 
motives), to capture the effect of motivation. Evidence of the effects of motivations on 
growth is mixed (see Storey, 1994; Kinsella et al., 1993; Wynarczyk et al., 1993; and 
Wheelen and Hunger, 1995). Generally, positive motives were found to raise the 
growth prospects of firm. Reid and Smith (2000a) found that small business start-ups, 
which aimed to make a high rate of return, achieved higher levels of performance. An 
assessment of both the long-lived small firm’s planning horizon at inception, and the 
expected lifetime of the business, was also obtained. Bhide (1994) was sceptical about 
the consequences of a rigid formal planning process for performance. Reid and Smith 
(2000a) found that the existence of a business plan was not, in itself, a predictor of 
success. However, a longer planning horizon was linked to the performance of the 
small firm (Smith, 1998; and Reid and Smith, 2000a). Qualitative evidence was also 
gathered on the owner-manager’s vision for the business and the achievement, or 
otherwise, of milestones that they set for the business at inception.
Scale or size can be measured by many different economic variables, such as 
sales revenue, output volume, capacity, employment or assets. Any of these can be 
used in the estimation of variants of Gibrat’s model (see Sub-section 5.2.5.3). 
However, to analyse the adjustment path to long run equilibrium, a trajectory of these 
economic variables over the life of the firm must be collected. Data were gathered on 
turnover and full-time equivalent employees, as owner-managers find it easier to recall 
these values rather than estimates of the book value of assets over the life of the firm. 
Sales turnover and the number of full-time equivalent employees also are not subject to 
differences in accounting conventions, such as policies on the depreciation of assets 
values etc.
Prior to examining the trajectory of sales and full-time equivalent employees, 
questions were included on the expectations of the owner-manager for the size of the 
business, measured in terms of full time equivalent employees and sales turnover, at the 
end of five and ten years of trading respectively. These figures form a base for 
comparison with the actual figures. Data gathered on FTEs and turnover were collected 
at the following points in the lifecycle; at inception (or after 1 year trading for turnover), 
after 5 years, 10 years, and at the time of interview (or the last trading year ended for
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turnover). Points in time such as inception, after 5 years, 10 years and time of 
interview, were used for ease of recall only, and were loosely chosen to capture 
potential phases of development within the small firm. It is recognised that this process 
may not be linear across all firms (see O’Farrell and Hitchens, 1988; Hall, 1995).
The owner-managers were presented with the following context to tentatively 
test whether Reid’s (1995) lifecycle effect occurs in practice; “Suppose a mature 
business is one which has reached its desired size in terms of employees and sales 
turnover” and then owner-managers were asked: “Would you say you are a mature 
business?” If they responded affirmatively, they were asked for the age, the turnover 
and the level of full-time equivalent employees of their business at maturity. These are 
the long run equilibrium size values, according to the owner-managers of the business. 
They can be compared to the equilibrium values produced by variants of Gibrat models.
Change in the competitive scope of the firm is another form of growth, be it 
geographic, segment, vertical or industry, see Porter, (1985). The main form of change 
in scope, which is measured in this section, is vertical scope. This is the number of 
activities performed in-house by the firm, instead of by independent firms. Changes in 
geographic scope are dealt with in section one of the survey instrument, whereas the 
other forms are dealt with in section three. To measure vertical scope, the activities 
which the firm performed at start-up and performed at the time of interview, as well as 
the timing of new activities undertaken in-house or activities abandoned, were 
identified. The activities were listed on Show-card 2.9. A completed version of this 
show-card is reproduced in Table 4.7 below. The activities listed corresponded to the 
primary activities and support activities in the value chain. However, these were 
worded in ‘layman’ terms for shared understanding as follows; accounting matters, 
training of personnel, computer support staff, production of product/service, sales, 
market research, strategic planning, innovations, legal matters and other. The type of 
activities undertaken later in the lifecycle, such as strategic planning also indicates that 
the firm is moving to a more mature stage in the lifecycle (see Churchill and Lewis, 
1983). A count variable of the functional activities performed within the firm at the 
time of interview and at inception was used to approximate the scope of the 
administrative organisation at these points in time. Extensions to the scope of the
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administrative organisation are considered, and relations between this variable and firm 
size, performance and age are examined, in Sub-section 7.3.1.
Table 4.7: Show Card 2.9
siinn r,u tl 2.M
Examine the following list of functiona/activities pet funned within your business and 
answer the following questions:
2.9.1 Which of the following activities did your business perform in the first year of 
trading? pride all that apply]
2.9.2 Which of the following activities does your business perform currently? (Tick all
that apply]
2.9.3 In cases where a change occurred how long since start-up did that change occur? 
[E.R. if yonr butiaea it now engaging ia an additional activity or has disengaged in an 
activity]
Activities At start-up 
tick all that 
apply
Tick all 
that apply 
today
When?
(months/years)
Accounting matters ef
Training of Personnel 0'
Computer support staff □ Ef ttc—
Production of product/scrvice B7 s7’"
Sales Sf
Market Research & ef
After sales service
Strategic planning 8/
Innovation sf sf
Legal matters □ □ i
Other (Please specify) □ c
11
Other (Please specify)
1
i
□ □ 1
i
Thanh mn. Nou please return this Unci lo the mien itut i.
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The nature of competition is thought to be an important, but not a central 
influence, upon the growth rate of individual small firms, according to Smallbone et. al. 
(1992). An objective measure of the nature of competition is difficult to obtain. A 
direct measure, such as the number of rivals (minor or major) obtained in section one of 
the survey instrument, may not be related to the extent of competition. Firms can 
differentiate themselves or re-position their product offerings so that they are not in 
direct competition with rivals. Here, data on the form of competition was obtained by 
listing the following forms; price, quality, volume, after sales service, new product 
development, advertising, tying up suppliers, delivery, marketing, and other please 
specify. A frequency count of the number of forms of competition is used to classify 
the competitive strategy space of the firm as ‘broad’ or ‘narrow’. It is presumed that a 
firm, which competes on a number of dimensions has a broad competitive strategy 
space and thus, is pursuing a differentiated, or niche based strategy, is sheltered from 
direct competition. A firm competing on a narrow number of dimensions is pursuing a 
less differentiated strategy. This is hypothesis is challenged in Sub-section 7.2.2. 
Evidence of endogeneity was found between this measure of the competitive strategy 
space and performance. A simultaneous equation model was developed and estimated 
in Chapter 9, where size, competitive strategy space and performance are jointly 
determined.
This was followed by questions on the objectives of the owner-manager for the 
firm at this more mature stage in the small firm’s lifecycle. The wording of the question 
on the owner-manager’s objectives at this stage, was similar to the question which the 
owner-managers were presented with on their aims for the business at inception. The 
only difference was a slight change in the emphasis of some of the response options. 
For example; motives, such as, to have a sizeable pension on retirement, to create 
employment in the community and to increase the value of the business on trade-sale 
were included. Bamberger (1983) stated that objectives are strongly influenced by the 
firm’s lifecycle phase. This is analysed in Sub-section 7.2.1. Qualitative evidence were 
also gathered on the reasons why, or why not, the business had, or had not, met the 
owner-manager’s expectations. This provided owner-managers with an opportunity to 
explain why the business failed to meet their expectations (i.e. lack of growth etc.)
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As the ownership of some of the surviving firms from the parent sample had 
changed, it is unlikely, except in the case of a family-owned business or a 
management/employee buyout, that the respondent would have knowledge of the 
founding owner-manager’s objectives, vision or expectations, or of the scale or scope 
of the business at start-up. However, rather than inserting a filter question implying that 
these respondents would not answer any of these questions, the same questions were 
asked of the new owner-manager. Thus, similar information was gathered for the new 
owner-manager with respect to the time of trade-sale. This occurred in very few cases 
because the vast majority of changes in ownership involved either family succession or 
employee/management buyouts.
The measures gathered in this section of the survey instrument were used to 
characterise the long-lived small firm (see Chapters 5-7). In Chapter 5, Gibrat’s model 
was estimated for sales turnover, full-time equivalent employees and a ratio of these two 
measures, labour productivity, over different time horizons. This provides an analysis 
of adjustments in scale as the firm matures. Chapter 7 describes the motives of the 
owner-manager, the competitive strategy space and the scope of the administrative 
organisation. Chapter 9 estimates a simultaneous equations model where size, 
performance and the measure of competitive strategy space are jointly determined.
4.3.3 Organisational Change
The function of this section of the survey instrument is to calibrate key 
organisational change within the firm. These changes can be thought of as permanent 
changes or critical decisions, which the firm makes over the course of its life. They can 
be ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ in implication and essentially are pivots rather than crisis 
points (see Section 2.2). They are treated below as contingent events, in other words, 
driven by environmental forces or other factors, which impinge on the firm (see 
Donaldson, 1994). Examples of key organisational changes examined in this study 
include changes in ownership, legal form, technology, location, cashflow, innovation, 
line of business, investment, number of outlets, market niches, product range, market 
positioning, diversification, assets, capacity, inputs and management.
Reid and Smith (2000b) used contingency theory to explain changes in the 
management accounting system of small business enterprises close to inception. The 
design of the measures in their survey instrument influenced the design of measures in
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this section of the survey instrument- Reid and Smith (2000b) in the design of their 
survey instrument asked the owner-managers to consider a contingency such as a 
cashflow crisis by asking, “Have you ever experienced a cashflow crisis?” initially, and 
then proceeding to ask, “When did you have your most severe cashflow crisis (m/y)?” 
This required the owner-manager to identify the year and month of their most severe 
cashflow crisis or the timing of this contingency. The owner-managers were then asked 
if they implemented a number of methods for managing costs (or ‘adaptations’). For 
the methods that they did employ, they were asked to identify when they were first 
implemented, in terms of months/years. Duration variables were calculated from the 
point of inception for the contingent event and each adaptation. The duration variable 
for the contingent event could be correlated with the duration variables for the 
adaptations. Significant positive correlations indicate that the timing of these events are 
related. This was an innovative design, which relied on contingency theory. However, 
while association measures could be calculated, cause and effect could not be isolated. 
This element of the design is improved upon here.
Organisational change is calibrated as follows: the owner-managers were 
presented with a list of key organisational changes (e.g. ownership, management, 
cashflow, business line etc.) on Show-card 3.1, reproduced in Table 4.8. The ‘other 
please specify’ option was also offered. The owner-managers were asked to select the 
main changes, which occurred in the operation of their small firm since start-up. Once 
they checked the relevant organisational changes, they were then asked to specify the 
age of the business when these changes occurred in months/years. This created a 
duration variable from the point of inception for each organisational change that had 
occurred. The completed version of Show-card 3.1 shown in Table 4.8 illustrates how 
the responses were recorded and also shows a snapshot of the development path of the 
long-lived small firm.
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Table 4.8 Show card 3.1
Mims card 3.1
3.1.1 Fioir. vour potnt of view what are the main changes in running the business since 
start-up9 Could you choose from options on this sheet7
3.1.2 Please specify the age of the business fin manths-vears) when these changes 
occurred
■ j Changes Tickill that apply
Age of business 
(yr/mths)
Ownership 71
1 00 Legal form 01 (c) Technical eT
[(d) location □
i (e) Cashflow 7 3.. °i K p
un- Innovation □
(8) lane of business □ J
1 (h) Investment D
Hi) Number of outlets 0
0) • Market niches s< *• *1P?C
HM 1 Product range f | j p.ir.
pi) | Market positioning | lltt
j (m) Diversification Q
(n) [ Assets ( 0" IW
(h) 1 Capacity "
<p) ! Inputs □
(q) Management a
• (Cl ; Other (Specify) □
..... .
Is) ; Other 1 Specify) □
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For the key changes identified by each long-lived small firm, the owner- 
manager was asked to select those three which were most important to the running of 
their business, since inception. Just three changes were extracted for more detailed 
consideration because pilot work had suggested that this was the best way of capturing 
salient information from the interviewing. They were then asked to provide qualitative 
evidence on these three organisational changes. In practice, the owner-managers were 
specifically asked to describe the exact organisational change, the reasons for change 
and the adjustments, which were made following the change. This qualitative evidence 
was formalised for each of the three changes in turn. The procedure adopted is 
explained directly below.
Figure 4.1: Explanation of Causation
Before After
Precipitating
Influences
Organisational
Change
Consequential
Adjustments> >
A simple diagrammatic device (see Figure 4.1), which formed part of Show-card
3.3 reproduced here in Table 4.9, was used in interviews with owner-managers to 
explain the focus of interest and to embed changes in organisational form within a 
contingency framework. It was explained that the interviewer wanted to know what had 
precipitated change in organisational form and what adjustments had been made after it 
had been achieved. The term ‘precipitating influences’ was used to describe the forces, 
which led to the change in organisational form (i.e. the contingency factors). In a 
similar vein, the term ‘consequential adjustments’ was used to describe those 
adaptations which followed the change in organisational form.8 Figure 4.1 made the 
pattern of causal relationships quite explicit. This in turn, made it easier to get owner- 
managers to estimate the intervals of time that occurred between precipitating
8 The precipitating influences were called ‘prior factors’ and the consequential adjustments were called 
‘adaptation factors’ on the Show-card 3.3 to ensure that the owner-manager clearly understood the 
direction of causation.
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influences and organisational change, and between organisational change and 
consequential adjustments.
Table 4.9: Show card 3.3
Show caul J.3
Change:
Before
P < oo e- •* S
Prior
Factors
After
'•--a-7 • <
Adaptation
factors
[Tick the relevant prior factors and then tick the relevant adaptation factors.|
I 3
Vi'
Hefnre F'ticmrs Afier 1
□ 1. Growth
□ 2. Demand W'
n 3. New niches / zv. s ) F-K"
□ 4. Tax efficiency □
□ 5. Credit policy n
□ 6. Finance □
0 7. Profitability □
u 8. Cost Changes O'"
□ 9. Sales B7
□ 10. Competition □
□ 11. Marketing □
□ 12. Trade intelligence □
□ 13. Capacity
E) 14. Access to buyers i
□ 15. Stock levels B- (
□ 16. Regulation 0
□ 17. Technology □
sr 18. Operational Efficiency cr
□ 19. Investment
□ 20. Delinquent suppliers □
j 21. Delinquent debtors □1 o 22. Headcount
23. Cost control
24. Skills ■r^
25. Mis of supplicrs/customers/rivals
26. Monitoring___________
27. Functions of manager
□
a
C -r
3s i 5 .
□ 28. Cashflow
6 29. Other (specify)6/fry .up
2/^
0'"' 30. Other (specify)
____________________________
Thank you. Now please return this sheet to the interviewer.
127
For each of the three most important organisational changes which occurred 
over the mature firm’s lifetime, the following line of inquiry was conducted. First, the 
owner-managers were presented with a show-card on which they could identify 
precipitating causes and consequential adjustments (e.g. credit policy, finance, trade 
intelligence and cash-flow). They were asked to identify the precipitating influences 
(‘Precipitator'} from a list of 30 such factors which impinge on the firm in the format 
displayed in Show-card 3.3 (see Table 4.9). Second, the owner-managers were asked to 
identify the number of months (‘PrecipitatorTime'}, which elapsed between identifying 
the precipitating cause and the undertaking of the organisational change within the firm. 
Third, owner-managers were asked to identify the consequential adjustments (Adjust'), 
which followed the change in organisational form. Fourth, the owner-managers were 
asked to identify the number of months (AdjustTime'}, which had elapsed between the 
occurrence of the organisational change and the appearance of the consequential 
adjustment. The factors listed in Show-card 3.3 were chosen openly. For example, if a 
respondent checked demand as a precipitating or an adjustment factor, it could be as a 
result of either an increase or a decrease in demand. The important thing was that a 
change had occurred in this factor, which drove or followed the organisational change. 
The information was recorded on a separate show-card for each of the three most 
important changes. This process was therefore undertaken three times with learning by 
the respondent on the first repetition of the process being transferable to the second and 
third repetitions.
Quantitative and qualitative data were recorded in the database for each 
organisational change (or contingent event). Each precipitating influence 
(‘Precipitator’} and consequential adjustment (Adjust’} checked in Show-card 3.3 was 
coded as “1” in the database and “0” otherwise (i.e. quantitative data). The length of 
time between each precipitating influence and the organisational change 
(‘PrecipitatorTime’} and the length of time between each organisational change and 
consequential adjustment (AdjustTime’} were also recorded numerically in months. 
Qualitative evidence on each precipitator and consequential adjustment was also entered 
into the database. This would specify, for instance, if demand were checked, whether it 
was an increase in demand or decrease etc. Show-card 3.3 reproduced in Table 4.9
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above, records a change in ownership in a Chandlery. The qualitative evidence entered 
into the database, including the description of the change, is as follows;
Description of Change:
The previous owner N wanted to retire. The current owner W told her of 
his interest in buying the business. He was a customer of Company X as 
he owned a fishing trawler. N was getting old. She decided to employ a 
partner/manager to relieve the pressure of operating the business. W had 
lost his fishing trawler in an accident so he entered the business as a 
partner of N in 1982. W bought out N over 3 years. He paid her £3,000 
a month. W could not do that now given the lack of tourists. Now W 
and his wife are partners running the business. N continued to work in 
the business for 7 years. She retired in 1989. N was good at letting W 
do his own thing. There was a lot of reorganisation of the business in 
1982. W took over the management e.g. displays, orders. The business 
is a growing since 1982.
Precipitating Influences:
Operational efficiency had to improve. N was not able to manage on her 
own anymore. N needed to increase skills levels by bringing someone 
into the business interested in purchasing the business. N wanted to 
reduce her management function. W had expressed an interest. N knew 
she wanted to retire sometime in the future. W had the necessary ship 
chandlery skills.
Consequential Adjustments:
Achieved increased profits, sales, cashflow and growth. Cost changes 
occurred as the business needed to pay W’s income as well as N's. 
Capacity increased. Got access to more buyers. Invested in stock. 
Operational efficiency improved. Headcount increased, skills increased, 
functions of manager were taken over by W. The firm entered new 
niches in 1991. N retired in 1989.
As stated above, one of the differences in this design and that of Reid and 
Smith’s (2000b) is that cause and effect are identified. Cause and effect is explicit 
because the real time of the precipitating influences and the consequential adjustments 
are identified. However, though cause and effect is isolated, the a priori link, or the 
mechanism, by which the change occurred, is not identified by this design. The 
mechanism can be explained through inductive reasoning from the qualitative evidence 
recorded and this can be used to explain the results of estimated models. The enterprise
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profiles presented in Volume II, Appendix 5 use the qualitative evidence to explain the 
results of estimated models in this manner. The consequential adjustments made, 
following the organisational change, enable the form of change to he calibrated. This 
has never been done in empirical applications of contingency theory. The contingency 
factors, (or the precipitating influences), which drove the change, and the change itself 
are solely examined. It is probable that small firms will evaluate the cost and benefit of 
adapting to changes in the environment or contingency factors and will only do so if 
there are implications for the performance of the firm (i.e. The firm may adopt a real 
options approach). In Section 7.4, the frequency of occurrence of these changes, the 
nature of the changes, and their timing over the lifecycle of the firm are examined. This 
Chapter also explores the numbers of precipitators heralding change in organisational 
form and the number of consequential adjustments following the organisational change. 
Measures of small firm flexibility can be computed from the real time data recorded. 
The calibration of these measures is described in Section 8.2.
4.3.4 Factors which Foster Survival
This section of the survey instrument gathered data on factors which fostered the 
survival of the long-lived small firm (e.g. technology, industry growth, debt etc.) some 
of which were identified in Section 3.3. It also questions owner-managers of the long- 
lived small firms on a related issue which can foster the longevity of the small firm 
namely, the end game of the firm (e.g. family succession, trade-sale, asset disposal, 
management buyout etc.). An end game may enable a business to continue trading even 
though the founder has retired from the business.
Under perfect competition, a small firm will not survive in the long run unless it 
generates economic profit or rent (7t > 0) (see Barney, 1991). Mature small firms in this 
sample have clearly passed this long-run economic test of survival. Even though this 
criterion is easily observable, it is only a proxy for economic profit It is neutral on 
insights into the drivers of long-run survival. To assess factors which contributed to the 
survival of small firms over the long haul, question 4.1 in the survey instrument lists 
items that fostered the longevity of the firm on a scale to be rated (e.g. market research, 
differentiation, cashflow).
Items were selected for inclusion in the scale based on theoretical relationships 
to hypothesised dimensions of performance described by Sandberg and Hofer (1987)
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and Chrisman et al. (1998). In addition, items were included based on evidence 
presented in Section 3.3 describing the determinants of post entry performance (e.g. 
location, debt, growth, technology, innovation). Twenty-eight items were incorporated 
into the scale under the following headings: environmental (11 items); financial (4 
items); business strategy (9 items); and internal organisation (4 items). Chrisman et al. 
(1998) extended Sandberg and Hofer’s (1987) model, which described new venture 
performance as a function of the entrepreneur, strategy and industry structure, to include 
resources and organisational structure. This approach would see there being an 
indissoluble link between the setting of performance standards and the control of the 
firm by the owner-manager. The most commonly conceived performance standards 
relate to budgets. However, there are many other forms including those relating to 
human factors, for example responsibility, and to technological ones, like hitting 
research milestones (see Wickham, 1998).
The key question put to owner-managers was as follows: “We ’d like to know 
what has kept you in business down through the years. Some things are good for 
business and some things are bad. What effect have the following had? ” The owner- 
managers were then asked to rate each of the 28 items on a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 
is ‘good’, 0 is ‘bad’, and 50 is ‘neutral’. They did so by placing a cross on a line, of 
length 100 units. In this way, the influence they judged this item to have had was 
calibrated, based on their actual experience of running the business. If an item was not 
applicable, the owner-managers were asked to say so by checking the box provided. A 
copy of the scale presented to the owner-manager on show-card 4.1 is reproduced here 
in Table 4.10. It is similar in appearance to a scorecard on which owner-managers rate 
the influence of each item on their performance. In fact, ratings are used to calibrate a 
novel measure of performance described in Section 6.3.
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Table 4.10: Show Card 4.1
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As long-lived small firms were operating for a sufficiently long period of time, 
it was believed that owner-managers were now readily able to draw on their experience 
of running their businesses, in self-appraising the influence that each of these items had 
on their performance. In doing so, the owner-managers had in their minds a large body 
of qualitative and quantitative evidence, on which they could base their judgments of 
performance. To illustrate; over time, they had learned how best to combine their 
factors of production to exploit market opportunities, and they had learned how to 
respond to threats in a way that improved their performance and enhanced their 
survival. Given that in order to survive, owner-managers comfortably juggle these 
various factors in their own minds, it was considered logical to seek an explicit 
measure of how this juggling act is sustained.
A scale was thought to be the best design, as the instrument would be long and 
unwieldy if questions were to be asked regarding each scale item in turn. Detailed data 
on a few factors is sacrificed for a quantitative assessment of the influence of a 
comprehensive list of 28 factors, each of which was calibrated on a 100-point scale. A 
simple, single question on self-appraisal of performance could, of course, have 
substituted for multi-item scales. However, DeVellis (1991) argues that the latter has 
two main advantages over the single question approach First, it produces detailed 
measurement across a wide spectrum of variables (i.e. drivers of performance), rather 
than a single variable (or driver). Second, by diluting variable specific effects, it 
produces a more comprehensive (and stable) measure of what is meant by long run 
survival, therefore allowing common influences to come through.
Rating factors along a continuum is a much easier task than ranking the list of 
factors from top to bottom especially for long lists of factors. Rating items allows 
rankings to be tied (see DeVellis, 1991). The 100-point scale used here to rate each 
item with the neutral position in the centre, conjures up the familiar image of a speed 
dial or gears in a car (Le. clearly defined neutral position). This is an easy and familiar 
image for the respondent to understand. The responses have a clearly ordered 
component. As the continuum ranges from 0 to 100, the extent of variation in the 
responses of owner-managers will be higher rather than if fewer response options were 
offered. The consistency with which owner-managers rate scale items is also improved
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by defining the ‘meaning’ respondents should assign to middle alternatives using 
adjectival labelling of scale points, (see DeVellis, 1991).
A number from, 0 to 100, was entered into the database for each item rated. 
This number was based on the point were a cross was made by the respondent on the 
100 point continuum for each scale item (see Table 4.10). Entering the data in this 
format may be criticised as being subjective, however on a scale of 0-100, the margin 
of error is quite small, so such criticisms are unsubstantiated. Factor analytic 
techniques can be used to analyse this data and were adopted in Chapter 6 to explore 
the underlying determinants of the scale (i.e. the subjective performance measure).
This measuring exercise provides a new form of empirical evidence on factors, 
which foster the survival of the small firm, based on judgements, but nevertheless 
useful in econometric estimation. It differs from the regular approach adopted in the 
literature, which analyses differences between surviving firms and non-surviving firms 
to explain longevity (Segarra and Callejon, 2002; Mata and Portugal, 2002, 1994; 
Mahmood, 2000; Mata et al., 1995; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Audretsch, 1991, 
1995; Doms et al., 1995; Dunne and Hughes, 1994; and Reid, 1993). As stated above, 
from the self-assessment of each item’s influence on the survival of the firm, a new 
overall measure of performance can be computed by summing the individual item 
scores.
Few studies cover all the items examined in this scale. The self-assessment 
scores provide comprehensive evidence on a range of factors not examined previously 
in any one study. Qualitative evidence was also gathered on the three most important 
items, which owner-managers of long-lived small firms believed fostered their 
survival. Therefore, items’ scores were verified by real events. Enterprise profile B; a 
hospital supplies firm, stated that suppliers were the single most important factor which 
fostered their survival. According to the owner-manager, “suppliers identified well 
accepted products which were ahead of the rest and which we want to be in
Three straightforward questions were asked of owner-managers about their 
end-game strategy. The first was a filter question, which asked the owner-manager; 
“Do you expect the business to keep trading well into the fiiture? (Yes/No)”. Those 
who answered “No” were asked to explain why not This gathered qualitative 
evidence on potential reasons why a business would not continue trading once the
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owner-manager retired. For those who responded affirmatively, the owner-manager 
was asked to indicate his expected end-game (i.e. trade sale, family succession, 
management/employee buyout or other). This established whether the owner-manager 
believed that a market existed for his business, the likelihood of family succession and 
whether management or employees were equipped to buy out the owner-manager. The 
’’other (please specify)” option captured different potential choices open to the owner- 
manager. The responses to these questions are examined in Section 7.5. A 
comprehensive analysis of potential end-games for long-lived small firms has received 
inadequate attention in the literature (see Tajnikar and Dosenovic, 2003).
4.3.5 Innovation and Technology
Much of the small firm’s literature has considered small firms as innovators or 
agents of change (see Audretsch, 1991, 1995; Acs and Audretsch, 1987, 1988). As 
stated in the acknowledgements to this thesis, Enterprise Ireland kindly granted 
fimding for the collection of data using the survey instrument under the International 
Collaboration Programme 2001 to 2002. This section on the level of innovativeness 
and the technological progressiveness of the long-lived small firm was included in the 
survey instrument to meet the requirements of the sponsoring body. The section aims 
to measure the extent of innovation undertaken by the firm. In particular, it assesses 
the level of product and process innovation carried out by the firm and gauges the use 
of information technology within the firm. It also examines the level of technical 
change in industries where long-lived small firms operate.9 The measures included in 
the section were adapted from an instrument developed by Prof. Reid and Dr. Smith 
(see Smith, 1997a, 1999; Reid and Smith, 2000a). They were tested on the 
Leverhulme (1994-1997) sample in the mid 1990s. Consequently, the discussion here 
focuses on the content of this section of the survey rather than on the design of the 
questions per se.
The most significant innovation undertaken by small firms is normally 
embarked on at inception, ‘the entrepreneurial event’ (Reid, 1992, 1999). Thus, 
owner-managers were first asked: “How innovative were you at start-up?” with 
response categories; Not at all, a little, quite a lot and a lot. Owner-managers who
9 This evidence can also be linked to other evidence gathered on innovation in section 3 and section 2 of 
the survey instrument, where information was gathered on new innovations, technical change and 
whether the firm engaged in innovation and market research as a separate activity within the firm.
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responded positively were then asked to describe the main type of innovation they 
undertook. They were asked to choose one of the following options; Quality, new 
products or services, new technology, marketing techniques, operational efficiency; 
and other. This was a forced choice question. Forcing respondents to choose a 
particular form of innovation avoids problems of acquiescence (see Converse & 
Presser, 1986). Long-lived small firms may have undertaken innovation in all these 
categories, but they were forced to choose the main area of innovation. This produces 
a concise measure of the chief area of innovation, which these long-lived firms 
undertook at inception.
The next four questions pertained to process innovation. Process innovation 
was defined initially as follows; ‘A process innovation is a new way you do things, 
which firms already do [e.g. how you cut a component; how you advise a client; how 
you overhaul an engine]’. Once presented with this definition, the owner-managers 
were asked; “What best describes the extent of innovation in your use of processes 
since start-up?” The respondent was asked to choose one of the following responses; 
No change, slight change, significant change and important change. This generated an 
ordinal measure of the extent of process innovation undertaken within the firm. Long- 
lived small firms which changed their processes since start-up were then asked to 
identify the main driver of this change from the following list: Imitation of rivals; 
hints from trade or professional journals; suggestions from customer; suggestions 
within the firm; suggestions from supplier, new staff ‘carrying in’ knowledge; and 
other (please specify). This question was also forced-choice. It assesses whether 
process innovations in small firms are derived externally or from internal learning. 
Subsequently, the level of process innovation undertaken by principal rivals was 
considered, as well as the level of competitive pressure placed on the firm by the 
process innovations of rivals. The owner-managers were provided with the same 
response categories to both these questions to reduce learning; none, a little, a lot, and 
don’t know.
The next seven questions pertained to product innovation. As above, product 
innovation was defined initially, as follows: ‘A product innovation is a new good or 
service that you can sell to meet a newly discovered customer need.’ Once presented 
with this definition the owner-managers were asked; “How many new
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products/services have you developed since start-up?” They were asked to choose one 
of the following responses; none, 1-5, 6-10, 11-20, and more than 20. This produces 
an ordinal measure of the extent of product innovation undertaken within the firm 
Small firms which engaged in product innovation since inception were asked if they 
reaped rewards from doing so, with the following response categories; Not as much as 
expected, a little, or a lot. If they reaped rewards from innovations, they were asked 
what form these rewards took; increased market share, increased profitability, both of 
these, or other. If they failed to reap rewards from product innovations, they were 
asked if they experienced difficulties launching product/services onto new markets, 
and the form of these difficulties; developing a sales strategy, getting customers to try 
the product, or other. These questions were not asked previously by Reid and Smith 
(2000a) but were included here to extract information on the difficulties small firms 
may face in reaping rewards from product innovations (Geroski and Machin, 1992). 
The level of product innovation undertaken by principal rivals and the level of 
competitive pressure placed on the firm by product innovations of rivals were 
measured as above for process innovations. The final question on product innovations 
assessed whether patents, copyright, trademarks or the rapid exploitation of 
innovations are required to protect innovations in their respective industries (Dosi, 
1988). Its function was to see if long-lived small firms could protect their innovations 
from imitation by rivals and therefore reap greater rewards.
The next three questions pertain to information technology (I.T.). As above, 
information technology was defined initially, as follows: ‘Information technology 
refers to devices businesses used to transmit and process general information (e.g. 
telephone fox, PC)’. Once presented with this definition, the owner-managers were 
asked; “What kinds of IT do you use?” They chose options from a comprehensive list 
provided (see question 5.10 in Volume II, Appendix 1). The importance of 
information technology to their business was also assessed. This produced an ordinal 
measure, with the response categories ‘unimportant’, ‘important’ and ‘very important’. 
From the list of the following response options; networking, producing accounts, 
managing dealings with buyers/suppliers, monitoring performance targets, designing 
new- products, gathering information on the activities of rivals, operational efficiency
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and setting targets or plans, the owner-manager was asked to select activities for which 
they employ information technology.
The final three questions in the survey examined the level of technical change 
faced by the long-lived small firm in its industry over its life. A filter question 
assessed initially whether there was technical change in the small firm’s industry. In 
order to discover the sources of this change those owner-managers who responded 
affirmatively were asked who the prime initiators of technical change were (i.e. market 
leaders, newly emerging innovators etc.). They were then asked to reflect on their 
experience of using new technologies since start-up and to state which of the following 
declarative statements best reflected their experience;
We haven’t used new technologies.
We have implemented new technologies but rarely successfully.
We have implemented new technologies but not always successfully.
We have generally been successful in implementing new technologies.
This provides an ordinal measure of success in the implementation of information 
technologies.
The measures obtained from this section of the survey are examined in Chapter 
7. They are related to growth in sales and employment and other measures of post 
entry performance to challenge existing hypotheses using new data on long-lived small 
firms. The measure of industry technical change is used as an explanatory variable in 
the performance and size equations in the simultaneous equations analysis in Chapter 
9.
4.3.6 Conclusion
This section described unique features of the design of the survey instrument 
for this study. Detailed measures incorporated in this survey were not gathered 
previously on a sample of long-lived small firms, or in some cases, on any sample of 
small firms. This permits new hypotheses to be challenged using new measures and 
existing hypotheses to be challenged using new data. The measures developed within 
the survey instrument enable a characterisation of the long-lived small firm (see 
Chapters 5-7), the development of a novel measure of performance (see Chapter 6) and 
the calibration of new measures of firm flexibility (viz. agility and speed) and firm- 
specific turbulence (see Chapter 8). These new measures are used in inferential 
analysis in Chapters 8 and 9. Chapter 8 examines the relationship between the
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measures of firm flexibility, firm-specific turbulence and the new measure of 
performance. In Chapter 9, a simultaneous equations analysis of the relation between 
size, performance and variables such as market extent and competitive strategy space is 
conducted. Qualitative evidence is used to triangulate the results of inferential analysis 
in the case study evidence presented in Volume II, Appendix 5.
4.4 Fieldwork Methods
Prof. Reid and the author collected the data through face-to-face interviews 
with the owner-managers of 63 long-lived small firms between October 2001 and 
February 2002.10 11This section outlines the lessons learned from piloting and the 
interviewing techniques applied. It also discusses variations in response rates in the 
extracted sample frame of long-lived small firms by parent sample.
4.4.1 Pilots
Six pilot interviews were undertaken. The sample of six small firms was 
identified by tracing the survivors of a pilot study, undertaken by Prof. Reid, for the 
Leverhulme (1994-1997) project.11 From this pilot study of thirteen firms, five were 
still in business. Four of these survivors agreed to be interviewed. Another two firms 
were selected for inclusion in the pilot, from the main sample of 150 firms, based on 
their proximity to the University of St. Andrews.
According to Converse and Presser (1986, p.74), a pilot study is a “dress 
rehearsal”', a test of the entire data collection process, not only a test of the survey 
instrument. They state that it “is not a time to repair gross errors, or to make new 
explorations. It is a time for cutting, trimming, splicing, rearranging and filling in new 
skip patterns, formatting for clarity and polishing” (p.74). All questions were tested to 
examine the level of variation in responses, to see if respondents understood the correct 
meaning of questions, to examine the difficulty of the task facing respondents in 
answering the questions and to assess the interest and attention of the owner-managers 
in the content of the survey. The flow and naturalness of the sections, the order of 
questions, skip patterns and the time it took to conduct the interview were also
10 Professor Reid interviewed nine firms in the sample and the author interviewed the remaining fifty- 
four firms.
11 Dr. Smith and Ms. Nilkes also interviewed the firms in the Leverhulme (1994-1997) sample. The 
Leverhulme Trust endorsed this project.
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considered. The main lessons learned from piloting and a brief description of the 
representativeness of firms involved in the pilot study are outlined below.
4.4.1.1 Pilot sample
The greater the diversity of cases that are used in a pilot study, the more 
rigorous is the testing of the survey instrument. A brief description of the firms, which 
participated in the pilot, is presented below in Table 4.11.
They are a mixed bunch of firms, which are slightly younger than the firms that 
were interviewed as part of the sample for this study. The average age of these firms 
was 8 years at the time of interview.12 They vary in terms of size, from ‘one-man 
outfits’ to those employing 12 full-time equivalent employees, and in terms of 
turnover, from generating gross sales of £15,000stg. to £3million stg. Two of the small 
firms that were included in the pilot study, had experienced a change in ownership, to 
explore how new owner-managers dealt with the questions posed in the survey 
instrument (e.g. questions on aims for the business and on pivotal changes etc.). In the 
first case, two partners, who ran a financial advisory service for employees of the NHS, 
then bought a property-letting agency. They bought the property-letting agency to add 
to their business portfolio, and to provide themselves with a main street presence. 
Unfortunately, they found it difficult to monitor both businesses and this letting agency 
wasn’t doing as well as they desired. The second case was a Golf Holiday Company, 
which was acquired by a London based company. The Golf Holiday Company 
operates in Scotland as a subsidiary of this firm. The original owner still had a 
significant share in the business and continued to run the Scottish office. The 
ownership of the other cases in the pilot study may not have changed, but they faced 
different issues of organizational transformation. For example, a carpet retailer had a 
number of retail outlets in one of the main urban centres of Scotland. Attempts by the 
owner-manager at regional expansion were unsuccessful. As another example a music 
store faced a lot of competition from larger retailers and had to re-position itself within 
the market place to compete. Such diversity of cases improved the challenge to the 
survey instrument.
12 Although these firms do not meet our criteria for a long-lived small firm (>10 years old), they are 
approaching this age. We did not wish to use any of the extracted 90 long-lived survivors for this pilot 
study in order to maximise our potential valid sample size. It was felt that firms identified for the pilot 
while younger, at eight years of age, had experienced a sufficient amount of organisational change to 
adequately test the questions in the survey instrument.
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Table 4.11: Descriptions of Firms in Pilot
Line of business Ownership Type of 
business
Employees
(FTEs)*
Sales 
(£000 stg)
Assets** 
(£000 stg)
Painting
Holidays
No change Sole trader 1 15 ■
Shellfish Farm No change Partnership 2 200 -
Carpet Retailer No change Partnership 12 1500 130
Property Letting 
Agency
Trade sale Partnership 3.5 120 10
Music Retailer No change Sole trader 1 56 60
Golf Holidays Takeover Private
Company
6 3000 -
Notes * FTE is an abbreviation for full-time equivalent employees.
** Asset values are missing either because they are unknown to the respondent or the question 
was not asked in the early version of the instrument.
4.4.1.2 The Findings of the Pilot Study
There were a number of issues which emerged during the pilot study. They are 
not all outlined here. The focus of the discussion is on the more significant findings. 
A number of changes were made to the content of the survey and to the ordering, 
wording and design of survey questions as the pilots were being undertaken. These 
changes enhanced the measures included in the survey and the flow of the instrument, 
as well as easing the difficulty of the response task. They are described in turn below.
In general, it was found that the length of time to administer the survey was too 
long. It took on average between 1.5-2 hours to administer. Therefore, to improve 
response rates, the instrument was reduced in length so that it could, if necessary, be 
conducted in one hour. Questions on the trajectory of performance (profitability) over 
its lifecycle were omitted as the respondent had difficulty remembering the trajectory 
of profits. The flow of the instrument was improved through including filter questions 
(see question 1.12.2 in Table 4.6). This increased the speed at which the instrument 
could be administered. The number of categories in various measures were reduced, 
where possible, to cut down on completion time. Repetition between section one of 
the survey instrument on general characteristics and section three on changes in the 
ownership and management was eliminated. Questions on changes in ownership and 
management were omitted from section 1 and assessed in section 3. This information 
was also obtained during initial contacts with the firm and recorded on the cover of the
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survey instrument prior to the interview, as indicated above. Additional questions 
were included on the owner-manager’s end-game, because in the clinical examination 
of these mature small firms, it seemed to be one of their greatest concerns. Thus, the 
quality of information gathered was not sacrificed for greater brevity. Solutions were 
sought to ease administration, without sacrificing the quality of reporting.
Section three of the instrument, on organisational change, and section four, on 
factors which fostered survival, benefited significantly from piloting. Initially, section 
3 considered pivotal points or more radical changes in the running of these businesses. 
However, many small firms do not change radically over their life, but make small 
changes, which are important from their point of view, and involve a lot of 
reorganisation. Thus, this section was entitled ‘organisational change’ and a broader 
list of changes was provided (see Show-card 3.1, Table 4.8). Originally, Show-card
3.3 consisted of two separate show-cards; one for ‘precipitating influences’ and 
another for ‘consequential adjustments’ respectively, which had to be completed by the 
owner-manager for each change. This process was lengthy and unwieldy. The factors 
listed on each show-card were also more specific detailing the direction of the change 
such as ‘a fall in profit margins’. It was decided during the pilots that this process 
needed to be simplified resulting in the compact design of show-card 3.3, which is 
much easier to understand and administer. The evidence gathered on organisational 
change is the same but the process is now more simple.
The design of Show-card 4.1 also changed. Four sub-scales, rather than a 
single multi-item scale, listing factors which fostered survival, was initially presented 
to the respondents. However, the owner-managers were not required to be familiar 
with the multi-dimensional nature of survival to answer the question. The four sub­
scales made the show-card look unnecessarily complicated. Thus, it was redesigned 
such that it was single dimensional; the number of words were reduced and only one 
question was asked. Originally, each owner-manager was asked whether they felt an 
individual factor had a ‘negative’ or a ‘positive’ effect on the longevity of the firm. 
This was simplified using phrases such as ‘bad’ and ‘good’ as owner-managers had 
difficulty with the words ‘negative’ and ‘positive’. Greater variation in the intensity of 
owner-manager’s responses was also sought.
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To show how careful piloting can simplify the design of questions to aid 
understanding and for ease of administration, copies of the original show-cards for 
show card 3.3 and show card 4.1 are presented below in Tables 4.12 and 4.13 
respectively. These can be compared to Tables 4.9 and 4.10 respectively.
4.4.2 Data Collection Process
As indicated above, the data were collected using face-to-face interviews. The 
advantages of using this method of data collection are that the interviewer can answer 
respondents’ questions and probe for adequate answers (Fowler, 1993). More complex 
question designs can also be used. Visiting the premises of the small firm and meeting 
the owner-manager builds rapport with these firms and also permits the collecting of 
documentation and (where applicable) product samples. A visual sense of the product, 
the operations of the firm and the market it serves is attained, which can be useful in 
explaining the respondent’s answers. In general, the job of the interviewer is to enlist 
the cooperation of selected respondents, to train and motivate respondents and to ask 
questions, record answers and probe incomplete answers in a standardised way (see 
Fowler & Mangione, 1990). The principles adopted in this study are outlined below.
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Table 4.12 Show Card 3.3 Before Piloting
Slw«v card 5.3
Fhngiri Paint:
3J.1 Gelaw ale potential diiveia n! pivotal points within ftlius. Was l.h;i pivotal point 
dmcit by any of dulse lactim.1)
3.3.2 li y litre.- many tnnnlhs did cadi lactnr precede Ihe pi viral pninP
Show curd 3.4
Pivotal Point:
A4I lieitnv are adaplatnnis to pivotal points within films I’lerem indicalc if iftcy line 
telcviiat for each pi uitni pi lint.
3.4.2 tfinv tnnj fin nonlii5) niter n pivotal |ynint did these vhiinjK-s nesur?
3.3.3 Dua.se Indtcaw i he- irm;j important daver of the pivotal point.
Furtnrx Tick 
all that
i, apply
How loop before?
w Increased business risk
lb) A eluuigc in demand "1
ICl New market niches umcrginij J
r<£) Existing legal form was no longer Ux efficient
tel Itntdcquntc credit policy Itg. with buyers or 
suppliers)
<ri Needed to raise oddillnnitl debt J
<£) A fail in profit margins
Higher wage costs . I
<i> Poor sates performance relativ e in cnnipHitons -
(Il A change In the Intmsily nF competition
lk> Higher costs of equipment and materials
in Limited rapacity lu cape vvllh suh» growth
(nil A mini la be more accessible Io bttjcns
tai Greater co-ordination necessary with suppliers 
of Inputs
- i
(01 Slock levels were inn high 7 1 1
(P.l New Pruts entering mnrkd
’.’I,
(if
A need For greater involicnicni Insulaund 
rnarketfrtc -
................
ObsnteiKUKC nt existing technology' r
rs) inefTirirwcies in npentlinp nF business C 1
(I J Losing customers to riv ids • •
lu) Delinquent supplier
tv) lkllni|uent itablara I
fwl Ollier I.Ptrasc specify) c ! 1
IXl i Other fPlease .specify)
IV) i
■
Other t Please specify I l j
Main llrlveR________________
tliank wit Nu.1 pirate ratal n llvs sln-vt ;.i lltr ntim ic'A.’t
3,43 Wtirt did pent feel was the main ndaptation following the pivotal point?
rids 
id) that 
nppiy.
How long 
after?
(a) Additional finance was raised f e.g, debt or capital) e
(bi liivexttnnntta new equIpnrenL'machbrery 1 •
(e) Invwtnreat in new premises r i
tell Entered a new market niches (with existing or new 
produclsl
1
(c) A change In tire number of employ cus L
(6 A eiunge In production volume c
fei Cast control Itic-iBHrt* <e.g. Reduce overtime, reduce 
wage billy
'hl A change In the organisation of Ute firm (e.g. frtun 
funetlanat Gnei Co product tinex etc.)
i«l A change in type of customer served
(I) A change In tire mix of buyers
Ikl A change In tire mix tif suppliers
1,n A change in firm ftsscls (dhcstflnvcst new equipment 
tie.)
iir.) increased sales effort
11!)
to)
A change in lire multi output fe.g. product) ndx
A change In Ihc product offering (e.j». quality changes 
tnorediffcntndirttd From rirelsl
-
«p) A cfaoagc In the Image cr the (e.p.
rcftirbfcftnical of preit&cs}
tq) Hired skilled employees
in Increased goodwill -or reputation or business
IS) Cuptured the business of customers from rivals
1 II) Improvements in ojicrotinnut effkteinqj
llu) Appointment of part-time staff
liv) A change In the style or ntanagetncitl (Lc. more layers 
»f hierarch*) I
<vv) Other fi’teuse specify)
(X> j Utlicr t.Heitse specify 1
. t
Main StniteL’Ic Change:
Thank wu. p'«<w rtlur* <tiK» 'heal in ihe :nter>
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Table 4.13 Show Card 4.1 Before Piloting
Slum curd 42
Lucinsa die (able un ihts end which is spit into 4 factor which influence the longevity of 
tout business. Tiicsc arc the mark? lavuuwiicn!, ftoce, the cuarrol nrgimisntion and 
uniiugy. Ilai allntiules of these 4 faeitgi are also listed, These feelers and ibeir aluibtto 
nay have pusiiiwly w negatively affected she longest}' of soar business. Tin: next Mo 
<pit<tiom a*l: son to awavs their influence or: the longevity of your (ion.
42,1 Please indicate whether you consider the attn bates of die following feclen to haw a 
negnlive influence ot a positive irJlucnct or. die longevity of your haiircwJ Taft 
not applicable |WA) if this tsin fuel Lhe case.
422 for each factor can you please tell mculictlrcriliiadasiiiiiiBlyocraiivi!. migaiive. 
neutral. josiliv: or strongly positive effect ct the Icxtjyevtly ol war firm?
Influences «n Lsngcvltv ofyuur IfusmiAs Negulivc
Influence Influence
SAi
Fuclur Internal Organhutlnn of Finn
>
X
Mix of inputs ttset! in production ilrcliices 
employee! and equipment etc.)
Cconiinalios of funainnsvnihnitbc lino
J ic.c. by iitodum or functional lines) -............._...
Ijnprovemciits in operational efficiency 1
Motivntioacf mvnet manager . " i
Sbils ol Tjoagcncnt
Shills of employees w
Other (Picas: specif)} i ' i
Influences on l.nngnity of poor Business Neenllvv j Pusitiit NA
Factor i Market Eh vtaMuneni ,rfxc Influence i
> i Ability ill negeeiale on-.tire with suppaeiii . "r
£ The gnmlfe potential in yrag mstrE CKirs.tt [ • J
; . The intensity of competition in your 1 •J i
Influences on Longevity of your Business 
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? ■' Stale I’t'kcvui ptxlu-i'scnicc
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• Sidssiinncficcdv
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j Cost conltol
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Riling product gaps
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Trade mteilieencc oi ri s ais
; The number of new entrants . ii L‘ Maritct research . —
1 Fcduto.’ouicjJ chances in iti&i'iry
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Regulation
1 j ’1 IL Product Ouaiits i i •
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... 1
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influences un Ijiogevitv of your Business 
hiclur Fliumciit!
> Cashflow of ihe business 
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| Ctwinpolicy
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J Other (Plea* specify!
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influence
' Positive I 
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r 1
II ! ■
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firm
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To conduct the fieldwork, the sample of firms was divided up into sub-samples; 
10-15 long-lived small firms in the sample frame, which were located in close 
proximity to each other. The sub-sample of long-lived small firms, which was 
bordering the University of St. Andrews, was contacted initially. The initial contact 
with the firms was via a pre-letter, which identified the author, explained the nature of 
and rational for the study, the process by which mature small firms were selected for 
inclusion, the time required for the interview and the benefits to the owner-manager of 
participating. It also assured the owner-managers that absolute confidentiality would be 
upheld and signalled that the author would contact them in the near future. Three 
versions of this letter were composed, one for each of the three ‘parent’ samples, from 
which long-lived surviving firms were traced. Multiple letters were written for reasons 
of simplicity and to reduce the length of the letter. Volume II, Appendix 2 contains a 
draft of each of these three letters. They were posted on headed writing paper from the 
Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm, C.R.I.E.F.F, and 
signed by Professor Reid and the author.
The owner-manager was then contacted by telephone within a week of posting 
the pre-letter in order to gain his co-operation and to arrange a convenient time for the 
interview. The telephone protocol, which was applied, is outlined in Volume II, 
Appendix 3. It indicates in a general sense, the terms on which the data from this 
conversation were gathered and it acts as a checklist while on the telephone with the 
owner-manager, to ensure that the complete agenda were covered. It was not applied 
rigidly as some respondents had individual concerns, which needed to be addressed over 
the telephone. The design accepted that the interviewer should judge the best approach 
to adopt to persuade an owner-manager to partake (Fowler and Mangione, 1990). If the 
owner-manager agreed to be interviewed, a copy of the agenda and a letter confirming 
the date and time of the interview was forwarded to him. A copy of this is presented in 
Volume II, Appendix 2. The directions to the business premises of the owner were 
downloaded from www.yell.co.uk, using the postcode of the point of departure to the 
destination point.
At the beginning of the interview, a preamble clarifying the interview 
procedures was explained to the respondent to put them at ease. This is reproduced 
here:
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The questionnaire is divided into 5 sections which include questions on 
the characteristics of your business, your expectations at start-up for the 
size and scope of your business, changes in the running of your business, 
factors which fostered your survival and the level of innovation of your 
business. The typical way in which we shall proceed will involve my 
asking a question and then noting your reply. In addition, there are a 
number of lists from which you will be asked to choose options. It is 
helpful to begin in a general way. This will help us to identify the main 
features of your business before going into detail. May we begin with 
the general questions?
The shortest interview time was approximately 50 minutes, but not unusually 2 
to 2.5 hours were spent in the company of the owner-manager, not only addressing the 
questions delineated in the questionnaire but looking around the business premises and 
discussing issues faced by long-lived small firms. Based on this, a great deal of 
qualitative evidence was gathered and recorded in the qualitative database under 
‘comments’. It is very difficult to gather this form of evidence by any other method of 
data collection. This information was invaluable in compiling the case studies 
presented in Volume II, Appendix 5.
Face-to-face interviews were applied in all cases except for two firms, which 
operated on the islands off the coast of Scotland. Time and money prevented the author 
travelling to these islands. However, rather than lose these firms from our sample, 
sections 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the survey instrument were forwarded by post to these 
respondents for completion. Once they returned the completed survey, they were 
telephoned by the author and section 3 was completed over the telephone and answers 
to any of the other questions, which were left blank or were ambiguous were clarified 
over the telephone. This worked quite well.
At the end of the interview the owner-manager was thanked for cooperating and
the next stage was explained as follows:
This is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for completing it. I hope 
you have also derived some interest yourself from doing so. Your time 
and cooperation are very much appreciated. Let me remind you that the 
strictest confidentiality will be upheld regarding the information you 
have provided about your business. If you should be so interested in our 
general findings regarding the development of small businesses we will 
be more than happy to share these results. We hope that our research 
will contribute to the success and growth of small business. We wish 
you all the very best with the fixture of your business.
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The owner-managers were also formally thanked in writing for their co-operation. A 
copy of this thank-you letter is provided in Volume II, Appendix 2. A copy of a report 
on the findings was also forwarded to all respondents at a later date.
4.4.3 Response Rates
Overall sixty-three firms were interviewed out of ninety long-lived small firms 
in our sample frame. This represents a response rate of 70%. The level of non-response 
did vary across the three ‘parent’ samples as can be seen from Table 4.1. Four-fifths 
(80%) of the eligible long-lived small firms from the Leverhulme (1985-1988) sample 
responded, three-fifths (61%) from the Telephone Survey (1991) sample and over four- 
fifths (86%) of the eligible long-lived small firms from the Leverhulme (1994-1997) 
sample were interviewed.
The owner-managers of firms, which were interviewed on face-to-face basis in 
the past, such as firms from the Leverhulme (1985-1988) and Leverhulme (1994-1997) 
parent samples, were familiar with C.R.I.E.F.F and the value of participating in such a 
study. The Telephone Survey (1991) had the lowest response rate because rapport was 
not developed with the owner-managers of this parent sample in the earlier interview. It 
is difficult to do this over the telephone. In addition, it was more difficult to get owner- 
managers of those firms, which had changed ownership to respond (cases in which a 
trade-sale occurred rather than family succession), because of their lack of awareness of 
C.R.I.E.F.F and the firm’s participation in earlier studies. Given that these firms are 
long-lived, a large proportion had changed ownership. Nearly a fifth (16%) of the long- 
lived small firms interviewed had changed ownership through a trade-sale or 
acquisition.
The composition of the sample of long-lived small firms interviewed is as 
follows: almost half (47%) the long-lived small firms interviewed were originally 
selected form the Telephone Survey (1991) sample; a third (32%) were from the 
Leverhulme (1985-1988) sample; and a fifth (21%) were from the Leverhulme (1994­
1997) sample. The general characteristics of these long-lived small firms are discussed 
in Part IV.
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4.4.4 Conclusion
Section 4.4 outlined the fieldwork methods used in this study. The value of 
piloting survey instruments is illustrated. This demonstrates clearly how the survey 
instrument evolved to its final form. Solutions were developed without sacrificing the 
quality of the data. This ‘dress rehearsal’ for the main study ensured that the measures 
in the survey document were finely honed and that the data collection process was 
tested.
Certainly interviewing owner-managers on a face-to-face basis allowed complex 
question designs to be administered. Further, the qualitative evidence obtained from 
meeting owner-managers on site is not matched by any other data collection methods 
other than perhaps participant observation. As the sample of long-lived small firms was 
identified from known sources, this significantly increased the response rate to the 
survey. In general, the data collection process, which took place between October 2001 
to February 2002 ran very smoothly. As seen from above, a number of steps were 
under taken to ensure that the data collected was of a very high standard.
4.5 Database Design
The data gathered was qualitative and quantitative in nature. Thus, two separate 
databases were set up in SPSS, one for the quantitative data and another for the 
qualitative evidence. The primary sorting key, which is the Firm ID number, enables 
interaction between both quantitative and qualitative forms of data recorded for this 
study. In total there are 635 variables in the quantitative database. The codes for these 
variables and their definition are provided in Volume II, Appendix 4. Data entered into 
the qualitative database was entered verbatim. Each question, which gathered 
qualitative evidence, was entered row by row into the database for each respondent. An 
additional row was entered for the comments by the owner-manager at the end of the 
interview and observations of the interviewer.
In general, quantitative variables were coded in a format, which facilitated 
flexible data analysis. For example, a precipitator such as demand was coded as “1” if it 
was checked, and “0” otherwise. This allowed frequency counts to be calculated. The 
year in which a change in the running of the business occurred was entered into the
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database to enable the transformation of this variable into a duration variable. This 
permitted the data to be manipulated with ease for analysis.
4.6 General Conclusions
This Chapter set out to analyse the composition of the sample frame of long- 
lived small firms. This was followed by a discussion of the design of the survey 
instrument used in fieldwork. Finally, the fieldwork methods adopted in the study were 
outlined. The main contributions of this Chapter are also in these three areas.
First, it outlines a convenient approach to identify long-lived small firms for 
further study. The use of known sources increases the response rate to such a study. 
Evidence gathered on small firms earlier in their lives (survivors and non-survivors) can 
be used to correct performance measures for selectivity bias in econometric testing (see 
Chapter 8). This evidence can also be used to test the validity of data gathered 
retrospectively. Finally, access to detailed evidence on these firms earlier in their 
lifecycle enriches case analysis (see Volume II, Appendix 5).
Second, this chapter discussed the construction of novel ways to calibrate 
organisational change, and factors which foster the survival of the long-lived small firm. 
New measures of flexibility, firm-specific turbulence and performance are generated 
using the data gathered with the survey instrument. These measures are used in 
inferential analysis in Part V (viz. flexibility and simultaneous equations analysis). As a 
result new evidence from the quantitative testing of hypotheses is presented on the long- 
lived small firm.
Third, the quality of data collected on long-lived small firms is another major 
contribution. Many of the measures included in this study have not been gathered for 
such a sample of firms previously. The time and effort spent travelling to the long-lived 
small firm’s site and the lengthy discussions with the owner-manager about the 
measures in the survey instrument ensures that the quality of the data obtained is high. 
In addition, the qualitative evidence obtained from examination of the firms’ products 
and production process etc. could not have been obtained by any other data collection 
method.
The mix of evidence gathered implies that the results of quantitative 
econometric testing of hypotheses can be further clarified by using the body of
150
qualitative evidence recorded. Detailed analytical enterprise profiles of seven firms are 
presented in Volume II, Appendix 5 to illustrate the quantitative results of this study. 
They also show the range of qualitative evidence, which is available on these long-lived 
small firms.
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CHAPTER 5 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LONG-LIVED SMALL FIRM
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5.1 Introduction
This Chapter presents a comprehensive description of the typical long-lived small 
firm in the sample using data collected in face-to-face interviews with the owner-managers 
of 63 long-lived small firms in Scotland. The analysis of the Chapter is divided into two 
sections. Section 5.2 examines the general characteristics of the long-lived small firm 
whereas Section 5.3 describes the market environment in which the long-lived small firm 
operates.
A number of features of the long-lived small firm are described in characterising the 
firms in the sample. Initially, the geographic and sectoral representativeness of the sample 
of 63 long-lived small firms interviewed is asserted. The relevant distributions in the 
sample are compared to their distribution in the Scotland and U.K. population where 
appropriate. Then, focusing on the age of the long-lived small firm, the influence of 
generational issues on the likelihood of survival is considered, as well as learning by the 
mature small firm. This is followed by an analysis of the size of the firm (as measured by 
FTEs and real turnover) and its relationship to age. Having described the size of the long- 
lived small firm, its organisational form is presented, and differences in size and efficiency 
across the organisational forms are explored. Finally, growth in size over the lifecycle of 
the long-lived small firm is considered. In particular, the empirical relevance of Gibrat’s 
Law of proportionate effect at different points in the lifecycle of the firm is investigated 
(see Sutton, 1997,1998). Such an analysis has not been conducted previously for a sample 
of small firms, although, it builds on empirical work by Reid (2001), who performed a 
similar analysis for small firms over shorter periods, early in their lifecycle, rather than at 
different points over the lifecycle, as the small firm matured. Jovanovic (1982) argued that 
firm growth is independent of size for mature firms, however, little evidence was found to 
support this proposition. In feet, Evans (1987a) found evidence to the contrary. He 
rejected Gibrat’s Law for mature firms defined as firms older than age 7, 20 or 45. This 
Chapter examines support for Gibrat’s Law at different points in their lifecycle for the 
sample of firms to see if evidence in support of Jovanovic’s (1982) special case exists.
After distinguishing between ‘hostile’ and ‘benign’ market environments (see Covin 
and Slevin, 1989; Covin et. al, 1999), Section 5.3 sets out to characterise the market
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environment in which the long-lived small firm operates and to form an assessment of the 
hostility of this environment. Initially, the geographical reach (e.g. local, regional, national 
etc.) of the firm’s market for its principal product is examined as well as changes in the 
geographical extent of the market over time. Then, the hostility of the principal market of 
the long-lived small firm is explored through an examination of rivalry (viz. number of 
major rivals, a gauge of the intensity of competition), niche plays (viz. holding a larger 
share of smaller markets and engaging in product differentiation) and the role of excess 
capacity.
In this Chapter a variety of univariate and bivariate statistical techniques are applied 
to test inferences in accordance with small sample distribution theory. In examining 
changes in the characteristics of the market overtime, broad changes are analysed (between 
start-up and the time of interview) rather than marginal organisational changes at each 
sequential stage of development. In general, the characterisation of the long-lived small 
firm provides a reference point for understanding the results of inferential analysis 
discussed in Chapters 8 and 9 and it complements evidence on the enterprise profiles 
presented in Volume n, Appendix 5.
5.2 Firm Characteristics
A number of characteristics of the long-lived small firm are presented in this 
Section. Subsection 5.2.1 begins with an analysis of the sectoral and geographical scope of 
the sample of 63 long-lived small firms. The importance of generational issues and age in 
promoting the longevity of the firm is discussed in Subsection 5.2.2 as well as the 
relationship between entrepreneurial learning and the age of the firm. Subsection 5.2.3 
considers the size of the long-lived small firm as approximated by turnover and fulltime 
equivalent employees and its dependence on age. The organisational form of the long-lived 
small firm, approximated by the legal status of the firm, is studied in Subsection 5.2.4. 
Differences in firm size and efficiency across the three organisational forms are explored. 
Subsection 5.2.5 examines growth in the scale of the firm’s operations over the lifecycle 
and analyses adjustments in the growth path of the long-lived small firm.
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5.2.1 The Geographic and Sectoral Composition
The geographic and sectoral composition of the sample of 63 long-lived small firms 
is determined by the composition of the parent sample of 219 firms and survival rates 
within different geographic areas and different sectors. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 presented 
survival rates for the parent sample within different sectors and geographic areas 
respectively. In this Chapter the sectors and geographic regions covered by the sample of 
63 long-lived small firms interviewed are briefly compared to the distributions of firms in 
Scotland and the UK, to show that the sample is representative of the population.
An examination of Table 5.1, which presents the sectoral composition [by 2-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code] of the 63 mature small firms in the sample, 
shows that most sectors, running through from agriculture (01) to domestic services (99), 
were represented. The main sectors (defined by largest share of annual turnover) included 
were: 32, mechanical engineering (4.8%); 43, textile industry (4.8%); 61, wholesale 
distribution (4.8%); 64, retail distribution (23%); 66, hotels and catering (4.8%); 67, repair 
of consumer goods and vehicles (6.3%); and 83, business services (9.5%). The typical 
long-lived Scottish small firm in the sample is a retailer. Similarly, the modal firm 
registered for VAT in Scotland is a retailer. This differs for the UK where the modal sector 
is a business service firm. Refer to Table 5.2, which presents the stock of small medium 
sized enterprises by sector for Scotland and the United Kingdom. It also presents the 
sectoral composition of the sample of 63 long-lived small firms interviewed as part of this 
study for comparative purposes.
The overall split between extractive/manufacturers (SIC 01-60) and services (SIC 
61-99) according to the primary SIC code is 37% and 63% respectively. This split closely 
resembles the proportions in manufacturing and services in the Scottish population at 34% 
and 66% respectively. The proportions in manufacturing and services are also comparable 
with figures for the extracted sample (N=219) and the sample frame of long-lived small 
firms (N=90), see Table 4.2. Figures for the UK as a whole suggest that 28% were in 
manufacturing and 72% of small firms were operating in the services sector (see Table 5.2). 
The proportions differ slightly for the UK because of the slower progression of the Scottish 
economy to becoming service based, compared to the UK as a whole (see Subsection
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Table 5.1: Sectoral Composition of Long-lived Small Firms
SIC Classification SIC
i*
N=63
2-
N=37
3rd
N=13
01 Agriculture and Horticulture 1
1.6%
11 Fishing 1
2.7%
22 Metal Manufacturing 2 1
3.2% 2.7%
32 Mechanical Engineering 3 1 l
4.8% 2.7% 7.7%
34 Electrical and Electronic Engineering 2 1
3.2% 2.7%
35 Manufacture of Motor Vehicles and Parts 1
1.6%
36 Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment 1
2.7%
37 Instrument Engineering 2
3.2%
41/42 Food, Drink and Tobacco Manufacturing 2 1
3.2% 2.7%
43 Textile Industry 3 1
4.8% 7.7%
47 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products, Printing and 2 1
Publishing 3.2% 2.7%
48 Processing of Rubber and Plastics 2 1
3.2% 2.7%
49 Other Manufacturing Industries 1 3
1.6% 8.1%
50 Construction 2 1
3.2% 2.7%
61 Wholesale Distribution 3 1 1
4.8% 2.7% 7.7%
63 Commission Agents 1
1.6%
64/65 Retail Distribution 15 8
23.8% 21.6%
66 Hotels and Catering 3
4.8%
67 Repair of Consumer Goods and Vehicles 4 4 3
6.3% 10.8% 23.1%
83 Business Services 6 5 3
9.5% 13.5% 23.1%
84 Renting of Movables 2 1
3.2% 2.7%
95 Medical and Other Health Services 1 1
1.6% 2.7%
96 Other Services Provided to the Genera! Public 1
1.6%
97 Recreational Services and Other Cultural Services 2 2 2
3.2% 5.4% 15.4%
98 f Personal Services 1 2 1
1.6% 5.4% 7.7%
99 Domestic Services 1 1 1
1.6% 2.7% 7.7%
Percentage in Services Sector 63% 68% 78%
Percentage in Extractive/Manufacturer Sector 37% 38% 22%
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Table 5.2: Stock of Small Medium Sized Enterprises By Sector
Sector Scottish
Sample
Scotland" b 
2001
UK"b
2001
Agriculture; Forestiy and fishing 1
(1.6%)
19,735
(16.6%)
149,670
(9.0%)
Mining and quarrying; Electricity, gas and water supply • 270
(0.2%)
1,570
(0.1%)
Manufacturing 20
(31.7%)
8,350
(7%)
149,325
(9.0%)
Construction 2
(3.2%)
12,135
(10.2%)
171,680
(10.3%)
Wholesale, retail and repairs 23
(36.5%)
24,680
(20.8%)
380,045
(22.8%)
Hotels and restaurants 3
(4.8%)
10,275
(8.7%)
107,270
(6.4%)
Transport, storage and communication 4,860
(4.1%)
75,325
(4.5%)
Financial intermediation 715
(0.6%)
15,545
(0.93%)
Real estate, renting and business activities 8
(12.7%)
24,255
(20.4%)
440,540
(26.5%)
Public administration; Other community, social and 5 11,965 152,395
personal services (7.9%) (10.1%) (9.2%)
Education; Health and social work 1
(1.6%)
1,450
(1.2%)
21,000
(1.3%)
Total 63
(100%)
118,690
(100%)
1,664,370
(100%)
Percentage in Extractive/Manufacturer 37% 34% 28.4%
Percentage In Services 63% 66% 71.6%
Notes: aSource: Small Business Service, April 2001
bThe stock of VAT registered enterprises represents the number of enterprises registered for VAT at the start of 
the year with the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR). This is an indicator of the size of the business 
population. Since over 99 percent of registered enterprises employ fewer than 50 people, it is also an indicator 
of the small business population. Coverage of enterprises will be poorer in VAT exempt areas such as Health, 
Education and Public administration and of the very smallest one person businesses operating below the 
threshold for VAT (From 1“ April 2001 the VAT threshold was an annual turnover of£53,000 sterling.).
4.2.1.1). There is a strong representation of firms engaging light and heavy manufacturing 
(31.7% versus 7% in Scotland and 9% in the UK) as opposed to firms in agriculture and 
construction, which are under-represented in comparison with figures for Scotland and the 
UK. However, the proportion of light and heavy manufacturing firms in the sample frame 
was high also reflecting the caseloads of directors of Enterprise Trusts in the mid eighties 
(see subsection 4.2.1.1).
Typically, the mature small firm’s broad industrial sector (i.e. whether 
manufacturing or services) at the time of interview was dependent on their industrial sector
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at start-up (Pearson’s Chi-square 6.794, d.f.=l, P-value=0.009)? Indeed, there is evidence 
of path dependence between the share of sales attributed to manufacturing at start-up and 
the share attributed to manufacturing as a mature small firm. This finding explains the slow 
transfer of turnover from manufacturing to service based activities in mature manufacturing 
firms in the small firm sector. Enterprise Profile D in Volume II, Appendix 5 illustrates a 
sectoral shift from manufacturing to services. Sales of a bulk bag manufacturer were 
mainly in merchandising bulk bags, at the time of interview, as opposed to manufacturing 
of bulk bags, when the firm was founded.
The geographic scope of the sample was extensive as seen from Figure 5.1 above. 
Over half (57%) of the firms in the sample are from urban areas, over a quarter (27%) are 
from non-urban centres and a sixth (16%) are from the Highlands and Islands in Scotland.1 2 
Urban regional economics has sought to explain spatial patterns of entry and exit. Studies 
conducted in the UK suggest that small firms in rural areas experience more rapid growth 
rates than those in conurbations or remote rural areas [Keeble, 1993]. Certainly from Table 
4.4, which presents the geographic scope of the stock of small medium sized firms in 
Scotland it is observable that a larger proportion of firms operate in urban centers such as 
Edinburgh and Glasgow. However, when the number of firms in each geographic region is 
standardised per resident adult over the age of sixteen then rural regions contain a larger 
relative stock of SBEs.
1 McNemar’s test for two related samples comparing the proportion of firms in manufacturing and services in
their early years of trading with the proportion in manufacturing and services at the time of interview 
confirmed this result (N=63 two tailed P-value =0.824 using binominal distribution). There was no statistical 
difference found. ■
2 Non-urban centres included firms firms located in Aberdeenshire (1 firms), Argyll (4 firms), Aryshire (3 
firms), Banffshire (2 firms), Fife (3 firms), Perthshire (2 firms) and Morayshire (2 firms). Highlands and 
Islands comprise of firms operating from Inverness-shire (3 firms), Caithneas (3 firms), Isle of Skye (1 firm), 
Orkney (1 firm) and Rosshire (2 firms). Urban areas included Edinburgh (8 firms), West Lothian (4 firms), 
Midlothian (6 firms), East Lothian (2 firms), Glasgow (5 firms), Lanarkshire (3 firms), Dundee (1 firm), 
Aberdeen (1 firm), Perth (1 firm), Renfrewshire (1 firm), Inverness (2 firms) and Stirlingshire (2 firms).
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Figure 5.1: Geographic Dispersion of Sample of Long-lived Small Firms
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From the discussion above in general it can be said that the geographic scope of the 
sample is extensive. The sectoral composition of the sample is representative of the 
proportion of firms in extractive/manufacturing and services sectors in Scotland. There is 
some over sampling of small firms in light and heavy manufacturing but this is perhaps 
reflecting the composition of the sample frame and the slow progression of small firms in 
the Scottish economy from manufacturing to services activities. Evidence suggests that the 
firm’s broad sectoral classification later in its life is dependent on this classification at start­
up.
5.2.2 Age
The average age is about 26 years, (25 ‘/2 years on average; median age is 22 years, 
roughly one generation) and no firm was younger than 10 years old. The maximum age in
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the sample was 90 years (roughly three generations). Generational issues are of central 
importance, as the small firm grows older. This is discussed in Subsection 5.2.2.1 below. 
Age as proxy for the accumulated experience of the firm is considered in Subsection 
5.2.2.2.
5.2.2.1 Generational Issues
Typically the long-lived small firm in this sample believed they were mature3, and 
as many mature small firms are family businesses generational issues are important. After 
one generation, owner-managers are frequently looking for end games. A fairly obvious 
choice is family succession. Given generally favourable conditions in the labour market, 
and an increasing variety of job options, it turns out that family succession is by no means a 
foregone conclusion (Bachkaniwala et al., 2001). For this reason the generational effect 
may have some impact on the lifecycle behaviour of the mature small firm.
While there has been little study of inter-generational effects using data on UK 
firms, evidence for small family firms in Italy suggest that issues surrounding family 
succession influence the likelihood of survival, as the small firm gets older. Lotti and 
Santarelli (2002) found that small family firms in Italy who had reached their thirtieth year 
in the market faced a higher risk of sudden exit This result supports evidence from the 
U.S. (Lansberg, 1983; Beckhard and Dyer, 1983). Stoy Hayward’s (1992) survey of family 
owned and non-family quoted companies in the United Kingdom, however, found that 
family companies were longer established than non-family companies. Westhead and 
Cowling (1998) explained that this higher family business survival rate in the U.K. is 
associated with the advantages of limited liability status coupled with slow growth rates in 
private firms permitting continued management by members of the founding family. 
Family succession is discussed further in Chapter 7, Subsection 7.51.
5.2.2.2 Learning
Partly the success of the SBE is attributable to the accumulated experience of the 
owner-manager by the practice of running the firm. Entrepreneurs initially ignorant of their
3 Over three quarters (77.8%) firms stated that they were mature in that they had reached their desired size for 
a business of that type in terms of full-time equivalent employees and turnover. On average the mature small 
firms were 16.6 (16.12) years of age at maturity according to the owner-managers (with corresponding 
standard deviation in parentheses).
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talents acquire information on their ability over time, revising their beliefs in light of 
market experience. Over time their ability is revealed at the same time as their skill is 
acquired (Jovanovic, 1982; Frank, 1988). This introduces time dependence into the 
performance growth relationship. The age of the SBE is a determinant of the firm’s growth 
rate as well as its size. Age, in this instance, is a proxy for the accumulated level of 
experience of the owner-manager.
To explore how new firm founders learn their ability, Disney et al. (2002) compared 
the survival prospects of firms which were new ventures, with the survival prospects of 
new ventures by existing firms, who had a stock of know-how. They found that new 
ventures per se were less likely to survive than new ventures by existing firms. However 
Disney et al. (2002) found that size and growth mattered, by examining the consequences 
of switching the size growth features of new firms with those of existing firms. This does 
not refute learning arguments. Smith (1999) found that the owner-managers perceptions of 
their relative strengths indicated an immaturity of judgment close to business inception, 
suggesting entrepreneurial learning was indeed important. Initial stock of human capital 
(see Erikson, 2002; Bates, 1990) and learning by doing are key factors determining a firm’s 
growth dynamics, to the extent that they enable new ventures to gain more resources at 
start-up, according to Mole (2002).
5.2.3 Firm Size
Many measures can be adopted to approximate the scale of the small firm (e.g. 
assets, turnover, fulltime equivalent employees, output etc). Turnover (in 2001 prices) and 
full-time equivalent employees are specifically examined here.
Turnover varied from 0 to £7.5 million pounds sterling with the average and 
standard deviation being £834,11 lstg. and £l,347,720stg. respectively. Diversification of 
the product portfolio aids the small firm accommodate fluctuating demand for individual 
products to maintain a steady level of turnover (see Ungem-Stemberg, 1990). The typical 
long-lived small firm produces or sells on average 10 (34.11) product (service) groups and 
16,901 (125,891) products (services) to generate this turnover (associated standard 
deviations are in parentheses). The importance of product group size to survival has been 
emphasised by Reid (1993), ch.9 and is also confirmed in Chapter 8 of this thesis.
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Turnover across principal product groups was diversified but not largely. More than 50% 
of turnover, on average, was raised from their main product group; 61.28% (23.66) of 
turnover was associated with the first most important product group, 22.32% (12.22) of 
turnover was associated with the second most important product group and 13.8% (10.35) 
was associated with the third most important product group (standard deviations are in 
parentheses). However products produced or supplied within different product groupings 
could accommodate to fluctuating demands.
Employment, as a measure of firm size, is less susceptible to variation. Relatively 
large small business enterprise, in terms of turnover, can have a relatively small workforce. 
The number of fiill-time equivalent (FTEs) employees varied from 1 to 130 with the 
average and mode being 13.55 and 6 respectively. In terms of firm size these mature small 
firms are on average just above the size of the micro-firm (less than 10 FTEs). Nearly two 
thirds (63%) of the 63 long-lived small firms had between 1 and 9 FTEs in 2001 (see Table 
5.3). Approximately a fifth (17.4%) had between 10-19 FTEs and almost a tenth (9.5%) 
had between 20 and 49 FTEs. Thus few of these firms grew to become small medium sized 
enterprises, with 50 or more employees (6% percent of firms in the sample). The 
predominant firm type is still the micro-firm, the average firm size being somewhat raised 
by the existence of a few large firms in the sample.
From examining Table 5.3, one finds that the modal age was 10-19 years with 43 
percent of firms in this class. It is important to note that little evidence exists of a 
relationship between the size, measured by FTEs, and age of the firm at the time of 
interview (Pearson’s R= -0.033, P-value=0.796). There is evidence of a positive 
relationship between the size of the firm at start-up and the age of the firm at the time of 
interview (Pearson’s R= 0.233, P-value=0.043). Thus only initial firm size is positively 
associated with the longevity of the small firm. This supports Geroski (1995) stylised 
result that the likelihood of survival is greater for larger firms than for smaller firms in their 
formative years, but not in the mature stage. At maturity, small firms can remain small, and 
face no disadvantage with respect to the likelihood of survival by occupying niche markets 
(see Agarwal and Audretsch, 1999).
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Table 53: Number of Full-time Equivalent Employees by Age in 2001 
Number of Full-time Equivalent Employees
1-9 10-19 20-49 50 + Total
10-19 18 4 3 2 27
20-29 10 6 1 2 19
30-39 7 1 0 0 8
40-49 1 0 4 0 5
50-59 2 0 0 0 2
60-100 2 0 0 0 2
Total 40 11 8 4 63
Start-up 55 0 1 0 56°
Notes: “Data is available on FTEs at start-up for 56 firms due to changes in ownership 
of 7firms in the sample.
5.2.4 Organisational Form
There is general evidence of changes in the organisational form of small firms, from 
the sole proprietorship form, to the partnership and private limited company forms, over the 
lifetimes of the firms, (cf. Reid, 1998; Freedman and Godwin, 1992). Out of the sample of 
63 long-lived small firms 1 (1.6%) was a sole trader operating from home, 15 (23.8%) were 
sole traders operating from business premises, 19 (30.2%) were partnerships and 25 
(44.4%) were private limited companies. Eighteen (28.6%) of the owner-managers 
indicated that they changed the legal form of their firm during the life of the business.
A reason for a change in legal form, from sole trader or partnership forms to private 
limited company, is the “apparent increased credibility, which the business has with both 
its customers and its bantf\ see Storey, (1994), p.l40. Further it has been shown that 
limited companies achieve higher rates of growth (Hakim, 1989; Kalleberg and Leicht, 
1991). However, according to Storey (1994) limited companies have higher failure rates 
and thus it is unwise to assume that the incorporated form is necessarily conducive to good 
management. Reid (1993,1998) found that the extension of hierarchy in the organisational 
form of firm had a significant negative impact on profitability, suggesting agency costs 
arising from a loss of supervisory control implied by changes from sole proprietorships 
through to private companies.
Table 5.4 presents differences in the mean characteristics of long-lived small firms 
in the sample across organisational forms. Average age varied by business type but not 
significantly. There was a significant difference in the proportion of firms in
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manufacturing across organisational forms (Pearson’s Chi-square=16.818, 2d.f., 
p<0.0001.) Manufacturing firms tended to be private companies whereas service firms 
were more likely to be organised as a partnership or a sole proprietorship. Firm size, 
measured by full-time equivalent employees, varied considerably by type of business, as 
did firm size, approximated by turnover. Whether the business was a sole proprietorship, 
partnership or private company its level of full-time employment was on average 5.94 
(5.85), 7.91(4.08) and 22.19 (27.69) and its turnover was on average £219,813 (£143,025), 
£557,526 (£455,994), and £1,372,821 (£1,885,391) respectively (with corresponding 
standard deviations in parentheses; turnover figures are in 2001 prices). A test of the null 
hypothesis of the equality of mean firm size (measured by FTEs and turnover) across 
organisational forms was rejected (p-value<0.01) using ANOVA indicating that private 
companies were larger than partnerships and sole proprietorships (see Table 5.4).
Labour productivity, which is a ratio of sales to full-time equivalent employees, for 
the last trading year, varied by business type, but not significantly. Given that there was no 
significant difference in labour productivity across organisational forms, there appear to be 
no gains in efficiency from limited liability status. Partnerships achieve a higher level of 
turnover per full time equivalent employee. This is to be expected, given the higher level 
of risk associated with this organisational form relative to sole proprietorships and private 
companies (i.e. partners are liable for each others actions).
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Table 5.4: Mean Business Characteristics Across Organisational Forms
Variable
Organisational Form
Test Statistic P-valueSole Proprietor
("ty
Partnership
(^9)
Private Company
(n=28)
Ageb 20.63 30.37 25.07 E(2,6o) slat =1.729 P=0.186
Employees (FTEs)ab
(9.77) (18.86) (15.72)
5.94 7.24 22.18 F(2,60)Stat=5.376 P=0.007
(5.85) (4.15) (27.18)
Turnover31’ 219,812 557,526 1,372,821 F(2,6o) stat =4.380 P=0.01
(143,026) (455,994) (1,855,391)
Labour Productivity15 55,032 72,339 64,425 F(2,60)Stat =0.380 P=0.685
(45,063) (31,334) (76,271)
Manufacturing 2 3 18 Pearson’s Chi- P=0.0001
(3.2%) (4.8%) (28.6%) Square = 16.818
Services 14 16 10 d.f.=2
(22.2%) (25.4%) (15.9%)
Notes: “Levenes testfor homogeneity of variance was rejected in these cases 
bStandard deviations are in parentheses
5.2.5 Growth
Growth in size occurs over time, from period t to t+r where r = 1,2,3,.... units of 
time (days, months, years etc.), if the scale of the small firm (St+^ in time period t+r is 
greater than the scale of the firm (Sr) in time period t. A decline in growth occurred if St+r< 
St. The Law of Proportionate Effect (or Gibrat’s Law) states that growth rates are 
independent of firm size and its past growth history. If it holds, all firm growth occurs at 
the same rate over an interval of time regardless of the initial size of the firm (see Sutton, 
1997,1998). Therefore the initial spread of firm sizes persists over-time.
There is conflicting evidence in support of Gibrat’s law (see Section 3.2). Early 
work supported Gibrat’s law (Hart and Prais; 1962; Simon and Bonini, 1958; Hymer and 
Pashigian, 1962), but subsequent empirical studies suggest a negative relationship between 
growth and size in the US (Mansfield, 1962; Hall 1987; Evans 1987a, b; Dunne et al., 
1989a) and in the UK (Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Hart and Oulton, 1996,1998). Therefore 
in recent years it is somewhat accepted by small business economists that a negative 
relationship exists between growth and size (Reid, 1993). This is an early lifecycle effect 
Reid (2001) concluded that this growth process stabilises overtime and tends to a long run 
equilibrium value. This proposition is tested below in Subsection 5.2.5.4 but first trends in
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measures of scale over time and across organisational forms are studied to aid 
interpretation.
5.2.5.1 Lifetime Trends in Size
Measures of the scale of the long-lived small firm at discrete intervals are presented 
in Table 5.5.4 Significant differences were found in the mean levels of real turnover, full­
time equivalent employees and labour productivity at different points in the lifecycle of the 
long-lived small firm.
The average full-time equivalent employment of long-lived small firms rose over 
their lives. An ANOVA test of the equality of mean full-time equivalent employees over 
time was rejected [Fp,224) statistic=5.53, P-value<0.001], The dispersion of full-time 
equivalent employees increased threefold over the life of the firm. Levenes Test for the 
homogeneity of variances was rejected [Levenes Fp^) Test statistic =7.069, p-value 
<0.0001]. Real turnover rose until the typical long-lived small firm was trading for ten 
years and then fell slightly after this point (i.e. it stabilised). An ANOVA test of the 
equality of mean turnover after the first year of trading, after 5 years of trading, after 10 
years of trading and in 2001 was rejected [F(3,i9i) statistic =2.85, p-value=0.039]. The 
dispersion of real sales increased twofold over the life of the firm. Levenes Test for the 
homogeneity of variances was rejected [Fp^i) statistic=4.879, p-value=0.003].
Labour productivity, a ratio of real turnover to full-time equivalent employment, fell 
over the life of the firm as a natural consequence of the points above. Significant 
differences were also found across mean labour productivity.5 The standard deviation of 
labour productivity fell by slightly more than a quarter over the life of the firm. Given that 
the dispersion of real sales and fulltime equivalent employees increased and the dispersion 
of labour productivity, a ratio of the two measures fell, adjustments in sales and employees 
towards an equilibrium level of labour productivity (or efficiency) were perhaps taking 
place.
4 Different histories of firms are represented as the measure of scale relate to disparate starting points.
5 An ANOVA test of the equality of mean levels of labour productivity yielded an F(3)n0) statistic of63,066 
with p-value ofO.OOOl. Levenes Test F(3> iTO) statistic of 44 was significant with a p-value of0.0001.
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Table 5,5: Scale of the Small Firm over its Lifecycle by Type of Business’
FTE Employees
Time N At
Start-up
After 5 
years
After 10 
years
Today
Nb 56 54 55 63
Mean 3.57 8.51 11.75 13.55
(Std dev.) (5.45) (11.27) (15.32) (19.89) I
Sole 12 1.83 4.54 4.83 3.92
Proprietor (1.05) (3.86) (5.14) (2.63)
Partnership 15 2.33 4.37 5.7 7.27
(1.58) (3.64) (3.49) (4.40) |
Private 19 5.61 14 19.68 17.76
Company (8.7) (16.64) (20.72) (13.76)
Real Turnover (2001 prices)
Time N After 1 After 5 After 10 2001
year years years
N 44 43 45 63
Mean 269,449 630,866 888,099 834,111 j
(Std dev.) (536,417) (985,967) (1,331,401) (1,347,719) I
Sole 13 128,530 269,989 257,661 209,769
Proprietor (99202.9) (233,230) (215,401) (154,861)
Partnership 11 205,971 410,002 528,309 568,182
(176,037) (336,219) (459,987) (459,909)
Private 19 403,627 1,005,651 1,536,774 1,485,474
Company (792,327) (1,377355) (1,821,924) (1,600,349)
Labour Productivity
j Time N After 1 After 5 After 10 2001
year years years
N 44 42 44 63
Mean 89,114 76,206 75,334 64,427
(Std dev.) (88,997) (56,441) (63,279) (57,893)
Sole 10 95,418 74,478 69,963 61,245
Proprietor (118,740) (61,392) (50,025) (52,050)
Partnership 10 107,401 99,714 98,731 74,395
(90,842) (62,493) (72,110) (34,558)
Private 15 77,689 74,323 76,041 80,932
Company (82,158) (56,786) (77,939) (100,864)
Notes: “Standard deviations are in parentheses
bN varies because ofchanges in ownership (7 cases) and because some firmsfound 
it difficult to recall the required information at points earlier in their life.
167
It is difficult to examine trends using aggregate data given the heterogeneity of the firms 
across organisational forms (see Subsection 5.2.4). Thus, it is more satisfactory to examine 
trends across business types (sole proprietors, partnerships and private companies).
5.2.5.2 Trends in Size Over life of Small Firm by Organisational Form
The mean firm size as measured by both full-time equivalent employees, and real 
turnover of all organisational forms, rose until the small firms ten-year birthday. After this 
point, on average, sole proprietors and private companies downsized. Average fiill-time 
equivalent employees and real turnover, of firms of partnership form, continued to rise after 
this point.
Mean labour productivity fell over the life of sole proprietors and partnerships. It 
suggests that these organisational forms do not foster the sustaining of high levels of 
productivity achieved at start-up. Labour productivity rises over the life of private 
companies. However, private companies never achieve the high levels of mean labour 
productivity of partnerships attained in the first ten years of trading. Similar patterns are 
found if percentage changes in these measures by business type from /to t+r are examined 
(see Table 5.6). From an examination of these percentages it is clear that most of the 
adjustment in the scale occurred over the first five years of trading. Small firms are 
experiencing a lot of growth in these early years of trading as compared with any other 
period of their development. This finding is compatible with the results of estimations of 
Gibrat’s Law over the lifecycle examined in the next Subsection.
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Table 5.6: Annual Percentage Change in Scale of the Small Firm over the Lifecycle
by Type of Business*
I ___________ FTE Employees___________________ 1
Time Over first
5 years
Over first
10 years
Lifetime” ?
N 54 55 56
% Change 
(Std dev.)
43%
(59)
41%
(77)
26%
(50)
Sole
Proprietor
32%
(40)
16%
(17)
7%
(8)1
Partnership 32%
(53)
24%
(28)
20% 1 
(28)
Private
Company
57%
(70)
67%
(108)
41%
(70)
Real Turnover (2001 prices)
Time Over first
5 years
Over first
10 years
Lifetime”
N 43 44 44
% Change 
(Std dev.)
60%
(86)
41%
(54)
29%
(46)
Sole
Proprietor
30%
(38)
15%
(19)
8%
(14)
Partnership 30%
(30)
25%
(23)
25% 1
(37)1
1 Private
Company
98%
(115)
68%
(70)
46% 8
(58)
Labour Productivity "
1 Time Over first
5 years
Over first
10 years
Lifetime” II
N 43 42 ~44 J
% Change 
(Std dev.)
12%
(38)
3%
(10)
2%
(9)
1 Sole 
Proprietor
6%
(18)
2%
(9)
1%
(6)
Partnership 5%
(16)
3%
(13)
2%
(ID
Private
Company
19%
(53)
3%
(10)
3%
(9)
Notes: "Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Corresponds to different life histories
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5.2.5.3 A Test of Gibrat’s Law Over the Life of the Long-lived Small Firm
Reid (2001) found evidence to refute Gibrat’s Law using the following specification
of Gibrat’s classical model which assumes an endogenous effect of size on growth:
Sw/S^yS,®-0 (5.1)
where S is size and y is the exogenous deterministic effect (the market growth rate). When 
p~l, the Gibrat case, occurs and equation (5.1) collapses to equation (5.2)
St+r/St=y (5.2)
In this instance, all small firms expand at a common growth rate, the market rate y (i.e. no 
endogenous effect). Then, growth is independent of firm size (see Sutton, 1997, 1998). 
When p>l larger small firms have higher growth rates than smaller ones. When [3<1 
smaller small firms have higher growth rates than larger small firms. Equation (5.1) can be 
extended by multiplying it by an independently distributed positive random variable Ut>0 
giving:
Sl+,/S,=7St«1-|)ut (5.3)
Equation (5.3) is expressed in log-linear form for ease of estimation as follows:
Ln St+T= Ln y + pLn St + Ln ut (5.4)
or
Sh-t= crT et (5.5)
where Ln St+T= st+x, Ln y=a, Ln St= st and Ln ut=st 
Equation (5.5) is estimated as
sem= a + 6st (5.6)
where e denotes the expected value of the dependent variable and (a,b) are regression 
estimates of (a,ff. Equation (5.6) is an expression for the first order linear difference 
equation for which the stability condition is 0< b <1. If this condition holds then the 
sequence st converges to an equilibrium value of s*. Equilibrium is achieved when
sW=st=s*=tt/(l-Z>) (5.7)
In refuting Gibrat’s Law, Reid (2001) estimated equation (5.5) using data on 150 Scottish 
small firms early in their lifecycle over a one year time period (1994-1995) and over a
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three-year period, (1994-1997). Here, tests of Gibrat’s Law over longer time intervals, and 
at different points in the life cycle, are conducted.
The ordinary least squares estimates of equation (5.5) were obtained for values of 
5/+rand s, using different measures of scale (reflated to 2001 prices where appropriate).6 
Three measures of scale were examined, the natural logarithm of full-time equivalent 
employees (Lempx), natural logarithm of real sales turnover (Lsalesx) and the natural 
logarithm of labour productivity (Lprodx), where ‘x’ represents different points in the 
lifecycle W’ for inception, ‘5yr’ for after 5 years of trading, ‘lOyr’ for after 10 years of 
trading and 'OT for the year 2001. Summary measures of these variables are provided in 
Table 5.7 and the results of the least squares estimations are presented in Table 5.8. These 
models are estimated for surviving firms, as data is not available on the trajectory of these 
scale measures for non-survivors.7
6An adjustment for heterscedasticity was undertaken using White’s heteroskedastic consistent covariance 
matrix.
7 A quick test demonstrated that sample selectivity bias did not have an appreciable effect on the results. 
There are some rudimentary data available on sales and employment on survivors and non-survivors. This 
data was gathered on die three parent samples when they were interviewed originally. A probit model of the 
form I=Xp where I is an index for survival in 2001 taking on the value of T’ for survivors and ‘0’ otherwise 
was estimated with log of employment (or sales or labour productivity where appropriate) as the independent 
variable. The inverse mills ratio (IMR) was computed and used as an additional regressor in the employment 
regression, estimation C, in Table 5.8. It produced the following results:
Independent Variable Coefr(b) T test on b
Lempst 0.433 2.19
IMR -7.039 -0.60
Constant 9.952 0.72
Similarly in sales regression estimation I
Independent Variable T test on b
Lsaleslyr 0.599 5.03
IMR -0.562 -0.62
Constant 6.555 3.42
and the labour productivity estimation O
Independent Variable Coeff.(b) T test on b
Lprodlyr 0.356 1.68
IMR -2.631 -0.75
Constant 10.244 1.97
In each case the coefficient on mills ratio (IMR) was not significant indicating that sample selectivity bias is 
not an issue of concern.
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Table 5.7: Summary Measures of Variables for Estimations of Gibrat’s Model
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Min. Max.
Lemp’01 63 2.051 1.017 0 4.868
Lempst 56 0.894 0.790 0 3.689
Lemp5yr 54 1.719 0.867 0 4.248
LemplOyr 55 1.953 0.989 0 4.533
Lsales’01 62 12.91 1.167 10.78 15.83
Lsaleslyr 44 11.78 1.176 9.295 15.07
Lsales5yr 43 12.75 1.037 11.04 15.58
LsaleslOyr 45 12.93 1.220 10.92 15.76
Lprod’Ol 62 10.86 0.652 921 12.94
Lprodlyr 44 10.96 0.985 8.60 12.93
Lprod5yr 42 10.99 0.711 9.582 12.31
LprodlOyr 44 10.92 0.825 9.000 12.55
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Table 5.8: Test of Law of Proportionate Effect
Estimations Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable
Coeff.
(A)
a
(constant)
Ttest
(i=0)
Ftest
<rM)
N R5 F-test
(b=D
St* St*
A Lemp5yr Lempst 0.646 1.147 5.28* 27.89* 54 0.33 8.35* 3.2420 26
B LemplOyr Lempst 0.529 1.493 3.15* 9.90* 55 0.17 7.88* 3.1661 24
C Lemp’01 Lempst 0.401 1.650 2.41** 5.82* 56 0.1 13.01** 2.7535 16
D LemplOyr Lemp5yr 0.985 0.250 13.12* 172.05* 54 0.73 0.04
E Lemp’01 Lemp5yr 0.792 0.635 8.36* 69.84* 54 0.47 4 79** 3.0607 21
F Lemp’01 LemplOyr 0.867 0.315 13.44* 180.67* 55 0.74 4.29’* 2.3588 11
G Lsales5yr Lsaleslyr 0.602 5.663 5.95* 35.41* 43 0.47 15.5* 14.2205 1,499K
H LsaleslOyr Lsaleslyr 0.713 4.563 7.64* 58.43* 44 0.48 9.49* 15.8879 7,943K
I Lsales’01 Lsaleslyr 0.613 5.801 5.45* 29.67* 43 0.39 11.84* 14.9855 3,222K
J LsaleslOyr Lsales5yr 1.050 -0.452 21.11* 445.76* 43 0.80 1.02
K Lsales’01 Lsales5yr 0.886 1.674 8.17* 66.71* 42 0.61 1.10
L Lsales’01 LsaleslOyr 0.891 1.427 11.73* 137.63* 44 0.8 2.07
M Lprod5yr Lprodlyr 0.327 7.413 3.09* 9.58* 42 0.2 40.54* 11.02 60K
N LprodlOyr Lprodlyr 0.520 5.210 7.36* 54.2* 43 0.37 46.36* 10.84 51K
0 Lprod’Ol Lprodlyr 0.422 6.306 5.65* 33.91* 43 0.34 60.01* 10.90 54K
P LprodlOyr Lprod5yr 0.840 1.673 5.8* 33.67* 42 0.51 1.24
Q Lprod’Ol Lprod5yr 0.540 4.972 3.89* 15.15* 41 0.30 11* 10.81 49K
R Lprod’Ol LprodlOyr 0.666 3.655 6.48* 42.03* 43 0.62 10.57* 10.94 56K
Notes:
a) * p-value =0.01, **p-value=0.05
b) The R2 ranges from 0.1 to0.8 (at values above 0.3 in most cases) and the F-values are highly significant (atp=0.0001 in the majority of cases). The performance 
of the estimations improves the shorter the time period between the explanatory variable and the regressor.
c) Values for sf (natural logarithm) and Sffabsolute values) are not presentedfor estimations D, J,K,L,P because an F test of the null ftypothesis b=l could not be 
rejected implying that the growth process is unstable (i.e. does not tend to an equilibrium value).
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The null hypothesis of Ho: 6=1 (see Table 5.8) is clearly rejected when the natural 
logarithm of firm size at start-up (after 1 year of trading where relevant) is regressed on the 
natural logarithm of size later in the firm’s lifecycle (after 5yrs, lOyrs etc.) when size is 
approximated by real turnover, full-time equivalent employees or labour productivity. The 
coefficient b may be judged to be less than unity. Gibrat’s Law is refuted which suggests a 
stable process of adjustment in small firm size early in the small firm’s lifecycle. However 
this result is less convincing particularly for real turnover when the natural logarithm of this 
variable after five years of trading or after ten years of trading are used as regressors in 
explaining variation in the natural logarithm of turnover in 2001. The null hypothesis of 
Ho: 6=1 cannot be rejected in these instances (see estimations J-K in Table 5.8). It seems 
Gibrat’s Law is supported once real turnover reaches an equilibrium level. Thus smaller 
SBEs enjoy relatively greater growth prospects in real turnover in the early years of trading, 
but grow at the market rate once growth in turnover reaches a certain level. There is 
evidence of support for Gibrat’s Law between year five and year ten for full-time 
equivalent employees and labour productivity (see estimations D and P). The null 
hypothesis of Hq: 6=1 could not be rejected in these cases, but not in any other case. Slope 
coefficients, 6, for regressions using full-time equivalent employees and labour productivity 
are approaching 1 in comparison with their values when Lempst (see estimations A-C) and 
Lprodlyr (see estimations M-O) are used as regressors particularly for shorter adjustment 
periods. Indeed, the small firm has a greater ability to adjust FTEs and Labour productivity 
as opposed to real turnover, later in the firm’s lifecycle. This is only the case over longer 
time intervals.
5.2.5.4 Changes in Adjustment Paths 1
Large changes in the slope coefficient 6 over the life of the firm (over 5 years, 10 
years or the life of the firm to date) for any scale measure indicate a change in the 
adjustment path of the scale of the firm. This subsection formally tests for changes in the 
slope coefficient over the life of the firm, and illustrates these shifts using phase diagrams.
Reid (2001) proposed a formal test for changes in the adjustment path. For 
example, a change in the adjustment path between estimations (A) and (C) reproduced here 
as regression equations (5.8) and (5.9) is conducted using an F Test of the null hypothesis
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that the slope coefficient of equation (5.8), 0.646, is equal to 0.401, the slope coefficient of 
equation (5.9).
Lemp5yr =1.147+ 0.646Lempst (5.8)
Lemp’01=1.650 + 0.401 Lempst (5.9)
In this particular case the Ho: Z>gt=0.401 was rejected (F statistic = 4.08, P-value <0.05). 
Thus there was a change in the adjustment process of full-time equivalent employee growth 
over the first five years of trading, and over the life of the firm to date (i.e. the point of 
inception to 2001). The adjustment processes represented by coefficient b in equations 
(5.8) and (5.9) are distinct. -
The results of similar tests at different points in the lifecycle are presented in Table 
5.9. The final column of this table tests the null hypothesis that growth process I and II are 
identical (Ho:Zh = 6U)» A comparison of the results of Tables 5.8 and 5.9 shows that 
adjustment paths seem to be distinct, when comparing growth rates over the first five years 
of trading (estimates A, G and M), to those growth paths which support Gibrat’s Law (D, J, 
and P, respectively). This shows a change in the growth path from one in which smaller 
small firms grew faster than larger small firms, to one in which all firms grow at the market 
rate. This supports evidence presented in Tables 5.6, that most of the growth in scale 
occurred over the first five years of trading. When comparing the growth path in FTEs 
over 5 year periods (estimates A and D), to growth paths over longer periods (estimates C 
and E, respectively) the null hypothesis, that the growth paths are equivalent, is rejected 
also. Thus the longer the time period, the greater is the ability of the small firm to adjust its 
headcount.
A phase diagram is a means of representing the dynamics of equation (5.5) with St+x 
on the vertical axis and st on the horizontal axis. The equilibrium set of points is then 
represented by the 45° line where Swx= st Vt (i.e. Z>=T). If Z?<1 then the sequence st 
converges to an equilibrium value of s*=a/(l -b). The equilibrium values are provided in 
Table 5.8, expressed in terms of both the natural logarithm, s*, and in absolute values, S*. 
The latter are calculated by taking the exponential value of s*. Phase diagrams are 
presented in Figures 5.2 to 5.4, for data on full-time equivalent employees, real turnover 
and labour productivity, respectively.
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Table 5.9: Test of Change in Adjustment Paths
Growth Path
Period I
Growth Path
Period H
Test of 
Equivalence
Estimation Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable
Coeff.
(bj)
Estimation Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable
Coeff.
(bn)
F-test 
bi =&n
Judgement
A Lemp5yr Lempst 0.646 B
D
C
LemplOyr
LemplOyr
Lemp’01
Lempst
Lemp5yr
Lempst
0.529
0.985
0.401
0.53
7.66*
4.02**
Not distinct
Distinct
Distinct
D LemplOyr Lemp5yr 0.985 E Lemp’01 Lemp5yr 0.792 6.58** Distinct
G Lsales5yr Lsaleslyr 0.602 H
J
I
LsaleslOyr
LsaleslOyr
Lsales’Ol
Lsaleslyr
Lsales5yr
Lsaleslyr
0.713
1.050
0.613
1.2
19.66*
0.01
Not distinct
Distinct
Not distinct
J LsaleslOyr Lsales5yr 1.050 K Lsales’Ol Lsales5yr 0.886 10.86* Distinct
M Lprod5yr Lprodlyr 0.327 N
P
0
LprodlOyr
LprodlOyr
Lprod’Ol
Lprodlyr
Lprod5yr
Lprodlyr
0.520
0.840
0.422
3.31***
23.47*
0.8
Distinct
Distinct
Not distinct
P LprodlOyr LprodSyr 0.840 Q Lprod’01 LprodSyr 0.540 4.28** Distinct
Note: *p-value=0.01, **p-value =0.05, ***p-vaIue=0.
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It is evident from Figure 5.2 that there is shift in the adjustment path of FTEs after 
the first 5 years of trading. The regression line for estimation A is further apart from that 
45° line (see Figure 5.2a) where 6=1, st = st+i:, in comparison with the regression line of 
estimation F (see Figure 5.2b). A similar argument can be made with respect to regression 
line of D and E in Figure 5.2c. Certainly these phase diagrams suggest that there is 
evidence to support Gibrat’s Law after the first five years of trading. The equilibrium value 
for FTEs in levels, St*, fell over time, from approximately 26 (3.242) after 5 years of 
trading, to 24 (3.1661) after 10 years of trading, and to 16 (2.7535) in 2001 (natural 
logarithm values, st*, are in parentheses). Finns are adjusting in their approach to these 
equilibrium values. Thus there is some learning here, as small firms revise their 
expectations of employment growth downwards over time. Chapter 9 explores this further, 
and explains adjustments downwards in size in terms of a ‘size/perfonnance’ trade-off.
With respect to real turnover, Figure 5.3b and Figure 5.3c illustrate support for 
Gibrat’s Law after 5 years of trading. The regression lines approach that of the 45° line, 
where st = s^. The equilibrium value for sales in levels, St*, increased from approximately 
£1.5m (14.2) after five years of trading, to £8m (15.9) after 10 years; but fell to £3m (15) 
when examining sales growth over the life of the firm to date. The associated natural 
logarithm values, st*, are in parentheses. In this instance, the small firm also revises its 
expectations of sales growth downwards. Labour productivity, as seen from Figure 5.4, is 
much more stable, and tends to an equilibrium value, between forty-nine (10.8) and sixty 
thousand (11), early in the life of the firm. It remains stable at this level, throughout its life. 
This suggests that full-time equivalent employees are adjusting to maintain an equilibrium 
level of efficiency, since, as the firm grows older, real turnover grows at the market rate.
In summary, Gibrat’s Law is rejected, suggesting a stable process of adjustment in 
small firm size in the early years of trading. This supports Reid’s (2001) findings that the 
growth process stabilises over time, and tends to a long run equilibrium value. This 
evidence of an early lifecycle effect is evident for all three measures of scale. However, 
after five years of trading, there is evidence in support for Gibrat’s Law, at least in the case 
of real turnover, where real turnover essentially grows at the market rate, after a certain 
point in the growth path of the firm. This finding was confirmed through the statistical
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analysis of adjustments in growth paths, and also visually, using phase diagrams. It 
supports Jovanovic’s (1982) proposition that firm growth is independent of size for mature 
firms.
5.2.4 Conclusions
The discussion showed that, while entrepreneurial learning is important in 
promoting the longevity of the small firm, initial size conditions have a larger effect. There 
is weak association between the age of the firm and its initial firm size. The size of the 
typical small firm has not generally grown over time. The predominant firm type is still the 
micro firm. There are few “gazelles” in the sample. Thus there seems to be a tendency for 
small firms to remain small. These firms can remain small and survive over the long haul. 
Small size may not be a disadvantage in some market niches (see Agarwal and Audretsch, 
1999). FTEs and turnover differ significantly across business types. Partnerships are the 
most efficient form, in terms of labour productivity. The level of productivity of private 
companies never achieves the level of productivity of partnerships.
There is little evidence for displacement of employment over time in terms of 
aggregate full-time equivalent employees. Yet there is some, when one looks at headcount 
across organisational forms (e.g. in sole proprietorships and private companies). Real 
turnover also fells, after the first ten years of trading in sole proprietorships and private 
companies, while labour productivity fells over the life of sole proprietorships and 
partnerships, but rises over the life of private companies. Despite an initial burst of growth 
in the early years of trading (over the first five years) there is some evidence of adjustment 
downwards in scale as the firm matures. Perhaps a size performance trade-off exists, (see 
Chapter 9).
In tests of Gibrat’s Law there was evidence of an early lifecycle effect. Thus 
smaller small firms grew fester than larger small firms (i.e. Gibrat’s Law was rejected). 
However, in estimates which exclude the first five-year period, there is evidence in support 
of Gibrat’s Law, particularly when real turnover is the size variable. In fact, there is 
evidence of a shift in the growth path for the first five years of trading, and the next five 
years, where scale grows approximately at the market rate. This evidence presents a new 
insight on empirical tests of Gibrat’s Law. It seems that is important to consider different
181
points in the lifecycle of the firm in testing Gibrat’s Law. Evidence which refutes Gibrat’s 
Law, at least in the case of real turnover, may be capturing an early lifecycle effect. If 
examined later in the small firm’s life evidence to support Gibrat’s Law may be found. The 
evidence supports Jovanovic’s (1982) theory which rejects Gibrat’s Law for young firms 
but suggests that firm growth rates may be independent of size among mature firms. 
Equilibrium levels of labour productivity are relatively stable (between 49K-60K) 
suggesting that the long-lived small firm is adjusting headcount to maintain efficiency. 
This also suggests a size/efficiency or performance trade-off, (see Chapter 9).
53 Market Characteristics
Covin and Slevin (1989) argue that the nature of the market into which the firm 
sells is a key influence on potential growth. They distinguish between what they term 
‘hostile’ and ‘benign’ environments. In hostile environments, the firm is threatened by 
vigourous and intense interactions with competitors (Miller and Friesen, 1983). The failure 
rate of companies in hostile environments tends to be high, and competitive intensity is 
often severe, and exacerbated by price wars and minimal customer loyalty. Not 
surprisingly, profit margins are characteristically low among films in these environments 
(Potter, 1994).
Benign environments have characteristics opposite to those of hostile environments 
(see Covin et al., 1999). In particular, according to Covin et al, (1999), benign 
environments are munificent settings, characterised by relatively high profit margins, low 
competitive intensity, high customer loyalty and a general tolerance for poor managerial 
decisions, by industry and market forces alike. The failure rate in benign environments 
tends to be relatively low. Product based competition is pervasive, as opposed to price 
competition. A live and let live philosophy characterises the competition (see Reid, 
Jacobsen and Andersen, 1993). This Section analyses the geographic scope of the main 
market and the extent of competition. It forms an assessment of the hostility of the 
competitive environment for the typical long-lived small firm.
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5.3.1 Market Extent
Almost half (46%) of long-lived small firms in the sample served local markets. 
The other half (54%) supplied markets with a wider geographical reach. Less than five 
percent (3.2%) served regional markets, almost a third (28.6%) supplied the Scottish 
market and a fifth (19%) supplied the UK market. Less than five percent (3.2%) served 
international markets. Almost half (47.6%) the mature small firms stated that their main 
market had changed since start-up. Typically they expanded their ‘market reach’ in the 
sense of moving from e.g. local to U.K. market. Figure 5.5 shows the percentage of firms 
operating in different markets at start-up and 2001. In general there was a decrease in the 
proportion of firms supplying local and regional markets and an increase in the proportion 
supplying the Scottish and UK market. This implies a general increase of ‘market reach’ 
over the lifecycle, but not a spectacular increase. A test of the null hypothesis of equality 
between the mean ranked market reach at start-up and mean ranked market reach in 2001 
was rejected using Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (Z statistical.747, p-value=0.0405<0.05; 
see Table 5.10 below).
Figure 5.5: Market Reach
■ At start-up
■ Today
Note: Today represents the year 2001
There is also evidence that the geographic scope of the small firm’s main market at 
start-up was dependent on the geographic scope of its main market at the time of interview 
(Pearson’s Chi-square=40.227 with d.f.= 16, p-value<0.001). This supports Reid’s (2001)
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findings for a sample of 150 Scottish small business start-ups. He found that unless firms 
start with ambitious marketing intentions, which aim at national or international markets, 
the odds are against their working their way up to these wider markets, even over longer 
periods of time.
Table 5.10: Tests for Change in Features of the Small Firm’s Market
Characteristic Ranks N Mean Rank Sign Test WUcoxon Signed 
Ranks Test
Main market + 11 10.73 -0.77 -1.747“
- 16 16.25 0.441 (0.081)
Ties 33
N 60
Market share + 6 8.25 0.015° -3.095“
- 19 14.50 (0.002)
Ties 27
N 52
Level of differentiation + 4 7.00 0.754° -0.054b
- 6 4.50 (0.957)
Ties 51
N 61
Market positioning + 4 6.50 0.019° -2.863“
- 15 10.93 (0.004)
Ties 42
N 61
Description of competition + 27 16.59 -3.712 -3.888b
- 5 16.00 (0.000) (0.000)
Ties 21
N 53
Notes
a Based on positive ranks 
b Based on negative ranks 
c Binomial distribution used
Larger main markets offer the prospect of growth with economies of scale (Reid, 
1994,1998). Certainly from Table 5.11 there is evidence of a positive relationship between 
size (approximated by FTEs and real turnover) and the geographical scope of the market (at 
start-up and 2001). There was a significant difference in the mean size of the firm, 
approximated by turnover [F(4,55) statistic = 11.685, p-value <0.0001] and FTEs [F(4; 55) 
statistic = 7.14, p-value <0.0001], at the time of interview, for long-lived small firms who 
served different geographical markets at start-up. However only. size approximated by 
turnover in 2001 differed significantly across firms serving different geographical markets 
in 2001 [F(4,58) statistic = 3.18 at a p-value of 0.02], These are exploratory results. A more 
systematic treatment involving the joint determination of size, main market and
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performance, is analysed in a simultaneous equations system in Chapter 9. While larger 
markets present growth opportunities, the small firm may face greater competitive pressure 
as its ambitions, in the same increase (Penrose, 1959). An assessment of the hostility of the 
competitive environment of the typical long-lived small firm is formed below.
Table 5.11: Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation between Geographic scope of 
the Market and Firm Sizep— Main Market1 Start-Up 2001
Main Market Start-Up Pearson Correlation 1
Sig. (1-tailed)
N 60
2001 Pearson Correlation .569 1
Sig. (1-tailed) .000
N 60 63
|FTEs Startup Pearson Correlation .544 .368
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .002
N 60 63
2001 Pearson Correlation .409 314
Sig. (1-tailed) .001 .006
N 60 63
Real After 1 year Pearson Correlation .225 .299
Turnover Sig. (1-tailed) .076 .024
N 42 44
2001 Pearson Correlation .151 .270
Sig. (1-tailed) .140 .022
N 53 56
5.3.2 Competitive Environment
Mature markets often take on hostile characteristics (like ‘trade stealing’), unlike 
growing markets, which often have benign attributes (like affirmative or ‘good’ rivalry). 
Since the small firms in this study are mature, it is likely that the markets in which they 
operate are also mature, and indeed hostile. Product differentiation was observed by Miller 
(1987) as a means by which firms in hostile environments sometimes compete, to cope with 
hostility. It is likely that the long-lived small firms in this sample have survived by 
pursuing such a strategy. The hostility of the principal market of the long-lived small firm 
is explored next, through an examination of rivalry, niche plays, and the role of excess 
capacity.
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5.3.2,1 Rivalry
Classifying markets as benign or hostile is difficult. Empirically, studies which 
have used a measure of hostility (or intensity of competition), have tended to focus upon 
the number of direct competitors or rivals of the small firm (Storey, 1994). Though 
compatible with the concept of perfect competition, it is not clear that competition is 
monotonically increasing in the number of firms serving the market-place. For example, 
the markets which a small firm chooses to supply may have few rivals but may be subject 
to hit and run competition. In such markets a few rivals may only be required for intense 
competition.
On average, the long-lived small firm faced competition from 26 (125.19) major 
rivals and 84 (400.56) minor rivals. In general, this simple index of the intensity of 
competition indicates greater competitive pressure in markets, with a greater number of 
major and minor rivals. Even with an average of just 26 major rivals, this pressure can be 
intense. A considerably large number of competitors are not required for intense 
competition. A few competitors would do for effective competition, particularly as stated 
above, if markets are subject to hit and run competition.
Rather than a count of the number of direct competitors or rivals Reid et al. (1993) 
showed that market concentration had a considerable bearing on competitive pressure. Reid 
et al. (1993) discussed the extent of rivalry in three classes of market models, namely 
monopolistic competition which they applied to low concentration markets, dominant firm 
with competitive fringe which they applied to medium concentration markets and 
conjectural oligopoly which they applied to high concentration markets. Concentration was 
measured by the proportion of output (e.g. sales, employment etc.) accounted by a certain 
number of the largest firms operating in the industry. The extent of rivalry within these 
market models was assessed for a number of case studies using Porter’s (1980) Five Forces 
model. Rivalry was shown to be intense for firms operating in low concentrated markets as 
opposed to firms operating in high concentrated environments. Without conducting a 
similar detailed analysis I can only surmise in Reid et al. (1993) terms that out of the 
sample of 63 firms, a ninth (11.1%) expected to compete with rivals in a contestable niche 
(and operated in a ‘dominant firm with competitive fringe’ market model), approximately a
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third (27%) expected to face less competition in niche markets (and operated in a 
‘conjectural oligopoly’) and more than half (61.9%) firms expected to compete head-to- 
head with competitors (and faced ‘monopolistic competition’).
Typically the long-lived small firm felt that rivalry within their market was strong 
and that the competitive environment had become more hostile since start-up. Out of the 
sample of 63 mature small firms, nearly half (46%) described competition as intense in all 
aspects such as price, quality etc.; over a third (39.7%) thought competition was strong but 
weak in some aspects such as strong quality competition but weak price competition; an 
eighth (12.7%) felt that competition was generally weak but strong in some aspects; and 
two percent (1.6%) of firms felt that competition was generally weak in all aspects. Figure
5.6 illustrates the increased hostility of the competitive environment following start-up. 
There has been a marked decline in the percentage of firms in benign competitive 
environments. A test of the null hypothesis of equality between the mean rank for intensity 
of competition at start-up and mean rank in 2001 was rejected [Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
Z statistic—3.888, p-value<0.0001; see Table 5.10 above]. A Sign’s Test confirmed this 
result also (Z statistic=-3.712, p<0.0001). This is perhaps because the markets which they 
occupy, have matured. An increase in the intensity of competition is not necessarily a 
negative phenomenon. Porter (1985) argues that intense competition promotes efficiency, 
that is, competitors who, by engaging in sharp and challenging rivalry, actually promote the 
innovativeness of incumbent firms, and hence improve their prospects of staying in 
business. Nickell (1996) is not convinced that there is a direct link between intense 
competition and performance but is persuaded by its capacity to weed out inefficient firms.
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Figure 5.6: Intensity of Competition
Note: Today represents the year 2001
5.3.2.2 Niche Players
Hostile environments are dominated by many similar sellers (Kay, 1993) and 
typically the long-lived small firm has an infinitesimal share of these markets. Nearly a 
quarter of the firms (23.8%) had a market share of less than one percent. However the 
variation ratio8 at 77.2% is high implying that over three quarters of the mature small firms 
had a larger share of smaller markets (i.e. niche markets; see Figure 5.7). Small firms have 
a larger share of these markets, as they are unattractive to, or sheltered from, larger rivals, 
given their size. A higher-level of market share in these markets is assumed to raise small 
firm’s opportunity to exercise market power, and to improve its survival prospects (Caves 
and Porter, 1977).
Nearly two thirds (65.1%) of long-lived small firms had expanded their market 
share since start-up. The market share of the small firm in 2001 was dependent on its 
market share at start-up (Kendalls taub=0.724, p-value<0.0001) and on the age of the firm 
(Kendalls taub=0.265, p-value<0.01). Thus there is evidence of path dependence: initial 
market share is important. As the small firm matures, its share of its main market tends to 
increase also. This is partly because the firm’s main market becomes more localised as it 
matures. The correlation between main market and age is negative confirming this 
tendency (Kendalls taub=-0.135, p-value<0.1 in left tail). Market share was significantly
8 The variation ratio represents the percentage not in the modal category'. It is a measure of spread for 
categorical variables.
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negatively correlated with market extent (Kendalls taUb=-0.222, p-vatue<0.5). This 
suggests that mature small firms have larger shares of localised markets. Figure 5.7 shows 
the percentage of firms at different levels of market share at start-up and then later, in 2001. 
There was a decrease in the percentage of firms with market shares of less than 20%, and a 
rise in the percentage of firms with market shares of 20% or more. This shift was 
significant [Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Z statistic = -3.095, p-value <0.001]. Thus the 
long-lived small firm’s share of niche markets increases as it ages.
Figure 5.7: Market Share
Market Share
□ At start-up 
■ Today
Note: Today represents the year 2001
To survive in hostile environments, the small firm often differentiates its product(s). 
Survival of small firms is linked to product differentiation (i.e. adoption of niche based 
strategies), see Reid, (1993). The owner-managers were asked to self-appraise the level of 
differentiation of their products and services relative to their direct competitor’s product 
offering. In general, the small firm tried to differentiate its product offering: A quarter 
(25.4%) sold different products; over half the sample sold similar but not identical products 
(52.4%); less than a fifth (17.5%) sold identical products; and nearly five percent (4.8%) 
could not say either way. Typically, long-lived small firms engaged in product 
differentiation throughout their life. Only a quarter (25.4%) of mature small firms stated 
that their resort to differentiation had changed since start-up. If there were changes, they 
could be in both directions (see Figure 5.8). There was no significant difference in the 
ranks (see Table 5.10 above). It is likely that the product offering of some small firm’s
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□ At start-up 
■Today
Identical Similar Different Cannot say
became similar to competitors over time (i.e. their differentiated products became the 
standard product over time) whereas other small firms were forced to differentiate their 
products to survive.
Figure 5.8: Level of Differentiation
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5.3.2.3 Excess Capacity
Excess capacity is another characteristic of unstable competitive environments. 
Over half (55.6%) of the long-lived small firms indicated that they were capacity 
constrained. Typically, these firms operated at close to, but not quite full, capacity (viz. at 
74% capacity). The existence of excess capacity is characteristic of mature markets. It can 
act as an entry deterrent (because it allows rapid reaction to invasion of market territory) 
but also can increase the intensity of competition among direct competitors, and thus, 
perhaps, the hostility of the market.
5.3.3 Conclusions
The typical long-lived small firm had expanded its market extent since start-up, 
although there is evidence of path dependence between the firm’s market extent at 
inception and at the time of interview (i.e. lock-in effects). There was evidence of a 
positive relationship between size and the geographical extent of the firm’s main market. 
This relation is explored further in a simultaneous equations analysis in Chapter 9. Most 
firms expected to compete head-to-head with rivals, and certainly believed that the 
competitive environment had become more hostile since start-up. The markets in which 
they operated had perhaps matured, thus increasing the intensity of competition. The
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market share of the typical long-lived small firm had increased as the firm matured, and this 
was more likely in localised markets. There was evidence of path dependence here too. 
The typical long-lived small firm sold differentiated product offerings throughout its 
lifecycle. Therefore, over the long haul, the long-lived small firm tried to avoid direct 
competition in increasingly hostile markets, through tactics like increasing the 
differentiation of their products, and expanding their share of localised markets. To survive 
in hostile or turbulent markets greater flexibility is preferred to less flexibility (c.f. Hart, 
1950). Relevant too, in this context is the argument of Mills and Schumann (1985), that 
allowing for larger diversity between rivals, greater flexibility tends to be more associated 
with smaller, rather than larger firms. The impact of flexibility on the performance of the 
small firm is examined in Chapter 8.
5.4 General Conclusions
This Chapter presents a detailed picture of the long-lived small firm in the sample 
and of the market environments in which it operates. As well as characterising the ‘typical’ 
long-lived small firm, it provides a point of reference for interpreting the results of 
inferential analysis on performance. It also complements the case analysis evidence 
presented in Volume H, Appendix 5. It highlights the influence of intergenerational effects 
on the survival of the long-lived small firm as a fruitful area for future research on these 
firms. The influence of intergenerational effects is followed up in a small way in the 
discussion on end-games in Chapter 7. There is also a discussion of these effects in the 
case analysis in Volume II. It is apparent that a more detailed analysis of intergenerational 
effects, developing work like that of Lotti and Santerelli (2002) is a promising area for 
future research.
This Chapter also contributes to the literature by testing Gibrat’s Law over the 
lifecycle of the long-lived small firm. This used new data on the trajectory of real turnover, 
full-time equivalent employees and labour productivity. The analysis concentrated solely 
on surviving firms, as tests for sample selectivity bias suggested that this effect had no 
appreciable effect on the results. Gibrat’s Law was rejected for the early years of trading, 
but after five years there was evidence in support of Gibrat’s Law and Jovanovic’s (1982)
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proposition that growth was independent of size for mature firms. This evidence was 
conclusive for real turnover, and to a lesser extent for FTEs and labour productivity.
The analysis of broad changes in the competitiveness of the market of the long-lived 
small finn is another feature of the analysis. This was conducted by comparing the 
characteristics of the market at start-up, and at the time of interview, using small sample 
statistics in an innovative way. From this analysis, we find that entrepreneurs tend to 
differentiate their product offering, expand their market reach, where possible, and then- 
market share of localised markets. There is evidence of lock-in effects in the choice of 
market at start-up. The geographic scope, and the share of this market at start-up, effects 
the extent to which the small firm has the ability to expand its market ‘reach’ and its market 
share.
Chapter 6 and 7 below will build on this analysis. Chapter 6 describes the 
performance of the long-lived small firm, using objective measures of performance and a 
novel subjective measure of performance, developed specifically for this study. Chapter 7 
broadens the characterisation of the long-lived small firm, to include an analysis of factors 
which promote longevity (e.g. market positioning, innovation, technology, the scope of the 
firm’s administrative organisation). The analysis also includes an examination of key 
organisational changes (e.g. changes in ownership, capacity) experienced by the firm, and 
the end-games that are considered by owner-managers.
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CHAPTER 6 MEASUREMENT OF LONG RUN SMALL FIRM 
PERFORMANCE
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6.1 Introduction
There are many definitions of organisational performance but little consensus 
regarding which definitions are superior, or on the criteria against which definitions of 
performance should be judged under different contexts, see Kanter and Brinkerhoff, 
(1981). Smith (1997a) and Reid and Smith (2000a) identify three approaches to 
measuring performance in small firms. In particular, they contrast an objective measure 
(e.g. quantitative measures like profitability and rate of return) with a subjective 
measure (e.g. a judgmental evaluation of performance, drawing on both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence). Mature small firms in this sample have clearly passed an 
objective performance criterion, such as the long-run economic test of survival (ft > 0), 
see Reid (1991) and Barney (1991). However, long run survival as a criterion per se 
provides no insights into the drivers of above-normal performance. This Chapter 
develops a new multi-dimensional measure of performance, in the sense of an index 
which captures the fitness of the firm to survive over the long haul. This measure is 
based on owner-managers’ self-appraisals of the importance of each of 28 factors which 
foster the long run survival of the firm (e.g. a subjective measure of performance), see 
subsection 4.3.4. The measure is used in inferential analysis in Chapters 8 and 9 
because it is both more comprehensive and more compatible with our evidence base for 
reasons outlined in this Chapter.
Essentially, this Chapter examines the efficiency of performance measures, both 
objective and subjective measures. The discussion is structured as follows: First, the 
effectiveness of objective measures in assessing the long run performance of small firms 
is examined in Section 6.2. This is followed, in Section 6.3, by a discussion of the 
construction of the subjective performance score. The underlying determinants of this 
self-appraised measure of performance are also examined using factor analytic 
techniques (see Gerbing & Andersen, 1998; Hair et. al., 1995). The reliability of this 
measure is assessed. Finally, the predictive power of the new multi-dimensional 
measure of performance is examined in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 concludes this Chapter.
6.2 Objective Measures of Performance
This Section evaluates the ability of objective measures of performance (e.g. 
traditional accounting measures) to capture the long run performance of small firms in
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this sample. The financial data gathered included asset growth, profitability and 
indebtedness. The usefulness of these measures in assessing the long run performance 
of mature small firms is explored below.
6.2.1 Asset Growth
Asset accumulation occurs from period t to t+t where t= 1,2,3,.... units of time 
(days, months, years etc.), if the assets of the small firm (X/+r) in time period Z+r is 
greater than the assets of the firm (At) in time period Z. A decline in growth occurs if 
A(+r< At. Asset accumulation may have a significant wealth enhancing effect for the 
owner-manager (e.g. as a pension, or nest egg, on retiring) and by aggregations, for the 
economy as a whole. Arguably, it is an indicator of the long run performance of the 
firm. To consider the converse, Reid (1993) found that small firms which started with a 
low asset base, often failed to accumulate assets over the lifecycle and therefore tended 
to go out of business. Such small firms were relatively vulnerable, and had low exit 
costs. However, to assess the ability of real asset growth to explain the long run 
performance of the firm an examination of asset accumulation of the mature small firms 
in the sample is required.
The typical long-lived small firm in this sample was set up on a shoestring 25 
years or more ago. Average assets at inception (reflated to 2001 prices) were 
£27,301stg. Since inception, average assets grew twelve fold and were £330,425stg in 
2001. Therefore the financial wealth (approximated by the book value of real assets net 
of depreciation) grew considerably over the life of the small firm. Figure 6.1 illustrates 
this large degree of asset accumulation over the life of the firm. The horizontal axis 
represents assets at inception, and the vertical axis, assets at the time of subsequent 
interview, expressed in 2001 prices respectively. Points on the 45° line correspond to 
cases where assets have not grown between start-up and 2001. Here, a similar pattern 
emerges to that displayed in Figure 11.9 in Reid (1993). However, the scale of asset 
accumulation in this phase diagram is much greater. Some long-lived small firms 
achieved significant asset accumulation over their life. The two main outlier points, 
expressed in terms of (At,At+x) at constant 2001 prices, are given by (£762, £5,000,000) 
and (£0, £2,000,000). They illustrate the marked extent of the asset accumulation in 
some cases. These firms are fast-growth firms or “gazelles” as denoted by Birch 
(1996). They represent a very small proportion of the long-lived small firms in the
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sample. Less than a tenth (8%) had an asset base of £800,000stg, or more in 2001 (see 
Table 6.1, which cross-tabulates assets at inception and assets at the time of interview 
expressed in 2001 prices).
Whereas most long-lived small firms experienced some accumulation of assets 
over their life1, few small firms achieved growth rates in assets to the degree mentioned 
above. Approximately, three quarters of the sample started with assets with a value of 
less than £15,000stg. (at 2001 prices). Over a fifth (22.4%) of the total number of firms 
interviewed had assets with a value under £50,000stg in 2001. More than half (51.7%) 
the firms had a book value of assets value of under £150,000stg in 2001.
1 This is visible form Figure 6.1 because most of the points are above the 45° line where = A-
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Table 6.1: Real Asset Accumulation (2001 Prices)
Assets in 2001
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Under
15k
9
(15.5%)
9
(15.5%)
6
(10.3%)
7
(12.1%)
2
(3.4%)
4
(6.9%)
1
(1.7%)
2
(3.4%)
2
(3.4%)
42
(72.4%)
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1
(1.7%)
1
(1.7%)
2
(3.4%)
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3
(5.2%)
2
(3.4%)
1
(1.7%)
6
(10.3%)
50K-
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1
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1
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2
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4
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1
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1
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1
(1.7%)
i
(1.7%)
200K+ 1
(1.7%)
1
(1.7%)
2
(3.4%)
Total 13
1(22.4%)
10
(17.2%)
7
(12.1%)
7
(12.1%)
8
(13.8%)
4
(6.9%)
4
(6.9%)
3
(5.2%)
2
(3.4%)
58
(100%)
Asset accumulation may be a positive predictor of staying in business but its 
predictive power is weak (see Reid, 1993). Cressy (1996) found its predictive power 
was further weakened when account was taken of human capital. It is evident from 
Table 6.1 above that almost a quarter of the long-lived small firms are still trading with 
a very low asset base. The failure of the book value of assets to capture intangible 
assets, which include items, such as goodwill (i.e. the reputation value of the firm, its 
customer lists etc.) and the human capital of the owner-manager, may provide an 
explanation for this. Intangible assets can represent a significant amount of the value of 
small firms, particularly those operating in the service sector. The true market value of 
the asset base of the business could in fact be much higher although it is recognised that 
some of the intangible asset base of the business is tied to the entrepreneur.
Given that nearly two thirds of the mature small firms in the sample are service 
firms, underestimation of the market value of the asset base is perhaps sizeable, and 
thus there are difficulties with relying on asset growth as a measure of long run 
performance. Moreover data for assets at inception is only available for fifty-eight 
cases in the sample. Owner-managers of the five firms formed by buying-out the 
founders of the firm actually did not know the value of the firm’s assets at inception.
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6.2.2 Accounting Profit
Accounting profit is the nearest approximation to economic profit available in 
this study but it is far from an adequate approximation (Fisher and McGowan, 1983). 
On average, net profits (with standard deviation in parentheses) were £39,971stg 
(93,989) less depreciation and directors remuneration. There are difficulties in relying 
on this measure to approximate the long run performance of the small firm, which are 
particular to the small firm case.
The issues relevant to performance measurement in the context of the small firm 
are well-documented (see Dess and Robinson, 1984; Sapienza et al. 1988). Self­
reported net profit figures by owner-managers are subject to much variation as small 
firms are not subject to the same reporting standards of large incorporated firms 
(Ballantine et al., 1993). Accounting records are less reliable as ownership is not 
separated from control (See Keasy and Watson, 1991). Owner-managers of small firms 
find it difficult to distinguish profit from income, see Reid (1993). Owner-managers do 
not like to report high profits also. According to Reid (1993) “Owner-managers do not 
like to admit a high profit. It might imply certain levels of tax liability, it might suggest 
that their market is not being adequately contested by actual and potential rivals and it 
might also suggest that surpluses could be channelled to raising the wage bilF (p.l 13).
The rate of profitability measured by net profits per pound of assets is perhaps 
another indicator of performance. On average, net profits per pound of assets in 2001
was 33% (61%), which relative to the banks rate of interest is quite high (standard 
deviation in parentheses). It was also high relative to the sales margin in 2001 
(percentage profit per pound sterling of sales), which was on average 8.52% (13%). 
This is perhaps due to the under valuation of assets (excludes intangible assets) or 
failure to distinguish profit from income, (i.e. the misgivings of its underlying 
components). A measure between 8.52% and 33% might be a more accurate measure of 
return.
Net profits and the rate of profitability are instantaneous (i.e. one point in time) 
measures of performance rather than measures of long run performance. A rate of 
change in rate of profitability over time is perhaps a more appropriate measure of long 
run profitability. However, this measure is not available for an adequate proportion of 
the sample. Figures on assets and net profits are only available for 20 firms for the year
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1985. However, to test the inferences examined in Part V, a performance measure which 
is defined for the entire sample is preferable. Further, given sensitivities about 
disclosing net profit figures, two small firms in the sample refiised to provide this 
information at the time of interview.
6.2.3 Financial Structure
In examining the survival of small business start-ups, Reid (1991) found that 
gearing had a significant negative effect on small firm survival. However if equity 
finance is a cheaper source of finance capital, Reid (2003) found that the optimal 
strategy for highly geared small firms is to retire debt early in its lifecycle. Later in the 
firm’s lifecycle, many forms of capital could be appropriate to the long-run survival of a 
specific firm. In general, for a higher level of external liabilities, a lower level of 
performance is expected.
Over two thirds (68.3%) of the mature small firms interviewed were financed 
through some form of debt. On average, these firms had two forms of debt. Nearly a 
half (44.4%) had a bank overdraft; two-fifths (39.7%) had a bank loan; nearly a quarter 
(22.2%) used hire purchase; and an eighth (12.7%) used other forms of debt finance, 
including, notably, leasing agreements. These were the main source of finance capital, 
apart from private equity. Outside equity was uncommon. Only three firms out of the 
sixty-three interviewed had any outside equity finance. These three firms were 
significantly bigger in size as measured by FTEs (T statistic= 2.319, p-value=0.023 
<0.05; see Table 6.2) and assets (T Statistic= 1.688, p-value=0,096 <0.1; see Table 6.2) 
in 2001 but not in terms of turnover. Further, there was no significant difference in the 
level of liabilities of these firms (see Table 6.2). In general, those firms which 
possessed outside equity finance had changed ownership over the life of the firm (i.e. 
the founders of the firm continued to hold an equity stake in the firm following the 
trade-sale).
These findings confirm the tendency for owners of mature small firm to have a 
clear preference for sources of financing that minimise intrusion into their business.2 
According to Lopez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias (2000) financing is based on, firstly 
personal savings and resources generated internally; secondly, short or long term debt; 
and thirdly, least preferred of all, new share issues that dilute control. This corresponds
2 Control aversion in small medium sized enterprises has been well documented by Cressy (1995), 
Chittenden et al. (1996), Reid (1996) and Berggren, Olofeson and Sliver (2000).
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to the pecking order theory of optimal capital financial structure as proposed by Myers 
(1984).
Table 6.2: T Test for two Independent Samples
Variable
Equity
Finance N Mean
T
statistic d.f.
Sig.
(2-tailed)
FTE 2001 Yes 3 38.667 2.319 61 0.024
No 60 12.292
Gross Sales 200la Yes 3 3393333 1.568 61 0.256
No 60 706150
Liabilities Yes 3 2.333 0.622 61 0.536
No 60 1.8
Assets 2001 Yes 3 970833 1.689 61 0.096
No 60 298405
Note: aT test is conducted under the assumption of unequal variances.
Statistical analysis indicates that the extent of liabilities is not age related. A 
significant relationship was not found to exist between the extent of the firm’s liabilities 
and age (Pearson’s R = -0.165 at a p-value of 0.196). The negative correlation supports 
Reid’s (2003) findings that the small firm typically seeks to retire debt early in its 
lifecycle. A significant positive relationship was found to exist between the extent of 
the firm’s liabilities and the number of full-time equivalent employees (Pearson’s R 
-0.323 at a p-value of 0.01). This is in the opposite direction to that found by Lopez- 
Gracia and Aybar-Arias, (2000). The existence of a generally smaller firm size in this 
sample3 and the limitation of Lopez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias’s(2000) data to the two 
year period 1994-19954 may explain the difference in the findings. Credit is perhaps 
rationed to smaller firms (Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990) due to asymmetric information 
between lenders and smaller firms (Berger and Udell, 1998). As a result, lenders wish 
to limit their exposure to perceived riskier projects (see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994).
6.2.4 Conclusion
The reliability of traditional accounting measures (e.g. asset growth, net profits 
etc.) as measures of long run performance in the small firms context was questioned in
3 Half of our sample are not private companies and therefore are not required to submit their accounts to 
companies registry office like the sample of Spanish firms selected for Lopez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias 
(2000) study.
4 Lopez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias’s (2000) sample probably contains young and old small firms.
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this section. There are misgivings about adopting asset growth as a measure of long-run 
performance, because of lack of, or poor accounting for, the intangible asset base of 
small businesses. Failure to account for the value of intangible assets is particularly 
troublesome, given that two thirds of the sample of long-lived small firms is small 
service based firms. Difficulties in ascertaining net profit from income, and practices of 
small firms involving under-reporting of profits raise questions about the accuracy of 
measures based on firm profitability. It is also difficult to gather data on these financial 
measures of performance of long-lived small firms retrospectively. The measures 
available in this study are only instantaneous rather than continuous indicators of long 
run performance. As it happens, different objective performance measures were 
gathered for each of the three parent samples. Further, data on the three parent samples 
were collected at different points in time. Thus there is an intrinsic lack of 
comparability of these measures over the full lifecycle of the firms.
Simple measures, such as employment growth or sales growth, over the life of 
the firm, which are arguably subject to less distortion, could be adopted to proxy long 
run performance. However complete data are only available for 44 firms, in the case of 
sales growth, and 56 firms, in the case of employment growth. There are other 
problems with these measures also. It was found in Chapter 5 that real turnover grows 
at the market rate, after 5 years of trading (see subsection 5.2.5). Therefore sales 
growth arguably fails to account for other sources of long run improvements in 
performance, such as increases in efficiency or reductions in costs etc. Moreover, Reid 
(1993) found a negative relation between profitability and growth, thus casting forther 
doubts about the usefulness of the growth measures in approximating long run 
performance of the small firm. Negative employee growth is also difficult to interpret 
in this context. Does it reflect efficiency improvements or poor performance? As 
wages are a principal cost driver for many small firms, tight control of the wage bill 
(e.g. by laying off, or casualising, staff) can enhance performance, Reid (1999). This 
affect is often associated with technical change (e.g. substituting office based computing 
for manual clerical work). Further, a measure of performance other than sales growth 
and employment growth is preferable for examining trade-offs between size and 
performance in Chapter 9.
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These concerns prompted the development of a subjective measure of 
performance. Resorting to a new performance measurement approach, which is 
common to the three sub-samples, allowed the empirical work to be undertaken on a 
common basis.
6.3. Subjective Measure of Long Run Performance
To assess the long run performance of small firms in the sample, owner- 
managers were asked to self-appraise the firm's performance, in terms of factors which 
had helped to keep them in business. The fitness of the small firm to survive over the 
long haul was appraised over twenty-eight items which covered aspects of the firm's 
business strategy (9 items), financial management (4 items), internal organisation (4 
items) and environment (11 items). The items, included in this multidimensional index 
of long run performance, were inspired by both the theoretical and empirical literature 
on factors which influence the survival and growth of small firms (see Subsection 4.3.4 
for a discussion of the design of this measure).
Respondents self-appraised each item (e.g. technology, rival’s innovation, 
regulation etc.) on a 100-point scale of performance. A score 40’ indicated that the item 
impacted negatively on the performance of the firm. A score of ‘100’ indicated that the 
item impacted positively on the performance of the firm. A score of ‘50’ indicated that 
the item had a neutral effect on the firm’s long run performance (see Table 4,10). The 
performance index for each firm was computed by summing the scores for each item. 
Scores were normalised to take account of those items that were not applicable (i.e. the 
total score was divided by the number of items rated)5. Out of a maximum performance 
score of 100, the average long-lived small firm scored 67; the measure ranged from 49 
to 90. Low performers had a performance rating between 49 and 62 (i.e. the lower 
quartile) and high performers had a performance rating of 73 to 90 (i.e. the upper 
quartile).
The parsimony, reliability and validity of this new index are investigated below. 
The reliability of the measure is tested in Subsection 6.3.2. The constructs underlying
5In statistical tests it was found that the number of items check by the respondent as being relevant to 
them was not related to age (Pearson’s R=-0.139, p-value=0.277) but was weakly positively related to 
size as measured by FTEs (Pearson’s R=0.329, p-value=0.009) and turnover (Pearson’s R=0.218, p- 
value=0.086). This implies that larger firms need to juggle more factors to survive.
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this index are explored using factor analytic techniques in Subsections 6.3.3-63.5. The 
predictive validity of the measured is assessed in Section 6.4.
6.3.1 Factor Analytic Techniques
An understanding of the attributes, which underlie performance, increases our 
knowledge of influences on long run survival. Factor analysis is a multivariate 
statistical tool that can be used to examine the underlying patterns of relationships 
among a larger number of variables and to determine whether or not the information can 
be summarised into a smaller set of constructs or attributes (Child, 1970; Loehlin,
1992). It can be used from either an exploratory or a confirmatory perspective.
In exploratory factor analysis, no a priori constraints are set on the number of 
factors extracted. The researcher seeks, under rather general assumptions, a latent 
variable structure that accounts for the inter-item correlations of an observed set of 
variables. In confirmatory factor analysis, on the other hand, the researcher has some 
preconceived thoughts based on prior research about the actual structure of the data 
(Hair et al. 1995). The researcher takes a specific hypothesised structure and sees how 
well it accounts for the observed relationships in the data. Joreskog (1974) notes that 
many investigations are to some extent both exploratory and confirmatory, since they 
involve some variables of known, and other variables of unknown, composition.
To cope with this kind of investigation, methodologists recommend the use of a 
statistical procedure, which comprises: (1) exploratory factor analysis; (2) reliability 
analysis; and (3) confirmatory factor analysis for validating measures (Gerbing & 
Andersen, 1998; Hair et al. 1995). Accordingly, this procedure is adopted here to 
identify and validate the underlying constructs of the long run performance index.
6.3.2 Reliability Test
The purpose of reliability analysis is to find those items that form an internally 
consistent scale, and to eliminate those items that do not. This Subsection presents the 
results of the reliability assessment through examining 1) item means and variances [see 
Table 6.3] 2) inter-item correlations [see Table 6.4] and 3) Cronbach’s (1951) alpha 
coefficient. The results are interpreted in turn below. Generally the scale items were 
applicable to almost all the long-lived small firms in the sample6 however where an
6 Items, which were common to the long run survival of all firms included competition, cashflow, quality, 
operational efficiency and skills. Items checked less frequently included new entrants (47), rival’s 
innovation (48), regulation (53), credit policy (54), market research (47) differentiation (53), advertising
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owner-manager stated that an item was not applicable a value of 50 (neutral rating) was 
entered. This ensured that there was no the missing values and facilitated the 
calculation of inter-item correlations and Cronbach’s alpha, as well as enabling a factor 
analysis to be conducted.
Item Means and Variances
If item means are close to the centre of the range of values and if item variances 
are high, this indicates that items are discriminating properly amongst the views of 
owner-managers. Items with a mean rating close to centre of the distribution (i.e. mean 
values close to 50; range is 1-100) included competition 54 (23.3), substitutes 50 (22.9), 
new entrants 43 (21.5), rival’s innovation 45 (23.2), debt 48 (26.3), regulation 47 (22.7), 
credit policy 59 (26.5) and advertising 53 (2) (with the corresponding standard 
deviations in parentheses). The standard deviations are high in all these cases except for 
advertising. This indicates heterogeneity in the assessment of owner-managers (i.e. 
received good and bad ratings) about the contribution of these items (other than 
advertising) to the long run survival of the firm. This heterogeneity generally relates to 
environmental items and aspects of financial management within the small firm. This is 
understandable for environmental items as these are largely outside the control of 
managers.
Those items with mean performance ratings of 75 or more include suppliers, 75 
(14.4); customer loyalty, 82 (15.8); quality, 88 (12); differentiation, 75 (18.5); product 
mix, 81 (12.8); diversification, 76 (16.5); operational efficiency, 78 (15.5); and skills 
80 (16.7) (with the corresponding standard deviations in parentheses). The mean 
ratings are high (well above the neutral 50) and the standard deviations are low, 
indicating that, in general, owner-managers are in agreement on the contribution of 
these items to long-run survival. High ratings on these items are consistent with 
evidence on factors promoting the survival of long-lived small firms (Brush and 
Chaganti, 1998; Leigh et al., 1991; Smallbone et al., 1992; Reid et al., 1993; Seigal ef 
al., 1993; Reid, 1993). The full range of the distribution (0 to 100) was adopted in 
rating items in most instances.
(51), diversification (53) and filling product gaps (47) (with counts in parentheses). The least checked 
item was substitute goods which were only applicable for long run survival in twenty-five cases (see 
Table 6.3).
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Inter-item correlations
High inter-item correlations suggest that scale items are all measuring the same 
concept. The lailure of scale items to inter-correlate with one another is an indication 
that items do not represent a common underlying construct. However, the failure of 
some items to correlate significantly with others can be due to the fact that performance 
is multi-dimensional. Some of the dimensions are related, others may not be.
No inter-item correlations are above 0.6 (see Table 6.4). The highest significant 
correlation is between cost control and operational efficiency at 0.584 (significant at p- 
value 0.0001). Other relatively high inter-item correlations include: credit policy and 
buyers willingness to pay (0.521); monitoring and skills (0.497); capital requirements 
and market positioning (0.444); credit policy and customer loyalty (0.434); quality and 
product mix (0.414); and skills and operational efficiency (0.413). These correlations 
are all significant at p-value<0.0001. Most of the remaining significant correlations are 
between 0.2 and 0.4.
Cronbach 's Alpha Coefficient
The closer the alpha coefficient is to a value of 1 the greater is the reliability of 
the items comprising the scale. Nunnally (1978) provides a widely accepted rule of 
thumb that alpha should be at least 0.7 for a scale to demonstrate internal consistency. 
The value of the alpha coefficient, for all 28 items, is 0.78, which is above 0.7.
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6.3.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis
To examine the underlying constructs of long run performance a subset of 
twelve items was chosen from the 28 scale items to be factor analysed. The subset was 
chosen in view of general rules regarding sample size (N > 50; N-63), and the ratio 
between sample size and number of items to be factor analysed (>5 cases; 63/12>5). 
Those items which were rated most frequently by small firms were included (i.e. items 
which were applicable to the long run performance of all or most small firms in the 
sample). By setting the cut off eigen-value at 1, five factors were extracted (using 
principal axis factoring). These factors explained 69% of the total variance, which is 
above the suggested threshold of 60% for social science studies (Hair et al, 1995). 
Table 6.5 presents the results after rotation [an orthogonal (varimax) and an oblmin 
rotation] to maximise the number of non-zero factor loadings and to facilitate 
interpretation. The factor names are based on their constituent elements. Each 
construct underlying long run small firm performance is interpreted below following the 
corroboration of this hypothesised structure using confirmatory factor analysis.
Coefficient alpha varied from 0.4 to 0.67 for each construct or factor extracted. 
These are close to, but below, Nunnally’s (1978) recommended level 0.7. However, as 
found above Cronbach’s alpha is 0.78 when all items are examined (and 0.7 for all 12 
items). Certainly, increasing the sample size and thus reducing sample variability, 
could have improved the analysis. Reducing selection bias (the representativeness of 
the universe of items) through increasing the ratio of the number of items to the number 
of constructs (i.e. the number of items per factor the more informative the factor 
analysis) could also enhance the analysis.
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Table 6.5: Exploratory Factor Analysis
Extraction Method: Principal Axis 
Factoring
Eigenvalues Alpha
Reliability
Rotation: Varimax Oblimin
Factor I Internal Organisation
Operational Efficiency 0.806 .831
Cost Control 0.640 .651 2.911 0.67
Skills 0.532 .504
Factor n Industry Structure & Rivalry
Cash flow 0.620 .596
Growth 0.580 .584 1.698 0.61
Market Positioning 0.469 .403
Competition 0.422 .418
Factor IH Business Strategy
Quality 0.943 -.977 1.309 0.59
Product Mix 0.456 -.468
Factor IV Resources
Location 0.863 .895 1.242
Factor V Nature of Buyers & Suppliers
Suppliers 0.556 .547 1.108 0.40
Customer loyalty 0.432 .366
6 iterations 11 iterations
Note: Standardised alpha for the 12 items 0.70
The five factors extracted accountfor 69% of the total variance.
6.3.4 Confirmatory Factor Analysis
While exploratory factor analysis and reliability test are able to derive some 
plausible constructs, confirmatory factor analysis is particularly useful in validating the 
measurement of these constructs (Gerbing & Andersen, 1998 and Hair et al., 1995). To 
assess the overall fit (i.e. convergent and discriminant validity of the measurement) of 
the five constructs extracted above, a similar analysis was performed, except that in this 
case the factors were extracted using the method of maximum likelihood. A chi-square 
test is used to assess whether the correlations implied by the factors extracted so far
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constitute an adequate account of the original correlations7. As shown in Table 6.6, the 
Chi-square statistic resulting from the confirmatory factor analysis was 9.972 with 16 
d.f. and a p-value of 0.868 which indicates that the present data fitted reasonably well 
the hypothesised measurement model. As regards convergent validity, Table 6.6 
indicates that all the items had significant loadings on their corresponding constructs (at 
p-value<0.01)8. The correlations between constructs (or factors) were low; a value of 
0.282 between Factor I and Factor III represented the highest correlation. This is weak 
evidence of discriminant validity between the constructs. The path loadings under the 
orthogonal and oblmin rotations are similar as a result.
7 Chi-square is a measure of overall fit of the model to the data. It measures the distance (difference, 
discrepancy, deviance) between the sample covariance (correlation) matrix and the fitted covariance 
(correlation) matrix. Chi-square is a badness-of-fit measure in the sense that a small chi-square 
corresponds to good fit and a large chi-square to bad fit. Zero chi-square corresponds to perfect fit. Chi- 
square is calculated as N -1 times the minimum value of the fit function, where N is the sample size.
8 Critical values for salient factor loadings are +/-0.24 and +/-0.318 at the 5 percent and the 1 percent 
levels respectively in accordance with critical values for Pearson's moment correlation coefficients. Due 
to the uncertainty about the assessment of error in factorial work for small samples, it is safer to adopt the 
1 percent level as the criterion for significance. For large samples (N>100) a rule of thumb widely used 
by factor analysts is that loadings having values +/- 0.3 or greater are taken as significant. Thus the value 
of +/- 0.318, the critical value at the 1 percent level for N=63, is more demanding (Child, 1970).
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Table 6.6: Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Extraction Method: Maximum
Likelihood
Rotation Method: Varimax Oblimin
Path" Path"
Loading Loading
Factor I Internal Organisation
Cost Control 0.649 0.667
Operational Efficiency 0.793 0.817
Skills 0.541 0.507
Factor II Industry Structure & Rivalry
Cash flow 0.637 0.612
Growth 0.549 0.551
Market Positioning 0.478 0.412
Competition 0.405 0.402
Factor Hl Business Strategy
Quality 0.974 1.010
Product Mix 0.440 0.447
Factor IV Resources
Location 0.872 0.903
Factor V Nature of Buyers and Suppliers
Suppliers 0.533 0.524
Customer loyalty 0.429 0.364
Note: “Allpath loadings are significant (p-value<0.01)
Chi-square statistic =9.972 16d.f. at a p-value of0.868.
6.3.5 Composition of the Five Constructs
Items were selected for inclusion in the scale under the following headings: 
environment, finance, business strategy and internal organisation, based on theoretical 
relationships to hypothesised dimensions of performance described by Sandberg and 
Hofer, (1987); Chrisman et al., (1998). Chrisman et al., (1998) extended the earlier 
Sandberg and Hofer (1987) model. The first described new venture performance as 
being a fimction of entrepreneurial attributes, strategy and industrial structure and it was 
extended to include resources and organisational structure. Items were not included on 
the values, beliefs, education and experience of the entrepreneur, as Sandberg and Hofer 
(1987) could not find evidence of the link between the entrepreneur and new venture 
performance. It was also decided that it was difficult to get the owner-manager to rate 
the effect of these items on the long run survival of the firm. An item was included for
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skills, which could capture part of the influence of the entrepreneur on new venture 
performance. The constituent variables of factors that emerged are not exclusively 
categorised under these headings, as there are interrelationships between the items. 
Generally all four aspects, except the entrepreneur, are represented in the five 
constructs.
The constituent variables of factor I, internal organisation, include cost control, 
operational efficiency and skills. These items are features of the organisational 
resources, structure, and systems of the firm (Chrisman et al., 1998). The internal 
organisation of the mature small firm is much simpler than in large organisations (e.g. 
fewer communication lines, reduced agency costs) which has been shown to be a source 
of small firm flexibility and offers greater opportunities to increase operational 
efficiency and to control costs (see Reid, 1998). The high variation in long run 
performance explained by this construct supports the results of Brush and Chaganti 
(1998) on the importance contribution of human and organisational resources to the 
performance of small firms occupying niches in retail industry. Cressy (1996) also 
highlights the importance of human capital as a determinant of firm survival.
Factor 2, industry structure and rivalry, includes cashflow, competition, growth 
and market positioning which reflect aspects of the attractiveness of the small firms 
choice of market niche. Structural features of the industry such as growth, market 
positioning and the level of competition influence the profit potential of the small firm 
(Porter, 1980). It was seen in section 3.3.1.3 that firms are more likely to survive in 
growing industries than in mature industries. Audretsch (1995) argued that if industry 
growth is positive and unanticipated, it will result in higher price cost margins thus 
facilitating survival. Firms with a high level of liquidity, or excess cash, have a greater 
ability to engage in industry rivalry, see Chrisman et al., (1998). Although, Storey et al. 
(1987) found that liquidity ratios were not the best predictors of failure, generally a 
decline in liquidity is symptomatic of a failing company, and a rise in liquidity of a non­
failing company.
Factor 3 represents attributes of the firm’s business strategy. In particular it 
refers to the product portfolio (i.e. breath of products offered and the quality of its 
product offering). Reid (1993) found that having a wide range of products positively 
influenced the survival of the firm. Factor 4, namely resources, has only one constituent
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element, namely location. A favourable location, giving a venture easy access to raw 
materials, customers, and suppliers is more valuable than a location chosen without 
such advantages in mind (Cooper, 1979). In subsection 3.3.2.5 it was found that 
location had a mixed effect on post entry performance. In the UK, firms located in a 
buoyant locality (see Storey and Wynarczky, 1996), or in accessible rural areas, 
experience the highest growth rates (see Storey, 1994). In other European countries, a 
firm’s location either had no effect, or firms located in major hubs had a higher rate of 
survival (see Fotopoulos and Louri, 2000a; Littunen, 2000). Items loading onto factor 5 
capture the dependency of the value added of the firm on customer loyalty, and on 
building relationship with suppliers of the firm (i.e. raising switching costs). Delinquent 
suppliers and debtors were shown to be a considerable threat to the survival of the small 
firm (Reid, 1993).
The analysis provides some underpinning to the actions, which owner-managers 
take to achieve the performance standards necessary for continued survival. It also 
lends support to models of the determinants of new venture performance proposed by 
Sandberg and Hofer (1987) and Chrisman et aL9 (1998).
6.4 Predictive Power
As stated above, the multi-dimensional measure of performance provides us 
with a measure of performance which is common to all firms in the sample. This makes 
it especially useful in econometric estimation. Prior to its application in econometric 
estimations, correlations with objective measures of performance, age and firm size are 
examined. These offer further evidence in support of the utility of this long run 
performance measure, a measure of the fitness of the small firm to survive over the long 
haul.
Table 6.7 illustrates that the long run performance indicator and asset growth are 
negatively correlated (Pearson’s R = -0.298, p-value<0.05). Thus it behaves similarly 
to the level of accounting net profits, which is also significantly negatively correlated 
with asset growth (Pearson’s R = -0.747, p-value<0.0001). The long run performance 
indicator is weakly positively correlated with net profits in 2001. There is only a 10 
percent probability in one tail that this correlation could have occurred by chance. It is 
also negatively correlated with the level of indebtedness of the firm, and in this instance
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there is only a 5 percent probability in one tail that this correlation could have occurred 
by chance. Thus, in these cases, the long run performance indicator is behaving as 
expected. There is, however, no correlation with the rate of profitability or the sales 
margin at one point in time (ie. year 2001). However, the appropriateness of these 
criteria to judge the validity of the subjective measure of performance is questionable, 
given the misgivings about these measures in small firms context.
Correlations with size and age are presented in Tables 6.8 and 6.9. As it 
happens, none of the performance measures (objective or subjective) are correlated with 
age. Although Reid (1993) found age to be a positive predictor of small firm survival 
for a sub-sample of these firms, this related to a much early period in their lifecycle. In 
general, there is a negative correlation between this long run indicator of performance 
and size. Smaller firms are more likely to perform better, according to this indicator, 
than larger firms. This is indicative of a trade-off between size and performance, and 
this tradeoff is explored further in Chapter 9. It suggests that there is a general tendency 
for small firms to remain small. The correlation with headcount in 2001 was significant 
(Pearson’s R - -0.210 with a two tailed p-value<0.1). There is only a 10 percent 
probability in one tail that the negative correlation with assets in 2001 could have 
occurred by chance.
I
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Table 6.7: Correlations with Objective Measures of Performance
Net Profit Liabilities
Rate of 
profitability
Asset
Growth
Sales
Margin
Pearson
Liabilities Correlation -0.012
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.928
N 61
Rate of Pearson
profitability Correlation 0.435 -0.075
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00/ 0.567
N 60 61
Asset Pearson
Growth Correlation -0.747 0.240 -0.101
Sig. (2-tailed) 3.58E-09 0.122 0.575
N 43 43 43
Pearson
Correlation 0.503 -0.003 0.663 -0.130
Sig. (2-tailed) 4.16 E-05 0.980 9.08E-09 0.413
Sales Margin N 60 60 59 42
Pearson
Long run Correlation 0.165 -0.208 0.0410 -0.298 0.115
performance Sig. (2-tailed) 0.203 0.103 0.754 0.052 0.381
Indicator N 61 63 61 43 60
Table 6.8: Correlations with Size
Pearson’s
Correlation
Sig.
(2-tailed) N
Assets 2001 -0.186 0.144 63
Assets At Start-Up -0.144 0.282 58
Actual Employees At Start-Up -0.039 0.778 56
Actual Employees After 5 Years -0.097 0.487 54
Actual Employees After 10 Years -0.064 0.641 55
Actual Employees 2001 -0.210 0.099 63
Actual Gross Sales After 1 Year -0.098 0.531 44
Actual Gross Sales After 5 Years -0.103 0.510 43
Actual Gross Sales After 10 Years -0.082 0.591 45
Actual Gross Sales 2001 -0.127 0.323 63
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Table 6.9: Correlations with Age
Attribute Pearson’s 
Correlation (:
Sig.
2-tailed)
N
Long Run Performance Indicator 0.059 0.646 63
Net profit -0.039 0.765 60
Rate of profitability (%) 0.027 0.839 61
Asset Growth (%) 0.088 0.576 43
Liabilities -0.165 0.196 63
Sales Margin 0.019 0.884 60
Significant differences in mean long run performance indicator were not found for 
broad industrial sector, legal status, market reach, market position and market share. 
This is another redeeming feature of the multidimensional measure of performance. 
The measure is neither correlated with age, sector, market, nor with the organisational 
form of the small firm. Thus it is useful for measuring the long run performance of a 
heterogeneous group of small firms.
6.5 General Conclusions
This Chapter raised a number of concerns about using traditional accounting 
measures to capture long run performance in a small firms context. A novel measure of 
performance was developed, using a similar design to score-carding, see Epstein and 
Manzoni (eds) (2002, Part III). This new measure was based on a subjective evaluation 
of factors influencing the long run survival prospects of the small firm. It measures the 
fitness of the small firm to survive over the long haul. It was available for all the long- 
lived small firms, which took part in the study and thus was more compatible with the 
evidence base. Scores were summed across the 28 scale items representing the sorts of 
factors which owner-managers juggle on a daily basis. This illustrates the 
comprehensiveness of the measure.
From an examination of the scores on factors, it was found that mature small 
firms were in agreement about the contribution of suppliers, customer loyalty, quality, 
differentiation, product mix, diversification, operational efficiency, and skills to the 
long-run survival of the firm. However, there were heterogeneity in the views of 
owner-managers with regard to competition, substitutes, new entrants, rival’s 
innovation, debt, regulation, credit policy and advertising. Five constructs capturing the
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internal organisation, industry structure and rivalry, business strategy, resources and the 
nature of customers and suppliers were found to underlie this long run performance 
measure, using factor analytic techniques.
Although arguably not as rigourous as objective measures, the subjective 
measure seems to be a reasonably good surrogate. This measure was found to behave in 
a similar manner to the objective measures of performance. Thus, it seems that 
entrepreneurs act on their own evaluations. Comparing the performance of diverse 
firms (in terms of scale, organisational form, sector) is complex, because performance is 
multi-dimensional. However, the subjective measure seems useful for measuring the 
long run performance of a heterogeneous group of small firms. In fact the correlations, 
which are presented in the next chapter and the results of inferential analysis in Chapters 
8 and 9 provide further assurances that as a performance measure it seems to be 
correctly discriminating between outcomes for the long-lived small firms.
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CHAPTER 7 LONGEVITY, PERFORMANCE AND ORGANISATION
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7.1 Introduction
This Chapter builds on evidence presented in Chapters 5 and 6 to complete our 
description of the typical long-lived small firm in the sample. Using the wealth of data 
gathered with the survey instrument, the discussion of the firm and market characteristics in 
Chapter 5 is extended to examine additional characteristics of the long-lived small firm. 
Specifically, this Chapter considers aspects of the mature small firm’s competitive strategy 
(e.g. market positioning and innovation) and it describes the evolution of the internal 
organisation of the firm (e.g. engagement in new activities and technological 
progressiveness). It also analyses key organisational changes (e.g. changes in ownership, 
capacity etc.), which occurred over the life of the firm and desired end-games of owner- 
managers. Where appropriate, these characteristics are related to measures of firm growth, 
objective measures of performance and the novel long run performance indicator (i.e. a 
subjective measure of performance, see Chapter 6). Such an analysis highlights factors 
which are likely to promote the post entry performance and growth (see Chapter 3). The 
characteristics are also related to firm age, to identify factors which are likely to foster the 
longevity of the small firm.
Thus, this Chapter contributes to the literature by testing existing hypotheses on 
entrepreneurial intentions, market positioning, size of competitive strategy space, product 
and process innovation, internal organisation and information technology, using new data 
on long-lived small firms. Moreover, in conducting this analysis, it identifies factors which 
are likely to influence the longevity, growth and performance of mature small firms in 
Scotland. This identifies routes or paths, which are expected to advance the performance 
and the longevity of the small firm. Knowledge of the prescribed paths, which are liable to 
foster longevity, is useful in educating new small firm start-ups. In addition, it discusses 
the importance, nature and timing of key organisational changes (Smallbone et al., 1992, 
1995) and attributes of planned end-games of long-lived small firms (Tajnikar and 
Dosenovid, 2003), issues, which have received scant attention in the past.
This Chapter also completes our reference point for understanding the results of the 
econometric analysis discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. The discussion on the key 
organisational changes feeds into Chapter 8, which examines the flexibility of the small
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firm in responding to organisational change. The discussion on the competitive strategy 
space of the long-lived small firm feeds into Chapter 9. The latter variable is determined 
jointly with size and performance in a simultaneous equation system. The analysis 
presented in this Chapter is also complemented by the case analysis presented in Volume II, 
Appendix 5.
A similar array of univariate and bivariate statistical techniques to those adopted in 
Chapter 5 are applied to test inferences in accordance with small sample distribution theory. 
Here again, rather than examining marginal organisational changes at each sequential stage 
of development, a comparison of the characteristics of the firm early in its lifecycle and as a 
long-lived small firm are examined.
The discussion is structured as follows: Section 7.2 portrays the mature small firm’s 
competitive strategy. A similar analysis for the internal organisational structure of the firm 
is performed in Section 7.3. In Section 7.4, key organisational changes, which occurred in 
the operations of the typical small firm over its lifetime, are described. Family succession, 
intergenerational issues and factors influencing the mature small firm’s end-game strategy 
are discussed in Section 7.5. Finally, Section 7.6 discusses the findings of this Chapter.
7.2 Competitive Strategy
‘Strategic choice’ is the commitment to undertake one set of actions rather than 
another (Oster, 1990). This commitment necessarily describes the allocation of resources, 
and thus involves making trade-offs (Porter, 1996). These strategic choices are path 
dependent. The set of actions undertaken in the past determine the production possibilities 
available in the future (Antonelli, 1997), and are referred to as the small firm’s ‘strategic 
legacy’ by Roper (1998).
Business strategies adopted by small firms are likely to be different from business 
strategies adopted by large firms, due to factors such as economies of scale, differences in 
organisational structure and product mix (see Prince and Thurik, 1995; Variyam and 
Kraybill, 1994; Bradbum and Ross, 1989). There is evidence that business strategies 
adopted by small firms are relatively diverse (Love et al., 1995). Studies show that small 
firms engage in small-scale R&D work (Kleinknecht et. al., 1991; Acs and Audretsch,
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1987, 1988), product and process innovation, and act to acquire new technical knowledge 
(Link and Bozeman, 1991; Variyam and Kraybill, 1994; Roper, 1998). Reid, Jacobsen and 
Andersen (1993) found that small firms at inception actively seek, and develop, focus 
strategies to serve particular geographic, customer and/or product niches.
The motivation of the owner-manager for establishing the business has been linked 
to the performance and the survival of the small firm (Reid and Smith, 2000a). The 
pervasive influence of the owner-manager of the firm, his dominance in making decisions, 
and the consequences of both of these factors for firm performance is discussed by Van 
Gelderen et al. (2000). In this Section, the expectations of the owner-managers, at start-up 
(or purchase) and at the time of interview, are examined. Then the mature small firm’s 
choice of market positioning, competitive tactics and its level of innovation are considered.
7.2.1 Aims & Expectations
Formal theories of entrepreneurship, like Blanchflower and Oswald’s (1990), 
emphasise that rational goals for establishing a new business may go beyond pecuniary 
considerations, to nonpecuniary considerations, such as a desire for autonomy and control. 
The personal values of the entrepreneur can influence how vigorously the owner-manager 
wants to grow on his firm or whether he wishes to close down his firm. Reid and Smith 
(2000a) found that of the numerous aims that owner-managers adopt (survival, growth 
etc.), only one appears to have a major impact on performance; the pursuit of a high rate of 
return on investment.
The long-lived small firms were asked to identify their chief aims for their business 
at start-up, and their main reasons for continuing to operate the business in 2001, from the 
categories listed in Table 7.1 below. Two fifths (39.7%) of the owner-managers hoped that 
the business would survive; a fifth (19%) of the owner-managers set up the firm to provide 
them with a source of employment; and few (2%) of owner-managers indicated that they 
set up the firm to obtain a high rate of return on their investment. While “the 
narrow...economic pursuit of the best rate of return on investment” (Reid and Smith, 
2000a, p. 165) had a positive impact on the performance of business start-ups in Scotland, 
the desire to create a business with ‘survival prospects’ seems to be more typical of the 
sample of long-lived small firms. The long run test of economic survival (7c > 0) is perhaps
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linked to the rate of return on investment. It could be classified as a positive motive rather 
than a negative one like setting up a business as an alternative to unemployment (Storey, 
1994). Only a tenth (9.5%) of owner-managers wished to pass the business on to family 
members. Rather than suggesting a lack of desire, or competence, of offspring to take over 
the running of the business, this perhaps indicates that the transfer of the wealth generated 
by the business within the family is not foremost on the mind of entrepreneurs in setting up 
these firms.
Table 7.1: Aims For Business at Start-up and 2001
Motivation
(Start-up)
N
(%)
Motivation
(2001)
N
(%)
To provide you with an 12 To provide you with employment 25
alternative to unemployment (19%) to the end of your working life (39.7%)
To have a business to pass on 6 To have a business to pass on to 6
to family members (9.5%) family members (9.5%)
To create a business with 25 To create employment in the 2
survival prospects (39.7%) community (3.2%)
Short term profit 1
(1.6%)
For long term profit 1
(1.6%)
Long term profit 3
(4.8%)
For fiirther growth 1
(1.6%)
Growth 4
(6.3%)
To get a return on the business 6
(9.5%)
High sales 1
(1.6%)
To increase the value of the 
business on trade sale
10
(15.9%)
High rate of return 1
(1.6%)
To have a sizeable nest egg on 
retiring
5
(7.9%)
To sell on the business
Other
1
(1.6%)
9
(14.3%)
Other 7
(11.1%)
There was a change in the motivation of owner-managers from start-up to the time 
of interview. While the employment of the owner-manager was still of foremost 
importance [two-fifths (39.7%) of the owner-managers chose this option], the conversion of 
private equity into funds for the retirement was of next importance. A third (33.3%) of the 
owner-managers were considering the value of the business on trade sale (or on another
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end-game); a tenth of the firms (9.5%) wished to get a return on the business; a sixth 
(15.9%) wished to increase the value of the business on trade sale; and eight percent (7.9%) 
wished to have a sizeable nest egg on retiring.
The relativist approach to performance measurement assesses whether the goals of 
the owner-manager for the business were achieved (Reid and Smith, 2000a). Almost ninety 
percent (87,3%) of firms stated that the business met their performance expectations. This 
is perhaps true, given that their chief intention at start-up was to create a business with 
survival prospects. Small firms whose expectations were not met, received a significantly 
lower mean performance rating of 59, in comparison to 69 for those whose expectations 
were met, according to the long run performance indicator (T statistic=3.516, 61d.f., p- 
value=0.001)
Nearly half (44.4%) of the owner-managers of long-lived small firms stated that 
they did not plan for the business at start-up. Those that did plan had a similar length of 
planning horizon of 14 months to the mean value of 151/2 months found by Reid and Smith 
(2000a). Less than half (43%) of the owner-managers set future targets (for sales and 
employee growth etc.) for the business at start-up. However, most of the firms (54%) at 
start-up believed that the firm would continue to trade indefinitely.
7.2.2 Market Positioning
Porter (1996) described the market position of a firm as a function of the needs it 
serves (i.e. narrow or broad), and the variety of customers it serves (Le. cost or 
differentiation or both) and access to customers (i.e. density of customers). Reid (1993, p. 
119) claimed Porter’s (1985) focus strategy was “most likely to offer the SBE a competitive 
advantage”. In Subsection 53.2.2, we found that the vast majority of long-lived small firms 
in the sample pursued a differentiation strategy. This corroborates Reid’s (1993) findings, 
evidence from Bradbum and Ross (1989), and the findings of Wright et al. (1995) and 
Carter et al. (1994). Caplin and Nalebuff (1986) illustrate that a high cost producer, by 
occupying positions well away from the centre of the market, may be able to avoid negative 
competition with its low cost rival and assure itself a market niche.
Market positioning was measured by a categorical variable, where firms self­
reported their market positioning as the Tow’, ‘middle’ and ‘top’ end of the market. Almost
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half (47.9%) served the middle-to-top end of their market, confirming evidence found by 
Bradbum and Ross (1989) and Reid (1993). Small firms pursue ‘focus’ or ‘niche’ based 
strategies to compete successfully in the market with larger rivals. The other half of the 
long-lived small firms (48%) stated that they served all segments of their market. 
Typically, their products are customised. Less than five percent (4.8%) of long-lived small 
firms solely served customers in the low end of the market, compared to sixteen percent at 
start-up. To survive in the long run, it is difficult for the small firm to compete on costs. 
Failure to achieve economies of scale in production hinders their ability to attain a long­
term competitive advantage in such a position.
There is some evidence that these small firms learned early in their life that is was 
difficult to compete in a low cost segment (see Figure 7.1). Two-fifths of firms (39.7%) 
changed their market positioning. Now they serve more premium ends of the market (i.e. 
middle to top ends). A test of the null hypothesis of equality between the mean ranked 
market positioning at start-up and in 2001, was rejected using Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
(Z statistic=-2.863, p-value<0.005; see Table 5.10 above). A Sign test confirmed this result 
also (p=0.0190.05 using the binominal distribution).
To pursue a focus or niche-based strategy, the long-lived small firm competes on a 
number of dimensions (price and non price). Essentially, the higher the number of 
dimensions upon which the small firm competes, the wider is its competitive strategy space 
and the greater is its willingness to compete. A wider competitive strategy space is
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characteristic of a differentiation strategy. The competitive strategy space of the small firm 
was calibrated by a count of the number of forms of competition used by the firm.1 It 
ranged from 1 to 8 where ‘ 1 ’ indicated that the small firm competes based on just one 
dimension of the competitive strategy space (e.g. price alone), and ‘8’ indicated that the 
small firm has a large competitive strategy space and therefore competes across many 
dimensions (e.g. price, quality, delivery). On average, the long-lived small firms competed 
on 4.5 dimensions. Over three-quarters (78%) of them competed on price, 87% on quality, 
58% on after sales service and 63.5% on delivery. It was less common to compete on 
advertising (28.6%), tying up suppliers (25.4%) and volume (23.8%). Figure 7.2 illustrates 
the percentage of firms, which use different forms of competition.
Figure 7.2: Forms of Competition
There was no significant difference found in the mean size of the competitive 
strategy space for various levels of intensity of competition (F(3r59) statistical27, p- 
value=0.944) or for various market positions (F(458) statistic =0.501, p-value=0.735). A 
diverse competitive strategy space is adopted across all market positions. Thus, it is 
perhaps not the number of methods of competition used, which determines the intensity of 
competition, but the vigour with which these are used. A significant difference was found
1 To measure this variable, the owner-managers were asked: “What form of competition is used in your 
principal market?” Response options included price, quality, volume, after sales service, new product 
development, advertising, tying up suppliers, delivery and marketing (see Subsection 4.3.2).
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in the mean size of the competitive strategy space for a variety of levels of differentiation 
(F(3,57) statistic =3.42, p-value=0.023). Long-lived small firms, which have identical 
products to rivals, compete on 3.6 dimensions; with similar products they compete on 4.26 
methods; and with different products to rivals they compete on 5.5 methods. The size of 
the competitive strategy space was related to the long run performance indicator (Pearson’s 
R=0.274, p-value=0.03<0.05). Thus, niche-based strategies are likely to increase the long 
run prospects of the firm. The joint determination of this variable, size and performance is 
analysed in a three equation simultaneous system in Chapter 9. It should be noted that 
neither market positioning, nor the size of the competitive strategy space, were directly 
correlated to firm growth (e.g. sales, employee or asset growth), nor other objective 
measures of performance (e.g. rate of profitability).
From the analysis above, it was found that long-lived small firms serve customers 
near the top end of the market. They compete on a number of dimensions to differentiate 
their product offering from those of rivals. The more differentiated the product offering of 
the long-lived small firm (i.e. the larger the competitive space), the higher is the likely 
long-run prospects of the small firm.
7.2.3 Innovation
While large firms may concern themselves with fundamental product and process 
innovations, small firms are disproportionately responsible for initial diffusion and near-to- 
market development activities (Freel, 2000b). In any case, almost 90 percent (87.5%) of 
the firms interviewed stated that they had engaged in product innovation since start-up.2 A 
similar percentage (92.3%) stated that they had engaged in process innovation since start­
up.
There is variation in the intensity with which long-lived small firms engage in 
product and process innovation. In the former case, approximately half (47.6%) of the 
long-lived small firms interviewed claimed they developed 1-5 new products; over a tenth 
(11.1%) developed 6-10 products; eight percent (7.9%) developed 11-20 products and a
2 This is distinct from ftindamental innovations at start-up. A third (33.3%) developed new products and 
services; approximately another third (30.4%) made quality improvements to existing products on the market 
A smaller proportion identified new technologies (3.6%), marketing (10.7%) and operational efficiency 
(14.3%) as the principal form of innovation.
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fifth (20.6%) developed more than 20 new products. Thus, only a fifth of the sample 
claimed to engage in a considerable level of product innovation (i.e. > 20 new products) 
whereas approximately half the sample engaged in product innovation on a minor scale (i.e. 
<5 new products). The level of process innovation was bimodal; a third (33.3%) of the 
small firms stated that there was a significant change in their processes since start-up and 
an additional third stated that there was important change in their processes over this 
period.
The intensity of product and process innovation increases with firm size (as 
measured by turnover and full-time equivalent employees in 2001) confirming the findings 
of Huiban and Bouhsina (1998), Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1995), and Bhattacharya and 
Bloch (2004)3. The latter two studies found that the extent of innovation increases less 
proportionately with firm size. Acs and Gifford (1996) show that improvement of existing 
product lines reduces the effect of firm size on new product innovation. We are unable to 
test this hypothesis for this sample of long-lived small firms.
Geroski and Machin (1992) argued that the process of research and development is 
likely to create persistent differences in the performance of innovators and non-innovators 
rather than any increased sales generated from the product innovations. They contend that 
the process of research and development is liable to increase the small firm’s external 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Levinthal, 1996) and relatedly its internal 
knowledge base - leading to greater flexibility and adaptability. Table 7.2 presents 
statistical tests of association between product and process innovation and age, as well as 
different measures of growth and performance, using Kendalls Taub. There is a significant 
positive correlation between the extent of process innovation and age (Kendalls 
Taub=0.227, p-value < 0.05). This finding indicates that older firms ranked the extent of 
their process innovation higher than younger firms, which in turn indicates that internal 
knowledge of sources of efficiencies in the processes of the small firm increases with age.
3 The correlations between full-time equivalent employees and product innovation (Kendalls taub = 0.210 at 
two-tailed p-value =0.031) and between full-time equivalent employees and process innovation (Kendalls taub 
= 0.237 at two-tailed p-value =0.016) were weakly positive and significant at the five percent level. 
Similarly, the correlations between turnover and product innovation (Kendalls taub = 0.174 at two-tailed p- 
value =0.073) and between turnover and process innovation (Kendalls taub = 0.241 at two-tailed p-value 
=0.031) were weakly positive and significant at the ten percent level or lower.
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No significant relationship was found between the extent of product innovation and age, 
though the sign on the Kendalls Taub was positive.
Table 7.2: Kendalls TaUb Correlation Coefficients between the extent of Product
and Process Innovation and Measures of Growth and Performance
Product
Innovation
Process
Innovation
Kendalls Taub Sig.
(2-tailed)
N Kendalls Taub Sig.
(2-tailed)
N
Age 0.158 0.105 63 0.227** 0.021 63
Rate of Profitability -0.128 0.192 61 0.059 0.555 61
Asset Growth (life) 0.275** 0.018 43 0.307* 0.010 43
Employee Growth (life) 0,176 0.089 56 0.219** 0.036 56
Sales Growth -0.014 0.904 44 0.144 0.219 44
ILabour Productivity
BGrowth (life)
-0.12 0.300 44 -0.142 0.227 44
iLong Run Performance
(indicator
-0.016 0.864 63 0.071 0.466 63
Product Innovation 1 ■ 63 0.110 0.309 63
Process Innovation 0.11 0.309 63 1 • 63
★Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
★★Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
A number of studies of small firm innovation (Roper et al., 1996; Roper, 1997; 
Wynarczyk and Thwaittes, 1997; Huenks, 1998; and Freel, 2000a) found a strong positive 
correlation between product innovation and turnover growth and between product 
innovation and performance (Wynarczyk and Thwaittes, 1997; Geroski and Machin, 1992). 
Here, a significant positive relationship is found between the extent of product innovation 
and asset growth (Kendalls TaUb=0.275, p-value<0.05). Thus, increases in the wealth of 
the firm are weakly, positively correlated with the extent of product innovation. 
Employment growth is also weakly correlated with product innovation but only at the 10% 
significance level. Similarly, the extent of process innovation is significantly positively 
correlated with asset growth (Kendalls Taub=0.307, p-value<0.05) and it is also
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significantly and positively correlated with employee growth (Kendalls TaUb~0.219, p- 
value<0.05). It seems that important changes in processes need a greater division of labour 
(e.g. as encouraged by a larger ‘headcount’). Even though the correlation is weak, it 
nevertheless supports Freel’s (2000b) findings; that innovators tend marginally towards 
greater internal control. Neither the rate of profitability nor the long run indicator of 
performance is correlated with either measure of innovation.
Lifetime sales growth was not significantly correlated with the extent of product or 
process innovation, which is contrary to recent findings by Freel (2000a); Wynarczyk and 
Thwaittes, (1997); Roper, (1997); and Roper et al., (1996). By contrast, there was 
equivocation in these studies concerning the relationship between product innovation and 
employment growth found above. An explanation for the former is provided by the 
findings of Geroski and Machin (1992), where the effect of new product innovation merely 
has a transitory influence on sales.4 According to Dosi (1988), the rewards to innovation 
are likely to persist, in so far as the firm is able to exert property rights, or effectively 
employ other appropriability devices (e.g. learning curves, secrecy, first mover advantages 
etc). Once the firm loses proprietary control over new knowledge, its influence on sales 
fades. Less than a quarter (22.2%) of mature small firms were able to protect their product 
innovations using trademarks, copyright and patents etc. This may explain the lack of a 
relationship between innovation and lifetime sales growth, and perhaps the lack of a 
relationship between innovation and the long-run performance indicator.
The typical long-lived small firm stated that approximate^ half their rivals engaged 
in product innovation (45.1%) and a half in process innovation (50.9%). However, most 
small firms felt little or no competitive pressure, from the product (72.4%) or process 
innovations (72.1%) of rivals. This is not surprising, as most small firms have ‘a live and 
let live ’ philosophy towards rivals in their markets, see Reid et al., (1993).
4 Typically, the owner-managers (86.5%) of the long-lived small firms stated that they reaped rewards (i.e. 
increased market share and profits) from developing product innovations; approximately half (45.5%) stated 
they reaped a lot of rewards.
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7.2.4 Conclusions
Over the life of the small firm, the expectations of the owner-manager changed from 
aiming to create a business with survival prospects, to the consideration of more pecuniary 
motives (e.g. having a ‘nest egg’ on retiring). In order to survive, the small firms cultivated 
market niches and engaged in product customisation strategies. They learned early-on the 
difficulties associated with competing solely at the low end of the market. Therefore they 
altered their strategies to serve the more premium ends of the market, where it was easier to 
create ‘value/price’ for customers. The more differentiated the strategy, the larger is the 
competitive strategy space.
Certainly, it seems that long-lived small firms are not smaller clones of the larger 
incumbents, but rather serve as agents of change through innovative activity (see 
Audretsch, 1995). Innovative activity influenced asset growth and employment growth 
within these mature small firms, but did not influence the long run performance indicator or 
lifetime sales growth. Difficulties in asserting intellectual property rights over near to 
market innovations may explain this.
7.3 Internal Organisation
In this Section, changes in the extent of the long-lived small firm’s administrative 
organisation are examined over the life of the firm. The technological progressiveness of 
the operations of the firm is also discussed.
7.3.1 The Scope of the Administrative Organisation
Penrose (1995) viewed the ‘coherent administrative organisation’ as the 
coordination mechanism for the services of the physical and human resources of the firm. 
The internal organisation of the resources of the firm renders their services more or less 
productive. As firms grow in size, they reorganise their resources, acquire new ones, some 
become more specialised and others become idle (Penrose, 1959). Firm growth, according 
to Ghoshal et al. (2000), involves a re-organisation or re-bundling of the activities of the 
firm, internalising the various stages of the value chain. Over stages of organisational 
development, changing resource combinations often require different management 
practices for continued success (Miller and Friesen, 1984; Kazanjian, 1988b).
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The scope of the small firm’s organisation is approximated by a count of the various 
stages of the value chain that is; by a count of the functional activities (e.g. production, 
accounting, I.T. support, sales, marketing, product innovation, strategic planning etc.) of 
the firm. The variable ranges from three to eleven roles where a value of ‘3’ represents a 
low level of internal organisation and a value of ‘11’ represents a firm where a large 
number of functions are performed internally. On average, the mature small firm engaged 
in seven functional activities at the time of interview. This average of seven functional 
activities, increased significantly from the average of five functional activities performed at 
start-up (examined using a Paired Sample T test T= -7.497 at p<0.0001; see Table 7.3).
At start-up, the long-lived small firm concentrated on the primaiy activities of 
production and sales. The accounting function supported these activities. Over half the 
firms in the sample engaged in after sales service (60.3%) and the training of staff at that 
time (57.8%). Extensions to the value chain occurred in the support functions of the firm 
(see Table 7.3). A McNemar test of the null hypothesis; that equal proportions of mature 
small firms engaged in each functional activity at start-up and the time of interview, was 
rejected (p-value <0.05 in one tail) for activities such as the training of staff, computer 
support systems, market research, innovation and strategic planning. This confirms 
Romano and Ratnatunga’s (1994) findings that the functions of planning and control are 
increasingly important as the firm grows.
The scope of the small firm’s administrative organisation at the time of interview 
was significantly dependent on the scope of its administrative organisation at start-up 
(Pearson’s R = 0.56, p-value<0.0001; see Table 7.4). This provides tentative evidence that 
the scope of the administrative organisation of the small firm is contingent or dependent on 
the small firm’s stock of inherited resources at start-up. Thus, the scope of the 
administrative organisation at start-up may have a long-lasting influence.
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Table 73: Internal Organisation
Activity Start-up 2001 McNemar
Test
Accounting 52
(82.5%)
56
(88.9%)
0.289”
Training 37
(57.8%)
57
(90.5%)
0.000”
Computer Support Systems 5
(7.9%)
49
(77.8%)
42.023s
(0.000)
Production of Product/Service 59
(93.7%)
59
(93.7%)
1.000b
Sales 60
(95.2%)
61
(96.8%)
1.000”
Market Research 20
(31.7%)
32
(52.5%)
0.008b
Innovation ~24
(38.1%)
~40
(63.5%)
0.000”
Strategic Planning 24
(38.1%)
38
(61.3%)
0.001”
After Sales Service 38
(60.3%)
43
(69.4%)
0.063”
Legal Matters 17
(27%)
19
(30.2%)
0.727b
Extent of Value Chain 5.38P 
f2 0746V
7.2623'
(2.1672)'
-7.497 
CO 0001
Notes:
a Continuity: corrected 
b Binomial distribution used, 
c Mean
d Standard Deviation 
e Paired Sample Ttest
The age of the small firm at the time of interview, however, was negatively related 
to the scope of the administrative organisation at start-up (Pearson’s R = -0.33 p- 
value=0.01; see Table 7.4). Older small firms in the sample tended to have a smaller 
administrative scope at start-up. A potential reason for this is perhaps the rarity of PCs, 
enterprise training etc. at the inception of these older firms (i.e. a cohort effect). This 
influenced the scope of the organisational structure of these firms later in their lives; older 
firms in the sample also tended to have a smaller administrative scope (Pearson’s R ~ -0.22,
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p-value<0.05 in one tail; see Table 7.4) at the time of interview. Brush and Chaganti
(1998) found that older small retailers did not exhibit a significant evolution in their
organisational systems, planning horizons and staff skills. They put this down to the ‘hands
on’ approach characteristic of smaller retail companies.
Table 7.4: Pearson’s R Correlation Coefficients between the Scope of the 
Administrative and Measures of Growth, Performance and Age
Administrative
Organisation
Administrative
Organisation
2001 Start-up
Pearson
Correlation
Sig.
(2-tailed) N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig.
(2-tailed) N
Administrative
Organisation
2001 1 - 63 0.565* 1.44E-06 63
Start-up 0.565* 1.44E-06 63 1 - 63
Rate of Profitability -0.095 0.468 61 -0.043 0.744 61
Long-run Performance 
Indicator -0.045 0.727 63 -0.006 0.960 63
Asset Growth 0.216 0.165 43 -0.192 0.219 43
Employee Growth (life) 0330** 0.013 56 -0.046 0.735 56
Sales Growth (life) 0.178 0.247 44 -0.046 0.765 44
Labour Productivity
Growth (life) -0.151 0.328 44 -0.02 0.890 44
Age (2001) -0228 0.072 63 -0334* 0.007 63
Notes:
★Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
★★Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Growth in size over the life of the small firm, as measured by fiill-time equivalent 
employees, was significantly positively related to the scope of the administrative 
organisation at the time of interview. Small firms, which experienced higher growth in 
headcount, also tended to increase the scope of the administrative organisation of the small 
firm (Pearson’s R = 0.33, p-value<0.05). There was no relationship between the scope of 
the firm’s administrative organisation and the other measures of growth or performance.
The absence of a significant relationship and the negative sign on correlations with 
the rate of profitability and the long run performance indicator is tentative evidence in 
support of Reid’s (1995) findings. He found that increasing the organisational complexity 
(approximated by business type) of SBEs reduced performance. However, a test of the null
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hypothesis of equivalence in the mean scope of the administration organisation across 
businesses types (i.e. sole traders, partnerships and private companies) could not be rejected 
using a one-way analysis of variance test (see Table 7.5). This runs contrary to 
expectations as private companies were found to have more complex organisational 
structures, see Reid (1998). This result is particularly surprising as these private companies 
are significantly bigger in size (see Table 5.5). However, Hall (1995) argued that 
influences other than growth, such as age, internal politics or factors external but not 
reflected in their growth rates, may be contributing to change in organisational form. 
Contingency theory emphasised the influence of factors such as technological uncertainty 
on changes in organisational form (see Donaldson, 1994).
Table 75: ANOVA of Legal status and the Scope of the Administrative
Administrative Organisation Administrative Organisation
Start-up 2001
Legal
status
Sole
Trader Partnership
Private
Company
Sole
Trader Partnership
Private
Company
N 16 19 28 16 . 19 28
Mean 5.375 5.053 5.607 7 6.737 7.714
Dfi 2 2
0/2 60 60
Fstat 397 1.330
P-value .672 ________ .272
There is significant evolution in the scope of the administrative organisation of the 
small firm as it ages. The firm engages in functional activities such as market research, 
innovation and planning etc. As discussed in section 2.3.1, lifecycle models (such as 
Greiner, 1972; Churchill and Lewis, 1983) are normally concerned with internal changes 
that occur as the firm grows in size. A positive relationship between the scope of the 
administrative organisation and growth in firm size offers tentative evidence in support of 
such models in contrast with the findings of Kazanjian (1988b) and Birley and Westhead 
(1990). However, its relationship with age is complex; older firms have smaller 
administrative organisations in comparison to younger firms. Thus, the lifecycle effect is 
non-linear.
235
7.3.2 Technological Sophistication
Reid (2000) considers information as being a precious resource. Skills in acquiring 
real time information reduce risk and uncertainty and improve the adaptability of the 
internal organisation to changes in its environment. Lybaert (1998) demonstrated that 
greater information use in SMEs was associated with better performance and was found to 
be positively associated with factors like strategic awareness, growth orientation and 
delegation.
Figure 7.3: Level of Information Technology
On average, long-lived small firms use seven (2.34) forms of information 
technology (I.T.) (with the corresponding standard deviation in parentheses). Figure 7.3 
illustrates the percentage of firms, which used various information technologies. Over half 
the small firms used: telephone (96.8%); fax (92.1%); personal computers (87.3%); E-mail 
(81%); mobile phone (84.1%); internet (68.3%); telephone answering (65.1%); and a 
website (57.1%). The permeation of information technology within the internal 
organisation of the firm and the introduction of I.T. into the day-to-day running of the 
business may diifer across industries, as some firms are more progressive in the adoption of
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new technologies than others. However, a test of the null hypothesis of the equivalence in 
the mean count of information technologies across broad industrial sector could not be 
rejected (see results of ANOVA presented in Table 7.6). Thus, there is tentative evidence 
that manufacturing and services firms use similar levels of I.T. Younger firms were 
significantly more likely to possess more forms of information technologies (Pearson’s 
R=0.35, p-value<0.05; see Table 7.7). Furthermore, long-lived small firms, which possess 
a larger number of forms of I.T. had broader administrative organisations. The scope of the 
administrative organisation at start-up and at the time of interview was significantly 
positively correlated with the number of forms of I.T. available to the firm (see Table 7.7). 
Small firms with a wider administrative organisation embraced I.T. and had perhaps greater 
needs for timely information.
Table 7.6: ANOVA of Sector and Information Technology
Smith (1999) found that mere belief in the importance of information technology is 
not directly related to the performance of a sample of 150 new business starts. High- 
perceived importance of I.T. for each performance group was especially strong amongst the 
better performers though. In the sample of 63 long-lived small firms, over half (54%) of 
the firms indicated that information technology was very important to their business; a third 
(36%) indicated that it was important; and a tenth (10%) indicated that it was unimportant 
to their business. The mean count of information technologies differed significantly across 
the small firms perceived views of the importance of I.T. [F(2,eo) statistic =7.031, p-
s
value=0.002]. The small firm with a low perceived view of I.T. importance possessed, on
average, five (2.58) forms of I.T.; seven (1.31) with a medium perceived view; and eight
i
(2.931) with a high perceived view of I.T. importance (associated standard deviations in
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parentheses). However, as found by Smith (1999), there was no significant difference in 
mean performance for higher levels of perceived importance of I.T. (see Table 7.8). In feet, 
a higher count of information technologies was significantly negatively correlated with the 
long run performance indicator (see Table 7.7). Ordinarily, greater use and absorption of 
I.T. would be positively correlated to performance (see Smith, 1999) but given that the vast 
majority of these small firms were set up prior to the general use of PCs in business, this 
divergent result is not surprising5. Even though younger firms were more likely to possess 
more forms of information technology (see Table 7.7), there was no significant difference 
in the mean age for firms, which differ in the perceived importance of information 
technology (see Table 7.8).
Table 7.7: Pearson’s R Correlation Coefficients and Information Technology
Count of I.T. Count of I.T. Uses
Pearson
Correlation
Sig.
(2-tailed) N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig.
(2-tailed) N
Count of I.T. 1 63 0.707* 4.55E-11 62
Count of I.T. Uses 0.707* 4.55E-11 62 1 • 62
Age (2001) -0353* 0.005 63 -0336* 0.008 62
Administrative
Organisation
2001 0.466* 1.2E-4 63 0.417* 7.0E-4 62
Start-up 0.296** 0.018 63 0.250** 0.050 62
Asset Growth (life) 0.255 0.097 43 0.230 0.144 42
Employee Growth (life) 0.167 0.219 56 0321* 0.017 55
Sales Growth (life) 0.229 0.135 44 0.295 0.055 43
Labour Productivity 
Growth (life) -0.054 0.728 44 -0.186 0.231 43
Rate of Profitability .037 0.780 61 0.095 0.47 60
Long-run Performance 
Indicator -0303* 0.016 63 -0.215 0.093 63
Notes:
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 
tailed).
5 This result is also consistent with Mitchell et al. (2000) who found that intensive use of I.T. could be a 
response to poor performance.
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Table 7.8: ANOVA of Perceived Importance of LT. and Age and Performance
Performance Perception of
Measure I.T. N Mean Dfi Df2 F Statistic Si&
Rate of Profitability Unimportant 5 0.104
Important 22 0.292 2 58 0.527 0.593
Veiy important 34 0.388
Unimportant 6 65.56
Long-run Performance Indicator Important 23 68.55 2 60 0.458 0.635
Very important 34 66.85
Asset Growth (life) Unimportant 4 23385
Important 16 1421 2 40 0.520 0.598
Very important 23 35099
Employee Growth (life) Unimportant 6 77.78
Important 19 497.74 2 53 0.574 0.567
Very important 31 499.90
Sales Growth (life) Unimportant 4 24.84
Important 15 321.94 2 41 2.202 0.124
Very important 25 613.47
Labour Productivity Growth (life) Unimportant 4 -5.200
Important 15 63.37 2 41 0.405 0.670
Very important 25 26.48
Age Unimportant 6 34.5
Important 23 27.04 2 60 1.571 0.216
Very important 34 22.94
The number of information technologies and the activities for which information
technologies were used within the firm were significantly correlated as expected (Pearson’s
R=0.71, p-value<0.0001; see Table 7.7). On average, long-lived small firms used
information technology for 4.5 (2.35) activities within the firm (standard deviation in
parentheses). Over half of the firms employed information technologies for networking
(57.1%), producing accounts (71.4%), managing dealings with buyers and suppliers (81%),
monitoring performance targets (50.8%) and improvements in operational efficiency
(79.4%) (see Figure 7.4 below). In a similar manner, the mean count of uses of information
technologies differed significantly across the small firm’s perceived view of I.T. 
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importance (F(2,60) statistic = 11.5 at a p-value=0.0001]. The small firm employed I.T. for 
one (0.82) activity, four activities (2.09) and five (2.11) activities for low, medium and 
high-perceived views of the importance of I.T. respectively (standard deviations in 
parentheses). Actual use of information technologies was related to firm growth, as 
measured by fulltime employees (Pearson’s R =0.32, p-value<0.05; see Table 7.7) and 
sales growth (Pearson’s R =0.30, p-value <0.1; see Table 7.7). The introduction of 
information technologies into the activities of the firm is more significant for growth in size 
(as measured by sales and FTEs) than the perceived importance of I.T. This supports the 
findings of Smith (1999) and Storey (1994).6
A test of the null hypothesis of equivalence in the mean uses of technologies across 
broad industrial sectors could not be rejected (see results of ANOVA presented in Table 
7.6). Younger firms were significantly more likely, to employ more forms of information 
technologies, for more activities within the firm (see Table 7.7). Furthermore, the scope of 
the administrative organisation at start-up and at the time of interview was also 
significantly positively correlated with the count of activities for which I.T. was used (see 
Table 7.7). Small firms with a wider administrative organisation had perhaps greater needs 
for formal reporting systems to monitor performance and operational efficiency.
6 Storey (1994) suggested that there are tentative indications that technological sophistication is positively 
associated with rapid firm growth.
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Figure 7.4: Uses of Information Technology
Industry-wide technical change has an important effect on promoting the long run 
survival prospects of the firm. Winter (1984) and Gort and Klepper (1982) show that the 
technological and knowledge situation affect the relative smoothness with which new firms 
are able to innovate and therefore survive (see Subsection 3.3.1.2). Four-fifths (82.5%) of 
the firms interviewed experienced technical change in their industiy over the life of their 
firm. A significant difference was found in the mean count of forms of information 
technology and in the mean number of activities for which I.T. was employed (see Table 
7.9) in industries which experienced technical change as opposed to those which did not. 
Thus, the level of technical change in the industry is a more important factor in explaining 
the adoption and use of I.T. as opposed to broad industrial sectors. Typically, this technical 
change was instigated within the industry. Almost two-fifths (38%) of the long-lived small 
firms stated that newly emerging innovators in the industry' initiated this change; a third 
(32%) stated that that forces outside the industry were responsible; and a quarter (24.5%) 
acknowledged that leaders in the industry were the chief initiators. A high percentage of
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the long-lived small firms (83%) stated that they generally were successful in implementing 
new technologies.
Table 7.9: ANOVA of Industrial Technical Change and I.T.
Industry
Information Technical
Technology Change N Mean Pfi Df2F statistic Sig.
Count of I.T. NO
YES
11
52
5.545
7.519 1 61 7.941 0.007
Uses of I.T. NO 11 3.364
YES 51 4.784 1 61 3.521 0.065
Note:
The p~value<0.05 (0.1) implying that the null hypothesis of equivalence in the means of the measures was 
rejected at a significance level of 5%(10%).
7.3.3 Conclusions
The scope of the administrative organisation of the firm evolved over the life of the 
firm. Extensions to the value chain occurred mainly in the support functions such as 
market research, strategic planning etc. The scope of the administrative organisation was 
found to be dependent on its scope at start-up. There was evidence of cohort effects, as 
older firms had a smaller administrative scope than younger firms. Employee growth was 
positively correlated with the extent of the administrative organisation but not with the long 
run performance indicator.
It seems that actual use of information technologies is important for the growth of 
the long-lived small firm over its life, as opposed to the count of the number of forms of 
information technology adopted by the firm. The level of technical change in the industry, 
perceived importance of information technology and the age of the firm seem to explain the 
number of forms of I.T. adopted and used by the firm. A firm with a broader administrative 
organisations scope also seems to have greater requirements and uses for information 
technologies, because their reporting systems are more formalised.
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7.4 Organisational Change
Throughout its life, the mature small firm makes key organisational changes or 
‘critical decisions’. In essence, key organisational changes are to be construed as ‘pivotal 
points’ or ‘crossroads’, rather than as crisis points (see Section 2.3). Typically, they are 
strategic in nature, and are disengaged from the regular decisions undertaken by the mature 
small firm on a daily basis. Examples include; changes in ownership, legal form, 
technology, location, cashflow, innovation, line of business, investment, number of outlets, 
market niches, product range, market positioning, diversification, assets, capacity, inputs 
and management. This Section explores the frequency of occurrence of these changes, the 
nature of the changes, and their timing over the organisational lifecycle.
7.4.1 Key Organisational Changes
Accentuating the pivotal nature of key changes, it is observed that they occur, on 
average, just eight times over the lifetime of the long-lived small firm. The minimum and 
maximum number of changes was just two and sixteen respectively. Thus, owner- 
managers were clearly being very discerning in interpreting any change in their operations 
as being a key change. There is little evidence of a significant relationship between the age 
of the firm and the number of key organisational changes it has undertaken in its life 
(Pearson’s R=0.014, p-value O.457X).O5). The relative frequencies of key organisational 
changes over the life of the firm are presented in Table 7.10.
Almost three-quarters (71.4%) of the long-lived small firms interviewed 
experienced a change in their capacity. This was the most common form of organisational 
change laced by the small firm. Over half of the small firms changed their product range 
(70%), cashflow (67%), assets (59%), location (54%) and management (50.8%). Further, 
Table 7.10 presents the proportion of the organisational changes undertaken, which were 
identified by owner-managers as one of the three most salient changes infringing on the 
operations of the firm. This presents new information about the strategic importance of 
these changes. For example, of the forty percent of mature small firms, which experienced 
a change in ownership, two-thirds (68%) of the owner-mangers stated that this change was 
one of the three most important changes in the operations of their firm. A similar 
percentage (41.3%) experienced a change in their market niche but only fifteen percent
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Table 7.10: Frequency of Occurrence of Key Organisational Changes
Type of Change Importance of Organisational Change
1* 2^ 3rd
N n ni n2 03
(%) (n/N) (n,/Ni*100) (n^N2*100) (n3/N3*100)
Ownership 25 17 11 5 1
(39.7%) (0.68) (17.5) (7-9) (1.8)
Legal form 18 4 2 1 1
(28.6%) (0.22) (3.2) (1.6) (1.8)
Technical 31 14 4 2 8
(49.2%) (0.45) (63) (3.2) (14)
Location 34 14 4 6 4
(54%) (0-41) (6.3) (9.5) (7)
Cashflow 42 23 10 9 4
(66.7%) (0.54) (15.9) (14.3) (7)
Innovation 27 5 2 1 2
(42.9%) (0.19) (3.2) (1.6) (3.5)
Line of business 23 10 3 4 3
(36.5%) (0.43) (4.8) (6.3) (5.3)
Investment 29 4 2 1 1
(46%) (0.08) (3.2) (1.6) (1.8)
Number of outlets 16
(25.4%)
7
(0.43)
3
(4.8)
4
(7)
Market niches 26
(41.3%)
4
(0.15)
1
(1.6)
3
(4.8)
Product range 44 24 9 10 5
(69.8%) (0.54) (14.3) (15.9) (8-8)
Market positioning 26 8 2 3 3
(41.3%) (0-31) (3.2) (4.8) (5.3)
Diversification 27 10 3 3 4
(42.9%) (0.37) (4.8) (4.8) (7)
Assets 37 5 1 4 3
(58.7%) (0.14) (1.6) (6.3) (5.3)
Capacity 45 16 5 7 4
Inputs
(71.4%)
11
(17.5%)
(0.36)
0
(0)
(7.9) (11.1) (7)
Management 32 15 2 1 12
(50.8%) (0-47) (32) (1-6) (21)
Other 3
(4.7%)
3
(1)
2
(3.2)
1
(1.8)
Total (Nt) 183
01
63
(100)
63
(100)
57
(100)
244
believed that this change was one of the top three most important changes in the operations 
of their firm. It is therefore important to also examine the strategic importance of key 
organisational changes for the operations of the firm.
Figure 7.5 presents a pie graph illustrating the strategic importance of the key 
organisational changes. Of the 183 (or Nj) organisational changes ranked as top three main 
changes, changes in product range and cash flow were ranked as important in an eighth of 
the cases (13% or n/NT), supporting the findings of Smallbone et al. (1992, 1995). Next in 
importance (at 9%) were changes in capacity and ownership. This was followed by 
changes in management, location and technology and so on. Little importance was 
attached to changes in inputs. The ordering of importance is in line with expectations. 
Organisational changes, which have been shown to influence the survival and growth of the 
firm, are ranked highly more often by mature small firms and visa versa (see Smallbone et 
al., 1992, 1995).
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Figure 7.5: Strategic Importance of Organisational Changes
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7.4.2 Features of Organisational Change
A simple diagrammatic device (see Figure 7.6 reproduced from Figure 4.1) was
used in interviews with owner-managers to analyse the features of organisational change, 
namely ‘precipitating influences’ and ‘consequential adjustments’. The term ‘precipitating 
influences’ was used to describe the forces, which led to organisational change. In a 
similar manner, the term ‘consequential adjustments’ was used to describe those 
adaptations, which ‘followed-on’ from organisational change. This diagrammatic device 
was helpful as it made explicit the pattern of causal relationships.
Figure 7.6: Explanation of Causation
Before After
Precipitating
Influences >
Organisational
Change >
Consequential
Adjustments
As explained in Section 4.3.3, owner-managers could identify precipitating causes 
(arising from its environment), and consequential adjustments (arising from its own 
organisational change) on a show-card, which contained a comprehensive list of 30 
potential categories (see Table 4.9). A count of the number of precipitating influences (P) 
and a count of the number of consequential adjustments (A) provides some insight as to 
effect of key changes on the operations of the firm. In a technical sense, the number of 
precipitating influences was measured by P = Zpjm where pjm is the occurrence of 
precipitating factor j for each change m. The number of consequential adjustments was 
measured by A=Zajm where ajm is the occurrence of adjustment j for each change m. For 
each organisational change, the average number of precipitating causes (P/n) and 
consequential adjustments (A/n) were calculated, where n is the number of firms which 
undertook that change. The average level of precipitating causes ranges from two, in the 
case of innovation to seven, for changes in the line of business of the firm. The average 
level of consequential adjustments ranges from five, for changes in cash flow to ten, for 
changes in the line of business (see Table 7.11). The average number of precipitating
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causes of organisational change (Precipitators) and the average number of consequential
adjustments (Adjust) following organisational change across the three most important
3 3 3 3
strategic changes identified by each firm, measured by ^Pc I ^mc and Ac / ]Tmc
c=l c=l c -1 c=l
respectively, was 5.27 and 7.31 respectively. In general, the average number of 
precipitating causes (P/n) and consequential adjustments (A/n) for each organisational 
change are clustered around these aggregate levels (see Table 7.11).
Using real options logic, the greater the array of factors encompassed in the variable 
Precipitator, the higher the option value of the firm (see McGrath, 1999, proposition I). 
According to McGrath (1999), the owner-manager who seeks high revenue opportunities 
over a wider area of factors is more likely to discover them than one who focuses on a 
circumscribed area. Organisational changes embracing a relatively high count of 
precipitating influences are likely to have more volatile returns (e.g. changes in line of 
business, diversification). There is greater risk and uncertainty associated with these 
changes. Organisational changes comprising of a relatively high count of consequential 
adjustments (e.g. changes in line of business, location) represent those which involve 
greater levels of sunk costs or commitment (Ghemawat, 1991). Further, there seems to be a 
tendency for organisational changes which involve a high count of precipitators to involve 
a large number of consequential adjustments. A test of the null hypothesis that average 
number of precipitators of organisational changes and average number of consequential 
adjustments are negatively related, was rejected (Pearson’s R of0.495, p-value of
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Table 7.11: Mean Precipitating Causes and Consequential Adjustments and Mean 
Precipitating Time and Adjustment Time by key Organisational Change
Type of Change n Precipitating
Influences
Consequential
Adjustments
Precipitating
Time
Adjustment
Time
Ownership 17 4.24
(2.56)
7.29
(4.37)
15.56
(12.58)
10.89
(12.77)
Legal form 4 6
(6.06)
6.25
(4.79)
4.8
(1.17)
15.35
(10.36)
Technical 14 6.5
(3.55)
7.93
(4.08)
10.38
(15.71)
5.63
(7.83)
Location 14 4.5
(2.65)
8.69
(3.33)
13.12
(15.59)
2.56
(3.42)
Cashflow 23 4.87
(2.38)
5.09
(2.81)
15.46
(21.37)
7.86
(8.36)
Innovation 5 2
(1)
6
(5-24)
26
(21.82)
11.33
(7.13)
Line of business 10 6.9
(2.38)
10.4
(3.53)
11.19
(13.03)
8.93
(8.03)
Investment 4 5.5
(3.11)
6.75
(3.30)
18.25
(12.82)
13.84
(22.33)
Number of 7 6 9 18.86 3.08
outlets (1-91) (4) (8.78) (3.98)
Market niches 4 5.75
(3-59)
7.25
(3.86)
7.97
(10.70)
25.48
(27.19)
Product range 24 5.78
(3.06)
7.58
(3.3)
14.51
(20.69)
4.67
(6.19)
Market 8 5.75 7.25 4 4.77
positioning (3.65) (5.09) (4.54) (5.32)
Diversification 10 6.6
(4.48)
7.6
(5.56)
19.9
(35.65)
3.94
(4.91)
Assets 5 3.8
(1.64)
6.6
(3.36)
8.52
(8.03)
4.01
(2.86)
Capacity 16 5.06
(3.34)
8.31
(2.9)
19.7
(22.84)
5.69
(10.66)
Inputs 0 - - - -
Management 15 5.29
(3-67)
7.27
(5-27)
15.42
(18.08)
5.52
(7.21)
Note: Standard deviations are provided in parentheses
0.026 in one-tail). They represent strategic options, where the owner-manager waited until 
he had more information before acting to mitigate downside risks. It is difficult to make 
any further tentative suggestions regarding nature of organisational changes prior to 
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examining the quantitative evidence presented in Chapter 8 and the qualitative evidence 
presented in Volume n, Appendix 5.
7.4.3 Timing of Key Organisational Change
For each of the three main organisational changes identified by the owner-manager, 
the length of time from the emergence of precipitating factors to the organisational change 
(PrecipitatorTime) and the length of time from the organisational change to changes in 
adjustment factors (AdjustTime) was recorded. In stable markets, the shorter these time 
periods are, the more flexible is the long-lived small firm. This differs in uncertain 
environments. Using real options logic, small firms operating in these environments can 
also achieve greater flexibility by staging commitments to organisational changes 
(McGrath, 1999; Bowman and Hurry, 1993). Such a strategy minimises downside risks. 
The average adjustment time is longer in these cases as the owner-manager adopts a ‘wait 
and see’ policy (Miller and Folta, 2002; Ingersoll and Ross, 1992; McDonald and Seigel, 
1986).
The average precipitating time per precipitator, is the sum of the number of months 
between detecting each precipitating factor (or ‘driver’) and making the organisational 
change, divided by the number of precipitating factors. Average precipitating time per 
precipitator Pt is calculated as Zptjm/Zpjm where ptjm is the length of time between each 
precipitating factor j and the occurrence of each main organisational change m. The 
average adjustment time per consequential adjustment, is the sum of the number of months 
between making the organisational change and each consequential adjustment, divided by 
the number of adjustment factors. Average adjustment time per consequential adjustment 
At is calculated by Zatjn/£ajm where atjm is the length of time between the occurrence of 
each main change m and each adjustment j. The average level of precipitating time per 
precipitator ranges from four months, for changes in legal form, to 26 months for 
innovation. The average level of adjustment time per consequential adjustment ranges 
from 2.5 months, for changes in location, to twenty-five months for entry into new market 
niches (see Table 7.11). The average precipitating time and the average adjustment time 
across the three most important strategic changes, calibrated by jP/^m,. and
C=I ,C C=1
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£A /Vmc respectively, were 15 and 7 months respectively. As the average
C=1 ,C C=1
precipitating time per precipitator is much higher than the average adjustment time per 
consequential adjustment, this suggests that small firms lingered until they were certain that 
change was required and then responded quickly (given that the average number of 
precipitators was lower than the average number of adjustments). However, no apparent 
relationship was found between the mean precipitating time per precipitator and the mean 
adjustment time per consequential adjustment (Pearson’s R of -0.197, p-value =0.465).
7.4.5 Conclusions
Smallbone, North & Leigh (1992, 1995) found that firms which had been active in 
making adjustments were the most successful in terms of growth in real turnover, 
employment and survival, using data collected on mature manufacturing firms. The 
flexibility of the long-lived small firm in adjusting to key changes in its environment, and 
the relationship between flexibility and performance is discussed further in Chapter 8. The 
evidence above found that these changes are indeed pivotal and occurred just eight times on 
average over the life of the firm. Some were ranked higher in importance than others (e.g. 
changes in product range and cashflow). There is some preliminary evidence here that 
firms adopt real options logic in undertaking key organisational change (see section 2.4.2). 
There is tentative evidence that owner-managers hold real options until uncertainties are 
resolved, especially when a change involves a number of consequential adjustments (i.e. 
when the downside risks are high). This observation suggests that the owner-manager 
scans the environment for more precipitators of change in this instance. At this juncture, 
there is little support for firms staggering adjustments to organisational change. However, 
Chapter 8 examines the empirical relevance of real options analysis further.
7.5 End-Games
For entrepreneurs who start a new firm, sooner or later, there comes a time when 
they choose, or are required by circumstances, to retire. This decision gives rise to a 
succession problem. This predicament can be solved in a number of ways: a family 
member could take over the running of the business; the owner-manager could sell the firm;
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employees could take over the running of the business; or the owner-manager could close 
down the firm and sell or dispose of the assets of the firm. Each of these end-games, or 
harvesting strategies, as referred to by Tajnikar and Dosenovid (2003), have different 
consequences for the continued operation of the mature small firm. Bjuggren and Sund 
(2002) argue that the decisive factor in choice of succession mode is the desire for 
efficiency, expressed as the highest possible value of the firm. A firm should stay in the 
family if this is the most profitable transition alternative. One reason for inter-generational 
succession, which they cite, is knowledge idiosyncrasy (i.e. trade secrets transferred 
through family members).
7.5.7 Family Succession
A fifth (21.7%) of the owner-managers believed that a family member would 
continue to run the business on their retirement. Long-lived small firms, which aimed to 
pass their businesses on to family members, were significantly higher performers (mean 
rating of 73 versus 67) according to the subjective performance measure (T test for two 
unrelated samples= 2.522, 61 d.f. at a p-value=0.03). Family succession, however, is no 
longer a foregone conclusion, for reasons indicated in Sub-section 5.2.2. Thus, the 
generational effect may have some impact on the lifecycle behaviour of the mature small 
firm. Small family firms face a higher risk of sudden exit after their thirtieth year (or one 
generation) (see Lotti and Santarelli, 2002; Lansberg, 1983; Beckhard and Dyer, 1983). 
According to Beckhard and Dyer (1983), only 30% of family firms in the U.S. are 
transferred to the second generation. In the U.K., a mere 24% are transferred to the second 
generation and 14% to the third.
Founders (principals) generally prefer to hand over the reins of their business to a 
family member rather than a professional manager, because the interests of the principal 
and his/her offspring (agent) are more likely to be aligned (Vickers, 1985). The resulting 
agent appointment game is more likely to be incentive compatible for the principal when he 
chooses an agent of his own type; namely a member of his family (who, as a natural result 
of family ties, can be understood to have an incentive structure the same type as his own). 
According to Kimhi (1997), intergenerational succession in family businesses involves a 
number of decisions: choosing a successor; timing the transfer of management
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responsibilities; timing the transfer of ownership; income distribution before and after 
transfer; and the compensation of other heirs. Optimal succession time was chosen as a 
solution to a family utility maximisation problem. A tightening of borrowing constraints 
enforces early succession.
Enterprise profile A in Volume II Appendix 5, provides an example of a family run 
business founded in 1960 and transferred from the founder to his sons on his retirement in 
1974. The two sons worked in the business while their hither still managed it for up to ten 
years (i.e. the apprenticeship period). Family idiosyncratic knowledge was acquired 
through learning by watching and doing (see Dyer and Handler, 1994; Bjuggren and Sund, 
2002). Thus, the founder was assured that his own interest and those of his sons were 
aligned on transfer of ownership. The founder was also aware of the level of competence 
of his two sons to run the business at the end of the period of apprenticeship. As these 
brothers are now approaching retirement, they also envisage that a family member will take 
over the running of the business. This illustration shows the importance of family 
succession in fostering the longevity of mature small firms.
Enterprise Profile B, the hospital supplies distributor, demonstrates an important 
lesson on the importance of assessing the business acumen of a family member wishing to 
take over the business. After a trial period with their daughter as manager, the husband and 
wife team who founded the firm, learned that their daughter did not have the personality for 
‘clinching sales deals’ which was a vital skill in ensuring the continued success of the firm. 
They are currently examining other possible end-games.
The process of transition within the family needs to be managed sensitively as latent 
family issues tend to surface (e.g. sibling rivalries, management style differences, roles of 
in-laws, financial position of family members etc.) (Beckhard and Dyer, 1983; Dyck et al., 
2002). Every year approximately 300,000 jobs are lost and 30,000 enterprises close down 
in the European community as a result of badly managed family successions (see Bjuggren 
and Sund, 2002). According to Morris et al. (19.97), family business successions occur 
more smoothly when heirs are better prepared, when family relations are affable and based 
on trust, and when family businesses engage in more planning for taxation and wealth 
transfer purposes.
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7.5.2 Trader-sale
Four-fifths of the long-lived small firms in the sample believed that family 
succession was an unlikely outcome. Half (51.7%) of the mature small firms believed that 
a trade-sale would be a likely outcome but a far from certain one. The uncertainty 
surrounding this end-game is discussed below. Particularly, the hidden strategic 
implications involved are mapped out.
In general, the rivals of the mature small firm would prefer the business to close 
down. In this case, they can capture the customers of the firm, without incurring any cost. 
However, such an outcome would require co-operative behaviour on the part of rivals and a 
lack of interest by outsiders or employees in purchasing the firm as a going concern. When 
rivals are unable to co-operate in this manner, they may start a bidding war to purchase the 
firm. If all rivals bid for the business, the trade-sale price will rise and the winner could 
end up paying for too much for the business. Non-cooperation among rivals is a preferable 
outcome for the founder or seller of the business.
A rival may also be willing to purchase the business to prevent entry by an outsider 
(or employee). However, the attractiveness of a proposition to purchase an existing 
business by an outsider is low. At present, there are little incentives (start-up grants etc.) 
for an outsider to purchase an existing business in comparison with setting up a new 
competing firm [see Johnson, (2003) for a discussion on how policy measures which favour 
new businesses over existing businesses may displace existing businesses]. This is perhaps 
an area, which should be examined by industrial policy-makers (see case profile E). The 
closure of a viable long-lived small firm, in this instance, represents a form of market 
failure.
As there is a high risk that an owner-manager may receive few offers for his 
business, he has a lower incentive to continue to grow on the business towards the end of 
its life. A relatively low asset base will raise the relative number of outsiders who are 
willing to purchase the firm. Further, asymmetric information between the buyer and the 
seller about the performance of the business and its growth potential will also lower its 
trade-sale price and the incentive of the owner-manager to continue to expand the business 
(Ackerlof, 1980). Thus, the risk of adverse selection (purchasing a poor performer) lowers
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the trade-sale price, the quality of the businesses for sale and the size of market for these 
businesses.7 To obtain a fair price for the firm its owner-manager will have to try and 
signal the quality of his business prior to sale.
There are also moral hazard issues arising from customers switching when a small 
business changes hands. A number of customers may use this as an opportunity to ‘shop 
around’. The loyalty of a customer to the firm may be tied to the reputation of the founder, 
not that of the new owner. In these instances, the founder is a significant part of the 
intangible assets of the business, e.g. service firms like mechanics, hairdressers etc. At the 
extreme, the firm has no re-sale value other than the disposable value of its tangible asset 
base.
7.5.5 Employee or Management Buy-Out
Owner-managers prefer an employee to take over the running of a business rather 
than outsiders if a family member is not interested or capable (see case profile B). There 
seems to be a ‘pecking order’ of preference in this instance also. A fifth (20%) of the 
mature small firms expected that an employee would take over the running of the business. 
Owner-managers of small firms did report difficulties in finding suitable candidates with an 
adequate level of competence, access to finance and a willingness to bear the risk of taking 
over the running of the business. Formal theories of entrepreneurial choice propose that the 
relative prices or rewards to employment, unemployment or self-employment as well as 
human capital, finance, attitudes to risk, family specific capital, receipt of inheritance 
govern moves from one employment state to another (see Knight, 1921; Lucas, 1978; 
Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979; Holmes and Schmitz, 1990; van Praag and van Ophem, 1995; 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; van Praag and Cramer, 
2001). There is a risk prior to retirement of the owner-manager that such an entrepreneurial 
employee would set up in competition with the firm rather than waiting to take over the 
running of his employer’s business. In this instance, the employee may have access to 
some grant support.
7 Average assets at trade-sale were £339,045stg (higher than the average level in 2001). Assets of firms, 
which changed ownership, grew by 94% (155%) since the time of the trade-sale (corresponding standard 
deviation in parentheses).
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The management of case profile D partly purchased the business from the founder 
in 1992. Even though the founder has retired, he is still involved in the running of the 
business in an advisory capacity, as he remains a chief equity holder in the business. The 
directors, who currently operate the business, were employed by the business for a number 
of years prior to taking over the day-to-day control of it (i.e. apprenticeship period). One of 
these directors signed an employment contract with the expressed intention of partaking in 
the running and ownership of the business. Incentives, such as the latter, attract 
entrepreneurial skills to join the firm. The founder (and now shareholder) still monitors the 
running of the business to ensure that his interests and those of the directors are aligned.
7.5.4 Close Down and Asset Disposal
A tenth (11.1%) of the mature small firms believed that the firm would close down 
on the retirement of the owner-manager. The owner-manager would try to recover the re­
sale value of the assets, which had alternative uses, such as the premises of the firm. Often 
the premises represent the pension or ‘nest egg’ of the owner-manager. Owner-managers 
argued that this was their only resort. A low trade-sale price was expected, as a significant 
asset base of the business was intangible, viz. the skill of the owner-manager. Again in this 
case, if the firm valued the physical assets of the business too high, there would be a 
smaller number of buyers with the ability and the desire to purchase the assets of the firm.
7.5.5 Conclusions
The discussion above indicates the complexity of the decisions facing the owner- 
manager regarding his retirement from the firm and following this, the continued operation 
of the firm. The probability of exit of long-lived small firms is high, as family succession 
is no longer a foregone conclusion. The difficulty in finding a buyer, who is willing to pay 
a fair price for the business, raises the probability of exit. Further research is required to 
identify ways in which industrial policy makers could support the purchase of long-lived 
small firms by outsiders or employees. Aid in this area could perhaps reduce the death 
rates of long-lived small firms.
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7.6 General Conclusions
In short, this Chapter presents new empirical evidence on factors influencing the 
longevity, growth and performance of mature small firms in Scotland. To survive in the 
long run, it seems that small firms learn to serve customers in the middle to top ends of the 
market. Very few firms survive by solely serving customers in the low end of the market. 
The evidence suggests that small firms face difficulties competing in this segment. Small 
firms are not on a level pegging with larger rivals who can achieve economies of scale in 
this segment of the market. Instead, it appears that small firms cultivate niche markets 
(e.g. through customisation or serving more premium ends of the market). As mature small 
firms become more differentiated, they tend to widen the dimensions of their competitive 
strategy space (e.g. price, quality, delivery etc.). The size of the competitive strategy space 
is related to the long run indicator of performance. The joint determination of size, 
performance and the competitive strategy of the firm are examined in a simultaneous 
system in Chapter 9.
A high proportion of long-lived small firms engaged in some form of product and 
process innovation. Older firms were inclined to engage in more process innovation than 
younger firms. Over their life they have perhaps become more aware of potential sources 
of efficiencies. Increases in wealth, approximated by asset growth, were related to the 
extent of product and process innovation. Process innovation was correlated with 
employment growth, suggesting that innovators tend marginally to greater internal control 
but neither product or process innovation was related to sales growth. This suggests that 
innovative activity has only a transitory effect on the sales of the mature small firm. Small 
firms lack proprietary control over near-to-market innovations and by implication, they 
constantly need to re-invent product offerings to survive in the long run.
The scope of the administrative organisation of the firm evolved over the life of the 
firm. Extensions to the value chain occurred in the support functions (e.g. market research, 
strategic planning etc.). These changes occurred as the firm grew in size (see Chapter 9 for 
more evidence on this relationship). Employee growth was positively correlated with the 
extent of the administrative organisation but not performance.
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Further, it seems that actual use of information technologies is important for the 
growth of the long-lived small firm, as opposed to the count of the number of forms of 
technologies adopted by the firm. There is tentative evidence that mature small firms with 
a broader administrative organisational scope have greater requirements and uses for 
information technologies. Their reporting systems are perhaps more formalised.
Throughout their lives, long-lived small firms adapted to their environment to 
survive and grow, given their initial stock of resources and business acumen. Key 
organisational changes are pivotal in nature and occur on average just eight times over the 
life of the long-lived small firm. Of the range of pivotal organisational changes identified 
by owner-managers, changes in product range and cash flow were ranked as most 
important. Next in importance were changes in capacity and ownership, followed by 
changes in management, location and technology etc. There was a further tendency for 
organisational changes, which embraced a high number of precipitating events (i.e. 
signalling greater volatility) to involve a large number of consequential adjustments (i.e. 
commitments). This examination of the strategic importance, nature and timing of key 
organisational changes is followed-up in Chapter 8 with an examination of the flexibility of 
the firm in response to key organisational change and the consequences of flexibility for 
performance.
Inter-generational effects are particularly pertinent for the continued survival of 
these small firms as they approach their thirtieth birthday. Without a competent and willing 
family member, employee or potential buyer for the business, the small-unincorporated 
firm faces a high risk of sudden exit at this time. This, in turn, has consequences for the 
employees and wider community in which the firm operates. Indeed, owner-managers 
grow more concerned about this, as the firm grows older. The expectations of the owner- 
managers change, from a desire to create a business with survival prospects, to the 
consideration of more pecuniary motives (i.e. nest egg on retiring). Factors which hamper 
efficient transfer of ownership of firms include: the valuation of the enterprise; the 
financing of the transfer of ownership; the pool of buyers; legal dispositions; and both 
personal and emotional aspects. The European Commission has policies on family 
succession (article 10). However, as 10% of poorly managed family transitions end in
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bankruptcy in the European Union, support (and/or education) for transfer of firms within 
the family and to other potential buyers, needs to be provided by industrial policy makers 
(see Bjuggren and Sund, 2002). An objective means of valuing these small firms should 
also be studied. The management of the process of transfer of ownership should also be 
supported (i.e. legal process and transfer of knowledge/skills etc.). This could perhaps 
reduce the death rates of long-lived small firms.
This comprehensive description of the typical long-lived small firm provides a 
reference point for understanding the results of the econometric analysis discussed, in 
Chapters 8 and 9. In Volume II, seven enterprise case profiles are presented, which 
illustrate using detailed qualitative evidence, the findings in this Chapter and in Chapters 8 
and 9.
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CHAPTER 8 FIRM-SPECIFIC TURBULENCE, FLEXIBILITY AND SMALL 
FIRM PERFORMANCE
260
8.1 Introduction
This Chapter focuses on the relationship between firm flexibility and the long run 
prospects of the small firm. It is argued that small firms survive and prosper, alongside 
larger firms, because of their relative flexibility in coping with environmental uncertainty 
(see Brock and Evans, 1989; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Acs et al., 1990). To illustrate, small 
firms have a lesser need to employ hierarchy to control their operations, and offer greater 
opportunities for the utilisation of variable factors of production e.g. casualisation of labour 
to enhance performance (Reid, 1998, 1999). Further, the use of flexible production 
technologies by small firms favours product differentiation strategies and enables them to 
react quickly to changes in customers needs (Acs et al., 1990).
The main hypothesis examines whether flexibility in undertaking key organisational 
changes (e.g. ownership, technology, location, line of business etc.) enhances the long run 
prospects of the small firm. This is explored through an analysis of the level and timing of 
precipitating causes of key organisational change identified by the owner-manager, and of 
the level and timing of consequential adjustments following the organisational change (see 
subsection 7.4.2). There is a lack of empirical evidence in the study of entrepreneurship on 
the relationship between firm flexibility and the long run prospects of the small firm (see 
Carlsson, 1989). This Chapter rectifies this deficiency by specifically considering this 
hypothesis using primary source data. This area of research reflects a change in economic 
policy, away from an emphasis on volume of start-ups to an emphasis on the quality of 
start-ups. The former has been the focus of the entrepreneurship literature in recent years 
(Birch, 1987; Davis et al., 1996; and Barnes and Haskel, 2002).
Performance of the long-lived small firm is explained in terms of turbulence and 
flexibility. New measures of turbulence and flexibility are introduced. The latter reflect 
the agility and speed of long-lived small firms in responding to change. The former, is 
referred to as firm-specific turbulence, and represents the level of firm-specific 
organisational change over the life of the long-lived small firm. Performance was 
measured using the long run performance indicator (see subsection 6.3). The theoretical 
development of flexibility in the economics literature is considered in Section 2.4. 
Carlsson (1989) identified three important aspects of flexibility in his empirical
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observations of larger firms. These were operational, tactical and strategic flexibility. The 
approach adopted here differs from Carlsson’s (1989) in two respects: first, it focuses on 
small firms, rather than large firms; and second, it focuses on the aspect that he found most 
difficult to calibrate, strategic (long-term) flexibility. The latter refers to “how the firm 
positions itself for the future" (p.l 87) to cope with uncertainty. Similar to Carlsson’s 
(1989) view, is Ghemawat's (1991) concept of flexibility. He defines flexibility in terms of 
the expected added value generated through the ability of the firm to revise its strategy, by 
adopting alternative courses of action, as the outcomes of uncertain events unfold. Both 
these definitions were influential in the formulation of the measures of small firm 
flexibility.
It was seen in Section 2.4.2, that real options theory explains how the value of a 
project, or new investment, can be augmented by valuing flexibility in the entrepreneurial 
decision-making process (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Luehrman, 1997; McGrath, 1997, 
1999). A sound valuation of a business opportunity captures its contingent nature (see 
Donaldson, 1994), For example, if market research indicates that sufficient demand exists 
for a new product, the entrepreneur will invest in its production, otherwise production of 
the new product may be either abandoned, or delayed. Both the direct (e.g. infrastructure 
requirements like increases in headcount, capacity etc.) and delayed effects (i.e. regulatory 
changes, network externalities, risk of pre-emption, loss of market share etc.) of such 
organisational changes must be considered in strategic decision-making (see Miller and 
Folta, 2002; Folta and Miller, 2002; Arthur, 1994; Ingersoll and Ross, 1992; Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988; McDonald and Seigel, 1986). This is especially important under 
conditions of high uncertainty and risk, when the ability to exploit fiiture options is likely to 
be very important for a firm, but uncertainty exists as to which options will be ‘winners’ in 
the future (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Indeed, the whole idea behind investing in ways that 
create real options is to avoid over committing to a particular course of action, before this 
uncertainty is reduced (McGrath, 1999). Viewing the staging of resource commitments to 
organisational change as a series of sequentially exercised options accommodates 
environmental uncertainty (Bowman & Hurry, 1993). This permits project redirection, 
advances learning and allows investment to be discontinued at the earliest possible time,
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while simultaneously conserving the firm’s precious resources. By adopting a real options 
line of reasoning, the entrepreneur can raise the flexibility of the small firm, and thereby 
enhance the long run prospects of the small firm. In the interpreting the evidence presented 
in this Chapter, the empirical relevance of this approach is examined.
Early descriptive evidence on the relationship between flexibility and performance 
was provided by Smallbone et. al (1992, 1995). They found that firms which were active 
in making adjustments, were the most successful, in terms of growth in real turnover, 
employment and survival, using data from mature manufacturing firms in the UK. 
However, they did not examine the form, process, or speed of adjustment, nor did they 
quantify the performance implications of such adjustments. This work should remedy these 
shortcomings.
This Chapter proceeds as follows: Section 8.2 examines the calibration of measures 
of flexibility (e.g. Agility, Speed), and firm-specific turbulence. Then, in Section 8.3, 
econometric estimates are reported on the relationship between flexibility, firm-specific 
turbulence and performance. This is done in two forms. The first, involves generalised 
least squares estimation (with heteroskedastic adjustment) of the relationship between finn- 
specific turbulence, measures of flexibility and performance. The second, involves a 
Heckman sample selection estimation of this performance relationship. Based on the 
results of these estimations, the Heckman two-step procedure was re-estimated, 
decomposing the measures of agility and speed into their component parts (e.g. 
Precipitator, PrecipitatorTime, Adjust and AdjustTime). This was found to aid the 
interpretation of the results. A further estimation of the model controlled for learning and 
the different life histories of the mature small firms (e.g. inclusion of Age and Age2 as 
explanatory variables), and nonlinearities in the relationship between firm-specific 
turbulence and performance. Tentative evidence of nonlinearities between the components 
of speed (e.g. PrecipitatorTime, AdjustTime) and agility (e.g. Precipitator, Adjust) wets 
identified in the latter two specifications of the model. Section 8.4 tests for these 
nonlinearities by including interaction terms between the measures of agility and speed in 
the Heckman two-step estimation of the performance relationship. Section 8.5 concludes 
this Chapter.
!
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8.2 Measurement of Firm-Specific Turbulence, Flexibility and Performance
This Section presents information on the variables used in econometric estimation 
and provides some amplification of the key hypotheses to be addressed. Initially, a detailed 
explanation is provided of how the key variables are defined and calibrated. Summary 
statistics for each of the key variables are discussed and are presented in Table 8.1 below.
8.2.1 Firm-Specific Turbulence
In this study, turbulence is measured in a novel way, and is referred to as ‘firm- 
specific turbulence’ (or FSTurbulence). This new approach follows the case study 
evidence of Markusen and Teitz (1985), which measures turbulence at the firm level. In 
their work, which concerned the underlying dynamics of the competitive environment, they 
found that the markets in which mature small firms operated were turbulent. All firms in 
their sample were expecting some change, whether in the form of a crisis, or growth 
opportunity. With respect to large corporations, Reilly et al. (1993) similarly defined 
turbulence as organisational changes experienced by the firm that were “nontrivial, rapid 
and discontinuous ...such as rapid growth, merger and hostile takeover.” (p.167). Insights 
from the literature on stages of growth models and contingency theory were also influential 
in devising this measure of firm-specific turbulence (see Subsection 2.3), as this literature 
emphasises organisational change at the firm level.
By contrast, the approach of Beesley and Hamilton (1984) is industry specific, 
rather than firm-specific, where turbulence is approximated by accounting for flows in the 
birth and death of firms in particular industries. A high number of relative flows in the 
birth and death of firms in an industiy signals a high level of turbulence in that industry. 
Fluctuations in patterns of demand across product varieties or plant locations, displacement 
of existing technologies by alternatives, regulatory restrictions, and the displacement of 
existing products by new and superior substitutes, are potential drivers of this industry 
specific form of turbulence (see Geroski, 1991, Chp 3; Dunne and Roberts, 1991; Sutton, 
1997; Confiaria, 1998; Segarra and Callejon, 2002). Certainly, evidence across different 
industries suggests a positive correlation between gross entry and exit rates (see Sutton, 
1997; Caves, 1998).
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Table 8.1: Mean, Standard Deviation and Range of Each Variable
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
FSTurbulence 7.90 3.8 2 16
Agility 0.874 0.407 0.220 2.38
Speed 21.84 16.19 2.45 73.9
Precipitators 5.27 2.72 1 15.67
Adjust 7.31 3.33 1.67 16
PrecipitatorTime 15.98 13.53 0 56
AdjustTime 16.65 16.44 0 70
Perform 67.35 8.10 49.11 90.43
Here, firm-specific turbulence {FSTurbulence} is measured by a frequency count of 
the number of changes undertaken by the mature small firm, qua organisation, over its 
lifetime. In a technical sense, FSTurbulence was calculated as £X;3 where X; is the 
occurrence of a change i. According to this measure, a relatively high number of 
organisational changes signals that the mature small firm is operating in a turbulent 
environment. Emphasising the pivotal nature of key changes, it was observed in 
Subsection 7.4.1 that they occur, on average, just eight times over the lifetime of the long- 
lived small firm (see Table 8.1). Thus, the average level of FSTurbulence was eight. The 
range was fourteen and the maximum FSTurbulence score was just sixteen. An 
FSTurbulence score of 5 or less (the lower quartile) was received by firms experiencing 
low levels of firm-specific turbulence, whereas a score of 9 or more (the upper quartile) 
was received by firms experiencing a lot of firm-specific turbulence.
It might be expected that older firms in the sample experienced higher levels of 
FSTurbulence, merely because they were older. However, a test of the null hypothesis that 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient, calculated for the count of key organisational changes and 
age, equalled zero could not be rejected (see Subsection 7.4.1). Thus, FSTurbulence is not 
age related. Furthermore a test of the null hypothesis of equivalence in the mean level of 
FSTurbulence across manufacturing and services firms in the sample (independent sample 
T test statistic^ 1.117, d.f.=61, p-value=0.268) and across legal forms (ANOVA Fp, 6i) 
statistic=0.680, p-value=0.511) could not be rejected. Whereas there is little evidence of
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differences in mean FSTurbulence across broad sectoral classifications, legal forms, and 
age, firm-specific turbulence was found to be significantly positively correlated with firm 
size and growth, as measured by FTEs and turnover respectively (see Table 8.2). Thus, 
larger and fast growing firms experience higher levels of firm-specific turbulence, 
confirming Smallbone’s et al. (1992, 1995) findings.
Table 8.2: Significant Correlates between Firm-Specific Turbulence and Firm Size
Variable Pearson’s Correlation with FSTurbuletice
Pearson Correlation 0.288
Turnover growth (lifetime) Sig. (2-tailed) 0.058
N 44
Pearson Correlation 0.356
FTE growth (lifetime) Sig. (2-tailed) 0.007
N 56
Pearson Correlation 0.405
FTEs 2001 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001
N 63
Pearson Correlation 0.289
Turnover 2001 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.022
N 63
8.2.2 Measures of Flexibility
Carlson’s (1989) notion of strategic flexibility and Ghemawat’s (1991) conception 
of flexibility are not concerned with the optimisation of strategy, but rather the selection of 
strategies that can be adapted to a range of critical outcomes. The ability to revise the small 
firm’s strategy, as circumstances unfold, enables the small firm to survive long-side large 
firms, which have scale advantages. This view of flexibility was influential in devising the 
dimensions of flexibility, referred to as agility and speed.
8.2.2.1 Agility
Small firm flexibility arises from their intense use of variable factors of production 
(e.g. casualisation of labour, lack of hierarchy, flexible production technologies etc.) (see 
Reid, 1998, 1999; Mata, 1993; Acs et al., 1990; Brock and Evans, 1989), The ability to 
adapt these factors of production, in response to forces of environmental change, reflects 
the first dimension of flexibility, referred to as ‘Agility’. The greater is the Agility of the 
small firm, the more easily can the entrepreneur exercise strategic options when they have
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reached fruition. Thus, the agile small firm is prepared for organisational change. In 
response to drivers of environmental change, it can react with relatively fewer adjustments.
Agility is calibrated by a ratio of the number of precipitating influences of 
organisational change (P) to the number of consequential adjustments (A) following 
organisational change. Agility was calculated for each of the three most important changes,
3
m, and averaged across these three changes (i.e. divided by^mc)? Formally Agility is
C=1
calculated as
ZU/4)
£=1
C=l
(8.1)
where P = Ep|m and pjm is the occurrence of precipitating factor j for each change m. 
A=£ajm, where ajm is the occurrence of adjustment j for each change m. A larger relative 
score for Agility implies that a firm is relatively more agile, and thus more flexible (i.e. the 
small firm adjusts less for a given number of precipitating influences). On average, the 
long-lived small firm's agility score is 0.87. As this value is less than 1, it implies that the 
typical long-lived small firm finds it difficult to limit the amount of trimming (or 
consequential adjustments) they need to make as a consequence of organisational change.2
As well as acting on precipitating influences, the small firm needs to be able to 
detect that circumstances have changed per se. To illustrate, Mata (1993) has found that 
uncovering precipitating influences can be a source of flexibility in small firms, and this 
ability differs across owner-managers. He found that if owner-managers within the small 
firms’ sector were not alert to detecting environmental changes, the presence of small firms
1 Each firm described the precipitators and consequential adjustments for the three most important changes, 
which occurred over their life (see Section 4.3.3). Note only two firms in the sample had less than three main 
organisational changes.
2 The average number of precipitators (Precipitator) and the average number of adjustments (Adjust) are
3 3 3 3
calculated by the ratios ZPC / ^\mc and 2^ Ac / ^nic respectively. It was seen in Section 7.4.2,
C=1 C=1 C = 1 C=1
that the average number of precipitating influences (Precipitator) is 5.27, which is lower than the average 
number of consequential adjustments (Adjust) at 7.31.
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would not grow. Alertness to precipitating causes of organisational change in the 
environment, and greater agility in making consequential adjustments following strategic 
change, is important to the long run prospects of the long-lived small firm.
8.2.2.2 Speed
Speed measures the ability of the small firm to respond promptly in the fece of both 
precipitating influences (arising within its environment), and consequential adjustments 
(arising from its own organisational change). Thus, the speedy small firm acts quickly 
before and after internal organisational change. Timeliness in reacting to precipitating 
causes of organisational change in the environment and in implementing consequential 
adjustments following change can provide a small firm with an early mover advantage, 
through creating switching costs, network externalities, buyer inertia and scale economies 
etc. (see Mueller, 1997). However, when small firms are operating in environments which 
are subject to high risk and uncertainty, adopting a ‘wait and see9 strategy, scanning the 
environment to detect precipitating influences of organisational change, before exercising a 
strategic option, is perhaps wise (see Bowman and Huny, 1993). Further, in such 
environments, staging commitments (or consequential adjustments) to organisational 
change is a prudent strategy, as it minimises downside risk and provides the small firm with 
the option to withdraw at low cost (see Subsection 2.4.2).
Formally, the speed of adjustment {Speed) can be computed by summing 
precipitating time {PrecipitatorTime) and consequential adjustment time {AdjustTime). 
Recall, the length of time lapsed from the emergence of precipitating factors to the 
organisational change is PrecipitatorTime’, the length of time lapsed from the organisational 
change to changes in adjustment factors is AdjustTime (see Subsection 7.4.2). Speed is 
calculated here as
ji
i
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Iwhere PrecipitatorTime, Pt, was calibrated as the length of time lapsed between the 
identification of the first precipitator by the owner-manager and the exercise of the 
organisational change [i.e. the maximum the length of time lapsed between each 
precipitating factor j and the occurrence of main organisational change m, ptjm, or 
Max(ptjm)=Pt]. AdjustTime, At, was approximated by the length of time lapsed between the 
exercise of the organisational change and the final consequential adjustment factor [i.e. the 
maximum length of time between the occurrence of main change m and each consequential 
adjustment j, atjm, or Max(atjm)==At]. In a similar vein, these measures were initially 
calculated for each of the three most important organisational changes. Then, average 
measures across the three most important changes were computed. The shorter are these 
time periods (i.e. average PrecipitatorTime, average AdjustTime, wexagz Speed), the 
quicker the long-lived small firm acts in response to forces of environmental change. On 
average, PrecipitatorTime is marginally less than AdjustTime with values of 16 and 17 
months, respectively. Speed was, on average, 22 months.
The measures of average PrecipitatorTime and average AdjustTime adopted above, 
differ from those discussed in Subsection 7.4.2 and in Power and Reid (2002) for two 
reasons. The measures of average PrecipitatorTime and average AdjustTime described in 
Subsection 7.4.2 cannot be adopted in econometric estimation, since they are linear 
functions of the number of precipitators {Precipitators or P) and the number of adjustments 
{Adjusts or A). Estimates of the performance relationship would be inefficient due to 
multicollinearity between the regressors. The measures of AdjustTime and 
PrecipitatorTime adopted in Power and Reid (2002), while overcoming the latter, fail to 
account for the clustering of precipitators of organisational change and consequential 
adjustments3. The clustering of precipitators and consequential adjustments drive these 
approximations of average AdjustTime and average PrecipitatorTime upwards. For 
example, let us examine PrecipitatorTime for two firms A and B4. Let us assume that firm
3 The approximations of PrecipitatorTime and AdjustTime adopted by Power and Reid (2002) were calculated 
as follows
3 / 3 3 / 3
n?=l / c=I m=l / c=I
4 A similar example could be presented fat AdjustTime.
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A identified four precipitators 6 months before changing its operations and firm B 
identified one precipitator at 18 months, and another one at 6 months, before changing its 
operations. Both firms A and B would receive a PrecipitatorTime score of 24 months, 
using Power and Reid’s (2002) approximation. However, firms A and B would receive a 
PrecipitatorTime value of 6 months and 18 months respectively, using the definition of P, 
expressed above in equation (8.2). Using Power and Reid’s (2002) approximation of 
PrecipitatorTime, Firm A’s speed measure is biased upwards considerably, from a response 
time of 6 months to 24 months. An implicit account is taken in Power and Reid’s (2002) 
approximation of the number of precipitators. Thus, it is more likely that an interaction 
between Precipitator and PrecipitatorTime would be found. Power and Reid (2002) do not 
explicitly test for interactions between the regressors, but as Section 8.4 examines this 
source of variation in the performance relationship, the conservative measures of Pt and At, 
expressed in equation (8.2) are adopted.
8.2.2.3 Correlates with Measures of Flexibility
Table 8.3 presents Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the measures of
flexibility and firm-specific turbulence. Agility and Speed are weakly negatively correlated 
(Pearson’s R=-0.23), with only a five percent probability in one tail that this result could 
have occurred by chance. Thus, more agile firms are likely to react faster to changes in 
their environment. The average number of consequential adjustments {Adjust} is 
significantly positively correlated with the average number of precipitators {Precipitator} 
(Pearson’s R=0.661). This provides tentative evidence that organisational changes, that 
require a large amount of adjustments, prompt the owner-manager to adopt a ‘war? and see ’ 
strategy, scanning the environment for more precipitators of change. The average number 
of consequential adjustments {Adjust} is also positively correlated with average 
consequential adjustment time {AdjustTime} (Pearson’s R=0.24, p-value=0.057). This 
indicates that adjustments are staggered for organisational changes which involve a large 
number of adjustments (i.e. more time has elapsed before the instigation of incremental 
adjustments).
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Table 8 J: Significant Correlates between Measures of Firm-Specific Turbulence 
and Flexibility
Speed AdjustTime
Precipitator
Time Agility :Precipitator Adjust
AdjustTime Pearson Correlation 0.853
Sig. (2-tailed) 1.06E-17
PrecipitatorTime Pearson Correlation 0.775 0.330
Sig. (2-tailed) 3.11E-16 0.008
Agility Pearson Correlation -0.229 -0.164 -0.215
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.071 0.199 0.091
Precipitator Pearson Correlation 0.036 0.079 -0.031 0.301
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.780 0.538 0.809 0.017
Adjust Pearson Correlation 0.267 0240 0.192 -0.382 0.661
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.034 0.057 0.133 0.002 2.87E-09
FSTurbulence Pearson Correlation 0.146 0.176 0.051 -0.119 0.451 0.452
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.255 0.168 0.694 0.354 2.0 E-5 2.0E-05
PrecipitatorTime and AdjustTime are significantly positively related (Pearson’s 
R=0.33). However, this finding may seem to be counter-intuitive. An expectation exists 
that, if the firm adopted a 'wait and see’ policy to resolve uncertainties prior to 
implementing organisational change (i.e. lengthening precipitator time), that the firm would 
then have to adjust quickly (i.e. a shorter adjustment time) to capture any performance 
improvements (i.e. a speedy firm is more flexible, and therefore achieves higher 
performance). The apparently counter-intuitive result may be explained by viewing 
consequential adjustments as a sequential chain of strategic options. In this instance, each 
option exercised provides preferential access to the next option in the chain. However, 
further options in the chain are not exercised unless they have matured and the value of 
waiting is at its lowest. Staggering consequential adjustments to organisational changes in 
this manner, may lengthen the adjustment time, and thereby generate a positive relationship 
between precipitator time and adjustment time. By proceeding in this way, the 
entrepreneur can raise the performance of the firm. Such tactics build on good fortune and 
mitigate against bad fortune (see Folta and Miller, 2002; McGrath, 1999; Luehrman 1998; 
Bowman and Hurry, 1993).
Firm-specific turbulence {FSTurbulence} is significantly positively correlated with 
the average count of precipitators {Precipitator) and with the average count of
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consequential adjustments (Adjust). This suggests that firms which experience greater 
firm-specific turbulence, are perhaps better at scanning the environment for precipitators of 
change, but also need to make more organisational adjustments, following key 
organisational changes. This indicates that these firms have to engage in more trimming 
because they are not as agile. Certainly, the relationship between Agility and FSTurbulence 
is weakly negative confirming this, however it is insignificant and thus cannot be relied 
upon (Pearson’s R=-0.119).
Measures of flexibility were not correlated with age, nor did they differ across legal 
forms, or broad sectoral classifications. Few measures of flexibility were related to size, 
lending general support for Carlsson’s (1989) theoiy, that there are some aspects of 
flexibility which are not related to size. The average number of precipitators was 
significantly positively related to fulltime equivalent employee growth (Pearson’s 
R=0.273), implying that firms which grew in headcount had a greater capacity to identify 
more precipitators of change. There was less than a five percent probability, in a one tailed 
test, that this result could have occurred by chance.
8.2.3 Subjective Measure of Long Run Performance
The long run indicator of performance Perform was described in Subsection 6.3. A 
performance score for each small firm was obtained by summating ratings on 28 items 
covering aspects of the firm's business strategy (9 items), financial management (4 items), 
internal organisation (4 items) and environment (11 items). This subjective measure is 
more consistent with our evidence base. It was shown in Section 6.4 to behave in a similar 
manner to conventional financial data, but was not subject to the misgivings of the latter, 
which make such measures difficult to interpret in sensible economic terms. On average, 
mature small firms in the sample received a performance score of 67 (out of a potential 
score of 0-100). A larger score indicates higher performance.
8.2.4 Performance, Flexibility and Firm-Specific Turbulence
This Subsection concludes by examining the expected causal relationship between 
flexibility and firm-specific turbulence (as independent variables) and performance (as the 
dependent variable). In general, greater flexibility is expected to have a positive effect on 
performance. This is true of approaches to flexibility, as diverse as those of Stigler (1939),
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Ghemawat (1991) and Aiginger and Weiss (1998). Firm flexibility has also been shown to 
explain relatively greater small firm presence in uncertain environments (see Mills and 
Schumann, 1985). This increased presence is indicative of enhanced small firm 
performance and prospects of survival. Furthermore, in real options logic, the greater the 
uncertainty, the more valuable is a real option. As the downside of a real option is fixed, 
the chance of gain is greater under high uncertainty, but the risk of loss no larger. Thus, the 
flexibility that a real option offers is valuable under these conditions (Brealey and Myers, 
1986; Fama and Miller, 1972).
In general, the greater the number of consequential adjustments relative to the 
number of precipitating influences, the less agile is the small firm. Here, Agility is 
interpreted as one aspect of flexibility. A higher level of Agility is expected to improve the 
performance of the small firm. If Speed is measured by the time taken to respond to both 
precipitating influences and consequential adjustments, it is expected to influence 
performance negatively.
As compared to the unambiguous effect of flexibility, the effect of firm-specific 
turbulence on performance is less clear. In general, a higher number of organisational 
changes would reflect a greater degree of firm-specific turbulence and visa versa; however, 
it does not automatically imply improved performance. Reid and Smith (2000b) found that 
both poorly performing (‘stagnant’) firms and highly performing (‘adaptive’) firms have 
relatively active discretionary policies. Whereas stagnant firms frequently embrace 
organisational change to counteract the consequences of inflexibility in terms of poor 
performance, adaptive firms frequently embrace organisational change to facilitate greater 
growth and other aspects of improved performance.
8.3 Estimates
To examine the degree to which the different dimensions of flexibility, and firm- 
specific turbulence, affect the performance of the long-lived small firm, Heckman’s sample 
selection model is applied (Lee, 1982, 1983; Heckman, 1976, 1979; Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 1993). This model assumes that there exists an underlying relationship 
between the long run performance score (Perform), the measure of firm-specific turbulence
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{FSTurbulence) and the measures of flexibility (e.g. Agility and Speed) of the long-lived 
small firm. This can be expressed as follows:
Perform = po + Pi FSTurbulence ^jAgility + $f>peed+ Uh (83)
where ui ~ N(0, a). It is expected that sample selection bias exists as the measures of 
performance, firm-specific turbulence, and flexibility are only observed for long-lived 
small firms, but not for non-survivors.5 Initially, a probit model of the survival of long- 
lived small firms is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. This model can be 
written as:
S=X/3+u2i (8.4)
where S is a binary variable which is equal to unity if the firm has survived, but otherwise 
equal to zero. The matrix X contains observations on those factors thought to influence the 
long-run survival of firms (e.g. number of full-time and part-time employees, gearing and 
number of product groups), the vector ft contains the estimated parameter coefficients and 
u2 ~ N(0, 1). The correlation between ui and u2 is given by p.6 From the binary probit 
estimation, the inverse of Mill’s ratio is calculated (lambda or f). The inverse of Mill’s 
ratio is used as an additional regresssor in the generalised least squares estimation of the 
performance equation (8.3) above. Heckman’s (1976, 1979) two-step procedure provides 
consistent estimators, under certain regularity conditions.7
Initially, the performance relationship (8.3) was estimated on a sample of 186 firms, 
for which complete data exists for the 63 long-lived small firms, as well as the 123 non­
surviving firms. Parsimonious data on industrial sector {Sector), start year {StYear), sales
5 If firm survival was random the fact that performance, firm-specific turbulence and flexibility is not 
observed for non-survivors could be ignored. However, the random survival of small firms is unlikely to be 
true, as significance differences exist between survivors and non-survivors in their performance, financial 
position etc. (see Reid, 1991,1999; Audretsch, 1991; Mata and Portugal, 1994,2002; Wagner, 1994; Mataet 
al. 1995; Doms et al. 1995; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Cressy, 1996; Louri and Fotoloupos, 2000a). 
Thus, the observed measure of performance of the sample of survivors is perhaps biased upwards.
6 p ranges from -1 to +1. Within this range (p^O) standard regression techniques applied to the performance 
equation will not yield consistent results. If p is not significantly different from zero (p = 0), selectivity is not 
a problem for the data set.
7 If selectivity bias exists (p^0), while Heckman’s (1976, 1979) two-step procedure produces consistent 
estimators, they are not efficient estimators.
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in the early years of trading (StSales), full-time employees (FtEmployees) and part-time 
employees (PtEmployees) was available for the non-surviving and the long-lived small 
firms, and is used to estimate the selection relationship (8.4) (see Table 8.4 for definitions 
of the variables). These variables were available for all three-parent samples. Heckman’s 
(1979) two-step procedure was also used for re-estimation on a sample of 89 firms 
(consisting of 39 long-lived small firms and 50 non-surviving firms), for which two 
additional regressors were available for inclusion in the sample selection equation: the 
gearing ratio (Gearing); and the number of product groups (ProdGroup). These additional 
variables were only available for two parent samples. The procedure was conducted twice 
in an attempt to use the available data in a comprehensive fashion.
Initially, for comparative purposes, generalised least squares estimators were 
computed of performance relationship (8.3) without sample selection. From a preliminary, 
exploratory, ordinary least squares regression of the performance relationship (8.3), a plot 
of the residuals against the predicted values suggested that the residuals were increasing 
with values of the predictors. To correct for this, the ordinary least squares model was 
weighted by the reciprocal of Sales, as a linear proportional relationship of the reciprocal of 
Sales to the absolute value of the residuals was found to be significant using the Glejser test 
for heteroskedasticity, see Davidson and McKinnon, (1993), ch. 11. The generalised least 
squares model presented in Table 8.5 had an R2 of 0.99 with probability value of 0.000.8 
The results of Heckman’s two-step procedure are presented in Tables 8.6 and 8.7. It is 
these estimates that are discussed in detail below, rather those of the generalised least 
squares estimation, taking a precautionary stance, as they have been corrected for
8 The interpretation of the R2 is dubious when there is no constant term in the least squares model, as in this 
case, where the ordinary least squares model is transformed by 1/sales (see Greene, 2000, p.467).
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Table 8.4 Definition of variables used in main text
Variable Definition
Age
Agility
Age of firm, in years.
Agility is the ratio of precipitator to adjustment factors averaged over 
three main changes.
Adjust Count of adjustments averaged over three main changes - Zajm/3, 
where ajm is the occurrence of adjustment j for each main change m.
AdjustTime Length of time between change m and the implementation of the last 
adjustment = Max (atjm)/^ m , where ajm is the occurrence of
Employees
FtEmployee
FSTurbulence
adjustment j for each main change m.
Number of full-time equivalent employees in 2001.
Number of full-time employees at start-up.
Count of main changes over life of long-lived small firm = ZXi?,
Gearing
Perform
where X; is the occurrence of a change i.
=bank loan/personal injection.
- Sf/n, where fj is the self appraised score between 0-100 for each
Precipitator
factor averaged overall factors 1 to n which were applicable.
Count of precipitator factors averaged over the three main changes -
PrecipitatorTime
Zpjn/3, where pjm is the occurrence of precipitator factor j for each 
main change m.
Length of time between the first precipitator and change m - Max 
m c > where ptjm is the length of time between each
ProdGroup
PtEmployee
Sales
Sector
Speed
precipitator factor j and the occurrence of each main change m.
Number of product groups.
Number of part-time employees at start-up.
Sales in 2001.
=0 services (SIC 61-99), 1 ^manufacturing (SIC 01-60).
The overall speed of adjustment can be obtained by summing the
StSales
average precipitator time and the average adjustment time.
Sales at first interview (1985 for SBE, 1991 for telephone, 1994 for
St Year
Survival
Leverhulme) at 2001 prices.
Year the business was established.
=1 survivor, 0 otherwise
selectivity bias. However, it is observed that the results presented in Tables 8.6 and 8.7 are 
broadly similar to the results in Table 8.5. The correlation between the disturbances in the 
performance and selection equations, p, is close to zero, suggesting that selectivity bias is 
not a major problem. In feet, a likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis, p=0, could not 
be rejected for the Heckman estimations presented in Tables 8.6 and 8.7, confirming that
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selectivity bias is not a key concern. Therefore, what is true of our analysis in Tables 8.6 
and 8.7 is also true of our analysis in Table 8.5.
8,3,1 Sample Selection Equations
The sample selection equations are interpreted initially, even though the central 
hypothesis of this Chapter focuses on the results of the performance equation. The main 
burden of the rest of this Chapter will explain the relationship between firm-specific 
turbulence, flexibility and performance. Firstly, the sample selection equation in Table 8.6 
is examined, which was estimated with the larger sample size (N=l 86).
From Table 8.6, it is observed that the coefficient on sales early in the lifecycle of 
the small firm (StSales) was significant. That is, initial size conditions had a positive 
impact on long run survival. The effect of size had a quite high elasticity; a 1% increase in 
mean sales earlier in the lifecycle increases the probability of survival by 0.2%, using 
elasticities calculated at the mean9. This kind of influence one would expect to observe, in 
terms of fundamental modelling of the small firm’s growth process. For example, if the 
time series of sales from inception is a random walk, terminating when this process hits the 
absorbing barrier of zero sales, the mean passage of time to exit is higher, the greater are 
first period sales. Furthermore, this finding confirms evidence of a positive relationship 
between initial size and firm survival for the U.S. (Evans, 1987a, b; Hall, 1987; Dunne et 
al. 1989a), Canada (Baldwin, 1995), the UK (Dunne and Hughes, 1994), Portugal (Mata 
and Portugal, 1994; Mata et al., 1995) and Germany (Wagner, 1994), see Subsection 
33.2.1.
9 Elasticities are calculated in the form of Slog y/Slog x which gives the percentage change in y for a 1 percent 
change in x.
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Table 8.5 Generalised Least Squares of Equation (83) (N-63)
Regressors Coeff. Std. Error Prob. Elasticities 
at mean
FSTurbulence -0.682 0.165 0.000 -0,100
Agility 8.600 3.141 0.000 0.099
Speed 0.383 0.033 0.008 0.164
Constant 55.023 3.024 0.000 0.837
Note: Readjusted =0.994;F(6,57)= 2414.51 Prob.>F = 0.0000
Table 8.6: Heckman Sample Selection Model of Equation (8.3) (N-1S6)
Regressors Coeff. Std. error Prob. Elasticities 
at mean
FSTurbulence -0.704 0.165 0.000 -0.104
Agility 8.700 3.039 0.000 0.101
Speed 0.386 0.033 0.004 0.166
Constant 55.334 2.982 0.000 0.848
Selection Equation
Sector -0.040 0.200 0.842 -0.071
FTEmployee -0.004 0.012 0.766 -0.023
PTEmployee -0.013 0.017 0.434 -0.043
StYear -0.003 0.011 0.776 -0.277
StSales 4.94E-07 2.50E-07 0.048 0.199
Constant -0.247 1.009 0.807
Mills-lambda -572900.2 1130278 0.612
Rho -0.073
Sigma 7854975.5
Wald chi2(6) 7424.31
Prob>chi2 0.0000
Note: Likelihood ratio test of Independent equations (Rho=0): Chi2(l)=0.30 Prob>Chi2=0.587
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Table 8.7 Heckman Sample Selection Model of Equation (8.3) (N~89)
Regressors Coeff. Std. error Prob. Elasticities 
at mean
FSTurbulence -0.860 0.223 0.000 -0.129
Agility 6.984 3.937 0.000 0.082
Speed 0.420 0.041 0.076 0.183
Constant 58.102 4.001 0.000 0.900
Selection Equation
Sector 0.239 0.326 0.463 0.387
FTEinployee -0.002 0.021 0.914 -0.013
PTEmployee -0.012 0.019 0.533 -0.035
StYear -0.018 0.027 0.517 -1.412
StSales 7.35E-07 4.39E-07 0.094 0.271
Gearing 1.5E-04 5.3E-04 0.778 -0.018
ProdGroup 0.241 0.130 0.063 0.610
Constant -0.073 2.361 0.975
Mills-iambda -2011447 2213760 0.364
Rho -0.210
Sigma 9587812.3
Wald chi2(6) 3890.92
Prob>chi2 0.000
Note: Likelihood ratio test of Independent equations (Rho=0): Chi2(l)=1.02 Prob>Chi2=0.313
Manufacturing firms had a negative influence on long run survival in Table 8.6 
(N=186) but a positive influence in Table 8.7 (N=89). This effect is not significant in both 
instances. This conflicting result probably occurs because the sample of 89 firms has a 
greater representation of manufacturing firms [i.e. it contains firms from the Leverhulme 
(1985-1988) and Leverhulme (1994-1997) parent samples, the former which over samples
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manufacturing firms, see Subsection 4.2.1.1], While all manufacturing firms are subject to 
the pressures of de-industrialisation, this effect is proportionally less in a sample containing 
more manufacturing firms.
The number of lull-time and part-time employees had a negative effect on survival. 
This suggests a larger headcount has a negative effect on long run survival, regardless of 
whether it is casual labour or fulltime employees cf. Reid (1999). Indeed, in Chapter 9 a 
trade-off was found to exist between firm size and performance implying that the mature 
small firm must become leaner and more efficient over time, if it is to survive. In addition, 
long-lived small firms are cautious about hiring new staff due to strict employment laws 
(see Blackburn and Hart, 2002, 2003; Edwards et al., 2003). Growth in services firms with 
lower headcounts, and the decline in manufacturing, also explains this result (Storey, 
1994:34-43). However, here the influences of both these variables do not have a significant 
impact on survival.
Age, generally, has a positive effect on survival (see Subsection 3.3.2.2). The year 
the firm was founded (StYear) was included in the estimation of the survival equation (8.4) 
as a proxy for the age of survivors and non-survivors, since data on the year in which the 
vast majority of non-survivors in our sample ceased to trade was not available. However, 
care needs to be taken, in interpreting this variable, as a result. StYear has a negative sign, 
which clearly juxtaposes the common effect of age on firm survival. However, from an 
inter-generational perspective, the impact of this variable suggests the longer the small 
independent firm is in business, the more likely it is going to exit the market. Thus, it 
suggests that if the owner-manager is retiring, and there is no market for the small business, 
or family member(s) willing and competent to take over the running of the business, the 
small firm is likely to cease trading (see Lotti and Santarelli, 2002; Bjuggren and Sund, 
2002). Again, this effect is not significant.
Turning to the sample selection equation in Table 8.7, which contains two 
additional regressors, the gearing ratio (Gearing) and the number of product groups 
(ProdGroup), and where the sample size is smaller (N=89). It is observable that the number 
of product groups (ProdGroup) is significant at the 10% level. The elasticity is very high. 
A 1% increase in mean number of product groups supplied earlier in their lifecycle
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increases the probability of long run survival by as much as 0.61%. This effect is 
consistent with the findings of Reid (1991). Furthermore, Ungern-Sternberg’s (1990) work 
emphasises the importance of the diversification of the product portfolio to accommodate 
fluctuating demand for individual products.
In examining the survival of small firm start-ups, Reid (1991) found that gearing 
had a significant negative effect on small firm survival. This is consistent with Fotopoulus 
and Louri’s (2000a) findings for Greek firms. A higher level of leverage was found to raise 
the firm’s hazard rate (see Subsection 3.3.23). Here, gearing has a negative sign but it is 
not a significant predictor of long run survival. If equity finance is a cheaper source of 
finance capital, the optimal strategy for a highly geared small firm is to retire debt early in 
its lifecycle (see Reid, 2003). However, later in its lifecycle many forms of capital could be 
appropriate to the long-run survival of a specific firm.
8.3.2 Performance Equations
Performance is examined using three estimators. First, a generalised least squares 
estimator, without sample selection, using a sample size of N=63 (see Table 8.5). Second, 
a Heckman sample selection estimation, using a sample size of N=186 (see Table 8.6). 
Third, a Heckman sample selection estimation, using a sample size of N=89 (see Table 
8.7). The focus of the discussion to follow is on the estimates presented in Tables 8.6 and 
8.7, which corrects for sample selection. Estimates of the performance equation in Table
8.6 are chiefly discussed below, as there are few differences between the results of Tables
8.6 and 8.7. Where differences emerge, these are clearly mentioned in the text.
Turning first to firm-specific turbulence {FSTurbulence), it was found to have a 
negative impact on performance. A 1% increase in the mean count of organisational 
changes reduces performance by 0.10% (or by 0.13% in Table 8.7). Excessive 
organisational change seems to be to the detriment of the long-lived small firm’s 
performance. As a business journalist commented on Power and Reid’s (2002) findings, 
“many a meddle may make a muddle of the business”, (see Jamieson, 2002). There is an 
intuitive explanation for this, which supports the interpretation of Reid and Smith (2000b) 
discussed above. It is that the relationship between firm-specific turbulence and firm 
performance tends to be U shaped. Both poorly performing firms (or ‘stagnant’ firms in
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their terminology) and highly performing firms (or ‘adaptive’ firms in their terminology) 
tend to be relatively active in undertaking changes, compared to moderately performing 
firms. Thus, stagnant firms are active in making organisational changes to survive, whereas 
adaptive firms are active in making organisational changes to improve performance and 
promote growth. It may be that there is only a small proportion of ‘adaptive firms’ in the 
sample experiencing positive dynamics, and a much larger proportion of relatively 
‘stagnant’ firms driving the negative relationship between FSTurbulence and Perform. 
This suggests that there is another selection process here, besides the long-run test of 
economic survival. It may take the form of deciding whether or not the small firm grows to 
be a large firm - a ‘gazelle’ as denoted by Birch (1996). Part of the reason for the existence 
of gazelles, may be that they are intrinsically designed to be of relatively large scale, and 
that they very rapidly grow towards this target size after inception. Many of the long-lived 
small firms have succeeded in the first selection process, but very few are triumphant in the 
second. Subsection 8.3.3 includes the square of FSTurbulence, as an additional explanatory 
variable in the performance relationship, to test whether the relationship between firm- 
specific turbulence and performance is in fact U-shaped.
Proceeding now to the flexibility measures in Table 8.6, it is noted that Agility has a 
significant and positive impact on performance. A 1% increase in the number of 
precipitators per adjustments {Agility) increases performance by 0.10% (or by 8% in Table 
8.7). This implies that small firms, which need to make less consequential adjustments in 
response to precipitators of change, face greater long run prospects. Such firms have an 
internal organisational structure, which is better equipped to cope with environmental 
change (i.e. they use more flexible production technologies).
The coefficient on Speed also has a positive and significant impact on performance. 
According to Table 8.6, this variable has a larger impact than any other does on 
performance. Indeed, a 1% increase in the speed of the firm in responding to change 
increases performance by 0.17% (or by 18% in Table 8.7). A shorter reaction time would 
normally be expected to increase performance, rather than the reverse as in this case. This 
result may be explained by the existence of internal and external costs to undertaking 
consequential adjustments or using real options logic.
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From the former perspective, small firms in the sample may be subject to short-term 
rigidities to growth such as financial constraints (i.e. lack of internal funding and 
difficulties raising finance externally), skill shortages, fixed capacity etc. (see Nilsen et al., 
2001; Dorns and Dunne, 1998; Barber et al., 1989). These rigidities may prevent the small 
firm from initiating a speedy response. However, such constraints would not normally 
enhance performance. The latter real options perspective, would argue that the small firm 
might sensibly decide to stage their adjustments in face of real uncertainties, regarding the 
future outlook of any organisational change. Adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach 
minimises the small firm’s loss in event of withdrawal, while at the same time providing it 
with the option to commit further resources, if uncertainties are resolved. Thus, by staging 
resource commitments to organisational changes in uncertain environments (i.e. implying a 
longer adjustment time), it is envisaged that the small firm could raise the firm’s 
performance by avoiding downside risks. Ghemawat (1991) recommended staging the 
commitment of resources to a new strategy, thereby increasing the firm's flexibility to pull 
back if the organisational change is unsuccessful. Such a policy raises the firm’s option 
value to withdraw or to invest depending on how circumstances unfold. It should be noted, 
that cautiousness in the commitment of resources to a strategy is not the only factor 
influencing this speed variable, but also the time it takes to react to precipitators of change. 
A small firm may also not exercise organisational change until certain that it will improve 
performance (McDonald and Siegel, 1986).
It seems that the regressors, Agility and Speed, in performance relationship (8.3) 
mask the effects of their individual component parts. By decomposing Agility into average 
count of precipitators of change {Precipitator} and average count of consequential 
adjustments {Adjust} and Speed into average precipitating time {PrecipitatorTime} and 
average adjustment time {AdjustTime) further knowledge is obtained on the relationship 
between the dimensions of small firm flexibility and performance. The specification of this 
new performance relationship is presented in equation (8.5) below and the results of the 
estimation of this relationship are discussed in Subsection 8.3.3.
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8.3.3 Extended Performance Equation
To further analyse the complexity of the relationship between the measures of 
flexibility and performance, the specification of the performance relationship (8.3) is 
extended in two ways. First, the measures of agility and speed are decomposed into their 
components (e.g. Adjust, AdjustTime}. Equation (8.3) is re-expressed as follows;
Perform - Po + Pi FSTurbulence +$2Precipitator + $3Adjust +
§d3recipitatorTime+§sAdjustTime+ Un (8.5)
Second, three further regressors are added to equation (8.5) in equation (8.6). An additional 
regressor, FSTurbulence squared, is included in equation (8.6) to test whether the 
hypothesis that the relationship between firm specific turbulence and the long run prospects 
of the firm is U-shaped convex (positive second derivative) or concave (negative second 
derivative). The variable Age and the square of Age are also included to capture potential 
learning effects, and to control for the different life histories of the long-lived small firms 
(see Agarwal and Gort, 2004). Equation (8.5) is extended as follows:
Perform — Po + Pi FSTurbulence+fyzFSTurbulence^fcPrecipitator + $ Adjust +
^PrccipitatorTime+^>6AdjustTime+ frAge* fiAge2+ Un (8.6)
Equations (8.5) and (8.6) were estimated using Heckman’s two step estimation method for 
the larger sample size, (N=186). Only the results of the estimation of the performance 
relationships are presented in Table 8.8. The estimates of the sample selection equation 
(8.4) for N-186 are unchanged, and thus are not presented here (see Table 8.6). Associated 
elasticities at the mean, for performance relationship (8.5) and (8.6), are presented in Table 
8.9. Both of the performance relationships are discussed in turn below.
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Table 8.8: Heckman Sample Selection of Equations (8.5) and (&.6)(N=186)
Estimation EQN (8.5) EQN (8.6)
Regressors Coeff. Coeff.
(Std. Error) (Std. Error)
FSTurbulence -1.457* -3.255*
(0.162) (0.842)
(FSTurbulence)2 0.116*
(0.042)
Precipitator 1.181* 0.469
(0.288) (0.299)
Adjust 0.119 0.585**
(0.307) (0.294)
PrecipitatorTime -0.174*** -0.061
(0.090) (0.080)
AdjustTime 0.405* 0.296*
(0.030) (0.035)
Age -0.553**
(0.224)
(Age)2 0.008**
(0.003)
Constant 66.495* 79.647*
(1.804) (3.190)
Mills-iambda 618626.3 500299.8
(915376.6) (813980.9)
Rho 0.106 0.100
Sigma 5864461.2 5017532.2
Wald chi2 13421.77 18343.31
d.f. 6 9
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000
Notes: *significant at p-value=0.01; ** significant atp-value=0.05; ***significant at p-value=0.1
Table 8.9: Elasticities at mean of Equations (8.5) and (8.6) (N-186)
Estimation EQN (8.5) EQN (8.6)
Regressors Elasticities Elasticities
at mean at mean
FSTurbulence -0.215 -0.480
(FSTurbulence)2 0.200
Precipitator 0.096 0.038
Adjust 0.013 0.064
PrecipitatorTime -0.029 -0.010
AdjustTime 0.107 0.078
Age -0.194
(Age)2 0.077
Constant 1.015 1.122
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8.3.3.1 Interpretation of Estimates of Equation (8.5)
Turning first to the estimates of equation (8.5), firm-specific turbulence 
(FSTurbulence) still has a large negative impact on the long-run prospects of the small 
firm. In fact, this variable has a considerably higher elasticity (-0.21) than any other 
regressor in this specification of the model. The impact of this variable has doubled in 
comparison with the estimate of FSTurbulence in the aggregate model presented in Table
8.6. As found above, too much organisational change can negatively impact on 
performance.
According to the estimates of equation (8.5) in Table 8.8, it seems that an intricate 
relationship exists between the measures of flexibility (i.e. Precipitator, Adjust, 
PrecipitatorTime and AdjustTime) and performance (Perform). The number of 
precipitating influences, which the owner-manager can identify from scanning the 
environment, (Precipitator), had a highly significant and positive effect on the long run 
performance of the small firm. The size of the effect is large judged by its elasticity. A 1% 
increase in the mean count of precipitators (Precipitator) increases performance by 0.10%. 
The count of precipitators of organisational change reflects the alertness of the entrepreneur 
to changes in the small firm's environment (Smith, 1997a; Wickam, 2001 p.324). The 
capacity of the owner-manager to identify potential drivers of opportunities to improve 
performance is important (see Mata, 1993). That is, the owner-manager for whom the 
count variable Precipitator is high, is not just passively noting changes in the environment. 
Rather, he is actively seeking signs of environmental change to which the business could be 
better adapted. Using real options reasoning, the greater the array of factors embraced in 
the variable Precipitator, the higher the option value of the firm (see McGrath, 1999, 
proposition I).
The PrecipitatorTime variable in equation (8.5) had a weakly significant negative 
effect on performance, with a ten percent probability that this result could have occurred by 
chance. The elasticity is moderately large (-0.03%). This suggests that a longer response 
time to detected changes in its environment had a significant negative impact on the 
performance of the small firm (PrecipitatorTime). A swift response improves the 
performance of the small firm.
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Interpreting the results for Precipitator and PrecipitatorTime jointly suggests that 
the influences of both these variables on performance dilfer (an may work in opposing 
ways). With a larger number of detected precipitators of organisational change, the firm 
has greater certainty that organisational change is necessary, to improve performance, or for 
sheer survival. However, if a small firm is slow to respond to detected drivers of change, it 
risks being too late to achieve improvements in performance from instigating the 
organisational change. A speedy response time improves performance. Therefore a trade­
off seems to arise. The longer is the PrecipitatorTime, the more Precipitators are detected. 
The more Precipitators are detected, the more are uncertainties surrounding the 
organisational change being resolved. But the longer the PrecipitatorTime, the greater is 
the risk that the mature small firm will foil to capture some of the benefits of improved 
performance. The interpretations of the estimates of Precipitator and PrecipitatorTime in 
performance relationship (8.6) are also captured by the discussion above (i.e. the direction 
of the signs are the same, the magnitude of the elasticities fall slightly). However, the 
coefficients on Precipitator and PrecipitatorTime are not significant when the three 
additional regressors are included in the model.
Discussion now examines the influence of the level and timing of consequential 
adjustments which the mature small firm instigates, following an organisational change 
(e.g. changes in headcount, stock levels or credit policy). There are some differences in the 
behaviour of the variable, Adjust, between equations (8.5) and (8.6). The coefficient on 
Adjust is not significant in equation (8.5), but has a positive and significant effect on 
performance in equation (8.6), with a higher elasticity. A 1% increase in the mean count of 
adjustments (Adjust} increases performance by 0.06%. A higher number of consequential 
adjustments (Adjust} following an organisational change, other things being equal, increase 
the performance of the long-lived small firm. A higher number of absolute adjustments 
may signal greater commitment by the firm to the organisational change. Furthermore, 
greater commitment perhaps indicates that the organisational change has significant 
implications for the long run survival prospects of the firm, Ghemawat, (1991).
The variable AjustTime, the lag between the organisational change (instigated by 
some precipitating influences), and the last consequential adjustment (e.g. capacity,
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cashflow), had a positive and a highly significant impact on performance. This effect is 
similar across equations (8.5) and (8.6) [The elasticity is slightly higher in equation (8.5) 
0.1% versus 0.08% in equation (8.6)]. This result is surprising as the small firm, which is 
slow to adjust, perhaps due to difficulties in altering the factors of production (e.g. 
technology), achieves a higher level of performance. However, the interpretation offered 
by real options analysis is preferred here (see Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Luehrman, 1998; 
McGrath, 1999). A real options approach would hold that extending AdjustTime could 
attenuate potential downside risks by limiting fixed costs and irreversible investments until 
uncertainties are resolved. This raises the bundled value of the portfolio of options (or 
consequential adjustments) and the flexibility of the firm. However, the staging of 
consequential adjustments (i.e. extending AdjustTime} may imply that it takes longer to 
receive the payoffs from organisational change. Thus, increases in the option value, 
deriving from increased flexibility, may come at a cost. In a technical sense, a trade-off 
exists. McGrath and Nerkar (2004) argue along similar lines that the value of an option 
(i.e. or an incremental investment) if not exercised is subject to diminishing returns with the 
passage of time. Thus, the entrepreneur cannot postpone investment indefinitely without 
risking the erosion of the value of the option.
Interpreting the estimates for Adjust and AdjustTime jointly, it seems that the more 
adjustments {Adjust}, the greater the sunk cost or the downside risk, in the event of 
withdrawal. However, a longer adjustment time {AdjustTime} can reduce the downside 
risks, as uncertainties are resolved. But the longer the AdjustTime, the longer it takes to 
receive the payofls or the performance improvements following the organisational change 
(i.e. the small firm risks imitation by rivals, loss of market share etc.) (see Folta and Miller, 
2002; Arthur, 1994; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). Thus, the extension of AdjustTime 
is not costless. The enterprise profiles presented in Volume II, Appendix 5 illustrate the 
dynamics of this argument for key organisational changes undertaken by a subset of firms 
in the sample.
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8.3.5.2 Interpretation of Estimates of Equation (8.6)
When the square of firm-specific turbulence {FSTurbulence2} was included as an 
additional regressor in the performance relationship (8.6), the effect of this variable was 
found to be positive and significant. The elasticity on squared firm-specific turbulence 
{FSTurbulence2) is high at (0.2%). The size of the elasticity on FSTurbulence increased 
considerably in this specification of the performance relationship (i.e. from -0.22 to -0.48). 
In general, the findings suggest that the rate at which firm specific turbulence negatively 
impacts on performance declines as firm-specific turbulence increases. Performance is a 
convex function of firm-specific turbulence. As poorly performing firms (or ‘stagnant’ 
firms) and highly performing firms (or ‘adaptive’ firms) tend to be relatively more active in 
undertaking organisational change (see Reid and Smith, 2000b), the declining rate at which 
firm-specific turbulence negatively influences performance sheds some light on this 
relationship. Adaptive firms are perhaps actively engaging in organisational change to 
enhance the long-run prospects of the firm. By contrast, stagnant firms are actively 
engaging in organisational change to offset poor performance.
The coefficient on Age, and the square of Age, is significant in explaining the long 
run prospects of the mature small firm in equation (8.6). A convex U-shaped relationship is 
present, here also, between age and performance. Age has a negative effect on 
performance (high elasticity of -0.19). This effect is similar in nature to the inverse relation 
found between age and firm growth (see Evans 1987a, b; Liu et. al., 1999; Reid, 1993; 
Dunne et. al. 1989a, Variyam and Kraybill, 1992; Dunne and Hughes, 1994) rather than the 
positive relationship found between age and firm survival (see Evans, 1987 a, b; Dunne et 
al. 1989a; Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Heshmati, 2001). It seems that the long run prospects, 
or performance, of the small firm declines as the firm gets older, however at a decreasing 
rate. The elasticity of the coefficient on the square of age is positive, but relatively low at 
0.07. Performance is a convex fimction of age. This is a satisfactory result. If 
performance fell at an increasing rate, the long run survival of these mature small firms 
would be tenuous.
The interpretation of the estimated components of agility (i.e. Adjust, Precipitator) 
and speed (i.e. PrecipitatorTime, AdjustTime) in performance relationship (8.6) are
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captured by the discussion above. However, the effects of age and firm-specific turbulence 
tend to explain most of the variation in the long run prospects of the small firm in this 
instance. A likelihood ratio test applied to a comparison of the specification of the model 
in equation (8.6) with that of equation (8.5) in Table 8.8 produced a %2 statistic of 19.31, 
which is considerably higher than the relevant %2o.os (3) significance point of 7.81. By 
implication, the preferred specification is the extended model in equation (8.6)50. The 
complexity of the relationship between the components of agility and speed indicates that 
there are likely non-linearities between the measures of speed (i.e. PrecipitatorTime, 
AdjustTime) and agility (i.e. Precipitator, Adjust) in the model. Interactions terms are 
included in equations (8.5) and (8.6) below to examine whether variation in performance is 
explained by simultaneous variation in measures of speed and agility.
8.4 Interactions between Flexibility Measures in the Performance Equation
Non-linearities between firm-specific turbulence and performance and age and 
performance were discussed above. This Section extends the performance relationship 
further to test whether non-linearities exist between the components of agility (i.e. 
Precipitator, Adjust) and speed (i.e. PrecipitatorTime, AdjustTime). Interaction terms, to 
capture simultaneous variation in these variables, are included as additional independent 
variables in performance relationships (8.5) and (8.6). These performance relationships are 
rewritten here, incorporating the interaction terms, as equations (8.7) and (8.8) respectively. 
Perform ~ po + pi FSTurbulence+fcPrecipitator + ^Adjust + ^^PrecipitatorTime ,
+ ^AdjustTime + ^(Precipitator ^PrecipitatorTime) +^-j(Adjust*AdjustTime) + Un (8.7)
Perform - Po + $\FSTurbulence+$iFSTurbulence2 + ^Precipitator + $ Adjust +
§sPrecipitatorTime+ ^AdjustTime + ^(Precipitator *PrecipitatorTime) 
+fiz(Adjust*AdjustTime) + p^ge+ pio^ge2 +uh (8.8)
10 IfZ0 and Li are the log-likelihood values associated with the foil and constrained models respectively. 
Then - -2(L,~ Lq) with d0-dj degrees of freedom, where d0 and d, are the model degrees of freedom 
associated with the foil and constrained models.
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As above, equation (8.8) is an extension of equation (8.7), it includes the square of firm- 
specific turbulence, age and the square of age as additional regressors.
In these specifications of the performance relationship two sources of non-linearities 
are hypothesised to exist. The first, an interaction term tests for simultaneous variation 
between the count of precipitators {Precipitators} and precipitating time 
{PrecipitatorTime}. Tentative evidence of a trade-off between the count of precipitators 
{Precipitator} and precipitating time {PrecipitatorTime} was found above. The second 
interaction term in equations (8.7) and (8.8) tests for simultaneous variation between the 
count of consequential adjustments {Adjust} and the length of time lapsed between the 
exercise of the organisational change and the instigation of the final consequential 
adjustment {AdjustTime}. Preliminary evidence of a trade-off between Adjust and 
AdjustTime was also found above.
The performance relationship, specified in equations (8.7) and (8.8), formally 
investigates the influence of the variables Precipitator, PrecipitatorTime, Adjust and 
AdjustTime, when interaction terms between these regressors are controlled for in the 
Heckman sample selection two-step procedure. The results for performance relationships 
(8.7) and (8.8), corrected for sample selectivity, are presented in Table 8.10, for N=186. 
Related elasticities at the mean are presented in Table 8.11. Sources of non-linearities 
between the components of speed and agility in the performance relationships are discussed 
in turn below.11
8.4.1 Interpretation of estimates of Equation (8.7)
Examining the results of equation (8.7), it is observed that the interaction between 
the number of precipitators {Precipitator} and the time it takes for the firm to instigate 
change {PrecipitatorTime} is negative and significant. Simultaneous variation in the
15 Similar observations to those presented above can be provided for non-linearities in firm-specific 
turbulence and age (i.e. both variables are convex in performance). They seem to be explaining most of the 
variation in performance in equation (8.8). A likelihood ratio test, applied to a comparison of model (8.8) 
with that of model (8.7) in Table 8.10, produced a %2 statistic of 11.41, which is higher than the relevant x2o.os 
(3) significance point of 7.81. This suggests that the joint addition of Age, square of Age and FSTurbulence 
squared increased the explanatory power of the model as above. The preferred specification is the extended 
model in equation (8.8).
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number of precipitators {Precipitator} and PrecipitatorTime attenuate their individual 
effects.
The influence of Precipitator on performance is positive and significant (elasticity 
-0.17).12 Greater alertness to forces of environmental change, and as a consequence more 
real-time information, has a positive impact on performance. It aids in the resolution of 
uncertainties. However, there are diminishing returns to adopting a ‘wait and see’ strategy 
(e.g. preemption, late entry, missed opportunities etc.) in an effort to identify further 
precipitators. The marginal effect of a higher absolute number of precipitators 
{Precipitator) on performance is reduced; the longer it takes the firm to initiate 
organisational change {PrecipitatorTime). The size of the elasticity on the interaction term 
is not inconsiderable at -0.09. This suggests that on observing an increasing number of 
warning bells or negative infleunces in the environment {Precipitator), the entrepreneur 
must balance its needs for further information to resolve uncertainties, with a greater 
impetus to act quickly (Le. shorter PrecipitatorTime) to raise performance. Thus, there 
seems to be evidence to support a real options approach to decision-making. At all times, 
the entrepreneur must weigh the costs and benefits of exercising a strategic option now, or 
in the future, given the available information (i.e. to exercise the real option its value cost 
metric>l, NPV >0 and its volatility should be low, see Luehrman, 1998 and Subsection 
2.4.2).
In equation (8.7), the sign of PrecipitatorTime has altered, it is now positive and the 
coefficient on this variable is no longer significant. The positive sign of PrecipitatorTime 
here does not alter the interpretation. It implies that adopting a ‘wait and see’ strategy 
improves firm performance, which is in line with the logic of real options (see Miller and 
Folta, 2002; Ingersoll and Ross, 1992; McDonald and Seigel, 1986). However, the 
elasticity of 0.06 is lower than the -0.09, the elasticity of the interaction term. The effect of 
a longer PrecipitatorTime is reduced as the number of Precipitators of organisational 
change increases. As above, more warning bells demand a quick response time, otherwise
12 In model (8.7), the marginal effect of a higher number of precipitators on performance is given by 
8E(Perform)/8Percipitator = p2 + 3&PercipitatorTime
Similar expressions can be written for marginal effect of the other regressors in the model, which are captured 
by the interaction terms.
292
the potential risk of late entry, or the prospect that the opportunity is going ‘out of the 
money’ (or has passed), is high. Indeed, there are diminishing returns to the adoption of a 
‘wait and see’ strategy.
The interaction between the number of adjustments {Adjust} and the time it takes for 
all adjustments to occur {AdjustTime} is negative, but it is not significant in equation (8.7). 
In any case giving it interpretation, the marginal effect of a higher absolute number of 
consequential adjustments {Adjust} on performance is reduced as the adjustment time 
{AdjustTime} increases, and the marginal effect of a longer adjustment period {AdjustTime} 
on performance is reduced as the number of adjustments increases {Adjust}. There are 
diminishing marginal returns to increasing the number of consequential adjustments 
{Adjust} or increasing AdjustTime (i.e. staging consequential adjustments). A relatively 
smaller number of adjustments and a relatively shorter adjustment time are preferred to 
achieve performance improvements. However, the elasticity of this interaction term is only 
moderate at -0.01.
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Table 8.10 Heckman Sample Selection of Equations (8.7) and (8.8) (N-186)
Estimation EQN(8.7) EON(8.8)
Regressors Coeff. Coeff.
(Std. Error) (Std. Error)
FSTurbulence -1.560* -3.151*
(FSTurbulence2)
(0.168) (0.890)
0.102**
(0.045)
Precipitator 2.088* 1.311*
(0.535) (0.539)
Adjust 0.572 0.473
(0.426) (0.392)
PrecipitatorT ime 0.198 0.194
(0.177) (0.162)
AdjustTime 0.407** 0.143
(0.195) (0.195)
Precipitator*PrecipitatorTime -0.109* -0.069***
(0.038) (2.885)
Adjust* AdjustT ime -0.007 0.016
(0.022) (0.036)
Age -0.472**
(0.225)
Age2 0.007**
(0.003)
Constant 61.980* 76.720*
(2.317) (4.731)
Mills - lambda 948046.4 13512
(843857.3) (802524.9)
Rho 0.176 0.125
Wald chi2 16102.09 19387.07
Df 6 11
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: *significant atp-value=0.01; ** significant at p-value=0.05; ***significantatp-value=0.1
Table 8.11 Elasticities at mean of Equations (8.7) and (8.8) (N-186)
Estimation EQN(8.7) EQN(8.8)
Regressors Elasticities Elasticities
at mean at mean
FSTurbulence -0.230 -0.465
(FST urbulence2) 0.175
Precipitator 0.169 0.106
Adjust 0.063 0.052
PrecipitatorTime 0.033 0.032
AdjustTime 0.107 0.038
Precipitator* PrecipitatorTime -0.094 -0.059
Adjust* AdjustT ime -0.014 0.035
Age -0.166
Age2 0.066
Constant 0.947 1.172
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There is some support for arguments by Miller and Folta (2002) to extend 
adjustments to organisational change (i.e. compound options or multistage investments in 
their terminology), as Adjust and AdjustTime are positive in sign, with elasticities at the 
mean of 0.06 and 0.11 respectively. These elasticities are higher than the elasticity on this 
second interaction term, and thus the impact of the latter is small. However, once this 
second interaction term is included as a regressor in the performance model, the coefficient 
on the number of adjustments (Adjust) is no longer significant (even at the ten percent 
probability level), but adjustment time (AdjustTime) remains significant.
8,4,2 Interpretation of estimates of Equation (8,8)
The effect of the interaction term (Precipitator*PrecipitatorTime) is negative, and 
significant, in equations (8.7) and (8.8) although, its significance falls in equation (8.8). It 
is only significant at the ten percent probability level. The effect of the second interaction 
term (Adjust*AdjustTime) changes sign from negative to positive in equation (8.8). In this 
instance, the marginal effect of a higher absolute number of consequential adjustments 
(Adjust) is increased, as adjustment time (AdjustTime) increases. Similarly, the marginal 
effect of a longer adjustment time on performance is increased, with an increase in the 
number of consequential adjustments. This is an argument for spreading out adjustments to 
organisational change over time particularly, when a number of adjustments are required. 
There is no evidence of a performance cost in this instance. However, the effect of this 
interaction term was insignificant and thus, the result should be interpreted with care.
Reflecting on the set of results presented in Table 8.10, there is evidence of an 
interaction between the number of precipitating influences of organisational change 
(Precipitator) and the time lapsed between the identification of the first precipitator and the 
organisational change (PrecipitatorTime). The sign of this interaction term is negative 
indicating that a trade-off exists. There are diminishing returns to adopting a ‘wait and see’ 
policy in an effort to identify more precipitators of change. The small firm feces the danger 
that the real option will no longer be ‘in the money’. Tins interaction effect offers support 
for the empirical relevance of the real options argument. The effect of the second 
interaction, between the number of consequential adjustments and the time lapsed between 
the change and the final adjustment (Adjust*AdjustTime), is difficult to interpret given the
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switch in signs, from negative to positive, in specifications of equation (8.7) to equation 
(8.8). Also, the coefficient on this interaction term is not significant. Therefore there is no 
clear evidence of a trade-off, at least in equation (8.8). There is an argument in equation
(8.7) for staging adjustments to organisational change. This lends some support for 
adopting a real options approach to resource allocation decisions within the firm.
A comparison of equation (8.8) with equations (8.5) and (8.6) was also conducted to 
test whether the inclusion of the interaction terms raised the variation in performance 
explained. A likelihood ratio test applied to a comparison of the specification of the model 
in equation (8.8) with that of equation (8.5) in Table 8.8 produced a x2 statistic of 22.76, 
which is considerably higher than the relevant xVos (5) significance point of 11.07. Thus, 
again here, the preferred specification is the extended model in equation (8.8). However, a 
likelihood ratio test applied to a comparison of the specification of the model in equation
(8.8) with that of equation (8.6) in Table 8.8 produced a %2 statistic of 3.45, which is less 
than the relevant x2o.os (2) significance point of 4.303. Therefore the preferred model 
specification is equation (8.6). Consequently, it seems that jointly the interaction terms do 
not explain a significant amount of the variation in performance.
8.5 General Conclusions
This Chapter examined the relationship between two dimensions of flexibility 
(agility and speed), firm-specific turbulence and the long run prospects of the firm, 
approximated by the long run performance indicator. It described the calibration of new 
measures of flexibility and firm-specific turbulence. A Heckman model with sample 
selection was employed to explain how differences in flexibility and firm-specific 
turbulence affected the performance of the mature small firm. The estimates suggest that a 
complex relationship exists between the measures of flexibility and the performance of the 
long-lived small firm.
Small firms, which can respond to precipitators of change with few changes in their 
operations, are agile. As expected, agility had a positive effect on performance. To 
prosper, the small firm should be agile or prepared for organisational change. Contrary to 
expectations, speed also had a positive influence on performance. An investigation was
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conducted, at a micro-micro-level, of the effects of flexibility on performance, to suggest an 
explanation for this finding. Examining estimates of a Heckman sample selection model, 
where variation in the components of agility (i.e. Precipitators, Adjust} and speed (i.e. 
PrecipitatorTime, AdjustTime} were used to explain performance suggested a more intricate 
relationship perhaps existed between flexibility and performance. Real options logic was 
found to be useful in explaining the results.
In interpreting the results, it was found that the mature small firm must be alert to 
drivers of change. The more precipitating influences identified, the higher is the 
performance of the firm. Following real options logic, the entrepreneur should hold options 
until uncertainties are resolved and the value of waiting is at its lowest. Such a strategy 
reduces downside risk, conserves the firm’s resources and raises the flexibility of the firm. 
However, a trade-off exists; it is in the best interests of the entrepreneur to act quickly in 
response to precipitators of change, or else it raises the risk of pre-emption, loss of market 
share etc. Increases in time lapsed between the identification of the first precipitator and 
the implementation of the organisational change can have negative consequences for 
performance. Thus, there are diminishing returns to adopting a ‘wait and see’ policy. 
Empirical evidence was found of this trade-off, when an interaction term was included to 
capture this effect, in the Heckman sample selection model.
Once the organisational change was implemented, it was found that the entrepreneur 
should follow through on all the necessary adjustments. A high number of adjustments 
were found to raise performance. The process of adjustment should not be undertaken 
impulsively however. Delays on adjustment were found to have beneficial consequences 
for performance as they reduce uncertainty and diminish irreversibility. Again in real 
options logic, the entrepreneur should spread out adjustments to the organisational change. 
In keeping with this logic, the firm should make small investments initially, and larger 
investments when the option matures or materialises. This limits the sunk costs in the 
event of a withdrawal. Concrete evidence of a trade-off relationship between the number of 
consequential adjustments and the time lapsed between the organisational change and the 
last consequential adjustment was not found. An interaction term included in the Heckman 
sample selection model to capture this effect was not significant. Thus, there is no
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evidence that extending the time to undertake consequential adjustments has a negative 
effect on performance.
While firm flexibility generally had a positive influence on performance, firm-specific 
turbulence had a considerable negative impact on performance. Too much trimming of the 
activities of the firm has a negative influence on performance. The evidence suggests that a 
U-shaped relationship exists between firm-specific turbulence and performance. Given the 
sizeable negative impact of firm specific turbulence on performance, it seems that only a 
small proportion of firms are experiencing positive dynamics. Small firms in the sample 
may have passed the long-run test of economic survival, but few have become superior 
performers.
Firm flexibility is shown to be an important determinant of the performance of small 
firms. Policymakers, therefore, have an important role to play in promoting small firm 
flexibility. In this regard, policymakers can educate firms to assess their own flexibility in 
response to changes, using tools for assessing their flexibility created from models like 
Table 4.9. With the predictions generated from the general model, the owner-manager can 
assess whether their scores fall within particular confidence intervals for low, medium and 
high performance. With this information, the owner-managers can try to improve the 
operational flexibility of their firms.
This Chapter provides empirical evidence of the relationship between flexibility and 
performance, using measures calculated across a number of types of changes. Further 
research could estimate a similar model examining flexibility measures for specific 
changes. The sample size, in this case, does not enable further microanalysis of this nature, 
however, predictions can be made from the general model using data on specific measures 
for different changes.
298
CHAPTER 9 SIZE, STRATEGY, PERFORMANCE:
A SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS ANALYSIS
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9.1 Introduction
It has been observed that few small firms grow to become fast growth firms or 
‘gazelles’ (see Storey, 1994, 1996; Birch, 1996)1. In general, there is a tendency for 
small firms to remain small. It was seen in Chapter 5 that the average size of the long- 
lived small firm in the sample grew from typically having less than 10 employees (3.57 
FTEs) at inception to having almost fourteen (13.55 FTEs) at maturity (an average age 
of 26 years). The modal firm type is still the micro-firm as the average size is 
somewhat raised by the existence of a few large firms in the sample. This hardly 
represents substantial growth over the period. It is difficult to argue that inefficiencies 
in the market fostered the survival (or success at ‘the first hurdle’) of these small firms, 
given the long period of time over which they have been examined. Only the fittest 
firms survive as the market selection process works out (Gould, 1993). This suggests 
that there are other factors in play that explain why many small firms don’t go on to 
clear ‘the second hurdle’ of growth in firm size.
To date empirical studies have deliberated over the characteristics of fast growing 
firms rather than examining the tendency of small firms to remain small (see Delmar et. 
al, 2003; Almus, 2002; Brilderl and Preisendorfer, 2000; Storey, 1996, 1997, 1998a,b; 
Birch, 1996; Seigel et al., 1993; Smallbone et. al, 1992, 1995; Leigh et al., 1991). Fast 
growing firms, according to Storey (1994), are direct providers of new employment 
opportunities in the small firm sector. He found that 4% of the fast growing firms in his 
sample create about 50% of the employment in this cohort over a decade. This is 
perhaps one justification for the focus of these studies. However, as stated in Chapter 1, 
long-lived small firms provide continued employment in communities and create 
positive externalities for these communities over extended periods of time. As the vast 
majority of these firms remain small-scale operations, it is important to examine why 
they sustain their small-scale existences. This Chapter addresses this gap in empirical 
work by investigating the tendency of small firms to remain small. It will be shown 
how the joint actions of firm size, performance and other factors, interplay in a way 
which discourages growth in the scale of the small firm. The latter include the size of 
the market for its product (e.g. local service) and the level of differentiation of its 
product (e.g. customised). It provides a micro-econometric analysis of the tendency of
1 Storey (1996, 1997, 1998a,b) describes them as the ‘ten percenters’ because they are few in number, 
Birch (1996) describes them as ‘gazelles’ because of they apparently effortless performance.
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small firms to pursue strategies which limit their growth in size, in order to survive and 
prosper in the market place.
Specifically, this Chapter examines two behavioural relationships between size, 
strategy and performance. These two relations are used to test the central hypothesis 
that there is a tendency for small firms to remain small. The first examines the 
relationship between firm size, the extent of the firm’s main market (local to 
international markets) and performance. The second considers the relationship between 
firm size, the diversity of the firm’s competitive strategy and performance. These 
relationships are estimated using simultaneous equation models.
Earlier work on small firms concentrated on firm size, particularly on the 
relationship between growth and firm size originating in the Law of Proportionate 
Effect (or Gibrat’s Law), see Section 3.2. Chapter 5, subsection 5.2.5 presented 
evidence of shifts in the scale of the small firms operations over the life of the firm 
using models inspired by Gibrat’s Law. Smaller SBEs in the sample were found to 
grow faster than larger SBEs early in their lifecycle phase to reach the so-called 
minimum efficient size (MES) of production. However, after approximately 5 years of 
trading there was evidence in support of Gibrat’s Law, at least for real turnover, 
implying that all SBEs grew at the market rate (i.e. independent of firm size) from that 
point on. Yet, the models on which these results are based are mechanistic in nature. 
Modem variants have tried to overcome this by including other firm specific 
characteristics, which may influence growth, as additional regressors. These 
characteristics included ownership structure (Dunne et al. 1989a; FitzRoy and Kraft, 
1991; Variyam and Kraybill, 1992), R&D, innovative activities and new technology 
(Hail, 1987; FitzRoy and Kraft, 1991; Doms et al., 1995; Liu et al., 1999), financial 
structure (Heshmati, 2001), human capital embodied in the owner-manager (Heshmati, 
2001; Liu et. al, 1999; McPherson, 1996) and export activities (Liu et al., 1999), see 
Subsection 3.3.4 However, this analysis has not been extended to examine the joint 
determination of size, and strategies which limit the size of the firm and performance, 
within a simultaneous equations model.
Managerial theories of the firm explicitly examined trade-offs between the growth 
of the firm and performance (see Penrose, 1959; Marris, 1964; Richardson, 1964; and 
Slater, 1980). Such ‘costs to growth’ were examined in Chapter 2, Subsection 2.5.1.
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Evidence of a negative relationship between growth and profitability is mixed. For 
instance, studies by Cowling (2004), Dobson and Gerrard (1989), Cubbin and Leech 
(1986) did not find clear evidence of a trade-off between growth and profitability. This 
is despite evidence of a negative (but insignificant) relationship between the rate of 
profitability and growth in assets in a 2SLS estimation of the growth model by Dobson 
and Gerrard (1989) and Cubbin and Leech (1986)2. However, Reid (1993, 1995, 1998) 
found evidence of a growth profitability trade-off for a sample of small business start­
ups within a simultaneous framework suggesting that there are diminishing returns to 
increasing firm size. Nevertheless, these earlier models can benefit from being 
extended to include other sources of endogeneity.
Other factors may influence the size performance relation. Lucas (1978) proposed 
that there is an infinity of optimal firm sizes distributed increasing in the managerial 
talent of the entrepreneur. Managerial ability places a constraint on the size of the firm 
as it exhibits diminishing returns to scale or to the span of control. For a sample of 
Dutch individuals Van Praag and Cramer (2001) find that risk aversion is a serious 
impediment to entrepreneurship but that success in entrepreneurship requires 
intelligence and general ability, with size of the workforce as the indicator of success.3 
Other factors include the motivation of the entrepreneur, financial constraints and lack 
of skilled labour. Most of these barriers to growth, according to Barber et al. (1989), 
are internal to the firm, (see Subsection 2.5.2 for more detail).
In this Chapter, Size is measured by the number of full-time equivalent employees. 
Main market is a categorical variable, which identifies the main market for the principal 
product group (which may range from local to international markets) (see Subsection 
5.3.1). Competitive Strategy is measured using a count variable of the competitive 
strategies (price and non-price) pursued by the small firm in their principal market (see 
Subsection 7.2.2). Performance is measured using the self-appraised multidimensional
2 Firm size was included as an exogenous explanatory variable in the growth and profit equations 
estimated by Dobson and Gerrard (1989) and in the profit equation estimated by Cubbin and Leech 
(1986) and Cowling (2004). It was found to have a negative (and insignificant) coefficient in growth 
equation indicating that smaller firms grow at faster rates and a positive (and insignificant) coefficient in 
the profit equation indicating that larger firms earn higher rates of profit. Firm size was not included as a 
regressor in Reid (1993, 1995, 1998). This may explain the mixed evidence of a growth profitability 
trade-off. In this study, firm size is treated as the endogenous regressor as opposed to firm growth.
3 Van Praag and Cramer (2001) extend Lucas’s model by assuming that individuals are uncertain of their 
entrepreneurial talent in choosing occupations. They choose the occupation which renders the highest 
expected utility given their attitude to risk and differences in their characteristics. Firm size is determined 
by the managerial ability of the entrepreneurs.
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scale (see Subsection 6.3). A detailed account of how these variables were measured is 
reserved until Section 9.3.
System estimation is adopted because it is difficult to disentangle one relationship 
from the other using single equation estimators in the presence of contemporaneous 
correlations and simultaneities. There is an inherent ‘lack of identification’ if single 
equation methods are adopted. To enhance the efficiency of estimation, and for 
comparative purposes, several system estimation techniques are reported. These are: 
seemingly unrelated regression (which corrects for contemporaneous correlations); two 
stage least squares (which corrects for endogeneity but not contemporaneous 
correlations); three stages least squares (which corrects for endogeneity and 
contemporaneous correlations); and generalised method of moments (which corrects for 
endogeneity, contemporaneous correlations and heteroscedasticity). This enables the 
robustness of the estimates across different techniques to be investigated. Other recent 
applications of a simultaneous equations approach in industrial organisation include 
Jans and Rosenbaum (1997), Beccarello (1996) and McDonald and Bloch (1999).4
Briefly, the Chapter is structured as follows: Section 9.2 examines the 
behavioural models to be estimated. Section 9.3 describes the variables used in 
estimation. Section 9.4 reports on Durbin-Wu-Hausman type tests of exogeneity, 
employed to examine whether simultaneities exist within each system. In this Section, 
the techniques for system estimation are also outlined and evaluated. Section 9.5 
reports the results of system estimation techniques. This Section also examines 
adjustments of size, main market, competitive strategy and performance within the 
simultaneous systems. Finally, Section 9.6 reports on the principal conclusions of this 
Chapter.
9.2 The Model
Two behavioural models are considered. Each behavioural model examines the 
relation between firm size and performance. This relation is augmented to examine 
further influences like the firm’s market extent, and the heterogeneity of the firm’s
4 Jans and Rosenbaum (1996) use nonlinear three stage least squares to estimate quantity and price 
equations. Beccarello (1996) used three stage least squares to estimate mark-up equations. McDonald 
and Bloch (1999) use instrumental variables to estimate the spillover effects of an industrial 
growth/performance trade-off model.
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competitive strategy. This Section provides some amplification of the key behavioural 
models being addressed.
9.2.1 Behavioural Model I
The first behavioural model examines the relationship between firm size, the 
extent of firm’s main market and performance. In general terms, the three-equation 
model is specified as follows:
P=f(S,M,X,)
- +
(9.1)
S~ h(P, M, XJ (9.2)
+»
M=g(S,P,X3). (93)
+, ?
where, P is a measure of the firm’s performance, S is a measure of firm size, M is a 
measure of the extent of the firm’s main market and Xj represents exogenous variables.
In equation (9.1), size is expected to affect performance negatively assuming 
that a trade-off exists between size and performance. This trade-off encourages owner- 
managers of small firms to reduce headcount to achieve greater efficiency. Such 
efficiency gains arise from greater labour productivity, often with an increase in the 
human capital of the remaining workforce. The substitution of capital for standard 
labour inputs is another potential source of efficiency gain. A fiirther source of 
efficiency is a reduction in agency costs as a consequence of lesser need for monitoring 
and lower levels of hierarchy (see Reid, 1998, 1992). Market extent, M, is expected to 
influence performance positively, as larger main markets offer the prospect of growth as 
a consequence of economies of scale (Reid, 1994, 1995, 1998). Xj here represents 
attributes of the financial structure of the firm, the diversity of the firm’s competitive 
strategy, aspects of its market and age.
Equation (9.2) represents size as a function of performance, market extent and 
other exogeneous variables. Based on previous evidence, and managerial theories of the 
firm, a negative relationship is expected between size and performance (suggesting a 
trade-off between size and performance). Market extent is expected to have a positive 
influence on firm size. Reid (1993) in examining new firm start-ups found that the less
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the dependence on local markets (or put another way the greater the nationality of 
markets) for the main product, the greater the growth rate, other things being equal. 
Using evidence based on 150 Scottish small business start-ups gathered from 1994 - 
1997, Reid (2001) found that growth is restricted unless firms start with marketing 
intentions aimed at national or international markets. Without this the small firm will 
never make major markets. Further, the choice of market extent is path dependent, and 
there are lock-in effects (see Subsection 2.5.3). An initial decision to serve local 
markets may therefore limit the future size of the small firm. A firm needs to adopt a 
strategy aimed at international markets early in its lifecycle if it is to continue on this 
road. Geographical expansion as a means of small firm growth, a neglected area of 
small business research, presents a number of difficulties for owner-managers (see 
Barringer and Greening, 1998). Through an examination of five case studies, Barringer 
and Greening (1998) found that effective business expansion requires careful planning 
for growth, the identification of suitable locations, the management of growth (hiring 
and motivating new staff) and learning and flexibility. In equation (9.2), X2 is a vector 
which represents a lagged performance variable, market variables and the extent of the 
firm’s administrative organisation.
Equation (9.3) expresses size and performance as a function of market extent. 
Firm size is expected to positively influence market extent based on arguments above. 
The effect of increases in performance on market extent is unknown and to be 
investigated. X3 incorporates market structural variables to approximate the extent of 
competitive pressure in the firm’s principal market.
Essentially, this three-equation model allows one to examine: (a) the existence 
of a trade-off between firm size and performance; and (b) the effect which market extent 
has on this trade-off. In general, it might be expected that the greater the extent of the 
firm’s main market, the greater is firm size, and the higher is performance. However, to 
gain improvements in performance, the reverse may be necessary: the firm may need to 
become leaner in size. Such firms might be expected to serve more localised markets 
better.
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9.2.2 Behavioural Model II
The second behavioural model considers the relationship between firm size,
heterogeneity of the firm’s competitive strategy, and performance. In general terms, the
three-equation model is specified as follows:
P =f (S, C, X4) (9.4)
- +
5= h(P, XJ (9.5)
C=j(P, X5) (9.6)
9
where C is an index of the heterogeneity of the firm’s competitive strategy and the other 
variables are defined as above. In equation (9.4) again, size is expected to affect 
performance negatively. The heterogeneity of the firm’s competitive strategy, C, is 
expected to influence performance positively. Thus, it is expected that the greater the 
number of dimensions along which the mature small firm competes, the higher is the 
performance of the firm. A focus strategy in which the firm competes on many 
dimensions has been found to confer the small firm with a performance advantage. 
Hence, Reid (1993, p. 119) claimed that Porter’s (1985) focus strategy was '"most likely 
to offer the SBE a competitive advantage": that is a strategy which is targeted to serve 
fiilly the needs of a very specific group of customers. Wright et al. (1995) 
recommended that focus or niche strategies were more appropriate for small firms, 
because entry barriers were lower. Carter et al. (1994) found that small firms prefer to 
focus on niche markets made up of geographic, customer or product segments. Caplin 
and Nalebuff (1986) show that a high cost firm, by locating well away from the centre 
of the market, may be able to avoid destructive competition with its low cost rival and 
guarantee itself a market niche. Porter’s (1985) ideas on ‘good competitors’ also 
explain the positive effect of the size of the competitive strategy space on performance. 
Such competitors, by engaging in sharp and challenging rivalry, actually promote the 
efficiency and innovativeness of incumbent firms, and hence improve their prospects of 
staying in business. In equation (9.4), X4 represents attributes of the financial structure 
of the firm, aspects of its market and age similar to Xj above.
Equation (9.5), which represents size as a function of performance, is now 
familiar ground and does not require any fiirther explanation. Equation (9.6) represents
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competitive strategy space as a function of performance, and other exogenous variables. 
The direction of the impact of performance upon the size of the competitive strategy 
space is unknown, and requires investigation. X5 like X3 incorporates market structural 
variables to approximate the extent of competitive pressure in the firm’s principal 
market.
9.23 Conclusions
The hypothesised trade-off relationship between size and performance expressed 
in the behavioural models above suggests that to attain higher performance the small 
firm must limit its size: decreases (increases) in firm size may raise (reduce) the 
performance of the firm. Arguably, it is this performance driven effect, which tends to 
limit the size of the firm: it may encourage owner-managers to reduce headcount to 
achieve greater efficiency. Smaller firms are expected to serve more localised or niche 
markets. One way of engaging in the latter is through cultivating more varied 
competitive strategies. By taking this approach, the firm is seeking to raise its 
performance.
9.3 Variables
This section presents information on the variables used in econometric 
estimation. It presents summary statistics on the key variables used in equation (9.1) to 
equation (9.6) above (see Table 9.1 below). A brief account is provided of how these 
variables are defined. For more information on the design and description of these 
variables the reader is referred to Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively. The endogenous 
variables in each behavioural model are examined initially. Exogenous variables Xi are 
then examined. This Section also provides some amplification of each structural 
equation to be used in estimation reported on in Section 9.5.
93.1. Endogenous Variables
There are three endogenous variables in each behavioural model, two of which 
are size, S, and performance, P. The other endogenous variables include main market, 
M, and the heterogeneity of the firm’s competitive strategy space, C, depending on the 
behavioural model which is being examined. Turning now to examine each of these 
variables in a brief way.
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Table 9.1: Mean, standard deviation and range of each variable
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
P = £fj/n where fj is the self appraised score between 0-100 for each factor averaged overall factors 1Oft
§ to n which were applicable. 67.3467 8.1036 49.11 90.43
s Number of foil-time equivalent employees in 2001. 13.6508 19.8488 1 130
M =1 (Local), =2 (Regional), =3 (Scottish), =4(British/Intemational) 2.2698 1.2599 1 4
a
W C = Zfi where fj are forms of competition used by the firm in their principal markets 4.5397 1.8035 1 8
LPst = [Sales at first interview (1985 for SBE, 1991 for telephone, 1994 for Leverhulme) at 2001 prices]/ 
[Employees at first interview (1985 for SBE, 1991 for telephone, 1994 for Leverhulme) at 2001 
prices]
113489 125103 1780 549577
Age Age of firm, in years. 25.5397 15.7284 10 90
Mriv = The number of major rivals 26.0318 126.1867 0 1000
MSh =1 (Under 1%), =2 (1-5%), =3 (6-10%), =4 (11-20%), =5 (21-30%), -6 (31-50%), =7 (Over 50%) 3.9841 2.4263 1 7
OC = Zfj where fj are the activities performed in the firm 7.2381 2.1381 3 11
D = If; where f are forms of debt used by the firm in their principal markets 1.8254 1.4429 0 4
Diff =1 (Identical), =2 (Similar), =3 (Different), =4 (Cannot say) 2.1746 0.7733 1 4
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It was seen in Chapter 6 that there are several approaches to measuring 
performance- Here performance, P, is approximated using the quantitative indicator of 
long run performance, a measure of fitness to survive over the long haul (see Section 
6.3). This measure was calibrated by summing scores from owner-manager’s self­
appraisals of 28 items covering aspects of the competitive environment, financial 
management, organisational structure, and business strategy. It is argued that this novel 
measure is both more comprehensive, and more compatible with our evidence base. 
This performance variable ranges form 49 to 90 out of a potential score of 0-100. A 
larger score indicates higher performance. On average, mature small firms in the 
sample received a score of 67. It is envisaged, that following changes in judgement of 
prospective firm performance, the owner-manager modifies factors like size and market 
extent etc. to enhance performance. Thus, this variable is expected to be endogenous 
within each simultaneous equations system.
The second endogenous variable in the model is firm size, S, and it is 
approximated by full-time equivalent employees. As with performance, there are 
several approaches to measuring firm size. The analysis was repeated using assets and 
sales, and similar results were found to those reported in Section 9.5. In 2001 these 
mature small firms were, on average, just above the size of the micro-firm (13 FTEs), 
generating £835,000stg. in turnover using assets valued at £330,000stg. Reid (1993) 
found that size measures, like assets and number of full time employees, early in the life 
of the firm in single equation models, had less obvious theoretical consequences for 
firm survival and were less useful predictors of survival. Here, Reid’s (1993) approach 
is extended to examine interrelationships between size, factors constraining growth and 
long run performance, all in a larger simultaneous equations system. In this way, a 
further understanding is gained of the relationship between firm size and performance 
and the tendency for new business starts to remain small.
The third endogenous variable, main market, M, is a categorical variable, which 
identifies the main market for the principal product group. It ranges from 1 to 4, where 
1 denotes more local markets and 4 denotes national or international markets. 
Typically, firms operated in localised markets. Nearly a half (46%) of the firms in the 
sample operated in local markets, few (3.2%) in regional markets, over a quarter 
(28.6%) in the Scottish market, about one fifth (19%) in the UK and few (3.2%)
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internationally. More than 50% operate in markets other than those that are local, with 
the largest proportion selling to the Scottish market. It was found (see Subsection 5.3.1) 
that firms may expand their market extent, but that there was some dependence between 
the firm’s choice of market extent at start-up, and the firm’s market extent in 2001.
The final endogenous variable measured the size of the competitive strategy 
space of the firm, C. This variable is calibrated by a count of the number of forms of 
competitive strategies adopted by the firm. This variable ranges from 1 to 8 where * 1 ’ 
indicates that the small firm competes based on just one dimension of the competitive 
strategy space (e.g. price or quality) and ‘8’ that the firm competes across many 
dimensions (e.g. price, quality, delivery). On average, the small firms competed on 4.5 
dimensions. In Subsection 7.2.2, a significant difference was found in the mean size of 
the competitive strategy space for different levels of differentiation. Higher values of 
this variable, C, represent a more differentiated strategy and a greater willingness to 
compete. A firm, which actively competes in this way, is expected to improve 
performance.
9.3.2 Exogenous Variables
There are a number of exogenous variables in each behavioural model to 
improve the specification, goodness of fit and to help identify the system, in a statistical 
sense. These are examined for each equation in turn.
9.3.2.1 Performance Equation P-f(,X$
The exogenous variables X in the performance equation, represents attributes of 
the financial structure of the firm, features of its market and age. Other industry (e.g. 
sector), structural (e.g. level of market share, the number of major rivals and the 
description of competition in the principle market), strategy (e.g. level of product 
differentiation and the level of information technology) variables were initially included 
in this equation, but were dropped because they did not significantly determine 
performance.
A feature of the financial structure of the firm was captured by a variable which 
measures the level of liabilities of the firm, D. Liabilities, D, are approximated by a 
count variable of the number of forms of debt that the firm had incurred. This variable 
ranges from 0 to 4, where ‘0’ indicates that the firm has no debt, and is financed by 
personal equity and retained earnings with an implied gearing ratio of zero. For a
310
higher level of external liabilities, a lower level of performance is expected. Indeed, 
Reid (1999) found that a bank loan, which requires debt servicing with its associated 
costs and risk, had a significant negative effect upon the probability of survival for a 
sample of Scottish small business start-ups. Over two thirds (68.3%) of mature firms 
interviewed were being financed through some form of debt. On average, these firms 
had taken on two forms of debt (e.g. bank loan, bank overdraft). This was the main 
source of finance, apart from private equity (see Subsection 6.2.3).
Market variables, such as technical change and, where appropriate, market 
extent, M, and the diversity of the firm’s competitive strategy, C, were treated as 
exogenous. Market extent, M and the diversity of the firm’s competitive strategy, C, 
were described above and consequently are not discussed again here. The level of 
technical change in the industry, T, is a dummy variable, which takes on the value of ‘1’ 
when the industry in which the firm operates experienced technical change over its life 
and ‘0’ otherwise. Fifty-two (82.5%) of the firms interviewed experienced technical 
change in their industry over the life of the firm. Industry-wide technical change has an 
important effect on the long run survival prospects of the firm. Winter (1984) and Gort 
and Klepper (1982) show that the technological and knowledge conditions determine 
the relative ease with which new firms are able to innovate and therefore survive (see 
Subsection 3.3.1.2). Audretsch (1995) illustrated the disparate effect a highly innovative 
environment exerts on the post-entry performance of new entrants. Those firms, which 
are able to adjust and offer a viable product apparently, experience higher rates of 
growth and a greater likelihood of survival. However, entrants that are not able to 
adjust and supply a viable product are confronted by a lower likelihood of survival. In 
feet, at a more micro-level, Reid (1999) found that either not using new technology at 
all or even perceiving one’s capability to implement new technology to be good had a 
significant and considerable negative effect upon new business survival.
Age, J, as a variable is feirly self-explanatory. The survival and success of the 
small firm may be attributed to the experience of the owner-manager accumulated by 
the practice of running the firm (see Reid, 1999; Evans, 1987 a, b; Dunne et al. 1989a; 
Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Heshmati, 2001). The owner-manager may initially be 
unaware of his ability, but, over time his ability is revealed, at the same time as his skill 
is acquired, see Jovanovic (1982). This introduces time dependence into the
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performance growth relationship: the age of the SBE is also a determinant of its growth
rate as well as its size (see Evans 1987a, b; Liu et. al., 1999; Reid, 1993; Dunne et. al.
1989a, Variyam and Kraybill, 1992; Dunne and Hughes, 1994). The average age is
about 26 years, (roughly one generation) and no firm was younger than 10 years old.
The maximum age in the sample was 90 years (roughly three generations), see
Subsection 5.2.2.
Performance equations (9.1) and (9.4) have five exogenous variables. Xi varies 
depending on the behavioural model being examined. Xi includes T, C, D, A and A as 
exogenous variables. X4 includes T, M, D, A and A2 as exogenous variables. It is noted 
that C is treated as exogenous in the specification of behavioural model I and M is 
treated as exogenous in the specification of behavioural model II.
9.3.2.2 Size Equation S=h(,X2)
The exogenous variables in the size equations (9.2) and (9.5) are: the level of 
technical change in the industry, T, described above; the labour productivity of the 
mature small firm at start-up, LPS(; and the scope of the administrative organisation of 
the firm, OC. Labour productivity early in the life of the firm (LPS(), is a ratio of sales to 
employees, as measured in the first interview at constant 2001 prices. It is 
predetermined and assumed to be exogenous. It is a measure of the operational 
efficiency of the firm earlier in its life. Firms which generate more sales per fulltime 
equivalent employees, are more operationally efficient. Greater operationally 
efficiency, early in the life of the firm, indicates superior performance at this stage.
Superior performers might be expected to grow in size (see Aw, 2002). This may not 
be the case, however, as firms grow fester early in their lifecycle compared to later (see 
Subsection 5.2.5 for evidence on lifecycle effects in labour productivity). On average, 
firms made £113,489stg. per fulltime equivalent employee at this stage in their life 
(ranging from £l,780stg. to £559,577stg.) in 2001 constant prices.
The scope of the administrative organisation of the firm (OC) is approximated 
by a count variable of the functional activities (e.g. production, accounting, I.T. support, J
sales, marketing, product innovation, strategic planning etc.) performed within the
firm.5 The variable ranges from three to eleven, where ‘3’ is a low level of internal
5 Penrose’s (1959) conceptualisation of the nature of the firm as a collection of physical and human 
resources whose services are made more or less complementary and thereby productive by (and specific 
to) the firm’s coherent administrative organisation is still relied upon. It is argued that the unique
l11t
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organisation and ‘IP a high level of internal organisation (e.g. a large number of 
functions are performed internally). On average, firms engage in seven functional 
activities (o=2.138). Typically, the larger the number of these functional activities, the 
greater is the division of labour, and the larger is the expected firm size. Thus, the 
scope of the administrative organisation is expected to have a positive influence on size. 
Indeed, the scope of the administrative organisation is significantly positively correlated 
with firm size (Pearson’s R -0.384 at a p-value=0.001 in one tail).
According to Ghoshal et al. (2000), firm growth is portrayed as the outcome of 
“a symbiotic process of resource accumulation and administrative organisation, a 
process... that induces its own creating and destroying actions from within” (p.146). A 
reorganisation of the administrative organisation involves rebundling activities, and 
internalising the various stages of the good and services value chain. This is perhaps a 
long run effect. Penrose (1959) argues that growth in the short run of the small firm is 
likely to be limited by the small number of possibilities that stem from the firms own 
limited resources and competition for their resources. In feet, while testing the growth 
efficiency trade-off, Reid (1994) found that as the SBE ascends the ladder of firm 
structure (as measured by the business type), it does so, in the short run, at the sacrifice 
of SBE growth.
9.3.2.3 Market Extent Equation M= g(S, P, X3)
In equation (9.3), the market extent equation, the set of exogenous variables, X3, 
includes: the number of major rivals in its main market, Mriv; and the market share for 
the firm’s principal product, MSh. The number of major rivals, Mriv, aims to provide a 
simple index of competitive pressure. In general, the greater the number of major 
rivals, the greater the competitive pressure. Even with an average of just 26 major 
rivals this pressure can be intense. Indeed, at extremes, it can be destructive (see Reid, 
Jacobsen and Andersen, 1993). Thus, increases in the number of major rivals are 
expected to entice the firm to pursue a differentiated strategy, and to seek to enter niche 
markets where there is less competition. Market share, Msh, is a categorical variable, 
which identifies the market share for the principal product group (as measured by 
proportion of sales). It ranges from 1 to 7 where ‘1’ indicates a low market share and
collection of resources that make up any firm provides both an inducement to expand and a limit to the 
rate of expansion for the firm.
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'T represents a high market share. It is assumed that the higher the firm’s market share, 
the greater is the firm’s opportunity to exercise market power, and therefore the easier it 
is to achieve growth, see Caves and Porter, (1977), Reid, (1994). Typically, small firms 
have a low market share in competitive markets or on the fringe of a co-ordinated 
oligopoly (e.g. a price leadership group). Some may seek and achieve a large market 
share of a small market niche, which itself is unattractive to larger firms. Examples 
would include local markets in fresh produce. However, such local markets have a 
limited size which curtails the potential scale of the firm. Nearly a quarter of the firms 
(23.8%) had a market share of less than one percent. Nevertheless, the variation ratio at 
77.2% is high, implying that over three quarters of the mature small firms had a larger 
share of smaller markets.
9.3.2.4 Competitive Strategy Space Equation C~j(P, X$)
The set of exogenous variables in equation (9.6), the competitive strategy 
equation, represent attributes of the firms principal market: the number of major rivals 
in its main market, Mriv, and the level of product differentiation, Diff. Product 
differentiation, Diff is a self-appraised measure of differentiation. It was scaled to be 
higher the greater the product heterogeneity. In this sample, the mature small firm 
typically sold similar, but not identical, products to its competitors. Most tried to 
differentiate their products. Out of the sample of 63 firms, 11 (17.5%) produced or sold 
identical products or services to competitors. Over a half (52.4%) produced or sold 
similar products and just over a quarter (25.4%) produced or sold different products. 
The question seems to be well understood, as only 3(4.8%) could not say either way.
9.3.3 Structural Equations
The two behavioural models are summarised by equations (9.1) to (9.6). These 
models are amplified here in equations (9.7) to (9.12). They now explicitly incorporate 
the exogenous variables discussed above. In equations (9.7) to (9.12), the functions/P, 
ftp, g(), j() are expressed in linear forms with additive disturbance terms Uj(f=l,2,..) 
The structural equations f(), h(), g() to be estimated for behavioural model I are as 
follows:
Pt = fo +/?;St Tt +fh Ct +fh Ht +/&A2 +uj (9.7)
St= ao +tf/Pt +ajLPSt +0/OC, +a5Tt +u2 (9.8)
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Mt — <5o +<5/Pt +<$?St +<5jMrivt +<%Msht +uj (9.9)
whereas the structural equations f(), h(), j() to be estimated for behavioural model II 
are6:
Pt = A +#st +ATt +$ct W> +AM,+M +M2 +«4 (91°)
St= ao +a7Pt +ajLPSt +a,OCt +ajTt +u5 (9.11)
C» = y0 +y7Pt +/2Mrivt +/jDifft h-u6 (9.12)
Equations (9.7) and (9.10) are identical except for the assumptions about which 
variables are endogeneous and exogeneous.
Initially, a priori considerations were used to classify variables as either 
exogenous or endogenous. Indeed, the selection of P, S, M, and C as endogenous arises 
as much from the extant literature, as from statistical considerations. However, once a 
priori knowledge has been incorporated in the model, its legitimacy needs to be 
explored econometrically. Therefore, formal tests for endogeneity within the system are 
examined in the Section 9.4, immediately below.
9.4. Methods
This Section reports on two matters: (a) Durbin-Wu-Hausman (henceforth 
DWH) type tests of exogeneity to examine whether simultaneities exist between firm 
size, small firm performance and the other endogenous variables M and C; and (b) the 
evaluation of appropriate system estimation techniques. Sample size prohibits us from 
examining all sources of endogeneity in one system (see Phillips, 1983) thus the DWH 
tests are conducted for each of the behavioural models outlined in equations (9.7) to 
(9.12).
6 It should be noted that the variable main market, M, was dropped from the size equation (9.11) because 
evidence of endogeneity was found between size and main market i.e. S=f(M) and M-g(S). using 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests. Thus to include M, in this equation would lead to inconsistent estimates of 
behavioural model II.
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9.4,1 Tests of Endogeneity
Simultaneities between endogenous variables in a system of structural equations 
induce a correlation between the regressors, X, and the error terms, w, of each equation 
of the system. This violates one of the assumptions of the classical linear regression 
model [i.e. the assumption that X(X ut) =0]. It is not always clear from theory whether 
certain explanatory variables are endogenous; or, if theory indicates that certain 
variables should be endogenous, whether the correlation with the error term is likely to 
be great enough that using least squares will result in serious bias. Thus, it is important 
to assess whether variables in our structural equations are endogenously determined. 
Here, DWH type tests are applied to investigate whether the set of estimates of the 
structural equations obtained by least squares are consistent or not.7 If the null 
hypothesis that OLS estimates are consistent is rejected, endogeneity (not every 
regressor is asymptotically independent of the disturbances) is present and the IV 
estimator is preferred to the least squares estimator8 (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, 
p.237). Failure to reject the null hypothesis suggests that there is no need for structural 
modelling but failure to reject it may or may not imply endogeneity (see Geroski, 1982, 
p.l50). Only under very special conditions will failure to reject be compatible with 
exogeneity. Hence, it is convenient to regard failure to reject as only indicative of 
exogeneity.
DWH tests for endogeneity were conducted for each behavioural model. The 
tests were conducted first to examine whether the endogenous variables showed 
evidence of endogeneity. Then DWH tests were conducted for the other exogenous 
variables in each behavioural model. The latter was done under the assumption that the 
endogenous variables in the behavioural model were infact endogenous, whether this
7 In practice the test is implemented as follows: Suppose a structural equation is
Yi = S X, + + u
where yjand y2 are vectors of suspected endogenous variables, Xi is a matrix of exogenous and 
predetermined variables, and u a vector of error terms. Let y 2 be the vector of fitted values of y2 from a 
reduced form regression of y2 against all the exogenous and predetermined variables in the system. The 
DWH test is simply an F test that the coefficient n on y2 is equal to zero (i.e. test ST ~ 0) in an 
estimation of the following regression yj = S Xj + ffy2 + 7iy2 + u •
8 In the absence of endogeneity, the least squares is the preferred estimator, as the asymptotic covariance 
matrix of the least squares estimator is never larger than that of IV estimator. The asymptotic covariance 
matrix is smaller unless endogeneity exists (see Greene, 2000 p.383).
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was based on statistical criterion, or a priori considerations from economic theory. The 
DWH tests are examined for each behavioural model in turn below.
No evidence of endogeneity between St and Pt was found for equations (9.7) 
to (9.9) using the DWH test, and a 5% significance level (see Table 9.2). According to 
theoretical criteria, there is some evidence of endogeneity between St and Pt, but 
given these results of the DWH tests, it is not large enough to lead to inconsistent 
estimates. We turn now to DWH tests for the exogenous variables in this system. 
Labour productivity earlier in the life of the firm, LPsh and age, A,, are predetermined 
within the system and are known to be exogenous. DWH tests were performed to test 
the exogeneity of the other variables in the system, namely, the level of liabilities of the 
firm, A, the diversity of the firm competitive strategy space Ct, industry technical 
change, 7), the scope of the administrative organisation, OCh the number of major 
rivals, Mrivt, and the level of market share, Msht. From Table 9.2 it is seen that the 
variables Db Ct) Th OCt and Msht are clearly exogenous. There is some evidence of 
endogeneity of Mrivt at the 5% level but this seems to be unidirectional in nature 
[Mt-g(Mriv^ but Mrivt^g(M^} 9 and thus is not explicitly modelled here.
9 F(i,56) statistic - 0.58, p -value = 0.4489 thus Ho pm=0 could not be rejected
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Table 9.2: Behavioural Model I: Durbin-Wu-Hausman Tests
Test for Evidence of Endogeneity
EQN (9.7) EQN (9.8) EQN (9.9)
Test St Test Pt Test Pt st
Variable Variable Variable
F-value (i( 53) 2.19 0.64 F 0,55) 1.35 0.3 F (1, 58) 2.06 0.17
Prob >F (0.1452) (0.4268) Prob>F (0.2499) (0.5862) Prob>F (0.1564) (0.6782)
Test for Evidence of Exogeneity
Test Variable Dt
EQN (9.7) 
ct Tt
EQN (9.8) EQN (9.9)
Tt OCt Mrivt Msht.
F-value 0.14 . 0.56 0.62 0.71 0.78 5.03 0.06
Prob>F (0.7067) (0.4568) (0.4346) (0.404) (0.3796) (0.0290) (0.8019)
Note: The F statistics (and associated probability values in parentheses) testing the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients on the fitted values of relevant test variable (obtained from regressions against all the 
exogenous variables in the system) are zero.
For the behavioural model n, some evidence of endogeneity was found between 
size and performance, St-h(P^ and diversity of competitive strategy space and 
performance, Ct^j(Pt) (see Table 9.3). This statistical evidence confirms a priori 
reasoning. As a result, theoretical and statistical criteria can be invoked to support 
system estimation in this case. Tests were performed for the exogeneity of the other 
variables in the system (except LPst, and age, A,). They would lead us to regard the Z)t, 
Tt and Mrivt variables as clearly exogenous. There is some evidence of endogeneity 
of OC, at the 5% level10 11and Difft at the 10% level11 but this seems to be unidirectional
in nature and thus is not explicitly modelled here.
10 F(i,60) statistic = 0.01, p-value =0.9220, thus Ho ps=0 could not be rejected
11 F(i,58) statistic=1.83, p-value =0.1890, thus Ho pc=0 could not be rejected
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Table 9.3 Behavioural Model H: Durbin-Wu-Hausman Tests
Test for Evidence of Endogeneity
EQN(9.10) EQN(9.11) EQN(9.12)
Test St c, Test Variable Pt Test Variable Pt
Variable
F-value {i,53) 2.12 0.99 (1,57) 8.2 F (1,58) 3.35
Prob>F (0.1511) (0.3236) Prob>F (0.0058) Prob >F (0.0722)
Test for Evidence of Exogeneity 
(St,Ctand Pt are assumed to be endogenous.)
EQN(9.10) EQN(9.11) EQN(9.12)
Test Variable Dt Mt Tt Tt OC, Mrivt Difft.
F-value 1.58 1.12 0.02 0.41 6.671 1.51 3.30
Prob>F (0.214) (0.2954) (0.8794) (0.5228) (0.0119) (0.2241) (0.0746)
Note: The F statistics (and associated probability values in parentheses) testing the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients on the fitted values of relevant test variable (obtained from regressions against all the 
exogenous variables in the system) are zero.
In conclusion, it is sufficient to note that there is weak statistical evidence of 
endogeneity for behavioural model II. However, as discussed earlier, failure to reject 
the null hypothesis does not imply that there is no endogeneity present, but that it does 
not lead to inconsistent estimates. Thus, to improve the economic interpretation of the 
results, and to increase statistical efficiency, system estimation is adopted.
9.4.2 System Estimation
A system of equations can be estimated in two ways. The first accounts for 
contemporaneous correlations between the errors of the structural equations in the 
system, using seemingly unrelated regression or SUR estimation. The second accounts 
for simultaneities between two or more endogenous variables, which are determined 
jointly within the system. The methods of estimating simultaneous equations vary, 
depending on their treatment of information and their use of different estimators (e.g. 
maximum likelihood12 versus instrumental variables). Single equation methods, like 
two stage least squares (2SLS) and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML), 
estimate the model one equation at a time whereas full-system estimators, like three 
stage least squares (3SLS) and full information maximum likelihood (FIML), estimate 
all the parameters jointly.
The choice of estimation technique in structural equation modelling is based on 
statistical efficiency criteria. In the presence of contemporaneous correlations, but in 
the absence of endogeneity, seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SUR) has an
12 Maximum likelihood methods are invariant to reparametrisation whereas instrumental variables are not.
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efficiency advantage over least squares estimation. If endogeneity is present, single 
equation methods, such as two stage least squares (2SLS), will have an efficiency 
advantage over ordinary least squares (OLS). However, single equation methods, like 
2SLS, do not correct for contemporaneous correlations between the errors of structural 
equations in the system, as each equation is estimated in turn. If full system methods 
(such as FIML or 3SLS) are employed, rather than single equation methods, they are 
likely to have an efficiency advantage, as they correct for endogeneity and the presence 
of contemporaneous correlations.
Full system estimators, however, are sensitive to misspecification error. A 
misspecification of any one equation will, in general, lead to inconsistent estimation of 
all equations. To avoid this problem, when efficiency is not a crucial criterion, 
investigators may well prefer to employ single equation methods. The easiest and the 
most widely used is 2SLS, as this confines the misspecification to the particular 
equation in which it may appear. Finite sample bias is another problem, which may 
affect the coefficient estimates of full system estimators. In fact, this affects all 
estimators, but finite sample variation of the estimated covariance matrix is transmitted 
throughout the entire system, in full system estimation, implying that the finite sample 
variance of 3SLS may well be as large (or larger) than that of 2SLS. Thus, the 
advantage of full system estimation in finite samples may be more modest than the 
asymptotic results suggest.
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p.234) state that it is generally desirable for a 
model to be somewhat over identified13, in order to ensure good finite sample properties 
for the instrumental variable (IV) estimator (of which 2SLS and 3SLS are examples). It 
allows the validity of the choice of instruments to be tested, to some limited extent. The 
greater the number of instruments included in the system estimation, the more efficient
13 A model is identified if the order condition (which is necessary but not sufficient) and the rank 
condition (which is necessary and sufficient) are met. An identified equation may be either under, exactly 
or over identified. An equation is exactly identified if unique numerical values of the structural 
parameters can be obtained. It is over-identified if more than one numerical value can be obtained for 
some of the parameters of the structural equations. The order condition requires that the number of 
excluded exogenous variables should be at least as great as the number of included endogenous variables 
for the identification of parameters. The rank condition requires that the probability limit of the estimator 
should be a non-singular asymptotic covariance matrix and the matrix of parameters have full rank for 
asymptotic identification of the parameters by use of the optimal instruments (all exogenous and 
predetermined variables in the system) (see Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993).
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the estimates will be. However, if estimates with as small a finite sample bias as 
possible are required, then fewer instruments are desirable (Phillips, 1983). According 
to Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p.220), there should be as many instruments as 
possible if N is very large (which is not the case in this thesis). If N is large, (N>500), it 
is the asymptotic properties of the estimators that are the primary concern. If N is only 
moderately large, (N<500), as is the case in this thesis, then use of a larger number of 
instruments increases the risk of finite sample bias. Thus, a balanced approach is 
required.
Nelson and Startz (1990) found the results of IV estimation tend to be highly 
misleading if the instrument is a poor one (i.e. there is weak correlation between right 
hand side variables and the instrument). Examining the correlation matrix for the 
variables in this system, presented in Table 9.4, it is observed that the correlations with 
each of the endogenous variables and potential instruments are not high but some of the 
correlations are above 0.25 which is statistically significant at the 5% level e.g. S, and 
Mrivt. There are a number of instruments in each system, as all the equations are over 
identified. Specifically, there are eleven over identifying restrictions in testing 
behavioural model I, and thirteen over identifying restrictions in testing behavioural 
model II (see Table 9.5). Thus, the validity of the choice of instruments has undergone 
some degree of testing.
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Table 9.4: Correlation Matrix
Variable st Pt LP.t Mrivt Msht Difft Dt
Pt -0.2107 1
LP„ -0.2511 -0.133 1
Mrivt 0.7581 -0.2094 -0.1286 1
Msht -0.107 0.1034 -0.0336 -0.1807 1
DifFt 0.0912 0.105 -0.1177 0.0062 0.0359 1
Dt 0.3245 -0.2076 -0.083 0.2204 -0.1759 0.3024 1
ct -0.0537 0.2744 -0.1093 -0.2183 0.2379 0.3708 0.2103
OCt 0.3824 -0.0449 -0.1407 0.1724 -0.1703 0.0525 0.228
Tt 0.1702 0.3674 -0.0173 0.0753 -0.0378 -0.0043 0.0023
Mt 0.3012 0.0771 0.0033 0.094 -0.2941 0.1826 0.1683
Age -0.0333 0.059 -0.1693 -0.0114 0.3751 -0.0994 -0.1649
Age2 -0.0653 0.1199 -0.1382 -0.0357 0.3153 -0.0945 -0.1477
Variable ct OCt Tt Mt Aget
OCt 0.0456 1
Tt -0.0716 0.1305 1
Mt 0.1336 0.335 -0.0345 1
Age -0.069 -0.2283 -0.035 -0.2354 1
Age2 -0.0711 -0.2426 -0.0153 -0.2365 0.9503
Note: Absolute values greater than 0.25 are significant at the 0.05 level.
Table 9.5: Over-identifying Restrictions
Behavioural
Model
Equations Excluded
Exogenous
Included
Endogenous
Over-identifying
Restrictions
ByEQN Z
9.7 4 2 2
I 9.8 6 2 4 11
9.9 7 2 5
9.10 4 2 2
II 9.11 6 1 5 13
9.12 7 1 6
In the presence of endogeneity, 3SLS, a foil system estimator, is likely to have 
an efficiency advantage over the single equation methods, such as 2SLS. The results of 
iterative 3SLS converge, in the limit, to those of FIML estimation for all parameters. 
They are not only asymptotically equivalent (and asymptotically efficient) compared to 
the results of FIML but should be numerically equivalent (although this can be masked 
by cumulative errors after high iterations). The error terms in a FIML estimation are 
assumed to be normally distributed, homoskedastic, and serially independent. In the
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presence of heteroscedasticity, of unknown form, H3SLS (and HDSLS), also referred to 
as GMM (Generalised Moments Method estimation), should be more efficient than 
3SLS (and DSLS) or FIML [Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, p.661].
Heteroscedasticity is present in size equation S—h().14 Given the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, and the sensitivity of FIML to finite sample bias in small samples, 
GMM estimates (or HI3SLS/H3SLS estimates in Table 9.715) are presented rather than 
FIML estimates.16
The results of the several system estimation techniques are presented in Section
9.5 for each behavioural model. The estimates of ordinary least squares, seemingly 
unrelated regressions, two stage least squares, three stages least squares, iterative three 
stage least squares and generalised moments method (or HI3SLS/H3SLS) are presented 
for comparative purposes. Each technique has an efficiency advantage under certain 
circumstances, as each places different restrictions on the data and have specific merits, 
which may overcome the failings of other techniques, particularly in smaller samples. 
Table 9.6 summarises the merits or otherwise of different system estimation techniques 
discussed above. Efficiency is not the overriding concern here; the limitation of finite 
sample bias is also a concern.
14No evidence of heteroskedasticity using Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity [x2(i) = 0.05 Prob. > 
X2(1) - 0.8153] or misspecification using Ramsey RESET test [F(3, 52) = 0.40 Prob. > F = 0.7521] was 
found for the performance equation P =f(). There was strong evidence of heteroskedsaticity for the size 
equation S=h(); Breusch-Pagan test for Heteroskedasticity [ x2(i> = 64.26 Prob > x2(i) “ 0.000] and but 
no evidence of misspecification Ramsey RESET test [F(3, 54) =1.8 Prob > F = 0.1969]. There was weak 
evidence of heteroskedasticity but no evidence of misspecification for the market extent equation M=g(); 
Breusch-Pagan test for Heteroskedasticity [x2(i) = 2.88 Prob > x2(i) = 0.0894] and Ramsey RESET test 
[F(3, 55) =1.7 Prob > F = 0.1787]. No evidence of heteroskedasticity using Breusch-Pagan test for 
Heteroskedasticity [x2(q = 0. 03 Prob. > x2(i) ~ 0.81655] or misspecification using Ramsey RESET test 
[F(3, 56) = 0.55 Prob. > F = 0.6499] for C=j(.).
15 In Table 9.7 the GMM estimates are based on the starting values of the 3SLS estimates rather than the 
I3SLS as the coefficient on LPS, in the I3SLS estimation is -1.4E-08 which is not recognised as a starting 
value in Shazam. The coefficients are the same as those on the 3SLS but the standard errors have been 
corrected using Whites HCCME estimator of the variance covariance matrix to correct for 
heteroscedasticity.
16 The results of FIML estimations of the two behavioural relations provided numerically similar 
estimates to DSLS estimates but the associated standard errors were very large. Thus the results were 
severely affected by finite sample bias. No efficiency advantage was obtained from adopting this 
technique.
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Table 9.6: Evaluation of System Estimation Techniques
Factors OLS SUR/
ISUR
LIML 2SLS 3SLS
DSLS
GMM FIML
Invariant to Reparameterisation d
Corrects for Heteroskedasticity d d
Corrects for Contemporaneous j •V
Correlation
Corrects for Endogeneity d
Better finite Sample Properties d
Economical d
Less Sensitive to Misspecification d d d
Greater Efficiency if no *7 d
Endogeneity
Sensitive to Normality d
9.5. Results
The results of system estimation and the relevant elasticities are reported in 
Tables 9.7 to 9.10 below. The estimates of each behavioural model are discussed in 
Subsection 9.5.1. The robustness of the results across estimation techniques and 
behavioural models is discussed in Subsection 9.5.2. Finally, in Subsection 9.5.3 the 
patterns of adjustment of size, performance and the other jointly determined variables 
within the simultaneous system (Cfc and M) are also examined to explore the central 
hypothesis that small firms tend to stay small.
9.5.1 The Estimates
The estimates of each behavioural model are discussed in turn below, beginning 
with behavioural model I. Sources of endogeneity within each system are discussed 
initially and then the results for the exogenous variables in each system are interpreted. 
Behavioural Model I
The results of behavioural model I, relating size, extent of main market, and 
performance, are reported in Table 9.7. The three equations are set out under each other 
with the performance on top, size in the middle and the market extent equation at the 
bottom. Coefficients are as in equations (9.7), (9.8) and (9.9). The t-values are shown 
under each coefficient. The relevant elasticities are presented in Table 9.8, calculated 
using the results of the 2SLS estimation and H3SLS estimation (see footnote 12 above) 
for comparative purposes. In general, the results of the H3SLS estimates are discussed 
most, as these results have greater statistical efficiency and
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Table 9.7: Results of System Estimation for Behavioural Model I
EQN OLS SUR ISUR 2SLS 3SLS DSLS GMMZH3SLS
P
Po 56.997 55.794 55.174 60.139 59.178 57.26 59.178
(12.12) (13.05) (14.54) (9.956) (11.3) (12.47) (14.392)
+PiS -0.0927 -0.1813 -0.2911 -0.0352 -0.1888 -0.3041 -0.1888
(-1.891) (-4.1) (-7.854) (-0.5664) (-3.483) (-7.614) (-11.725)
+P2T 9.0916 9.4913 8.731 8.4426 10.235 11.155 10.235
(3.995) (4.489) (4.211) (3.755) (4.752) (5.017) (4.4292)
+p3c 1.4607 1.2818 0.8009 1.6192 0.7698 0.3657 0.7698
(2.974) (2.897) (2.166) (3.261) (1.754) (0.9371) (2.1091)
+p4 D -1.2564 -1.0554 -0.6363 -1.4053 -0.6954 -0.3862 -0.6954
(-1.93) (-1.806) (-1.319) (-2.144) (-1.268) (-0.8815) (-1.5728)
+PsM 1.1844 2.0051 3.4408 -0.1334 0.8294 2.2964 0.8294
(1.605) (2.936) (5.226) (-0.0692) (0.4733) (1.42) (0.5760)
+PsA -0.2275 -0.1806 -0.1087 -0.2671 -0.1413 -0.0888 -0.1413
(-1.289) (-1.14) (-0.8349) (-1.545) (-1.024) (-0.8736) (-1.5117)
+p7AA2 0.00323 0.0026 0.0016 0.0034 0.0020 0.0012 0.0020
S =
(1.659) (1.507) (1-111) (1.804) (1.312) (1.083) (1.9697)
Oo 42.844 68.487 100.96 118.66 111.1 107.77 111.1
(2.081) (3.618) (6.164) (2.838) (2.681) (2.591) (2.7953)
+ajP -0.8860 -1.3437 -1.8896 -2.0856 -2.0463 -2.0453 -2.0463
(-3.062) (-5.046) (-8.254) (-3.33) (-3.293) (-3.275) (-3.1732)
+a2T 14.611 16.485 15.528 24.841 24.159 24.073 24.159
(2.396) (2.921) (3.081) (3.067) (3.042) (3.078) (3.2367)
+a3LPs, -4.24E-05 -3.36E-05- 1.58E-05-5.46E-05 -2.30E-05 -1.40E-08 -2.30E-05
+a4M
(-2.44) (-2.151) (-1.307) (-2.759) (-1.373) (-0.0012) (-3.0769)
4.2922 7.1327 11.088 6.5029 6.9769 8.4208 6.9769
(2.365) (4.236) (7.257) (1.106) (1.286) (1.775) (1.9745)
+a5OC 1.8621 1.3368 0.5193 0.8820 0.9946 0.6411 0.9946
M =
(1.706) (1.363) (0.6892) (0.5259) (0.6952) (0.6623) (1.6555)
80 0.8973 -0.3277 -2.7022 3.5595 3.4313 2.9079 3.4313
(0.7094) (-0.2712) (-2.293) (1.654) (1.601) (1.37) (1.7895)
+SiS 0.0369 0.0439 0.0522 0.0493 0.0374 0.0388 0.0374
(3.309) (4-171) (5.425) (2.143) (1.678) (1.733) (1.8996)
+82P 0.0240 0.0392 0.0694 -0.0176 -0.0159 -0.00890 -0.0159
(1.315) (2.25) (4.07) (-0.5425) (-0.4917) (-0.2783) (-0.5555)
-t-53Mriv -0.0037 -0.0030 -0.0019 -0.0057 -0.0033 -0.0030 -0.0033
(-2.094) (-1.811) (-1.291) (-1.84) (-1.117) (-0.9949) (-1.4800)
+84Msh -0.1636 -0.1419 -0.0907 -0.1573 -0.1296 -0.1231 -0.1296
(-2.705) (-2.501) (-1.791) (-2.548) (-2.151) (-2.05) (-2.5645)
Note: The 3SLS estimates were iterated 2 times to generate the DSLS estimates. The GMM estimates are based on the starting 
values of the 3SLS estimates rather than the 13SLS as the coefficient on LPst in the DSLS estimation is -1.4E-08 which is not 
recognised as a starting value in Shazam. The coefficients are the same as those on the 3SLS but the standard errors have been 
corrected using Whites HCCME estimator of the variance covariance matrix to correct for heteroscedasticity.
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thus are more precise. An initial examination of estimates of equations (9.7), (9.8) and
(9.9) suggest that the results are robust across estimation techniques.
The estimates indicate that a trade-off indeed exists between firm size and 
performance. For the H3SLS, I3SLS, 3SLS, SUR and OLS estimates, the coefficient of 
firm size, St) has a significant negative influence on performance, Pf=f(St), f’<0 and the 
coefficient of performance, Pt, has a significant negative influence size, St=h(Pt)> h’<0. 
For the 2SLS estimates, size is not significant in determining performance, though its 
sign suggests a trade-off. As stated above, the H3SLS estimates are regarded as being 
superior, in terms of their econometric properties and thus are relied upon here.
The trade-off between size and performance suggests that there is potential 
benefit to performance from reducing firm size. Here, an increase in firm size, as 
measured by full-time equivalent employees, actually reduces the performance of the 
firm. These reductions in performance may be attributed to a reduction in labour 
productivity. This could be because there are increased costs associated with hiring 
more employees, with rising effort being expended in recruiting and training new staff. 
Thus, the small firm may face the prospect of having to sacrifice increases in profits or 
performance, in order to grow.
Viewed in the opposite way, the performance equation suggests that reductions 
in firm size, can actually lead to increases in performance. Performance may rise due to 
a leaner cost base (i.e. lower wage bill). Reid et al. (1993) suggested that the wage bill 
is often the principal cost driver of small firms and that tight control of this expense is a 
prerequisite for survival. Reid (1999) demonstrated that a reduction in the number of 
full-time employees raises the probability of survival rather than a reduction in the 
headcount of the firm. Using a simple arithmetic example, he shows how causalising 
the workforce (i.e. by hiring part-time employees as opposed to full-time employees) 
can control the wage bill without reducing employment in terms of headcount.17 
Restructuring the workforce in this manner may more readily allocate workers 
according to marginal productivity. Over-time small firms perhaps learn how best to 
optimally allocate the labour input to maximise profits. By becoming leaner in size (as 
measured by full-time equivalent employees), the survival and the long run prospects of 
the long-lived small firm are promoted.
17 He found empirical evidence to support this for a sample of mature small firms (c.f. Reid, 1996) rather 
than for a sample of young business start-ups (c.f. Reid, 1999).
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Other sources of efficiencies may arise from substitution of capital for labour, 
reduced agency costs (Reid, 1992) or a relative increase in the human capital of the 
remaining workforce in the firm. At the limit, however, one-man outfits will find it 
difficult to compete in the same league as dominant players in the market unless their 
product or service is very specialised (i.e. niche products). Thus, one would expect that 
there are diminishing gains to the exclusive pursuit of size reduction strategy. 
Certainly, if the goal of the entrepreneur were to raise its performance the trade-off 
relationship suggests that downsizing might be the principal way of achieving 
improvements in performance.
For the H3SLS estimates, evidence of simultaneity exists, between the extent of 
the main market and firm size. Size has a significant positive influence on the extent of 
the firm’s main market, Sf=h(M,), and the extent of the firm’s main market has a 
significant positive influence on size, Mf=g(St). There is evidence of cumulative 
causations in the sense that the wider the extent of the firm’s market, the bigger the size 
of the firm, and the greater the size of the firm, the wider the extent of its main market. 
This property moves in the opposite direction to the trade-off between size and 
performance. In this context, the trade-off between size and performance perhaps 
places a limit on the extent to which the firm is able to grow through entering new 
markets or penetrating existing markets.
There is no evidence of endogeneity between the extent of the market and 
performance, except perhaps through contemporaneous correlation, as the coefficients 
of Mt and Pt, in Pt=f(MJ and Mi=g(PJ respectively, are only significant under the SUR 
estimation. The positive sign on main market, Mt, in performance equation (9.7) 
supports Reid’s (2001) conclusions that less dependence on local markets, or put 
another way the greater the intemationality of markets for the main product, the greater 
the performance of the firm, other things being equal. In the market extent equation
(9.9), the sign of coefficient on performance changes from positive to negative when the 
model explains endogeneity between Mb Pt and Sh. This effect is not given further 
interpretation here, as the coefficient was not significant.
Let us turn now to examine each equation, by reference to the elasticities at the 
mean, as presented in Table 9.8. Beginning with performance equation (9.7), it was 
found that a 1% increase in firm size, Sh leads to a 0.04% fall in performance, Pt, and
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visa versa. Increases in the size of the firm reduce the performance of the mature small 
firm, but the impact is small. By contrast, the extent of the firm’s main market, Mt, had 
a positive effect on firm performance, as discussed above. However, this effect was not 
significant and had a moderate elasticity of 0.03%. The coefficient on the firm’s 
competitive strategy space, G, had positive and significant impact on performance. A 
1% increase in the strategy space of the firm leads to a 0.05% increase in performance. 
Should a small firm be operating in an industry, which is subject to technical change, Tb 
this experience has a significant positive effect on performance and its impact is quite 
large (elasticity is 0.13%). Thus industry level technical change seems to have an 
important effect in promoting the long run survival (and prospects) of the firm 
supporting Audretsch’s (1995) findings for surviving entrants. The more liabilities, D(, 
the firm is exposed to, the lower the performance of the firm, though the coefficient on 
this variable was not significant in the H3SLS estimation. A 1% increase in the forms 
of liabilities of the firm lowers performance by 0.02%. Reid (1993) shows that higher 
gearing has a crucial (and negative) impact on many key aspects of the firm’s existence: 
medium term viability, growth and profitability. Excessive levels of liabilities too may 
be detrimental to the small firm’s medium term viability. Here, the effect has a negative 
sign but it is not significant predictor of long run survival at the 5% level. The effect of 
greater exposure to external liabilities in the latter part of the firm’s life is uncertain. If 
equity finance is a cheaper source of capital, the optimal strategy for highly geared 
small firms is to retire debt early in their lifecycle (Reid, 2003). However, later in its 
lifecycle many forms of capital could be appropriate. In Chapter 8, it was also found 
that the coefficient on gearing was insignificant in explaining long run survival. The 
effect of age, At, on the measure of performance was insignificant. The coefficient on 
age squared was significant at the 10% level using both 3HSLS and 2SLS. There is 
therefore a weak suggestion that as the firm gets older its performance falls, but at a 
decreasing rate. Performance is a convex function of age. This is a plausible result. If 
performance fell at an increasing rate the long run survival of these mature small firms 
would be fragile. A similar result was found for age in Chapter 8 (see Subsection 
8.3.3.2).
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Table 9.8: Elasticities at the Mean for Behavioural Model I
EQN 2SLS H3SLS EQN 2SLS H3SLS EQN 2SLS H3SLS
P = S= M
Po 0.893 0.8787 a0 8.6923 8.1385 50 1.5682 1.5117
+PiS -0.0071 -0.0383 +aiP -10.2894 -10.0953 +8,S 0.2965 0.225
+P2T 0.1035 0.1254 +a2M 1.0813 1.1601 +82P -0.523 -0.471
+p3c 0.1091 0.0519 +a2T 1.50 1.46 +82Msh -0.276 -0.2274
+P4 D -0.0381 -0.0188 +a3LPSt -0.4539 -0.1914 +82Mriv -0.0656 -0.0383
+P5M -0.0045 0.028 +a4OC 0.4677 0.5274
+p6A -0.1013 -0.0536
+p7AA2 0.0454 0.0267
In the size equation (9.8), performance had the largest impact on size. A 1% 
increase in performance leads to as much as a 10% fall in size (measured by full-time 
equivalent employment). This effect is also considerable, relative to the influence of 
size on performance (elasticity of -0.04%). This finding demonstrates why there is a 
tendency for these mature small firms to reduce their headcount, and to become leaner 
to gain fiirther improvements in performance. Here also, the extent of the main market 
has a sizeable impact on firm size, though its impact is much lower relative to the 
influence of performance. A 1% increase in market extent leads to a 1.2% rise in full­
time equivalent employment. A small firm operating in an industry, which is subject to 
technical change, also experiences a significant positive impact on firm size (elasticity 
is 1.5%). In response to technical change in the industry, the firm grows in size. In 
similar vein, Audretsch (1995) found that small firms, which survived in innovative 
environments, exhibit higher growth rates. Greater headcount is perhaps required to 
respond to technical changes (i.e. the firm may need to increase the human capital of the 
firm etc.). The coefficient on labour productivity earlier in the life of the firm, LPst, was 
negative and significant in the H3SLS estimation. This effect is indicative of the early 
lifecycle effects in labour productivity (see Subsection 5.2.5). Younger small firms 
generated more growth in sales per full-time equivalent employee than mature small
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firms. It seems that more operationally efficient firms early in their life shed labour in 
later years to maintain efficiency. It had the lowest influence on size (elasticity is - 
0.19%). The size of the administrative organisation OCt, had a positive but insignificant 
effect on the size of the firm. A 1% increase in the size of the administrative 
organisation of the firm raises firm size by 0.53%. This result is consistent with the 
discussion of Ghoshal et al. (2000) on administrative reorganisation. To engage in a 
larger number of these functional activities, a greater division of labour is required.
In the market equation (9.9), as stated above, performance had a negative and 
insignificant effect on the extent of the firm’s main market (elasticity -0.5%). Firm size 
had a positive and relatively large impact on the extent of the firm’s market. A 1% 
increase in firm size raises the intemationality of the firm’s market by 0.23%. This 
effect was significant. Both higher levels of market share and number of rivals had a 
negative effect on the extent of the firm’s main market. The size of the elasticity of 
each effect was -0.23% and -0.04%, respectively. The coefficient of market share was 
significant. This is perhaps indicating that small firms have high market shares in 
localised markets or niche markets. As generic markets become more competitive 
(because of more rivals) entry into niche markets becomes an attractive survival strategy 
for the small firm.
Behavioural Model II
The results of the behavioural model relating firm size, diversity of the firm’s 
competitive strategy, and performance are displayed in a similar manner in Table 9.9.18 
The relevant elasticities at the mean are reported in Table 9.10. This time for equations
(9.10), (9.11) and (9.12), an initial examination of estimates suggests that the results are 
robust across the estimation techniques. These estimates again indicate a trade-off 
relationship exists between firm size and performance. For the HDSLS estimates, the 
coefficient on firm size, St, has a significant and negative influence on performance, 
Pt^f(St), f’<0 and the coefficient on performance, Pt, has a significant negative 
influence size, St=h(Pt), h ’<0. In similar vein to evidence found above, the coefficient 
on size, as measured by full-time equivalent employees, is not significant in 
determining performance for the 2SLS estimates, though its sign suggests a trade-off.
18 This time the GMM estimates are calculated using the starting values of the I3SLS estimates and are 
thus referred to as HI3SLS estimates.
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The interpretation of this trade-off is similar to that provided above for behavioural 
model I and thus it is not repeated again here.
The properties of the behavioural relation between the competitive strategy 
space of the firm and performance are less clear. System estimation techniques indicate 
that competitive strategy space, Ch had a positive and significant impact on 
performance, Pt=f(St,Ct). In equation (9.12), the coefficient on performance, Pt, turns 
negative in sign once simultaneity between performance and competitive strategy space 
is considered (suggesting a trade-off) but it is insignificant. Causality is perhaps 
unidirectional, i.e. Pt=f(Sh Ct) but Ct ^j(Pt)- That is, the competitive strategy of the firm 
has a significant positive influence on performance, but its performance does not 
significantly influence the heterogeneity of the competitive strategy, Ct^}(Pt). If the 
goal of the owner-manager were to raise performance, the model suggests the small firm 
may achieve it by reducing its size, and by competing strongly, using a wide variety of 
strategies (both price and non-price).
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Table 9.9: Results of System Estimation for Behavioural Model II
EQN OLS SUR ISUR 2SLS 3SLS I3SLS GMM/HI3SLS
P =
Po 56.997 54.849 52.986 53.113 52.89 54.996 54.996
(12.12) (13.02) (20.1) (8.059) (8.938) (10.65) (14.822)
+p3s -0.0927 -0.1477 -0.2854 -0.0047 -0.1045 -0.1754 -0.1754
(-1.891) (-3.347) (-10.74) (-0.0604) (-1.488) (-2.87) (-5.2349)
+P2T 9.0916 9.1551 8.356 8.6902 9.6744 10.09 10.090
(3.995) (4.378) (4.066) (3.706) (4.221) (4.46) (4.2035)
+p3c 1.4607 1.9884 2.5872 2.8866 2.6524 2.1594 2.1594
(2.974) (4.537) (11.95) (2.015) (1.999) (1.83) (2.5702)
+p4 D -1.2564 -1.0752 -0.1995 -1.9571 -1.2475 -0.9173 -0.9173
(-1.93) (-1.86) (-0.7354) (-231) (-1.673) (-1.402) (-1.7515)
+P5M 1.1844 0.9561 0.1016 0.6129 0.2589 0.1414 0.1414
(1.605) (1.458) (0.3279) (0.7171) (0.3597) (0.2378) (0.3152)
+PeA -0.2275 -0.1787 -0.0205 -0.2814 -0.1775 -0.1417 -0.1417
(-1.289) (-1-142) (-0.2873) (-1.536) (-1.152) (-1.099) (-1.4783)
+P?AA2 0.0032 0.0026 0.0003 0.0038 0.0023 0.0018 0.0018
S =
(1.659) (1.477) (0.3837) (1.874) (1.35) (1.204) (1.7393)
Oto 40.127 66.671 121.55 146.71 136.45 133.08 133.08
(1.879) (3.331) (8.018) (2.758) (2.654) (2.71) (3.2072)
+aiP -0.7830 -1.204 -1.9507 -2.4254 -2.2709 -2.1831 -2.1831
(-2.635) (-4.317) (-9.009) (-3.023) (-2-9) (-2.896) (-3.3654)
+a2T 12.658 17.224 24.552 25.869 24.34 23.049 23.049
(2.017) (2.892) (3.931) (2.742) (2.709) (2.738) (3.1674)
+a3LPSt -3.92E-05 -3.37E-05 -8.30E-06 -5.44E-05 -2.53E-05 -1.14E-05 -0.1162E-04
(-2.179) (-2.027) (-0.9421) (-2.433) (-1.344) (-0.7666) (-1.3200)
+a4OC 2.7988 2.4408 0.5728 2.0858 1.7843 1.3618 1.3618
C =
(2.648) (2.494) (1.066) (1.615) (1.708) (1.747) (2.9287)
Yo -0.1729 -1.773 -4.0967 4.6964 6.2102 7.3857 7.3857
(-0.0949) (-1.019) (-2.621) (1.393) (1.857) (2.122) (2.8140)
•+y,P 0.0445 0.0705 0.1201 -0.0301 -0.0452 -0.0595 -0.0595
(1.696) (2.813) (5.29) (-0.5928) (-0.8992) (-1.139) (-1.5469)
•+y2Mriv -0.0026 -0.0030 -0.0011 -0.0036 -0.0061 -0.0075 -0.0075
(-1.522) (-1.879) (-0.9198) (-1.951) (-3.514) (-4.361) (-11.711)
+y3Diff 0.8183 0.7549 0.2653 0.9014 0.7033 0.6254 0.6254
(3.041) (2.981) (1.674) (3.2) (2.708) (2.463) (3.0788)
Note: The 3SLS estimates were iterated 2 times to generate the I3SLS estimates. The GMM or HI3SLS 
estimates are based on the starting values of the I3SLS. The coefficients are the same as those on the 
I3SLS but the standard errors have been corrected using Whites HCCME estimator of the variance 
covariance matrix to correct for heteroscedasticity.
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We turn now to the impacts of the variables in the three equations per se as 
approximated by the relevant elasticities at the mean (see Table 9.10). The impacts of 
variables in the performance (9.10) and size (9.11) equations are only discussed in a 
brief way. This is because generally the size of the elasticities, the signs of the variables 
and their significance are remarkably similar to the results reported on in Table 9.9 for 
the performance and size equations of behavioural model I. Therefore, differences 
rather than similarities are emphasised in the analysis here. Examining the elasticities 
for performance equation (9.10), one finds that the relative magnitude of the elasticity 
of size on performance is 0.04%, as found above for equation (9.7). The relative 
importance of the diversity of the firm’s competitive strategy, Ch in determining 
performance increases. It now has the largest impact on performance. A 1% increase in 
the competitive strategy space of the firm increases performance by 0.15%. The t-value 
of the coefficient on D(, the number of liabilities of the firm increased slightly. Other 
than these differences, the results of the performance equation (9.10) are largely similar 
to those for equation (9.7) above. In the size equation, performance had the largest 
impact on size as seen above. A 1% increase in performance is associated with an 11% 
reduction in full-time equivalent employment. The magnitude of this effect is similar to 
that for behavioural model I. Thus, there is a tendency for mature small firms strip out 
excess labour to gain further improvements in performance. In this instance, the labour 
input is perhaps more accurately matched to production requirements. The coefficients 
of labour productivity and the scope of the firm’s activities increased in significance. 
The elasticity of the latter also increased from 0.53% to 0.72% whereas the elasticity of 
the former fell from -0.19% to -0.09%.
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Table 9.10: Elasticities at the Mean for Behavioural Model II
EQN 2SLS HDSLS EQN 2SLS HDSLS EQN 2SLS HDSLS
P = S = C =
Po 0.7886 0.8166 a0 10.7475 9.7491 Yo 1.0345 1.6269
+P.S -0.0009 -0.0356 +ai P -11.9657 -10.7703 +y,P -0.4459 -0.8833
+P2T 0.1065 0.1237 +a2T 1.5642 1.3936 -Hy2Mriv -0.0204 -0.0432
+p3c 0.1946 0.1456 +a3 LPst -0.4519 -0.0945 +y3Diff 0.4318 0.2996
+P4D -0.0530 -0.0249 +a4OC 1.1060 0.7221
+P5M 0.0207 0.0048
+p6A -0.1067 -0.0537
+P?AA2 0.0503 0.0235
In the competitive strategy space equation [equation (9.12)] performance had a 
negative and insignificant effect on the heterogeneity of the firm’s competitive strategy. 
This is not surprising as many factors, other than performance may be determining the 
size, or scope, of the firm’s competitive strategy. Thus, it is not a major concern. 
Higher levels of product differentiation have a positive and significant impact on the 
dimensions of the competitive strategy of the firm. The size of the elasticity of this 
effect was 0.30 and 0.43 for the HI3SLS and the 2SLS estimation, respectively. To the 
extent that product heterogeneity (Diffy confers local monopolistic advantages on the 
small firm, it increases the dimensions on which the firm competes to protect these 
advantages. This finding supports evidence that small firms usually seek to cultivate 
mild forms of product differentiation, especially through customer service and delivery 
(Reid, 1993). However, it should be borne in mind that strongly differentiated products 
can only be sold in very limited niche markets, especially if they are constructed on a 
customer specified (i.e. bespoke) basis. The greater the competitive pressure in the 
market, as measured by the count of the number of rivals, the smaller the number of 
dimensions of competitive strategy of the mature small firm. Thus, as the market 
approaches a perfectly competitive market, the mature small firm competes on less
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dimensions (Reid et al., 1993). The size of this impact is small relative to that of the 
level of product differentiation (elasticity — -0.04).
In general, there is evidence of strong equilibrating forces on the small firm to 
reduce in size. Performance improvements are a clear driver of this. To improve 
performance, the small firm may need to downsize. However, size reduction also needs 
to be synchronized with suitable small firm strategies. Lean firms tend to survive by 
supplying niche or localised markets. The small firm also gains improvements in 
performance by cultivating highly differentiated competitive strategies. These effects 
seem to compound with the effect of size. The latter is illustrated more clearly through 
an examination of adjustment paths in Section 9.5.3 below.
9.5.2 Diagnostic Tests
Overall, the results displayed in Tables 9.7 - 9.10 are found to be broadly 
complementary. In general, the overall significance and individual coefficient 
significance of the estimates is greater using the HDSLS (or H3SLS) estimation. 
Arguably, these are the most satisfactory set of estimates in terms of statistically 
efficiency, since DSLS (or 3SLS) is a full system estimator and HDSLS (or H3SLS) 
estimates are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The generalised R2 measure, R2, which 
indicates the proportion of the generalised variance in Y explained by variation in the 
right hand variables in the system equations was over 0.7 for all system estimation 
techniques of each behavioural model (see Table 9.11)19. A likelihood ratio test of the 
null hypothesis, that all the slope coefficients in all equations are simultaneously equal
19 Single R2 measures are not appropriate in an equation system. The R2 from a particular equation 
computed could be negative since with system estimation in general it is not the case within each equation 
that the sum of the residuals is zero. The numerator could be larger than the denominator that is the 
unexplained variation can be larger than the total variation implying a negative R2. This is because single 
equation systems minimises e’e and therefore maximises the R2 in general. System estimation methods 
do not minimise e’e. The maximum likelihood (ML) estimator minimises the determinant of the residual 
cross products matrix; that is ML minimises det E’E. Hence ML does not maximise the individual 
equation R2 values. Since single equation R2 measures are flawed in the equation system context a
different goodness of fit measure should be employed, R2
The system R2 reported in Shazam (1993) is defined as
R = 1-1 / (r-r)'(r-r)|
where Y is an N x M matrix (N is the number of observations and M is the number of equations), 
Y contains the sample means and is the variance covariance matrix.
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to zero, was rejected again for all system estimation techniques of each behavioural 
model. The Chi-square statistic %2 - -Jv(log(l - -ft2)) was greater than the value of the 
chi-square distribution, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of variable 
coefficients in the system, at an a level of 5%. Thus, the R2 measures are reliable. 
Further, a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for a diagonal covariance matrix was 
rejected, after a comparison with the chi-square critical value with degrees of freedom 
equal [M(M-l)/2] where M is the number of equations in the system.20 This confirms 
that equation-by-equation application of least squares estimation would be 
inappropriate to estimate the structural equations of the two behavioural models. Thus, 
it is important to take account of contemporaneous cross-equation correlation of 
disturbances using full system estimators such as 3SLS rather than single equation 
methods such as 2SLS.
Table 9.11: Diagnostic Tests
STATISTIC
Behavioural Chi-Square LM test J Test
Model I R2 (16 d.f.) (3 d.f.) Iterations (11 d.f.)
SUR 0.8276 110.74 8.5917
ISUR 0.9650 211.17 8.5917 2
| 3SLS 0.8795 133.31 24.769
1I3SLS 0.9586 200.65 24.769 2
H3SLS 2 19.024
Critical value 26.3 6.25 19.68
Behavioural Chi-Square LM test J Test
Model II R2 (14 d.f.) (3 d.f.) Iterations (13d.f.)
SUR 0.7809 95.656 6.5889
.f ISUR 0.9875 276.22 6.5889 2
| 3SLS 0.7569 89.103 23.045
2 I3SLS 0.8325 112.56 23.045 2
HI3SLS 2 17.992
Critical value 23.68 6.25 22.36
20 The Lagrange Multiplier statistic reported in Shazam (1993) is computed as
M /—1
= TV £ 22 f 2 where N is the number of observations, M is the number of equations and where
f=2 >1 IJ
r;2 the squared correlation coefficient of residuals given by 2 _ . Under the null hypothesis of a
rv " -
a ii & ji
diagonal covariance structure the statistic has an asymptotic distribution.
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A test of the number of over identifying restrictions was conducted using 
Hansen’s (1982) test of over identifying restrictions (or the J test). The test statistic is 
asymptotically distributed as a chi-square, with degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of over identifying restrictions. For each behavioural model, the J test for the over­
identifying restrictions was smaller than the chi-square critical value, suggesting that 
over-identifying restrictions are consistent with the data. As the results of the system 
estimation seem robust, the next Subsection analyses the adjustment path of the 
behavioural relation between size, performance and the other endogenous variables in 
the system, namely market extent and the size of the competitive strategy space.
9.5.3 Adjustment Paths
A final interpretation of each behavioural model is embarked upon in this 
Subsection, by examining relationships between jointly determined variables in the 
system (e.g. for behavioural model II interrelationships between firm size, dimensions 
of competitive strategy space and performance). Suppose all the exogenous variables 
for the estimated equations in each system are assigned to their mean values. A 
function for performance P~f(), firm size S~h(), market extent M=-g() and 
competitive strategy C—j() can be approximated. These relations are examined on a 
two dimensional graph. The size performance trade-off is examined initially and then 
adjustment paths for each behavioural model are illustrated. The stability of each 
relation is also examined.
Using the estimated coefficients of the GMM estimates in Tables 9.7 and 9.9 
and the mean values for exogenous variables, the functions approximated for 
behavioural model I are as follows;
Pt= 68 -0.1888St + 0.8294M{ (9.13)
Pt= 69.9 -0.1888St (9.13a)
St= 136 -2.0463?' + 6.9769Mt (9.14)
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St= 151 - 2.0463?, (19.14a)
Mt = 2.83 + 0.03 74$, - 0.0159 Pt (9.15)
For behavioural model II they are as follows:
Pt= 59.938
Pt= 69.742
St= 160.668
Ct= 8.55
- 0.1754$,
- 0.1754$,
-2.1831?,
- 0.0595?,
+ 2.1594 C, (9.16)
(9.16a)
(9.17)
(9.18)
It is informative to graph the performance and size equations. Solving out 
expressions (9.13a) and (9.14a) for behavioural model I, and (9.16a) and (9.17) for 
behavioural model II, gives the equilibrium values (S*, P*) of (13.652, 67.346) and 
(13.639, 67.349) respectively. These are remarkably close to the mean values for firm 
size, and the multidimensional measure of performance in the sample, which were 
13.6508 and 67.3467. Figure 9.1 presents the case for behavioural model II. Thus 
equilibrium values (S*, P*) of (13.639, 67.349) denote the equilibrium point E. It 
should be noted, further, that the equations indicate a stable equilibrium point.21 Thus, 
starting from a performance level of 69.742 on the vertical axis, a convergent path to the 
equilibrium point E can be traced. Similarly, starting from a size of 160 full-time
21 This stability condition can be expressed:
(dP/dS)9t3a = -0.1888 > -0.48869= (dP/dS)9.i4a for behavioural model I and (dP/dS)916a = -0.1754> - 
0.45806 = (dP/dS)9.i7 for behavioural model II. These stability conditions represent convergent paths to 
equilibrium for the behavioural models.
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equivalent employees on the horizontal axis another convergent path to E can be traced. 
As E is close to the relevant mean size and performance values in the sample the typical 
mature firm in the sample may be thought of as close to this equilibrium point. The 
relative size of the adjustments for S=h(P) is much larger than the relative magnitude of 
the adjustments for P=f(S). In response to a desire for increases in performance, there 
would be a strong need for the small firm to adjust downwards in size. Therefore, to 
improve long run survival prospects, the small firm needs to become a leaner, more 
efficient operation. Performance compels the small firm to remain a small-scale 
operation.
Figure 9.1 Size Performance Trade-off
Turning to behavioural model I and solving out expressions (9.13), (9.14) and 
(9.15), one obtains equilibrium values (S*, P*, M*) of (14.7958, 67.1275, 2.32) which 
are similar to their levels in the sample (13.639, 67.349, 2.27). The typical mature firm 
in the sample is operating at a higher level of performance and a lower level of firm 
size. Figure 9.2 illustrate shifts in the size function, S=h(P,M), leftward through 
equation (9.14) as a result of a one-unit reduction in the mean market extent. A new
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equilibrium point E* is reached where E* represents higher values of performance and 
lower values of firm size. Small firms, by operating in more localised markets, achieve 
higher performance. The impact on firm size is considerable, these firms are much 
smaller in size. The strategic choice of market extent and the compelling need to reduce 
size to raise performance merge to produce this outcome. In essence, this figure is 
suggesting that the long run prospects of these small firms is promoted through 
exploitation of local and niche markets. However, the localisation of markets (caused 
by a one unit reduction in market extent) also shifts the performance function P=f(S, M) 
leftward through equation (9.13), and, mitigating the relative size of this effect, the new 
equilibrium is now E**. The influence of main market on performance was not 
significant at the 5% level, thus this result needs to be interpreted with care.
Figure 9.2 Effect of Localisation of Markets
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Figure 9.3: Shifts in S-h(P,M) and M=g(S, P)
According to Figure 9.3, the market extent function M=g(S, P) does not shift 
very much in response to a one-unit increase in performance, holding all other variables 
equal. Performance needs to increase by a significant amount (5 units) before a 
noticeable difference is found in the market extent equation (9.15). The size equation 
shifts to the left by a significant amount in response to a small change (one unit) in 
performance. The equilibrium size falls by a relatively large amount.
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Figure 9.4 Impact of Increase in Diversity of Competitive Strategy
Solving out expressions (9.16), (9.17) and (9.18) for behavioural model II gives 
equilibrium values (S*, P*, C*) of (13.6196, 67.3576, 4.54). This equilibrium is very 
close to the respective values of average size, performance and diversity of competitive 
strategy in the sample of (13.639, 67.349, 4.5397). Figure 9.4 illustrates shifts in the 
performance function, as a result of a change in the dimensions of the competitive 
strategy of the firm. If the firm increases the heterogeneity of its competitive strategy, 
the performance function shifts to the right, and a new equilibrium point E* is reached, 
where E* represents higher values of performance and lower values of firm size. The 
magnitude of this increase in performance could be dampened, if improvements in 
performance feed back into the heterogeneity of the firm’s competitive strategy. 
However, this effect was insignificant, across system estimation techniques, and thus is 
not given much interpretative attention here. In essence, this figure is suggesting that
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the long run prospects of these small firms can be promoted through further 
specialisation of the dimensions by which they compete.
An examination of the adjustment paths above shows in general, that there is a 
strong tendency for the small firm to adjust downwards in size even for very small 
increases in performance. The influence of the latter is compounded with the strategic 
choices of the firm (e.g. the exploitation of local and niche markets). Firms, which are 
small in scale, are inclined to serve niche markets and to cultivate highly differentiated 
competitive strategy. The initiation of these strategies and the shedding of excess 
labour inputs raise the performance of the firm.
9.6. General Conclusions
This Chapter examines two behavioural models. The first one examines the 
relation between firm size, the performance and market extent. The second examines 
the relation between firm size, performance and size of competitive strategy space. 
These models are examined to explore the tendency for small firms to remain small. 
Novel measures of performance, size of competitive strategy space and market extent 
are used in exploring this hypothesis. A set of system estimation techniques was 
employed to estimate the behavioural models. The similarity of the results across the 
estimation techniques suggests the robustness of the results.
The work finds that there is a strong tendency for the small firm to remain small, 
on a number of fronts. First, as a trade-off exists between firm size and performance the 
mature small firm should act to eradicate excess labour used in the process of 
production. The small firm adjusts downwards in size by a considerable amount to 
achieve fiirther increases in performance. A 1% increase in performance leads to as 
much as a 10% fall in size. This effect is also substantial relative to the influence of 
size on performance (elasticity of -0.04%). Performance is a strong equilibrating force 
to downsize. Second, to attain higher equilibrium levels of performance small firms 
must strive to attain a competitive advantage in a localised or niche market. The small 
firm can capture a larger share of such markets and can avoid direct competition with 
larger rivals. Third, higher performance is attainable by firms who pursue a varied 
competitive strategy. This can be achieved through producing customised or specialist 
products. It can also be accomplished through increasing the aggressiveness of its
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competitive strategy, to defend market niches by raising its advertising and marketing 
efforts. Survival of small firms is linked to product differentiation, as typically small 
firms are niche players (Caplin and Nalebuff, 1986). The small firm seeks economies of 
scope in serving these niche markets, to improve the long run prospects of the firm. 
Acting in these ways, entrepreneurs can have a positive influence on the long run 
performance of the small firm. However, as seen above, these actions limit firm size. 
Thus there is a strong tendency for the small firm to remain a small-scale operation.
344
CHAPTER 10 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
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10.1 Aims and General Findings
This thesis endeavoured to identify those factors which foster the long-run 
survival, or continued existence, of the small firm. Under this broad research objective, 
three research themes were examined. First, the long-lived small firm, its long run 
performance and growth were characterised. Second, the long run performance of the 
mature small firm was explained using new measures of flexibility and turbulence. 
Third, the tendency of the long-lived small firm to remain small was considered in a 
simultaneous equation model where size, long run performance and a third variable (viz. 
market extent or size of competitive strategy space) were determined endogenously.
The study was fieldwork based and involved gathering new data (both quantitative 
and qualitative) in face-to-face interviews with 63 owner-managers of mature small 
firms in Scotland. An instrument which incorporated novel ways of calibrating 
organisational change and performance, was designed specifically for this study. The 
unique body of data enabled a number of new hypotheses to be tested. Both 
quantitative and qualitative data were combined to create seven detailed, illustrative 
case studies of enterprises which had survived over a long period. This enriched the 
quantitative analysis of the data on long-lived small firms.
The main findings of the study were as follows:
> On average, the firms which took part in the study were 26 years old and thus 
were indeed long-lived. The predominant firm type was still the micro-firm 
(63% of the 63 long-lived small firms had between 1 and 9 FTEs). The long- 
lived small firm’s market environment, competitive strategy (viz. motives, 
market positioning, innovation) and internal organisation had undergone great 
transition since inception.
> Too much ‘trimming’ (or change) by the small firm had a negative effect on its 
long run survival prospects. Firm-specific turbulence was found to be a convex 
function of performance (i.e. the rate at which firm-specific turbulence 
negatively impacts on performance declined as firm-specific turbulence 
increased). This suggests that poor performers (stagnant firms) were chopping 
and changing merely to survive, whereas superior performers (adaptive firms) 
were chopping and changing effectively, to grow on the business.
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> Flexibility (e.g. as measured by Agility and Speed) raised the long run prospects 
of the firm. Small firms must be prepared for change, agile, or both. A longer 
reaction time can raise performance. Acting prudently, adopting a ‘wait and see’ 
policy before implementing organisational change, and staging adjustments to 
organisational change, raises the small firm’s option value to withdraw or to 
continue to invest, depending on how circumstances unfold.
> Alertness to precipitators of change had a positive impact on performance 
(elasticity 0.10%). However, the evidence indicates that there are diminishing 
returns to entrepreneurial efforts to identify more precipitators of change. 
Adopting a ‘wait and see’ policy, prior to instigating change, can only be 
pursued for a limited period of time, before diminishing returns set in.
> A higher number of adjustments had a positive effect on performance suggesting 
that entrepreneurs should follow through on all the adjustments made following 
organisational change (elasticity=0.06%). However, the evidence indicates that 
the entrepreneur should not act impulsively. Adjustments typically involve 
investments which are in the nature of exercising an option. Delaying an 
adjustment may have beneficial consequences for the performance of the firm if 
it reduces uncertainty (elasticity for adjustment time =0.08%). It limits 
downside risks and raises the flexibility of the firm to revise its strategy.
> In general, there is evidence of a strong equilibrating force on the small firm to 
reduce in size. Performance improvements are a clear driver of this force. A 
1% increase in performance leads to as much as a 10% fall in size (measured by 
full-time equivalent employment). This effect is also considerable relative to the 
influence of size on performance (elasticity of -0.04%). Thus the evidence is 
that to improve performance, small firms often need to downsize. Lean firms 
survive by supplying niche or localised markets. Evidence indicates that the 
small firm also gains improvements in performance by cultivating highly 
differentiated competitive strategies.
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Other findings were as follows:
> In tests of Gibrat’s Law over the lifecycle of the long-lived small firm, the law 
was refuted early in the small firms lifecycle but supported thereafter. There 
was a shift in the growth process after five years of trading, at least in real 
turnover where real turnover, grew at the market rate after this point.
> Real turnover, early in the lifecycle of the firm, and number of product groups, 
were found to increase the likelihood of the survival of the small firm.
> Misgivings associated with ‘objective’ measures of performance in a small firm 
context prompted the development of a new measure of performance common 
to all firms. This measure was based on the subjective evaluations of the 
owner-manager, and is a measure of the fitness of the firm to survive over the 
long haul. Factors which were judged to be important to the long run survival 
of the firm included suppliers, customer loyalty, quality, differentiation, product 
mix, diversification, operational efficiency and skills. Environmental forces 
(e.g. competition, substitutes, new entrants etc.) and financial aspects (e.g. debt, 
credit policy) were deemed as threats to the firm’s performance. This measure 
was found to be multidimensional using factor analytic techniques. The 
dimensions corresponded to Chrisman’s et al. (1998) view of new venture 
performance as a fimction of the entrepreneur, strategy and industry structure, 
resources and organisational structure.
> Family succession was only a likely end game in a fifth (21.7%) of cases. Over 
half (51.7%) the firms believed that a trade-sale was a likely outcome. Another 
fifth (20%) believed that an employee would take over the running of the 
business. Only a tenth (11.1%) believed that the firm would close down on the 
retirement of the owner-manager. Issues hampering the survival of the firm 
include finding a pool of buyers, asserting the value of the business enterprise, 
the transfer of idiosyncratic knowledge and finance.
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The chief contribution of this thesis involved the collection of an original body of 
data on long-lived small firms, and the application of a positivist approach to the testing 
of novel hypotheses about performance and growth on these data. The main findings 
presented above are judged to make a significant contribution to the existing literature 
on small business economics.
10.2 Research Conclusions and Contributions
This Section summarises the key research conclusions and contributions by 
reference to those parts of the thesis that most embody them: Parts IV (Chapters 5-7) 
and V (Chapters 8-9). Essentially, the main conclusions, indicated in 10.1 above, are 
examined in greater detail below.
Part IV builds up a picture of the typical long-lived small firm in the sample. 
Chapter 5 contributed to the literature by presenting a characterisation of the long-lived 
small firm and its market environment. The surviving firms were almost one generation 
and predominantly small in size (i.e. micro firms). These firms can remain small and 
survive over the long haul, supporting Agarwal and Audretsch, (1999) findings. Initial 
size, and not size at maturity, is associated with longevity, see Geroski (1995). 
Furthermore, building on an analysis by Reid (2001) Chapter 5 finds that the growth 
process of real turnover shifts from a stable growth process, which tends to an 
equilibrium value of real turnover early in the life of the firm to a semi-stable growth 
path where real turnover grows at the market rate (i.e. independent of firm size) after 
five years of trading. This analysis differs from, and extends, Reid (2001), because 
support for Gibrat’s Law is examined over longer time intervals, and at different points 
in the life cycle. The behaviour of growth in real turnover over the lifecycle presents a 
new insight on empirical tests of Gibrat’s Law. Gibrats Law is refuted early in the 
lifecycle of the firm and supported later in the lifecycle.
Putting this finding in perspective, it seems that is important to consider different 
points in the lifecycle of the firm in testing Gibrat’s Law. Evidence which refutes 
Gibrat’s Law, at least in the case of real turnover, may be capturing an early lifecycle 
effect. If examined later in the small firm’s life, evidence to support Gibrat’s Law may 
be found. This prescription supports Jovanovic (1982) findings, but is at odds with 
Evans (1987a) findings. As stated in Chapter 3, Jovanovic (1982) rejected Gibrat’s Law 
for young firms, but suggested that firm growth rates may be independent of size among
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mature firms. Evans (1987a) found no evidence of this for mature firms aged 7, 20 and 
45 years.
The evidence is not as convincing for models using full-time equivalent 
employees and labour productivity over longer time intervals. The small firm has a 
greater ability to adjust FTEs and labour productivity, as opposed to turnover later in the 
firm’s life. It is plausible that the firm adjusts headcount to maintain long run 
equilibrium values of labour productivity (i.e. real turnover per FTE), as long run 
equilibrium values of labour productivity tend to remain relatively stable over the life of 
the firm (between 50-60K).
Chapter 6 develops a novel measure of performance by summing owner-manager 
appraised ratings. These ratings are based on the perceived firm’s fitness to stay in 
business over the long haul. The index is based on 28 distinct attributes incorporating 
aspects of the firm’s competitive environment, financial management, organisational 
structure and business strategy. Owner-managers judged suppliers, customer loyalty, 
quality, differentiation, product mix, diversification, operational efficiency, and skills to 
be important to the long-run survival of the firm. This confirms findings on the 
influence of diversification (Ungem-Stemberg, 1990; Reid, 1993), human capital 
(Cressy, 1996; Bates, 1990; Erikson, 2002) and relations with customers and suppliers 
(Reid et al., 1993) to the long run survival and growth of the firm. Owner-managers 
had heterogeneous views on the influence of financial (e.g. debt, credit policy) and 
environmental attributes (e.g. competition, substitutes, new entrants, rival’s innovation, 
regulation) on the long-run survival of the firm. The underlying multi-dimensional 
nature of this long run performance indicator was confirmed using factor analytic 
techniques. The five dimensions extracted, namely, internal organisation, industry 
structure and rivalry, business strategy, resources and nature of buyers and suppliers, 
provide some structure and insight into the variables which the owner-manager must 
juggle to manage the firm. They help to corroborate Chrisman’s et al. (1998) view of 
new venture performance as a function of the entrepreneur, strategy, industry structure, 
resources and organisational structure.
The long run performance indicator behaves in a similar manner to net profits, in 
that it is negatively correlated with asset growth and the level of indebtedness of the 
firm. The owner-manager seems to take actions which are based on his own judgment
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about the long run prospects of the firm. Thus the performance measure also behaves as 
expected in econometric models of performance in Chapters 8 and 9. The measure 
allows a judgement to be made of relative performance, on a common basis, for all 
small firms, both in services and manufacturing. It is not subject to the weaknesses 
associated with using objective measures, such as asset growth and rate of profitability. 
The failure to value the intangible asset base of the business, and inaccuracies in self 
reported net profit figures (due to failure to distinguish profit from income, implied tax 
liability, annual variation) in the small firms’ context severely affect such figures. To 
illustrate, difficulties in interpreting reported performance figures of the enterprise 
profiles (presented in Volume II, Appendix 5) clearly illustrate the problems with using 
objective measures like asset growth (see enterprise profiles B, E, F and G) and rate of 
profitability (see enterprise profiles B, C and G)
In Chapter 7, existing hypotheses on entrepreneurial intentions, market 
positioning, size of competitive strategy space, product and process innovation, internal 
organisation and information technology are challenged, using new data on long-lived 
small firms. This Chapter also presents new evidence on key organisational changes 
experienced by the firm over its life and on potential end-games of mature small firms 
on the retirement of the owner-manager.
Key organisational changes identified by the owner-manager were found to be 
pivotal, in that they occurred on average just eight times over the life of the firm. Thus 
owner-managers were very discriminating in attributing the term ‘key’ to organisational 
change. From the list of changes presented to owner-managers, a change in capacity 
was identified in three quarters of the cases as the most common form of organisational 
change. Over half of the small firms also changed their product range, cashflow, assets, 
location and management. Even though a change in capacity was the most common 
form of change, changes in product range and cashflow were jointly ranked as most 
important in the running of the business.
As the firm ages, intergenerational effects become important. There are signs of a 
change in motivation of the owner-manager of the long-lived small firm from creating a 
business with survival prospects to trying to raise the value of the business on a trade- 
sale or other end game. Traditionally, family succession was the most likely end game 
but only a fifth of owner-managers stated that they were passing the business on to their
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offspring. This is a preferable option for the owner-manager as interests are closely 
aligned and idiosyncratic knowledge can be transferred over time (not in all cases 
though, see enterprise profile B versus A and C). Half the owner-managers were 
hoping to sell on the firm, yet difficulties in locating buyers willing to pay a fair price 
for the business were highlighted. There was a wariness about the capacity for 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of rivals (potential buyers) etc. Another fifth 
wished to transfer the business to an employee, but expressed difficulties in locating 
suitable and competent successors who had both access to finance and the capacity to 
bear the risk of running the business. Despite such difficulties, enterprise profile D is an 
excellent example of a successful transfer of ownership using this end game. It was 
only in a tenth of cases that owner-managers believed that their business would close 
down upon their retiring, which is comforting news for policy makers. It would be 
interesting to re-interview these firms in another ten years to investigate which end 
game was finally adopted.
Part V explores two novel hypotheses in econometric terms. Chapter 8 
contributes to the literature by considering the relationship between small firm 
flexibility and the long run prospects of the small firm. The theoretical development of 
the concept of flexibility in the literature has not yet been followed by its empirical 
development, see Carlsson (1989). This Chapter aims to remedy this omission in the 
literature. The long run performance indicator is explained in terms of firm-specific 
turbulence (i.e. count of key organisational change experienced by the small firm) and 
new measures of flexibility (viz. Agility and Speed). Estimation of the implied 
performance equation uses Heckman’s sample selection model. Carlsson’s (1989) 
notion of strategic (long-term) flexibility, and Ghemawat’s (1991) conception of 
flexibility, as the ability of the firm to revise its strategy as uncertain events unfold, 
were influential in the formulation of the measures of flexibility adopted in the 
estimation.
It was found that the flexibility measures enhanced the long run prospects of the 
small firm (see Table 8.6). Further, agility was found to have a positive and significant 
impact on performance (elasticity = 0.10). Those small firms, which are able to dampen 
consequential adjustments, in response to precipitators of change, are thereby able to 
raise the long run prospects of the firm. This suggests that the strength of such firms is
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in having an internal organisational structure which is better equipped to cope with 
environmental change. It was found that speed (in the sense of time taken to adjust) 
also had a positive and significant effect on the performance of the firm, which may 
seem contrary to prior expectations (elasticity = 0.17). The suggested interpretation, in 
the fece of this anomaly, is that a longer reaction time can raise performance using real 
options logic (Luehrman, 1997, 1998; McGrath, 1999). By acting prudently, adopting a 
‘wait and see’ policy before implementing organisational change, and by staging 
investments to achieve organisational change, the firm’s option value, to withdraw or to 
continue to invest, is raised. Holding a portfolio of options, until uncertainties are 
resolved, is likely to raise the performance of the firm as the firm is thereby avoiding 
downside risks.
The empirical relevance of the real options reasoning was tested more stringently 
when agility (i.e. Precipitator, Adjust} and speed (i.e. PrecipitatorTime, AdjustTime} 
were disaggregated into their component parts. Evidence of non-linearities was found 
between Precipitator and PrecipitatorTime indicating that there are diminishing returns 
to adopting a ‘wait and see’ strategy in an effort to identify precipitators of change (see 
Table 8.10). Alertness to precipitators of change had a positive impact on performance. 
Entrepreneurs should be actively scanning the environment for opportunities to improve 
performance, or for signs of environmental change to which the firm could be better 
adapted. A longer reaction time (PrecipitatorTime} had a positive but not significant 
effect on performance providing weak confirmation that adopting a ‘wait and see’ 
policy is advantageous. However the marginal effect of a higher absolute number of 
precipitators on performance is reduced, the longer the firm takes to initiate 
organisational change. That a trade-off exists, is confirmed by the negative and 
significant coefficient on the interaction term (Precipitator*PrecipitatorTime). The 
entrepreneur can only hold options for a limited period, as the potential risk of late entry 
or of the opportunity becoming ‘out of the money’ is high, as the number of 
precipitators rise. At all times, the entrepreneur must weigh up the costs and benefits of 
exercising a strategic option, now or in the fiiture, given available information. At a 
general level, the ability to exercise a strategic option in the fiiture provides the 
entrepreneur with greater flexibility. Thus, by adopting a ‘wait and see’ strategy, the 
owner-manager can gather fiirther information, and can wait to exercise the strategic
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option when it lias reach fruition (i.e. its value cost metric>l, and NPV >0 and low 
volatility, see Luerhman, 1998).
Evidence of non-linearities was not found between the number of consequential 
adjustments (Adjust) and the adjustment time (AdjustTime). Interpreting evidence from 
Table 8.8 it was found that a higher number of adjustments had a positive effect on 
performance, signalling that the firm should follow through on all the adjustments to be 
made following the organisational change. However, the entrepreneur should not act 
hastily. Delaying an adjustment may have beneficial consequences for performance, if 
it reduces uncertainty and diminishes irreversibility. A firm which stages adjustments 
to organisational change (taking a longer adjustment time) may actually raise its 
performance. Such an approach would hold that the entrepreneur should proceed 
cautiously when implementing change. He should make smaller investments initially, 
before instigating larger irreversible investments. Larger investments should only be 
made once uncertainties are resolved. This limits downside risks and raises the 
flexibility of the firm to revise its strategy as circumstances unfold. Put more 
technically, it raises the bundled value of the portfolio of options (or consequential 
adjustments).
Firm-specific turbulence was found to have a negative effect on performance. Too 
much ‘trimming’, or too much organisational change, reduces performance. For 
example, it wastes resources, and suggests false or imprudent moves, which then require 
correction. Firm-specific turbulence was found to be a convex function of performance. 
The rate at which this negative impact of firm-specific turbulence imposes its effect on 
performance is found to decline, as firm-specific turbulence increases. It is confirmed 
that both poorly performing firms (or “stagnant” firms) and highly performing firms (or 
“adaptive” firms) tend to be relatively active in undertaking changes, compared to 
moderately performing firms, see Reid and Smith (2000b). On the one hand, stagnant 
firms are active in making organisational changes just to survive, and on the other, 
adaptive firms are highly active in making organisational changes, because of a keen 
desire to improve performance and promote growth. It may be that a relative 
preponderance of these “stagnant” firms in the sample is driving the overall negative 
relationship observed between firm-specific turbulence and performance, with only a 
small proportion of small firms experiencing positive dynamics.
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In the sample selection equation, two variables were found to have a positive 
influence on the long run survival of the small firm (see Table 8.7). These were initial 
start-up size (as measured by real turnover, early in the life of the firm) and number of 
product groups. The former finding supports earlier evidence reported on above, of the 
importance of initial start-up size to the longevity of small firms. Diversification was 
also judged by owner-managers to be important to fitness of the small firm over the 
long haul.
Overall, it has been found in the extant literature that proportionately few small 
firms enjoy high performance and growth. Storey (1996, 1997, 1998a,b) describes 
these few as ‘ten percenters’ because they are rare, and Birch (1996) describes them as 
‘gazelles’ because of their apparently effortless higher performance. Rather than 
focusing on the characteristics of the rare high performers Chapter 9 explores a new 
hypothesis, which is the tendency for most small firms to remain small, in terms of scale 
of operation, throughout their lives. Investigating whether a trade-off exists between 
growth and performance has received both a lot of theoretical development (Penrose, 
1959; Marris, 1964; Richardson, 1964; and Slater, 1980) and extensive empirical testing 
(Cubbin and Leech, 1986; Dobson and Gerrard, 1989; Reid 1993, 1995, 1998; Cowling, 
2004). By contrast, Chapter 9 examined whether a trade-off existed between size and 
performance. The joint determination of firm size, performance and other factors, 
which may inhibit growth in the scale of the small firm was analysed in a three-equation 
simultaneous model. The latter factors included the size of the market for its product 
(e.g. local service) and the level of differentiation of the product (e.g. extent of 
customisation).
Clear evidence was found of a trade-off relationship between size (measured by full­
time equivalent employees) and performance (measured using the long run indicator of 
performance). Size was found to influence performance negatively, and performance 
was found to influence size negatively. Further, the impact of increases in performance 
on size (measured by elasticities) is much larger relative to increases in size on 
performance. A 1% increase in performance leads to as much as a 10% fall in size 
(measured by full-time equivalent employment) whereas a 1% increase in size leads to 
only a 0.04% fell in performance (see Table 9.9 and Table 9.11). It is therefore 
concluded that performance improvements are a strong equilibrating force on the small
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firm, creating inexorable pressure to reduce in size. More specifically, reductions in 
size lead to increases in performance due to a leaner cost base and to relative increases 
in the human capital of the workforce, and thus to higher labour productivity.
Other jointly determined variables in the three equation models included market 
extent and the size of the competitive strategy space. Evidence of a simultaneous 
relationship was found between the extent of the main market and firm size. Size has a 
significant positive influence on the extent of the firm’s main market, and the extent of 
the firm’s main market has a significant positive influence size. Thus the wider the 
extent of the firm’s market, the bigger the size of the firm; and the greater the size of the 
firm, the wider the extent of its main market. The impact of market extent on size 
(elasticity =1.16%) was much higher than the impact of size on main market (elasticity 
=0.225%). This property of the model has an effect whose impact is in the opposite 
direction to the trade-off between size and performance discussed earlier. In this 
context, it seems that the trade-off between size and performance places a limit on the 
extent to which the firm is able to grow through entering new markets or penetrating 
existing markets. By implication, if the entrepreneur wishes to increase his firm’s 
performance, there is a motivation to remain small. To illustrate, Figure 9.2 has shown 
that the effect of entering a more local market, other things being equal, is to raise 
performance, and to reduce the headcount of the firm.
Only a unidirectional relationship was found between the performance, and the size 
of the competitive strategy space. The size of the competitive strategy space has a 
positive and significant affect on performance. However, performance does not have a 
significant influence on the heterogeneity of the competitive strategy. Rather than just 
becoming leaner in size, the entrepreneur can also raise the performance of the firm by 
increasing the size of the competitive strategy space (i.e. by fiirther differentiating its 
product offering) and thereby cultivating a niche market. In fact, an increase in the size 
of the competitive strategy space, holding all else equal, results in a rise in performance, 
and a reduction in firm size (see Figure 9.4). In this sense, the pursuit of a focus 
differentiation strategy imposes a limitation on the growth in firm size (i.e. there is a 
tendency for the firm to remain small).
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10.3 Further Research and Recommendations
This Section concludes this Chapter by suggesting potentially fruitful areas for 
further research. It also suggests recommendations to policymakers, and to business 
educators, concerning prescriptions that can increase the long run prospects of small 
firms, in appropriate contexts.
The analysis presented in Chapter 5 could be extended by surveying the 
characteristics of long-lived small firms in other countries for comparative purposes. It 
would also be interesting to examine the behaviour of net assets over the lifecycle of the 
long-lived small firm, to see if they behave in a similar manner to real turnover (i.e. 
grow at the market rate after five years of trading). Lack of data on net assets over the 
lifecycle prohibited an analysis of support for Gibrat’s Law at different points in the 
lifecycle in this study using this size measure. Further the scale measures used in 
testing Gibrat’s Law over the lifecycle were gathered retrospectively and correspond to 
different life histories of firms. It would be nice to reaffirm the findings using data 
gathered on scale measures longitudinally over the life of the firm, for a single cohort of 
small firms.
Chapter 6 developed an indicator of the long run performance of the firm, which 
was useful for measuring the performance of a heterogeneous group of firms, as it was 
not related to age, organisational form or market characteristics of the firm. In the 
estimations of performance equations in this thesis it seems that owner-managers act on 
this performance measure. It would be interesting to see how this long run indicator of 
performance behaves in estimates of other performance equations. The results of factor 
analysis of the underlying determinants of this performance measure could be 
investigated fiirther, by increasing the size of the sample so that more items could be 
included in the analysis.
In Chapter 7 a number of issues surrounding the end game were highlighted as 
potentially fruitful areas for fiirther research. An in-depth study is required of different 
end games (e.g. family succession, trade-sale and management/employee buyout, asset 
disposal) looking at the transfer of idiosyncratic knowledge, the process of passing the 
baton, the finance of purchase, the market for long-lived small firms and the market 
value of long-lived small firms (particularly those with sizeable intangible assets). The 
role of policy makers in counteracting market failure also needs to be explored (e.g. the
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absence of pool of buyers or proper market, asymmetric information between buyers 
and sellers on quality of these businesses, low market valuations for these businesses 
because of risk of adverse selection). There perhaps is a role for policy maker, in 
fostering a better functioning market for these firms. For example, it could operate in a 
similar manner to the market for venture capital, with a better provision of 
intermediation services, like third party due diligence. The value of founders as 
advisors to prospective new managers of the firm needs to be communicated by 
business educators, because this is one way in which idiosyncratic knowledge can be 
transferred. This is particularly important in cases where the founder represents a 
sizeable component of the intangible asset base of the business. It may ensure that 
customers do not switch suppliers, and may therefore help retain the goodwill of the 
business, following changes in ownership. Other areas which could be investigated 
include financial assistance to, and management training of, employees to take over the 
running of long-lived small firms. In general, research into these areas may help policy 
makers and business educators reduce the death rate or risk of sudden exit of long-lived 
small firms as they approach their thirtieth year of trading.
In Chapter 8 measures of flexibility (viz. agility and speed} were shown to enhance 
the long run prospects of the firm. These measures were averaged across a number of 
types of changes. Further research could estimate a similar model examining the 
influence of flexibility measures on performance for specific changes. Limits on 
sample size do not enable microanalysis of this nature in this thesis. In business 
education, more emphasis could be placed on adopting a real options approach to 
decision-making within the firm. Entrepreneurs can be taught to act in ways which 
increase the flexibility of the firm, and ultimately its performance. By adopting the 
guiding principles of real options analysis, the firm will perhaps not engage in as much 
trimming of, or meddling into, the business. According to the findings of the thesis, this 
will reduce the negative impact of firm-specific turbulence on firm performance.
Finally, Chapter 9 found that there is a general tendency for the long-lived small 
firm to remain small. The larger proportion of small firms are not ‘scaleable’. This 
should be recognised by business educators and policy makers. Proportionately few 
firms will grow to be large firms. Policies and strategies to promote longevity should 
not solely focus on the few ‘gazelles’, but should focus more on the bedrock of small
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firms who tend to remain small throughout their lives. These firms serve localised and 
niche markets by differentiating what they offer to their market. In fiirther research, the 
econometrics of the size/performance trade-off identified in Chapter 9 could be re- 
estimated using alternative measures of performance (like purely financial indicators) 
for comparison with the long run indicator of performance used here. Larger 
simultaneous equation systems, controlling for more sources of endogeneity could be 
estimated (i.e. the joint determination of market extent, size, performance and 
competitive strategy space etc.). This would be possible if larger scale sponsorship of 
work of this sort (e.g. from central government) could be obtained, to promote a larger 
scale analysis of what is promising to be an illuminating and powerful research 
methodology, in an area of considerable policy importance.
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APPENDIX 1: SURVEY INSTRUMENTATION
Interviewer:
Date /
Time of Interview:
Respondent:
Firm Name:
Firm address:
Telephone:
Email:
Website:
New owner Z all that apply When (mth/yr)
Trade sale □
Takeover □
Age:
Preamble:
The questionnaire is divided into 5 sections which include questions on the characteristics of 
your business, your expectations at start-up for the size and scope of your business, changes 
in the running of your business, factors which fostered your survival and the level of 
innovation of your business. The typical way in which we shall proceed will involve my 
asking a question and then noting your reply. In addition there are a number of lists from 
which you will be asked to choose options. It is helpful to begin in a general way. This will 
help us to identify the main features of your business before going into detail.
May we begin with the general questions?
Section 1: The Business
1.1.1 How would you now define your main line of business?
1.1.2 On this sheet, in which industrial category (categories) does your firm lie?_______
[Hand respondent list of Standard industrial Classification (SIC) codes - Show card 1.2]
[N.B. If several categories relevant, identify most important by sales]
Importance Level SIC Code
First most important
Second most important
Third most important
[Once the respondent has completed his/her reply retrieve the show card]
1.2 In a legal sense how would you define your business?
Sole trader (operating from home) □
Sole trader (operating from business premises) □
Partnership □
Cooperative □
Private company □
Public company □
Other [Please specify! □
1.3. How many product groups or ranges do you currently produce? ________________
[e.g. pens , paper; making two.]
1.4. How many products do you produce or supply for your markets? ________________
[e.g. four kinds of pens, three kinds of paper; making seven in all.]
1.5.1 What are your most important product groups or ranges according to sales?
[N.B. If several categories relevant, identify most important by sales]
Importance Level Product Group % of sales
First most important
Second most important
Third most important
1.5.2 What percentage of sales do each of these account for?
[If more than 1 product group]
1
1.6 How many major rivals do you have?
[If there is a change ask the respondent to provide an estimate.]
How has this changed over Up / Down I Same By how much? 
_______the life of the business? ______________
1.7 How many minor rivals do you have?
[If there is a change ask the respondent to provide an estimate.]
How has this changed over Up / Down / Same By how much? 
_______ the life of the business? ______________
1.8.1 At present do you consider your main market to be:
Local Regional Scottish British International?
□ □ □ □ □
1.8.2 Has this changed since start-up?
Yes □ How? _____________________________________
No □ ~.....
1.9.1 In your principal market what is your market share for__________________ ?
[Insert the respondents specified main product offering]
Under 1% □
I- 5% ' □
6-10% □
II- 20% □
21-30% □
31-50% □
Over 50% □
Not known □
1.9.2 Has this changed since start-up?
Yes □ By how much? _________________________________________
No □ .................. ................
1.10.1 How would you compare products in your main product group with those of 
competitors? Would you say they are:
Identical Similar Different Cannot say?
□ □ □ □
1.10.2 Has this changed since start-up?
Yes □ In what way? _____________________________________________
No □
2
1.11.1 At present do you sell products or services typically to customers at the
Low end of the market: Standard Products at Low Price □
Middle of the market: Medium Quality Products at a Medium Price □ 
Top end of the Market: High Quality Products at Premium Price □
All of the above □
Other? (Please specify______________________________________ ) □
1.11.2 Has this changed since start-up?
Yes □ In what way? __________________________________________
No □ ” “ ” ~
1.12.1 How would you describe competition in your main market?
Intense in every aspect (price, quality rivalry etc) □
Strong but weak in some aspects (for example absence of price □
competition but strong quality competition and inter-rivalry)
Generally weak but strong in some aspects □
Generally weak in all aspects □
1.12.2 Has this changed since start-up?
Yes □ In what way? __________________________________________
No □ ~
1.13 Do you have a capacity output which you regard as the capacity or maximum 
possible output?
Yes □ At what percentage of this maximum does your
business normally operate? ______________
No □ Go to 1.14.1
1.14 What were your net profits in the last trading year approximately speaking?
[Your estimate should be net of taxes and directors fees]
[i.e. If you cannot give precise figures, rough figures or 'guesstimates' will do]
1.15.1 What is the approximate size of your business today in terms of total assets (book 
value)?
1.15.2 What was the approximate size of your business today in terms of total assets (book 
value) at start-up?
1.16.1 Do you have any debt? [Includes bank overdraft]
Yes
No
□
□ Go to 1.18
1.16.2 What form does this debt take? [Tick all that apply]
Bank overdraft □
Bank loan □
Hire purchase agreements □
Other (Please Specify □
1.17 Do you have any outside equity finance?
[Cash from business angel who sunk money into your business]
Yes □ What percentage of total equity is outside equity? _________ %
No □
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SECTION 2: EXPECTATIONS OF SCALE ASP SCOPE OF FIRM
The following questions examine your expectations of the size and scope of this business at 
start-up.
[In the case of a trade sale ask the respondent to answer the questions with respect to when they took over 
the running of the business unless they have prior knowledge of the activities of the firm under its 
previous owners.]
2.1 What was your main aim for the business at start-up (trade-sale)? [Tick one only]
To provide you an alternative to unemployment □
To have a business to pass on to family members □
To create a business with survival prospects □
Short term profit □
Long term profit □
Growth □
High sales □
High market share □
High rate of return □
To sell on the business □
Other (Please specify) □
2.2 At start-up how far did you plan ahead (in months/years) for your business?
Months/Y ears
2.3 At start-up how long did you believe the life of the business would be? 
  Months/Y ears
2.4.1 What was your vision for the business at start-up?
2.4.2 Did you set future targets for your business at start-up? 
[e.g. performance targets]
Yes
No
□
□ Go to 2.5
5
[Use the table provided below to insert the answers to the following questions.]
2.4.3 What future targets did you set when starting your business?
[The three most important if more than 3]
2.4.4 Did you achieve these targets?
2.4.5 Of those targets that you did achieve how long (in months) after start-up did you 
achieve them?
2.4.6 Of those targets that you did not achieve can you explain why not?
1. Future Target
Achieved? Yes/No Encircle When achieved? (months/years)
Why not?
2. Future Target
Achieved? Yes/No Encircle When achieved? (months/years)
Why not?
3. Future Target
Achieved? Yes/No Encircle When achieved? (months/years)
Why not?
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2.5.1 At start-up how many employees did you hope to have at the end of
[Use full-time equivalent employees where two half-time employees is equivalent to one full­
time employee] [Include the owner manager]
5 years? ___________
10 years? ___________
2.5.2 At start-up what did you hope your gross sales to be at the end of
5 years? ___________
10 years? ___________
"Suppose a mature business is one, which has reached its desired size in terms of employees 
and sales turnover. Please answer the questions below with this in mind.
2.6.1 Would you say that you are a mature business?
Yes □
No □ Go to 2.7.1
2.6.2 How old was the business when it matured?
__________  Years
2.6.3 How many employees did you have on maturity?
2.6.4 What was your gross sales on maturity?
[Use the table provided below to insert the answers to the following questions.]
2.7.1 How many employees did you actually employ
[Use full-time equivalent employees where two half-time employees is equivalent to one full­
time employee][Include the owner manager]
At start-up (takeover)? ___________
After 5 years? ___________
After 10 years?
Today?
[i.e. If you cannot give precise figures, rough figures or 'guesstimates' will do]
[i.e. If the business has not been trading under current ownership for 5 years or 10 years write N/A]
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2.7.2 What was your gross sales at the end of
1 year of trading? ___________
After 5 years? ___________
After 10 years? ___________
Last year of trading? ___________
[i.e. If you cannot give precise figures, rough figures or 'guesstimates' will do]
[i.e. If the business has not been trading under current ownership for 5 years or 10 years write N/A]
2.8.1 Did you expect to compete head on with rivals, or indirectly by entering a niche 
which is not occupied by rivals?
Head to head with rivals ,• □
Indirectly through entering a niche market □
2.8.2 What form of competition is used in your principal market?
Price □
Quality □
Volume □
After sales service □
New product development □
Advertising □
Tying up suppliers □
Delivery □
Marketing □
Other? (Please specify) □
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2.9 Examine the following list of functions/activities performed within your business 
and answer the following questions:
[Hand the respondent show card 2.9]
2.9.1 Which of the following activities did your business perform in the first year of 
trading? [Tick all that apply]
2.9.2 Which of the following activities does your business perform currently? [Tick all 
that apply]
2.9.3 In cases where a change occurred how long since start-up did that change occur? 
[E.g. if your business is now engaging in an additional activity or has disengaged in an 
activity]
Activities At start-up 
tick all that 
apply
Tick all 
that apply 
today
When?
(months/years)
Accounting matters □ □
Training of Personnel □ □
Computer support staff □ □
Productionof product/service □ - □
Sales □ □
Market Research □ □
After sales service □ □
Strategic planning □ □
Innovation □ □
Legal matters □ □
Other (Please specify) □ □
Other (Please specify) □ □
[Once the respondent has completed his/her reply retrieve the show card]
9
2.10 Why do you continue to operate the business today? [Tick one only]
To provide you with employment to the end of your working life □ 
To have a business to pass on to family members □
To create employment in the community □
For long term profit □
For further growth □
For increased sales □
For increased market share □
Get a return on the business □
To increase the value of the business on trade sale □
To have a sizeable pension or nest egg on retiring □
Other (Please specify) □
2.11.1 Do you believe that the business has met your hopes for it at start-up?
Yes □
No □
2.11.2 Why?/Why not?
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3.1.1 From your point of view what are the main changes in running the business since 
start-up? Could you choose from options on this sheet?
[Hand the respondent show card 3.1]
3.1.2 Please specify the age of the business (in months/years) when these changes 
occurred.
Changes Tick
all that apply
Age of business 
(yr/mths)
(a) Ownership □
(b) Legal form □
(C) Technical □
(d) Location □
(e) Cashflow □
(f) Innovation □
(g) Line of business □
(h) Investment □
(i) Number of outlets □
(j) Market niches □
(k) Product range □
(1) Market positioning □
(m) Diversification □
(n) Assets □
(O) Capacity □
(p) Inputs □
(q) Management □
(r) Other (Specify) □
(S) Other (Specify) □
[Once the respondent has completed his/her reply retrieve the show card]
If more than options are ticked on show card 3.1 above then say:
3.1.3 Of the changes you identified above what are the 3 most important changes in the 
running of the business?
First most important
Second most important
Third most important
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3.2 Could you please briefly describe each of these changes? 
[Insert the descriptions in the space provided below.}
Change:
(a) Explanation:
Change:
(b) Explanation:
■ .’ • *. -
Change:
(C) Explanation:
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I am interested in relevant factors leading up to each change and adaptations which occurred 
after each change. We will deal with each of the three changes in the running of your 
business in turn.
[Hand the respondent show card 3.3]
3.3.1 What are the prior factors for_________________ ? [Insert the name of the change]
[The respondent should examine the factors on the show card and tick the prior factors that 
are relevant in the space provided while the interviewer writes a more detailed description of 
each of these.]
3.3.2 By how many months did each prior factor precede the change?
Change:
(a) Prior Factors How long before?
Change:
(b) Prior Factors How long before?
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Change:
(C) Prior Factors How long before?
3.3.3 What are the adaptation factors for __________________ ? [Insert the name of the
change]
[The respondent should examine the factors on the show card and tick the adaptation factors 
that are relevant in the space provided while the interviewer writes a more detailed 
description of each of these.]
3.3.4 How long after the change (in months) did each adaptation factor occur?
Change:
(a) Adaptation Factors How long after?
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Change:
(b) Adaptation Factors How long after?
Change:
(c) Adaptation Factors How long after?
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SECTION 4: FACTORS WHICH FOSTER SURVIVAL
4.1 We'd like to know what has kept you in business down the years. Some things are 
good for business and some things are bad. What effect have the following had? 
[Hand the respondent show card 4.1]
[The respondent should show with a cross whether the effect was good or bad.]
Suppliers N/A
□
Bad Neutral
1
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Growth N/A
□
Bad
1
Neutral
1 1
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Competition N/A
□
Bad Neutral
1 1
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Buyer's willingness to pay N/A
□
Bad
1
Neutral
1
Good
0i 25 50 75 100
Customer loyalty N/A
□
Bad 1 Neutral 1 Good
01 25 50 75 100
Access to buyers N/A
□
Bad
1
Neutral Good
c> 25 50 75 100
Substitutes N/A
□
Bad Neutral Good
<) 25 50 75 100
New entrants N/A
□
Bad1 Neutral Good
i) 25 50 75 100
Technology N/A
□
Bad1 Neutral
1
Good
i0 25 50 75 100
Rival's Innovation N/A
□
Bad1 Neutral
1
Good
10 25 50 75 100
Regulation N/A
□
Bac1 Neutral 1 Good0 25 50 75 100
Cashflow N/A
□
BatI Neutral Good
0 25 50 75 100
Debt N/A
□
Bat1 Neutral 1 Good0 25 50 75 100
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Credit Policy N/A□ Bad1 I
Neutral 1 Good
0 25 50 75 100
Capital requirements N/A
□
Bad
1 I
Neutral
I
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Market positioning N/A
□
Bad
1 I
Neutral
1
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Location N/A
□
Bad
-..... I
Neutral
1
Good
1
0 25 50 75 100
Cost Control N/A
□
Bad
I
Neutral
1
Good
0' 25 50 75 100
Quality N/A
□
Bad
1
Neutral
1 1
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Market research N/A
0
Bad
1 I
Neutral
• 1
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Differentiation N/A
□
Bad I Neutral 1 Good
() 25 50 75 100
Advertising N/A
□
Bad
I I
Neutral
1 1
Good
1
0 25 50 75 100
Product/Service Mix N/A
□
Bad
1 1
Neutral
1 1
Good
10 25 50 75 100
Diversification N/A
□
BadI Neutral Good
i0 25 50 75 100
Operational efficiency N/A
□
Bad1 Neutral Good
I0 25 50 75 100
Skills N/A
□
Bac1 Neutral
1
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Monitoring N/A
□
Bad
I I
Neutral Good
0 25 50 75 100
Filling product gaps N/A
□
Bat1 Neutral Good
0 25 so 75 100
[Once the respondent has completed his/her reply retrieve the show card]
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4.2 If you were to single out the 3 most important elements of your business strategy 
which fostered your survival what would they be? Please list these in order of 
importance.
Most important elements of your business strategy
1.
2.
3.
4.3.1 Do you expect the business to keep trading well into the future?
Yes □ Go to 4.4
No □
4.3.2 Why not?
Go to section 5
4.4 From your point of view what exit strategy will enable the business to continue 
trading?
Trade sale □
Family member will continue running the business □
Management/Employee buy out □
Other (Specify) □
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SECTION 5: INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY
5.1.1 How innovative were you at start-up? [Tick one only]
Not at all 
A little 
Quite a lot 
A lot
□ Go to 5.2
□
□
□
5.1.2 What type of innovation did you mainly undertake? [Tick one only] 
Was it based on:
Quality □
New products or services □
New technology □
Marketing techniques □
Operational efficiency □
Other (specify) □
5.2 A process innovation is a new way you do things which firms already do [e.g. how you 
cut a component; how you advise a client; how you overhaul an engine] What best describes 
the extent of innovation in your use of processes since start-up? [Tick one only]
No change [we kept all our processes the same]
Slight change [we modified a few of our processes in minor ways] 
Significant change [we modified a few of our processes in major ways] 
Important change [we modified many of our processes in major ways]
□ Go to 5.4
□
□
□
5.3 What best describes why you had process innovation to the extent you have just 
described? [Tick only one]
Imitation of rivals □
Hints from trade or professional journals □
Suggestions from customer □
Suggestions within the firm □
Suggestions from supplier □
New staff‘carrying in’knowledge □
Other (please specify) □
Not applicable □
5.4 How much process innovation is undertaken by your principal rivals? [Tick one only]
None □
A little □
A lot □
Don’t know □
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5.5 How much competitive pressure is put on you by process innovation of your 
principal rivals? [Tick one only]
None □
A little □
A lot □
Don’t Know □
5.6.1 A product innovation is a new good or service that you can sell to meet a newly 
discovered customer need. How many new products/services have you developed 
since start-up? [Tick one only]
None □ Go to 5.7
1-5 □
6-10 □
11-20 □
More than 20 □ Approximately how much more?
5.6.2 Did you reap rewards from developing product/service innovations within your 
firm? [Tick one only]
Not as much as expected
A little
A lot
• - •
□
□
' Go to 5.6.4
5.6.3 What form did these rewards take? [Tick one only]
Increased market share □
Increased profitability □
Both of the above □
Other (Please specify ) □ Go to 5.7
5.6.4 Did you experience difficulties in launching new products/services onto the
market? [Tick one only]
Yes □
No □ Go to 5.7
5.6.5 What form did these difficulties take? [Tick all that apply]
Developing a sales strategy n
Getting customers to try the product □
Other (Please specify) □
5.7 How much product innovation do your rivals undertake? [Tick one only]
None □
A little □
A lot □
Don’t know □
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5.8 How much competitive pressure is put on you by product innovation of your 
principal rivals? [Tick one only]
None □
A little □
A lot ' □
Don’t know □
5.9 Are any of the following methods used to protect innovations in your industry? [Tick 
all that apply]
Patent □
Copyright □
Trademarks □
Exploitation of innovation rapidly [i.e. before rivals can respond] □
Other (Please specify) □
5.10 Information technology refers to the devices businesses use to transmit and process 
general information e.g. telephone, fax, PC. What kinds of IT do you use? [Tick all 
that apply]
(a) Telephone □
(b) Fax □
(c) Telephone answering □
(d) Electronic mail □
(e) Telephone/video conferencing □
(f) Cellular telephone □
(g) Website □
(h) Internet □
(i) Radio communication □
(j) Personal computers □
(k) Electronic databases □
(l) Other (Please specify) □
(m) Other (Please specify) □
5.11 How important is information technology to your business? [Tick one only] 
Is it:
Unimportant □
Important □
Very important □
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5.12 For which of the following do you use information technology? [Tick all that apply]
Networking □
Producing accounts □
Managing dealings with buyers/suppliers □
Monitoring performance targets □
Designing new products □
Gathering information on the activities of rivals □
Operational efficiency □
Setting targets or plans □
Other (Please specify) □
5.13 Has there been alot of technical change in your industry over the life of the 
business?
Yes □
No □ Completed
5.14 Who have been the prime initiators of technical change? [Tick one only]
Acknowledged leader in the industry □
Newly emerging innovators in the industry □
Forces outside the industry [e.g. government constructed incentives] □
Other [e.g. please specify briefly] □
5.15 Which of the following statements best reflects your experience of using new 
technologies?
[N.B. Relate this to your experience since start-up by reference to developments like 
automation, robotics, numerically controlled machines] [Tick one only]
We haven’t used new technologies □
We have implemented new technologies but rarely successfully □
We have implemented new technologies but not always successfully □
We have generally been successful in implementing new technologies □
This is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for completing it. I hope you have also 
derived some interest yourself from doing so. Your time and cooperation are very much 
appreciated. Let me remind you that the strictest confidentiality will be upheld 
regarding the information you have provided about your business. If you should be so 
interested in our general findings regarding the development of small businesses we will 
be more than happy to share these results. We hope that our research will contribute to 
the success and growth of small business. We wish you all the very best with the future 
of your business.
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Show card 1.2: SIC Classification Numbers
01
03
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
21
22
23
24
25
26
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
4L
43
44
45
Agriculture and Horticulture
Forestry
Fishing
Coal Extraction and Manufacture of Solid Fuels
Coke Ovens
Extraction of Mineral Oil and Natural Gas
Nuclear Fuel Production
Production and Distribution of Electricity. Gas and Other Forms of Energy 
Water Supply Industry
Extraction and Preparation of Metalliferous ores
Metal Manufacturing
Extractions of other Minerals
Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products
Chemical Industry
Production of Man-made Fibres
Manufacture of Other Metals
Mechanical Engineering
Manufacture of Office Machinery' and Data Processing Equipment 
Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Manufacture of Motor Vehicles and Parts
Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment
Instrument Engineering
Food. Drink and Tobacco Manufacturing
Textile Industry
Manufacture of Leather Goods
Footwear and Clothing Industries
Timber and Wooden Furniture Industries
Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing 
Processing of Rubber and Plastics
Other Manufacturing Industries
50
61
62
63
64/6
66
67
71
72
74
75
76
77
79
81
82
83
84
85
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
Construction
Wholesale Distribution
Dealing in Scrap and Waste metals
Commission Agents
Retail Distribution
Hotels and Catering
Repair of Consumer Goods and Vehicles
Railways
Other Inland Transport
Sea Transport
Air Transport
Supporting Services to Transport
Miscellaneous Transport Services and Storage not Elsewhere Specified
Postal Services and Telecommunications
Banking and Finance
Insurance
Business Services
Renting of Movables
Owning and Dealing in Real Estate
Public Administration, National Defence and Compulsory Social Security 
Sanitary Services
Education
Research and Development
Medical and Other Health Services
Other Services Provided to the General Public
Recreational Services and Other Cultural Services
Personal Services
Domestic Services
you. Now please return this sheet to the interviewer.
Show card 2.9
Examine the following list of functions/activities performed within your business and 
answer the following questions:
2.9.1 Which of the following activities did your business perform in the first year of 
trading? [Tick all that apply]
2.9.2 Which of the following activities does your business perform currently? [Tick all 
that apply]
2.9.3 In cases where a change occurred how long since start-up did that change occur? 
[E.g. if your business is now engaging in an additional activity or has disengaged in an 
activity]
Activities At start-up 
tick all that 
apply
Tick all 
that apply 
today
When?
(months/years)
Accounting matters □ □
Training of Personnel □ □
Computer support staff □ □
Production of product/service □ □
Sales □ □
Market Research □ □
After sales service □ □
Strategic planning □ □
Innovation □ □
Legal matters □ □
Other (Please specify) □ □
Other (Please specify) □ □
Thank you. Now please return this sheet to the interviewer.
Show card 3.1
3.1.1 From your point of view what are the main changes in running the business since 
start-up? Could you choose from options on this sheet?
3.1.2 Please specify the age of the business (in months/years) when these changes 
occurred.
Changes Tick
all that apply
Age of business 
(yr/mths)
(a) Ownership □
(b) Legal form □
(c) Technical □
(d) Location □
(e) Cashflow □
(f) Innovation □
(g) Line of business □
(h) Investment □
(>) Number of outlets □
0) Market niches □
(k) Product range □
(1) Market positioning □
(m) Diversification □
(n) Assets □
(o) Capacity □
(P) Inputs □
(q) Management □
(r) Other (Specify) □
(s) Other (Specify) □
Thank you. Now please return this sheet to the inten icwer.
Show card 3.3
Change:
Before After
[Tick the relevant prior factors and then tick the relevant adaptation factors.]
Before Factors After
□ 1. Growth □
□ 2. Demand □
□ 3. New niches □
□ 4. Tax efficiency □
□ 5. Credit policy □
□ 6. Finance □
□ 7. Profitability , . • • •
□ 8. Cost Changes □
□ 9. Sales □
□ 10. Competition □
□ 11. Marketing □
□ 12. Trade intelligence □
□ 13. Capacity □
□ 14. Access to buyers □
□ 15. Stock levels □
□ 16. Regulation □
□ 17. Technology □
□ 18. Operational Efficiency □
□ 19. Investment □
□ 20. Delinquent suppliers □
□ 21. Delinquent debtors □
□ 22. Headcount □
□ 23. Cost control □
□ 24. Skills □
□ 25. Mix of suppliers/customers/rivals □
□ 26. Monitoring □
□ 27. Functions of manager □
□ 28. Cashflow □
□ 29. Other (specify) □
□ 30. Other (specify) □
Thank you. Now please return this sheet to the interviewer.
Show card 3.3
Change:
Before After
[Tick the relevant prior factors and then tick the relevant adaptation factors.]
Before Factors AJier 1
□ 1. Growth □
□ 2. Demand □
□ 3. New niches □
□ 4. Tax efficiency □
□ 5. Credit policy □
□ 6. Finance □
□ 7. Profitability ,
□ 8. Cost Changes □
□ 9. Sales □
□ 10. Competition □
□ 11. Marketing □
□ 12. Trade intelligence □
□ 13. Capacity □
□ 14. Access to buyers □
□ 15. Stock levels □
□ 16. Regulation □
□ 17. Technology □
□ 18. Operational Efficiency □
□ 19. Investment □
□ 20. Delinquent suppliers □
□ 21. Delinquent debtors □
□ 22. Headcount □
□ 23. Cost control □
□ 24. Skills □
□ 25. Mix of suppliers/customers/rivals □
□ 26. Monitoring □
□ 27. Functions of manager □
n 28. Cashflow □
n 29. Other (specify) □
□ 30. Other (specify) □
Thank yon. Now please return this sheet to the interviewer.
Show card 3.3
Change:
Before After
[Tick the relevant prior factors and then tick the relevant adaptation factors.]
Before Factors . 1/^/-
□ 1. Growth □
□ 2. Demand □
□ 3. New niches □
□ 4. Tax efficiency □
□ 5. Credit policy □
□ 6. Finance □
□ 7. Profitability □
□ 8. Cost Changes □
□ 9. Sales □
□ 10. Competition □
□ 11. Marketing □
□ 12. Trade intelligence □
□ 13. Capacity □
□ 14. Access to buyers □
□ 15. Stock levels .□
□ 16. Regulation □
□ 17. Technology □
□ 18. Operational Efficiency □
□ 19. Investment • □
□ 20. Delinquent suppliers □
□ 21. Delinquent debtors □
□ 22. Headcount □
□ 23. Cost control □
□ 24. Skills □
□ 25. Mix of suppliers/customers/rivals □
□ 26. Monitoring □
□ 27. Functions of manager □
□ 28. Cashflow □
n 29. Other (specify) ' □
□ 30. Other (specify) □
Thank you. Now please return this sheet to the intervievver.
Show caul 4.1
4.1 We'd like to know what has kept you in business down the years. Some things are 
good for business and some things are bad. What effect have the following had? 
[Show with a cross whether the effect was good or bad.]
Suppliers N/A□
Bad
1
Neutral
 . 1  J 1
Good
X0 25 50 75 100
Growth N/A□
Bad
L
Neutral
1
Good
10 25 50 75 100
Competition N/A□
Bad
1 1
Neutral
1 X
Good
_____ 10 25 50 75 100
Buyer's willingness to pay N/A□
Bad
L 1
Neutral
1
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Customer loyalty N/A□
Bad Neutral
X ■ i '
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Access to buyers N/A□
Bad
L 1
Neutral
1
Good
10 25 50 75 100
Substitutes N/A□
Bad
L 1
Neutral
1 1
Good
J0 25 50 75 100
New entrants N/A□
Bad 1 NeutralX 1
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Technology N/An
Bad
L
Neutral
1
Good
10 25 50 75 100
Rival's Innovation N/An
Bad
1
Neutral
1 1
Good
______ 10 25 50 75 100
Regulation N/A1 1
Bad
1
Neutral
1
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Cashflow N/A
1 1
Bad
L 1
Neutral
1
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Debt N/A1 1
Bad 1 Neutral 1
Good
i) 25 so 75 100
Credit Policy N/A
□
Bad
L
0
Neutral
1 1
Good
1 125 50 75 100
Capital requirements N/A
□
Bad
1
Neutral
1
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Market positioning N/A
□
Bad
1 1
Neutral
1 1
Good
J0 25 50 75 100
Location N/A
□
Bad
1 1
Neutral
1 1
Good
1
0 25 50 75 100
Cost Control N/A
□
Bad
1 1
Neutral
1
Good
J
0i 25 50 75 100
Quality N/A
□
Bad
1 1
Neutral
1
Good
Jc1 25 50 75 100
Market research N/A
□
Bad Neutral
1- ■ 1 ••
Good
. 1t> 25 50 75 100
Differentiation N/A
□
Bad
I 1
Neutral
1 1
Good
J0 25 50 75 100
Advertising N/A
□
Bad1
1 1
Neutral
1 1
Good
J
i9 25 50 75 100
Product/Service Mix N/A
□
Bad
1 1
Neutral
1
Good
J0 25 50 75 100
Diversification N/A
□
Bad1
1 1
Neutral Good
J0 25 50 75 100
Operational efficiency N/A
□
Bat1 Neutral
1
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Skills N/A
□
Bat1 Neutral
1
Good
J0 25 50 75 100
Monitoring N/A
□
Ba<1 Neutral
1
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Filling product gaps N/A
□
Bad
L........... 1
Neutral
j
Good
0 25 50 75 100
Thank you. Now please return this sheet to the interviewer.
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Type 1: Preletter Template for the Leverhulme (1994-1997)
Xth October 2001
Dear
I am a lecturer in Economics at University College Cork. I am currently an academic visitor to CRIEFF, 
where I am undertaking a Ph.D. on strategies for survival of long-lived small firms. I am interested in 
firms which have contributed to the local communities in which they operate. I am particularly concerned 
with those factors which have fostered the survival of your business. To date, few studies have examined 
the contributions of successful long-lived firms, like yours, to the Scottish economy. Your own experience 
is valuable and may help us to increase the survival rate of, and support for, small firms.
Eighty long-lived small firms in Scotland, such as your business, were selected for inclusion in this study. 
The sample was taken from an earlier study of Professor Gavin Reid. Dr. Julia Smith and Marianne Nilkes 
also undertook die interviews between 1994-1998. The Leverhulme Trust endorsed this study. We are 
interested in gathering more information on these firms, whether the business is currently under new 
ownership or management, or otherwise. Data gathered on the firms later in their lifecycles will add to our 
understanding of the dynamic nature of firm survival.
With your cooperation we would like an hour of your time to go through our questionnaire. We find that 
this exercise of looking at your business in a structured way can be of immediate benefit to you. It tends to 
generate new insights into the running of your business.
We would like to assure you that absolute confidentiality will be upheld throughout the entire study. The 
identity of your business will not be disclosed. When the study is completed a summary of your findings 
will be sent to you.
We do hope you will be willing to participate in this study. You will contacted either by me or Prof. Reid 
in the near future, to arrange a convenient time for this interview. Thank you in advance for your 
cooperation.
Yours sincerely,
Bernadette Power Gavin C. Reid
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Type 2: Preletter Template for the Leverhulme (1985-1988)
X‘h October 2001
Dear
I am a lecturer in Economics at University College Cork. I am currently an academic visitor to CRIEFF, 
where I am undertaking a Ph.D. on strategies for survival of long-lived small firms. I am interested in 
firms which have contributed to the local communities in which they operate. I am particularly concerned 
with those factors which have fostered the survival of your business. To date, few studies have examined 
the contributions of successful long-lived firms, like yours, to the Scottish economy. Your own experience 
is valuable and may help us to increase the survival rate of, and support for, small firms.
Eighty long-lived small firms in Scotland, such as your business, were selected for inclusion in this study. 
The sample was taken from an earlier study of Professor Gavin Reid. He undertook the interviews with Dr. 
Lowell Jacobsen and Ms. Jacqueline Campbell between 1985-1988. This study was endorsed by Scottish 
Enterprise and Scottish Business in the Community. We are interested in gathering more information on 
these firms, whether the business is currently under new ownership or management, or otherwise. Data 
gathered on the firms later in their lifecycles will add to our understanding of the dynamic nature of firm 
survival.
With your cooperation we would like an hour of your time to go through our questionnaire. We find that 
this exercise of looking at your business in a structured way can be of immediate benefit to you. It tends to 
generate new insights into the running of your business.
We would like to assure you that absolute confidentiality will be upheld throughout the entire study. The 
identity of your business will not be disclosed. When the study is completed a summaiy of your findings 
will be sent to you.
We do hope you will be willing to participate in this study. You will contacted either by me or Prof. Reid 
in the near future, to arrange a convenient time for this interview. Thank you in advance for your 
cooperation.
Yours sincerely,
Bernadette Power Gavin C. Reid
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Type 3: Preletter Template For the Telephone Survey 1991
Xth October 2001
Dear
I am a lecturer in Economics at University College Cork. I am currently an academic visitor to CRIEFF, 
where I am undertaking a Ph.D. on strategies for survival of long-lived small firms. I am interested in 
firms which have contributed to the local communities in which they operate. I am particularly concerned 
with those factors which have fostered the survival of your business. To date, few studies have examined 
the contributions of successful long-lived firms, like yours, to the Scottish economy. Your own experience 
is valuable and may help us to increase the survival rate of, and support for, small firms.
Eighty long-lived small firms in Scotland, such as your business, were selected for inclusion in this study. 
The sample was taken from an earlier study of Professor Gavin Reid. This study was endorsed by the 
Federation of Small business. It concerned funding shortages in small firms. Professor Reid and Ms. 
Margo Andersen conducted the interviews by telephone. We are interested in gathering more information 
on these firms, whether the business is currently under new ownership or management, or otherwise. Data 
gathered on the firms later in their lifecycles will add to our understanding of the dynamic nature of firm 
survival.
With your cooperation we would like an hour of your time to go through our questionnaire. We find that 
this exercise of looking at your business in a structured way can be of immediate benefit to you. It tends to 
generate new insights into the running of your business.
We would like to assure you that absolute confidentiality will be upheld throughout the entire study. The 
identity of your business will not be disclosed. When the study is completed a summary of your findings 
will be sent to you.
We do hope you will be willing to participate in this study. You will contacted either by me or Prof. Reid 
in the near future, to arrange a convenient time for this interview. Thank you in advance for your 
cooperation.
Yours sincerely,
Bernadette Power Gavin C. Reid
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Type 4: Letter Of Confirmation And Respondents Agenda
Xth October 2001
Dear Mr. X
Thank yon for agreeing to take participate in our study examining strategies for survival 
of long-lived small firms. I am writing to confirm that the interview will take place on 
Thursday 20th of October at 10am as we agreed over the telephone. Please find enclosed 
the attached agenda for this interview.
I look forward to meeting you and I hope that you will find this interview beneficial.
Yours sincerely,
Bernadette Power
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Factors which Foster the Survival of Long-lived Small Firms
Agenda Outline:
1. The General characteristics of your business.
2. Expectations for the size and scope of your business at start-up.
3. Changes in the running of your business.
4. Factor, which fostered your survival.
5. Innovation and Technology.
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Type 5: Thank You Letter
Xth October 2001
Dear Mr. X,
I would like to thank you for the interview you gave me last Friday. The information you 
provided should prove to be extremely helpful as Prof. Reid and I progress in our study 
of long-lived small firms.
We hope that our research will contribute to the success and growth of small business. 
We will forward you the results of the study in April 2002. We wish you all the very best 
for the future of your business. Thank you once again for your cooperation.
Yours sincerely,
Bernadette Power
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APPENDIX 3: TELEPHONE INTERVIEWING CALLING STRATEGY
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1. May I speak to Mr./Ms.________________  (the owner manager) please.
2. Hello Mr.ZMs._______ , I was wondering if I can speak to you for a few minutes. Are
you available to speak with me at present?
Exit strategy: When would you be available to talk with me? (Agree a date and time). I will 
phone you back then. Thank you Mr./Ms.
3. I am a lecturer in Economics at University College Cork. I am currently an academic 
visitor to CRIEFF, University of St. Andrews where I am undertaking a Ph.D. on 
strategies for survival of long-lived small firms. I am working with Professor Reid, 
Director of CRIEFF within the department of Economics here at the University.
4. Have you received our letter outlining the nature of the project, which we sent to you 
towards the end of last week? (Yes/No)
5. Do you understand what is involved in the project? (Yes/No)
6. Would you like me to explain the project fiirther to you? Basically we are examining 
strategies for survival of long-lived small firms that is small business which were 
classified as small at start-up and are still trading 15 years later. We are particularly 
concerned with those factors, which have fostered the survival of these businesses as 
this evidence can help new small businesses survive. We also want to increase the 
profile of the continued small business enterprise, as they seem to be neglected to a 
large extent by industrial policy. A lot of data is in existence on small business start­
ups but few studies have examined the contributions of successful long-lived firms, 
like yours, to the Scottish economy. If there was more information available on the 
contribution of these firms this may increase the support for continued businesses. 
We have developed a questionnaire, which we would like to work through with you 
in the near fiiture. It covers questions on the characteristics of your business, your 
expectations at start-up for the size and scope of your business, major changes in the 
operations and strategy of your business, factors which have fostered your survival 
and the level of innovation and technology of your business.
Exit strategy: When would you be available to talk with me? (Agree a date and time). I will 
phone you back then. Thank you Mr./ Ms.
7. Is you understanding of the aims and merits of the project clear now? (Yes/No)
8. On the basis of that could we come and interview you in the near future? (Y es/No)
If Negative - try to persuade the owner manager to take part.
9. Can we agree on a date and time now? Would you like to take a look at your diary? 
We will probably need an hour or so of your time? Yes/No (Arrange time)
42
Make sure to check schedule of interviews etc, that there are no clashes. 1
Exit strategy: When would be the best time for me to ring you back to arrange a time for this 
interview. (Agree a date/ time). Thank you Mr. 
10. Either Professor Reid or I will conduct the interview however it will more than likely 
be me. Thank you for agreeing to participate we will send a note to confirm this and a 
summary agenda for the interview. We look forward to meeting you 
Mr.ZMs.____________ .
Other Specific Questions:________________________________________________________
To Address Question: How was I selected?__________________________________________
Eighty long-lived small firms in Scotland, such as your business, were selected for inclusion 
in this study.
The sample was taken from an earlier study of Professor Gavin Reid. Dr. Julia Smith and 
Marianne Nilkes also undertook the interviews between 1994-1998. The Leverhulme Trust 
endorsed this study.
The sample was taken from an earlier study of Professor Gavin Reid. This study was 
endorsed by the Federation of Small business. It concerned funding shortages in small firms. 
Professor Reid and Ms. Margo Andersen conducted the interviews by telephone.
The sample was taken from an earlier study of Professor Gavin Reid. He undertook the 
interviews with Dr. Lowell Jacobsen and Ms. Jacqueline Campbell between 1985-1988. This 
study was endorsed by Scottish Enterprise and Scottish Business in the Community.
To Address Question: Why participate?______________________________________________
This provides you with the opportunity to reflect on the strategies you used over the life of the 
business, which may have influenced its survival. We find that this exercise of looking at 
your business in a structured way can be of immediate benefit to you. It tends to generate 
new insights into the running of your business.
It is also an opportunity for you to rely your experience in running a small business. These 
may be a valuable tool for generating support for small business.
When the study is completed a summary of your findings will be sent to you.
To Address Question: Confidentiality?_______________________________________________
We would like to assure you that absolute confidentiality will be upheld. The identity of your 
business will not be disclosed.
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APPENDIX 4: DATA DICTIONARY
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Notes
The data dictionary contains the variables names used in the database which hold for all 
of the administered questionnaire data. It also shows how answers were coded for ease of 
analysis.
Notes to accompany the Data Dictionary
Note
1 =0 (no), =l(yes)
2 = 01 (Agriculture and Horticulture), = 03 (Forestry), = 11 (Fishing), = 12
(Coal Extraction and Manufacture of Solid Fuels), =13 (Coke Ovens), =14 
(Extraction of Mineral Oil and Natural Gas), =15 (Nuclear Fuel 
Production), =16 (Production and Distribution of Electricity, Gas and Other 
Forms of Energy), =17 (Water Supply Industry), = 21 (Extraction and 
Preparation of Metalliferous ores), =22 (Metal Manufacturing), =23 
(Extractions of other Minerals), =24 (Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral 
Products), =25 (Chemical Industry) =26 (Production of Man-made Fibres), 
=31 (Manufacture of Other Metals), =32 (Mechanical Engineering), =33 
(Manufacture of Office Machinery and Data Processing Equipment), =34 
(Electrical and Electronic Engineering), =35 (Manufacture of Motor 
Vehicles and Parts), =36 (Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment), =37 
(Instrument Engineering), =41/42 (Food, Drink and Tobacco 
Manufacturing), =43 (Textile Industry), =44 (Manufacture of Leather 
Goods), =45 (Footwear and Clothing Industries), =46 (Timber and Wooden 
Furniture Industries), =47 (Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products, 
Printing and Publishing), =48 (Processing of Rubber and Plastics), =49 
(Other Manufacturing Industries), =50 (Construction), =61 (Wholesale 
Distribution), =62 (Dealing in Scrap and Waste metals), =63 (Commission 
Agents), =64/65 (Retail Distribution), =66 (Hotels and Catering), 
=67(Repair of Consumer Goods and Vehicles), =71 (Railways), =72 (Other 
Inland Transport), =74 (Sea Transport), =75 (Air Transport), =76 
(Supporting Services to Transport), =77 (Miscellaneous Transport Services 
and Storage not Elsewhere Specified), =79 (Postal Services and
Telecommunications), =81 (Banking and Finance), =82 (Insurance), =83 
(Business Services), =84 (Renting of Movables), =85 (Owning and Dealing 
in Real Estate), =91 (Public Administration, National Defence and 
Compulsory Social Security), =92 (Sanitary Services), =93 (Education), =94 
(Research and Development), =95 (Medical and Other Health Services), =96 
(Other Services Provided to the General Public), =97 (Recreational Services 
and Other Cultural Services), =98 (Personal Services), =99 (Domestic 
Services)
3 =l(Sole trader operating from home), =2 (Sole trader operating from
business premises), =3 (Partnership), =4 (Cooperative), =5 (Private
45
company), =6 (Public company), =7 (Other)
4 =l(up), =2 (Down), =3 (Same)
5 =1 (Local), =2 (Regional), =3 (Scottish), =4 (British), =5 (International)
6 =1 (Under 1%), =2 (1-5%), =3 (6-10%), =4 (11-20%), =5 (21-30%), =6 (31- 
50%), =7 (Over 50%), =8 (Not known)
7 =1 (Identical), =2 (Similar), =3 (Different), =4 (Cannot say)
8 =l(Low end of the market), -2 (Middle of the market), =3 (Top end of the 
Market), =4 (All of the above), = 5 (Other)
9 =1 (Intense in every aspect), =2 (Strong but weak in some aspects), =3 
(Generally weak but strong in some aspects), =4 (Generally weak in all 
aspects)
10 =1 (Bank overdraft), =2 (Bank loan), =3 (Hire purchase agreement), =4 
(Other)
11 ~1 (To provide you an alternative to unemployment), =2 (To have a business 
to pass on to family members), =3 (To create a business with survival 
prospects), =4 (Short term profit), =5 (Long term profit), =6 (Growth), =7 
(High sales), =8 (High market share), =9 (High rate of return), =10 (To sell 
on the business), =11 (Other)
12 =1 (Head to head), =2 (Niche)
13 =1 (To provide you with employment to the end of your working life), =2 
(To have a business to pass on to family members), =3 (To create 
employment in the community), =4 (For long term profit), =5 (For further 
growth), =6 (For increased sales), =7 (For increased market share), =8 (Get a 
return on the business), =9 (To increase the value of the business on trade 
sale), =10 (To have a sizeable pension or nest egg on retiring), =11 (Other)
14 =1 (trade sale), =2 (Family member will continue running the business), =3 
(Management/Employee buy out), =4 (Other)
15 =1 (Not at all), =2 (A little), =3 (Quite a lot), =4 (A lot)
16 =1 (Quality), =2 (New products or services), =3 (New technology), =4 
(Marketing techniques), =5(Operational efficiency), =6(Other)
17 =1 (No change [we kept all our processes the same]), =2 (Slight change [we 
modified a few of our processes in minor ways]), =3 (Significant change [we
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modified a few of our processes in major ways]), =4 (Important change [we 
modified many of our processes in major ways])
18 =1 (Imitation of rivals), =2 (Hints from trade or professional journals), =3 
(Suggestions from customer), =4 (Suggestions within the firm), -5 
(Suggestions from supplier), =(New staff ‘carrying in’ knowledge), =6 
(Other), =7 (Not applicable)
19 =1 (None), =2 (A little), =3 (A lot), =4 (Don’t know)
20 =1 (None), -2 (1-5), =3 (6-10), =4 (11-20), =5 (More than 20)
21 =1 (Not as much as expected), =2 (A little), =3 (A lot)
22 -1 (Increased market share), —2 (Increased profitability), =3 (Both of the 
above), =4 (Other)
23 =1 (Developing a sales strategy), =2 (Getting customers to try the product), 
=3 (Other)
24 =1 (Unimportant), =2 (Important), =3(Very important)
25 =1 (Acknowledged leader in the industry), =2 (Newly emerging innovators 
in the industry), =3(Forces outside the industry [e.g. government constructed 
incentives]), =4 (Other)
26 -1 (We haven’t used new technologies), =2 (We have implemented new 
technologies but rarely successfully), =3 (We have implemented new 
technologies but not always successfully), -4 (We have generally been 
successful in implementing new technologies)
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VARIABLE
NAME
VARIABLE NOTE
ID IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
TRADSAL TRADE SALE 1
DATETRSA DATE of TRADE SALE (MONTHZYEAR)
TAKEOVER TAKEOVER 1
DATETAKO DATE of TAKEOVER (MONTH/YEAR)
AGE AGE
LINE MAIN LINE OF BUSINESS
FMSIC FIRST MOST IMPORTANT STANDARD INDUSTRIAL 
CLASSIFICATION
2
SMSIC SECOND MOST IMPORTANT STANDARD INDUSTRIAL 
CLASSIFICATION
2
TMSIC THIRD MOST IMPORTANT STANDARD INDUSTRIAL 
CLASSIFICATION
2
LEGAL LEGALSTATUS 3
OLEGAL OTHER LEGAL STATUS
PGROUP NUMBER OF PRODUCT GROUPS
PRODUCTS NUMBER OF PRODUCTS
FPGROUP FIRST MOST IMPORTANT PRODUCT GROUP
SPGROUP SECOND MOST IMPORTANT PRODUCT GROUP
TPGROUP THIRD MOST IMPORTANT PRODUCT GROUP
PFPGROUP % OF SALES OF FIRST MOST IMPORTANT PRODUCT GROUP
PSPGROUP % OF SALES OF SECOND MOST IMPORTANT PRODUCT GROUP
PTPGROUP % OF SALES OF THIRD MOST IMPORTANT PRODUCT GROUP
MRIVALS NUMBER OF MAJOR RIVALS
CMRIVALS CHANGE IN NUMBER OF MAJOR RIVALS 4
PCMRIVAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NUMBER OF MAJOR RIVALS
MINRIV NUMBER OF MINOR RIVALS
CMINRIV CHANGE IN NUMBER OF MINOR RIVALS 4
PCMINRIV PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NUMBER OF MINOR RIVALS
MARKET MAIN MARKET 5
CMARKET CHANGE IN MAIN MARKET 1
HCMARKET MAIN MARKET AT START-UP 5
MSHARE MARKET SHARE 6
CMSHARE CHANGE MARKET SHARE 1
HCMSHARE MARKET SHARE AT START-UP 6
DEBPROD LEVEL OF DIFFERENTIATION 7
CDIFPROD CHANGE IB LEVEL OF DIFFERENTIATION 1
HCDIFPD LEVEL OF DIFFERENTIATION AT START-UP 7
MPOSIT MARKET POSITIONING 8
OPOSIT OTHER MARKET POSITIONING
cmposit CHANGE IN MARKET POSITIONING 1
HCMPOSIT MARKET POSITIONING AT START-UP 8
DESCOMP DESCRIPTION OF COMPETITION 9
CDESCOMP CHANGE IN COMPETITION 1
HCDESCOM DESCRIPTION OF COMPETITION AT START-UP 9
CAPACITY CAPACITY OUTPUT 1
OPERCAP CAPACITY NORMALLY OPERATE
NPROBTT NET PROFIT 2000 NET OF TAXES AND DIRECTORS 
RUMUNERATION
TOASSET ASSETS 2001
ST ASSET ASSETS AT START-UP |
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DEBT DEBT 1
BANKOVER BANK OVERDRAFT 1
BANKLOAN BANKLOAN 1
HPURCH HIGHER PURCHASE 1
OFDEBT OTHER FORM OF DEBT 1
SOFDEBT SEPCIFY OTHER FORM OF DEBT
EQUITYF EQUITY FINANCE 1
PEQUTTYF PERCENTAGE OUTSIDE EQUITY
MAIN AIM MAIN AIM 11
OMAINAIM OTHER MAIN AIM
PLANHEAD PLAN AHEAD (MONTHS/YEARS)
LIFEBUS LIFE OF BUSINESS (MONTHS/YEARS)
FEEMPLOY 5 YEAR EXPECT HEADCOUNT
TEEMPLOY 10 YEAR EXPECT HEADCOUNT
FEGSALES 5 YEAR EXPECT GROSS SALES
TEGSALES 10 YEAR EXPECT GROSS SALES
MBUSIN MATURE BUSINESS 1
AGEMAT AGE AT MATURITY
NEMPMAT NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AT MATURITY
GSALEMAT GROSS SALES AT MATURITY
AEMPST ACTUAL EMPLOYEES AT START-UP
AEMP5YR ACTUAL EMPLOYEES AFTER 5 YEARS
AEMP10YR ACTUAL EMPLOYEES AFTER 10 YEARS
AEMPTO ACTUAL EMPLOYEES TODAY
ASALE1YR ACTUAL GROSS SALES AFTER 1 YEAR
ASALE5YR ACTUAL GROSS SALES AFTER 5 YEARS
ASAL10YR ACTUAL GROSS SALES AFTER 10 YEARS
ASALTOD ACTUAL GROSS SALES TODAY
EXPCOM EXPECTED 12
CPRICE PRICE 1
CQUALITY QUALITY 1
CVOLUME VOULME 1
CAFTSALE AFTER SALES SERVICE 1
CNPD NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 1
CAD VERT ADVERTISING 1
CTYESUP TYING UP SUPPLIERS 1
SDELIVE DELIVERY 1
CMARK MARKETING 1
COTHER OTHER FORM OF COMPETITION 1
SCOTHER SPECIFY OTHER FORM OF COMPETITION
STACC START-UP: ACCOUNTING MATTERS 1
STTRAIN START-UP: TRAINING OF PERSONNEL 1
STCOMPSW START-UP: COMPUTER SUPPORT STAFF 1
STPROD START-UP: PRODUCTION OF PRODUCT/SERVICE 1
STSALES START-UP: SALES 1
STMKTRES START-UP: MARKET RESEARCH 1
STASALE START-UP: AFTER SALES SERVICE 1
STRATPLA START-UP: STRATEGIC PLANNING 1
STINNOV START-UP: INNOVATION 1
STLEGAL START-UP: LEGAL MATTERS 1
STOTHER START-UP: OTHER 1
SPOTHER SPECIFY OTHER
STOTHER2 START-UP: OTHER2 1
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SPOTHER2 SPECIFY OTHER2
TACC TODAY: ACCOUNTING MATTERS 1
TTRAIN TODAY: TRAINING OF PERSONNEL 1
TCOMPSW TODAY: COMPUTER SUPPORT STAFF 1
TPRODPRO TODAY: PRODUCTION OF PRODUCT/SERVICE 1
TSAJLES TODAY: SALES 1
TMKTRES TODAY: MARKET RESEARCH 1
TAFTSALE TODAY: AFTER SALES SERVICE 1
TSTRATPL TODAY: STRATEGIC PLANNING 1
TINNOV TODAY: INNOVATION 1
TLEGAL TODAY: LEGAL MATTERS 1
TOTHER TODAY: OTHER 1
TOTHER2 TODAY: OTHER2 1
WACC DATE OF CHANGE: ACCOUNTING MATTERS
ATRAIN DATE OF CHANGE: TRAINING OF PERSONNEL
WCOMPSW DATE OF CHANGE: COMPUTER SUPPORT STAFF
WPRODPRO DATE OF CHANGE: PRODUCTION OF PRODUCT/SERVICE
WSALES DATE OF CHANGE: SALES
WMKTRES DATE OF CHANGE: MARKET RESEARCH
WASALES DATE OF CHANGE: AFTER SALES SERVICE
WSTRATPL DATE OF CHANGE: STRATEGIC PLANNING
WINNOV DATE OF CHANGE: INNOVATION
ELEGAL DATE OF CHANGE: LEGAL MATTERS
WOTHER DATE OF CHANGE: OTHER
WOTHER2 DATE OF CHANGE: OTHER2
CONAIM WHY CONTINUE TO OPERATE TODAY 13
OCONAIM OTHER AIM FOR OPERATION TODAY
HOPEMET EXPECTATIONS MET 1
COWSHIP CHANGE: OWNERSHIP 1
CLEGALF CHANGE: LEGAL FORM 1
CTECH CHANGE: TECHNICAL 1
CLOCAT CHANGE: LOCATION 1
CCASH CHANGE: CASHFLOW 1
CINNOVA CHANGE: INNOVATION 1
CLINE CHANGE: LINE OF BUSINESS 1
CINVEST CHANGE: INVESTMENT 1
COUTLET CHANGE: NUMBER OF OUTLETS 1
CNICHES CHANGE: MARKET NICHES 1
CPRODRA CHANGE: PRODUCT RANGE 1
CMKTPOS CHANGE: MARKET POSITIONING 1
CDIVERS CHANGE: DIVERSIFICATION 1
CASSET CHANGE: ASSETS 1
CCAPAC CHANGE: CAPACITY 1
CINPUTS CHANGE: INPUTS 1
CMGT CHANGE: MANAGEMENT 1
COTHR CHANGE: OTHER 1
SCOTHR SPECIFY CHANGE OTHER
COTHER2 CHANGE: OTHER2 1
SCOTHER2 SPECIFY CHANGE OTHER2
TOWSEQP TIME OF CHANGE: OWNERSHIP
LEGALT TIME OF CHANGE: LEGAL FORM
TTECH TIME OF CHANGE: TECHNICAL
TLOCAT TIME OF CHANGE: LOCATION
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TCASH TIME OF CHANGE: CASHFLOW
TINNOVA TIME OF CHANGE: INNOVATION
TLINE TIME OF CHANGE: LINE OF BUSINESS
TINVEST TIME OF CHANGE: INVESTMENT
TOUTLET TIME OF CHANGE: NUMBER OF OUTLETS
TMKTNIC TIME OF CHANGE: MARKET NICHES
TPRODRA TIME OF CHANGE: PRODUCT RANGE
TMKTPOS TIME OF CHANGE: MARKET POSITIONING
TDIVERS TIME OF CHANGE: DIVERSIFICATION
TASSET TIME OF CHANGE: ASSETS
TCAPAC TIME OF CHANGE: CAPACITY
TINPUTS TIME OF CHANGE: INPUTS
TMGT TIME OF CHANGE: MANAGEMENT
TOTHR TIME OF CHANGE: OTHER
TOTHR2 TIME OF CHANGE: OTHER2
FNBCBLAN FIRST MOST IMPORTANT CHANGE
SNBCHAN SECONF MOST IMPORTANT CHANGE
TNBCHAN THIRD MOST IMPORTANT CHANGE
PF1GROW PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: GROWTH 1
TPF1GRO PRECIPITATORTIME 1: GROWTH
PF1DEM PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: DEMAND 1
TPF1DEM PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: DEMAND
PF1NICH PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: NEW NICHES 1
TPF1NICH PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: NEW NICHES
PF1TAXEF PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: TAX EFFICIENCY 1
TPF1TAXE PRECIPITATORTIME 1: TAX EFFICIENCY
PF1CREDP PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: CREDIT POLICY 1
TPF1CRED PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: CREDIT POLICY
PF1F1N PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: FINANCE 1
TPF1FIN PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: FINANCE
PF1PROFT PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: PROFITABILITY 1
TPF1PROF PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: PROFITABILITY
PF1COST PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: COST CHANGES 1
TPF1COST PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: COST CHANGES
PF1SALES PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: SALES 1
TPF1SALE PRECIPITATORTIME 1: SALES
PF1COMP PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: COMPETITION 1
TPF1COMP PRECIPITATORTIME 1: COMPETITION
PF1MARK PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: MARKETING 1
TPF1MARK PRECIPITATORTIME 1: MARKETING
PF1TRAIN PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: TRADE INTELLIGENCE 1
TPF1TRAI PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: TRADE INTELLIGENCE
PF1CAPAC PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: CAPACITY 1
TPF1CAP PRECIPITATORTIME 1: CAPACITY
PF1ACCBU PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: ACCESS TO BUYERS 1
TPF1ACCB PRECIPITATORTIME 1: ACCESS TO BUYERS
PF1STOCK PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: STOCK LEVELS 1
TPF1STOC PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: STOCK LEVELS
PF1REG PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: REGULATION 1
TPF1REG PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: REGULATION
PF1TECH PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: TECHNOLOGY 1
TPF1TECH PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: TECHNOLOGY
PF1OPEFF PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY ' 1
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TPF1OPEF PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
PF1INVES PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: INVESTMENT 1
TPF1INV PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: INVESTMENT
PF1DSUP PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: DELINQUENT SUPPLIERS 1
TPF1DSUP PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: DELINQUENT SUPPLIERS
PF1DDEB PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: DELINQUENT DEBTORS 1
TPF1DEB PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: DELINQUENT DEBTORS
PF1HEAD PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: HEADCOUNT 1
TPF1HEAD PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: HEADCOUNT
PF1CCONT PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: COST CONTROL 1
TPF1CONT PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: COST CONTROL
PF1 SKILL PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: SKILLS 1
TPF1SKIL PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: SKILLS
PF1MEX PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: MIX OF 
SUPPLIERS/CUSTOMER/RIVALS
1
TPF1MIX PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: MIX OF SUPPLBERS/CUSTOMERS/ 
RIVALS
PF1MON PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: MONITORING 1
TPF1MON PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: MONITORING
PF1MGR PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: FUNCTIONS OF MANAGER 1
TPF1MGR PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: FUNCTIONS OF MANAGER
PF1CASH PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: CASHFLOW 1
TPF1CASH PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: CASHFLOW
PF1OTH PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: OTHER 1
TPF1OTH PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: OTHER
SPF1OTH SPECIFY PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: OTHER
PF1OTH2 PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 1: OTHER2 1
TPF1OTH2 PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: OTHER 2
SPF1OTH2 SPECIFY PRECIPITATOR TIME 1: OTHER 2
AF1GROW ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: GROWTH 1
TAF1GRO ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: GROWTH
AF1DEM ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: DEMAND 1
TAF1DEM ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: DEMAND
AF1NICH ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: NEW NICHES 1
TAF1NICH ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: NEW NICHES
AF1TAXEF ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: TAX EFFICIENCY 1
TAF1TAXE ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: TAX EFFICIENCY
AF1CREDP ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1:CREDIT POLICY 1
TAF1CRED ADJUSTMENT TIME 1 :CREDIT POLICY
AF1FIN ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: FINANCE 1
TAF1FEN ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: FINANCE
AF1PROFT ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: PROFITABILITY 1
TAF1PROF ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: PROFITABILITY
AF1COST ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: COST CHANGES 1
TAF1COST ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: COST CHANGES
AF1 SALES ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: SALES 1
TAF1SALE ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: SALES
AF1COMP ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: COMPETITION 1
TAF1COMP ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: COMPETITION
AF1MARK ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: MARKETING 1
TAF1MARK ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: MARKETING
AF1TRAIN ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: TRADE INTELLIGENCE 1
TAF1TRAI ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: TRADE INTELLIGENCE
A FI CAPAC ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: CAPACITY 1
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TAF1CAP ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: CAPACITY
AF1ACCBU ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: ACCESS TO BUYERS 1
TAF1ACCB ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: ACCESS TO BUYERS
AF1STOCK ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: STOCK LEVELS 1
TAF1STOC ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: STOCK LEVELS
AF1REG ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: REGULATION 1
TAF1REG ADJUSTMENT TIME 1:REGULATION
AF1TECH ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: TECHNOLOGY 1
TAF1TECH ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: TECHNOLOGY
AF1OPEFF ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY 1
TAF1OPEF ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
AF1INVES ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: INVESTMENT 1
TAF1INV ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: INVESTMENT
AF1DSUP ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: DELINQUENT SUPPLIERS 1
TAF1DSUP ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: DELINQUENT SUPPLIERS
AF1DDEB ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: DELINQUENT DEBTORS 1
TAF1DEB ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: DELINQUENT DEBTORS
AF1HEAD ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: HEADCOUNT 1
TAF1HEAD ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: HEADCOUNT
AF1CCONT ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: COST CONTROL 1
TAF1CONT ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: COST CONTROL
AF1 SKILL ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: SKILLS 1
TAF1SKIL ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: SKILLS
AF1MIX ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: MIX OF SUPPLIERS/CUSTOMERS 
/RIVALS
1
TAF1MIX ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: MIX OF SUPPLIERS/CUSTOMERS/
RIVALS
AF1MON ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: MONITORING 1
TAF1MON ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: MONITORING
AF1MGR ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: FUNCTIONS OF MANAGER 1
TAF1MGR ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: FUNCTIONS OF MANAGER
AF1CASH ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: CASHFLOW 1
TAF1CASH ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: CASHFLOW
AF1OTH ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: OTHER 1
TAF1OTH ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: OTHER
SAF1OTH SPECIFY ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: OTHER
AF1OTH2 ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 1: OTHER 1
TAF1OTH2 ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: OTHER
SAF1OTH2 SPECIFY ADJUSTMENT TIME 1: OTHER
PF2GROW PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: GROWTH 1
TPF2GRO PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: GROWTH
PF2DEM PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: DEMAND 1
TPF2DEM PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: DEMAND
PF2NICH PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: NEW NICHES 1
TPF2NICH PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: NEW NICHES
PF2TAXEF PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: TAX EFFICIENCY 1
TPF2TAXE PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: TAX EFFICIENCY
PF2CREDP PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: CREDIT POLICY 1
TPF2CRED PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: CREDIT POLICY
PF2FIN PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: FINANCE 1
TPF2FIN PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: FINANCE
PF2PROFT PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: PROFITABILITY 1
TPF2PROF PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: PROFITABILITY
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PF2COST PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: COST CHANGES 1
TPF2COST PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: COST CHANGES
PF2SALES PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: SALES 1
TPF2SALE PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: SALES
PF2COMP PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: COMPETITION 1
TPF2COMP PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: COMPETITION
PF2MARK PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: MARKETING 1
TPF2MARK PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: MARKETING
PF2TRAIN PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: TRADE INTELLIGENCE 1
TPF2TRAI PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: TRADE INTELLIGENCE
PF2CAPAC PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: CAPACITY 1
TPF2CAP PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: CAPACITY
PF2ACCBU PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: ACCESS TO BUYERS 1
TPF2ACCB PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: ACCESS TO BUYERS
PF2STOCK PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: STOCK LEVELS 1
TPF2STOC PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: STOCK LEVELS
PF2REG PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: REGULATION 1
TPF2REG PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: REGULATION
PF2TECH PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: TECHNOLOGY 1
TPF2TECH PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: TECHNOLOGY
PF2OPEFF PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY 1
TPF2OPEF PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
PF2INVES PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: INVESTMENT 1
TPF2INV PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: INVESTMENT
PF2DSUP PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: DELINQUENT SUPPLIERS 1
TPF2DSUP PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: DELINQUENT SUPPLIERS
PF2DDEB PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: DELINQUENT DEBTORS 1
TPF2DEB PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: DELINQUENT DEBTORS
PF2HEAD PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: HEADCOUNT 1
TPF2HEAD PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: HEADCOUNT
PF2CCONT PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: COST CONTROL 1
TPF2CONT PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: COST CONTROL
PF2SKILL PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: SKILLS 1
TPF2SKIL PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: SKILLS
PF2MIX PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: MIX OF SUPPLIERS/CUSTOMERSZ 
RIVALS
1
TPF2MIX PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: MIX OF SUPPLIERS/CUSTOMERSZ 
RIVALS
PF2MON PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: MONITORING 1
TPF2MON PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: MONITORING
PF2MGR PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: FUNCTIONS OF MANAGER 1
TPF2MGR PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: FUNCTIONS OF MANAGER
PF2CASH PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: CASHFLOW 1
TPF2CASH PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: CASHFLOW
PF2OTH PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: OTHER 1
TPF2OTH PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: OTHER
SPF2OTH SPECIFY PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: OTHER
PF2OTH2 PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 2: OTHER2 1
TPF2OTH2 PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: OTHER2
SPF2OTH2 SPECIFY PRECIPITATOR TIME 2: OTHER
AF2GROW ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: GROWTH 1
TAF2GRO ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: GROWTH
AF2DEM ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: DEMAND 1
TAF2DEM ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: DEMAND
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AF2NICH ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: NEW NICHES 1
TAF2NICH ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: NEW NICHES
AF2TAXEF ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: TAX EFFICIENCY 1
TAF2TAXE ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: TAX EFFICIENCY
AF2CREDP ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2:CREDIT POLICY 1
TAF2CRED ADJUSTMENT TIME 2:CREDIT POLICY
AF2FIN ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: FINANCE 1
TAF2FIN ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: FINANCE
AF2PROFT ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: PROFITABILITY 1
TAF2PROF ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: PROFITABILITY
AF2COST ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: COST CHANGES 1
TAF2COST ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: COST CHANGES
AF2SAL.ES ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: SALES 1
TAF2SALE ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: SALES
AF2COMP ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: COMPETITION 1
TAF2COMP ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: COMPETITION
AF2MARK ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: MARKETING 1
TAF2MLARK ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: MARKETING
AF2 TRAIN ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: TRADE INTELLIGENCE 1
TAF2TRAI ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: TRADE INTELLIGENCE
AF2CAPAC ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: CAPACITY 1
TAF2CAP ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: CAPACITY
AF2ACCBU ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: ACCESS TO BUYERS 1
TAF2ACCB ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: ACCESS TO BUYERS
AF2STOCK ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: STOCK LEVELS 1
TAF2STOC ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: STOCK LEVELS
AF2REG ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2:CREGULATION 1
TAF2REG ADJUSTMENT TIME 2:CREGULATION
AF2TECH ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: TECHNOLOGY 1
TAF2TECH ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: TECHNOLOGY
AF2OPEFF ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY 1
TAF2OPEF ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
AF2INVES ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: INVESTMENT 1
TAF2INV ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: INVESTMENT
AF2DSUP ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: DELINQUENT SUPPLIERS 1
TAF2DSUP ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: DELINQUENT SUPPLIERS
AF2DDEB ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: DELINQUENT DEBTORS 1
TAF2DEB ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: DELINQUENT DEBTORS
AF2HEAD ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: HEADCOUNT 1
TAF2HEAD ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: HEADCOUNT
AF2CCONT ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: COST CONTROL 1
TAF2CONT ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: COST CONTROL
A F2 SKILL ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: SKILLS 1
TAF2SK1L ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: SKILLS
AF2MIX ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: MIX OF SUPPLIERS/CUSTOMERS/ 
RIVALS
1
TAF2MIX ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: MIX OF SUPPLIERS/CUSTOMERS/
RIVALS
AF2MON ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: MONITORING 1
TAF2MON ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: MONITORING
AF2MGR ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: FUNCTIONS OF MANAGER 1
TAF2MGR ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: FUNCTIONS OF MANAGER
AF2CASH ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: CASHFLOW 1
TAF2CASH ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: CASHFLOW
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AF2OTH ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: OTHER 1
TAF2OTH ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: OTHER
SAF2OTH SPECIFY ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: OTHER
AF2OTH2 ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 2: OTHER2 1
TAF2OTH2 ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: OTHER2
SAF2OTH2 SPECIFY ADJUSTMENT TIME 2: OTHER
PF3GROW PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: GROWTH 1
TPF3GRO PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: GROWTH
PF3DEM PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: DEMAND 1
TPF3DEM PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: DEMAND
PF3NICH PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: NEW NICHES 1
TPF3NICH PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: NEW NICHES
PF3TAXEF PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: TAX EFFICIENCY 1
TPF3TAXE PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: TAX EFFICIENCY
PF3CREDP PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: CREDIT POLICY 1
TPF3CRED PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: CREDIT POLICY
PF3FIN PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: FINANCE I
TPF3FIN PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: FINANCE
PF3PROFT PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: PROFITABILITY 1
TPF3PROF PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: PROFITABILITY
PF3COST PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: COST CHANGES 1
TPF3COST PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: COST CHANGES
PF3SALES PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: SALES 1
TPF3SALE PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: SALES
PF3COMP PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: COMPETITION 1
TPF3COMP PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: COMPETITION
PF3MARK PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: MARKETING 1
TPF3MARK PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: MARKETING
PF3TRAIN PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: TRADE INTELLIGENCE 1
TPF3TRAI PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: TRADE INTELLIGENCE
PF3CAPAC PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: CAPACITY 1
TPF3CAP PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: CAPACITY
PF3ACCBU PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: ACCESS TO BUYERS 1
TPF3ACCB PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: ACCESS TO BUYERS
PF3STOCK PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: STOCK LEVELS 1
TPF3STOC PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: STOCK LEVELS
PF3REG PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: REGULATION 1
TPF3REG PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: REGULATION
PF3TECH PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: TECHNOLOGY 1
TPF3TECH PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: TECHNOLOGY
PF3OPEFF PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY 1
TPF3OPEF PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
PF3INVES PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: INVESTMENT 1
TPF3INV PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: INVESTMENT
PF3DSUP PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: DELINQUENT SUPPLIERS 1
TPF3DSUP PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: DELINQUENT SUPPLIERS
PF3DDEB PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: DELINQUENT DEBTORS 1
TPF3DEB PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: DELINQUENT DEBTORS
PF3HEAD PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: HEADCOUNT 1
TPF3HEAD PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: HEADCOUNT
PF3CCONT PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: COST CONTROL 1
TPF3CONT PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: COST CONTROL
PF3SKELL PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: SKILLS . 1
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TPF3SKIL PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: SKILLS
PF3MIX PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: MIX OF SUPPLIERS/CUSTOMERS/
RIVALS
1
TPF3MIX PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: MIX OF SUPPLIERS/CUSTOMERS/ 
RIVALS
PF3MON PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: MONITORING 1
TPF3MON PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: MONITORING
PF3MGR PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: FUNCTIONS OF MANAGER 1
TPF3MGR PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: FUNCTIONS OF MANAGER
PF3CASH PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: CASHFLOW 1
TPF3CASH PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: CASHFLOW
PF3OTH PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: OTHER 1
TPF3OTH PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: OTHER
SPF3OTH SPECIFY PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: OTHER
PF3OTH2 PRECIPITATOR FACTOR 3: OTHER2 1
TPF3OTH2 PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: OTHER2
SPF3OTH3 SPECIFY PRECIPITATOR TIME 3: OTHER
AF3GROW ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: GROWTH 1
TAF3GRO ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: GROWTH
AF3DEM ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: DEMAND 1
TAF3DEM ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: DEMAND
AF3NICH ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: NEW NICHES 1
TAF3NICH ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: NEW NICHES
AF3TAXEF ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: TAX EFFICIENCY 1
TAF3TAXE ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: TAX EFFICIENCY
AF3CREDP ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3:CREDIT POLICY 1
TAF3CRED ADJUSTMENT TIME 3:CREDIT POLICY
AF3FIN ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: FINANCE 1
TAF3FIN ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: FINANCE
AF3PROFT ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: PROFITABILITY 1
TAF3PROF ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: PROFITABILITY
AF3COST ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: COST CHANGES 1
TAF3COST ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: COST CHANGES
AF3SALES ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: SALES 1
TAF3SALE ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: SALES
AF3COMP ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: COMPETITION 1
TAF3COMP ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: COMPETITION
AF3MARK ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: MARKETING 1
TAF3MARK ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: MARKETING
AF3TRAIN ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: TRADE INTELLIGENCE 1
TAF3TRAI ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: TRADE INTELLIGENCE
AF3CAPAC ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: CAPACITY 1
TAF3CAP ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: CAPACITY
AF3ACCBU ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: ACCESS TO BUYERS 1
TAF3ACCB ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: ACCESS TO BUYERS
AF3STOCK ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: STOCK LEVELS 1
TAF3STOC ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: STOCK LEVELS
AF3REG ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3:CREGULATION 1
TAF3REG ADJUSTMENT TIME 3:CREGULATION
AF3TECH ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: TECHNOLOGY 1
TAF3TECH ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: TECHNOLOGY
AF3OPEFF ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY 1
TAF3OPEF ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
AF3INVES ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: INVESTMENT 1
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TAF31NV ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: INVESTMENT
AF3DSUP ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: DELINQUENT SUPPLIERS 1
TAF3DSUP ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: DELINQUENT SUPPLIERS
AF3DDEB ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: DELINQUENT DEBTORS 1
TAF3DEB ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: DELINQUENT DEBTORS
AF3HEAD ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: HEADCOUNT 1
TAF3HEAD ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: HEADCOUNT
AF3CCONT ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: COST CONTROL 1
TAF3CONT ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: COST CONTROL
AF3SKILL ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: SKILLS 1
TAF3SKIL ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: SKILLS
AF3MIX ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: MIX OF SUPPLIERS/CUSTOMERS/
RIVALS
1
TAF3MIX ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: MIX OF SUPPLIERS/CUSTOMERS/
RIVALS
AF3MON ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: MONITORING 1
TAF3MON ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: MONITORING
AF3MGR ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: FUNCTIONS OF MANAGER 1
TAF3MGR ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: FUNCTIONS OF MANAGER
AF3CASH ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: CASHFLOW 1
TAF3CASH ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: CASHFLOW
AF3OTH ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: OTHER 1
TAF3OTH ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: OTHER
SAF3OTH SPECIFY ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: OTHER
AF3OTH2 ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 3: OTHER2 1
TAF3OTH2 ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: OTHER2
SAF3OTH3 SPECIFY ADJUSTMENT TIME 3: OTHER
FSSUP FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: SUPPLIERS
FSGROW FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: GROWTH
FSCOMP FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: COMPETITION
FSBUYWTP FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: BUYERS
WILLINGNESS TO PAY
FSCUSTLO FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: CUSTOMER LOYALTY
FSACCBUY FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: ACCESS TO BUYERS
FSSUB FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: SUBSTITUTES
FSNWENT FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: NEW ENTRANTS
FSTECH FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: TECHNOLOGY
FSRIVINN FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: RIVAL’S INNOVATION
FSREG FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: REGULATION
FSCASH FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: CASHFLOW
FSDEBT FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: DEBT
FSCREDP FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL:CREDIT POLICY
FSCAPREQ FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: CAPITAL 
REQUIREMENTS
FSLOCAT FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: LOCATION
FSCOSTC FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: COST CONTROL
FSQUAL FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: QUALITY
FSMKTRES FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: MARKET RESEARCH
FSDIFF FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: DIFFERENTIATION
FSADVERT FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: ADVERTISING
FSPROMIX FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: PRODUCT MIX
FSDIVERS FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: DIVERSIFICATION
FSOPEFF FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: OPERATIONAL 
EFFICIENCY
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FSSKILLS FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: SKILLS
FSMONIT FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: MONITORING
FSPROFGA FACTORS WHICH FOSTERED SURVIVAL: FILLING PRODUCT 
GAPS
EXPFUTT EXPECTED TO TRADE WELL INTO FUTURE 1
EXITSTRA EXIT STRATEGY 14
OTHEXIT SPECIFY OTHER EXIT STRATEGY
INNOVST LEVEL OF INNOVATIVENESS AT START-UP 15
TYPEINNO TYPE OF INNOVATION 16
SOTYPEIN SPECIFY OTHER TYPE OF INNOVATION
PROINNO EXTENT OF PROCESS INNOVATION SINCE START-UP 17
WHYPRIN WHY PROCESS INNOVATION TO THIS EXTENT 18
OWHY OTHER REASON WHY PROCESS INNOVATION TO THIS EXTENT
RIVPROI EXTENT OF PROCESS INNOVATION BY RIVALS 19
CRIVPRC EXTENT OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURE BY RIVALS PROCESS 
INNOVATION
19
PRINNO EXTENT OF PRODUCT INNOVATION SINCE START-UP 20
MORE20 NUMBER OF PRODUCTS MORE THAN 20
REWARDS REAP REWARDS FROM PRODUCT INNOVATIONS 21
FORMREW FORM OF REWARDS 22
OFORMRE OTHER FORM OF REWARDS
DIFFLAUN DIFFICULTIES IN LAUCHING NEW PRODUCTS 1
FORMDIFF FORM OF DIFFICULTIES 23
OFORMDIF OTHER FORM OF DIFFICULTIES
RIVPRODI EXTENT OF PRODUCT INNOVATION BY RIVALS 19
CRIVPROD EXTENT OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURE BY RIVALS PRODUCT 
INNOVATION
19
PATENT PATENTS 1
COPYRIG COPYRIGHT 1
TRADMARK TRADEMARKS 1
EXPLQUIC EXPLOITATION OF INNOVATION RAPIDLY 1
OTHPROTI METHODS TO PROTECT INNOVATIONS 1
OTHPROTS SPECIFIC OTHER METHOD TO PROTECT INNOVATIONS
TELEPHO TELEPHONE 1
FAX FAX 1
TELANS TELEPHONE ANSWERING 1
EMAIL ELECTRONIC MAIL 1
TVCONFER TELEPHONE/VIDEO CONFERENCING 1
MOBILE CELLULAR TELEPHONE 1
WEBSITE WEBSITE 1
INTERNET INTERNET 1
RADCOM RADIO COMMUNICATION 1
PC PERSONAL COMPUTERS 1
ELECTOR ELECTRONIC DATABASES 1
OTHERIT1 OTHER IT 1 1
SOTHTTl SPECIFIC OTHER IT 1
OTHERIT2 OTHER TT 2 1
SOTHIT2 SPECIFIC OTHER IT 2
NBIT IMPOTANCE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 24
USEFTNET NETWORKING 1
USEITNAC PRODUCING ACCOUNTS 1
USEITADM MANAGING DEALINGS WITH BUYERS/SUPPLIERS 1
USEITPT MONITORING PERFORMANCE TARGETS 1
USEITDES DESIGNING NEW PRODUCTS 1
59
USEITRIV GATHERING INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES OF RIVALS 1
USEITOE OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY 1
USEITTAR SETTING TARGETS OR PLANS 1
USITOTH OTHER USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 1
SUSITOTH SPECIFIED OTHER USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOFY
TECHCHGE TECHNICAL CHANGE 1
INTTCHGE PRIME INITATORS OF CHANGE 25
OTHCHGE OTHER PRIME INITATORS OF CHANGE
IMPLTECH YOUR EXPERIENCE OF USING NEW TECHNOLOGIES 26
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APPENDIX 5: CASE ANALYSIS
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5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this appendix is twofold. First, to illustrate what a long-lived 
small firm looks like, through examining a series of seven case profiles of mature small 
firms. Second, to use the qualitative evidence, gathered using the instrumentation 
developed for this study, to illustrate key aspects of the results. Qualitative evidence 
gathered early in the life of the long-lived small firms, particularly with respect to the 
Leverhulme (1985-1988) sample, is also analysed, where appropriate, to enrich the 
analysis from a longitudinal point of view, see Reid (1993) and Reid et al. (1993). No 
amount of econometric work and statistical analysis can convey the level of 
metamorphosis, which has occurred over the life of these mature small firms. In-depth 
analysis of seven cases is a powerful tool to capture the evolution of these firms and to 
examine the relevance of the results of this study.
The seven cases were chosen for three reasons: 1) their representativeness of the 
three parent samples; 2) their diverse characteristics (e.g. sector, age, size etc); and 3) the 
level of organisational change that occurred over their lives. The profiles are denoted A, 
B,...through to G. Four of these cases (A, B, C and D) were chosen from the 
Leverhulme (1985-1988) sample, as qualitative evidence is available on these firms early 
in their lives, see Reid (1993) and Reid et al. (1993). A service-based company was 
chosen from the Telephone survey 1991, as this sample was mainly comprised of services 
based firms, see Reid, (1996). Two further cases, a corporate design firm and a soft 
furnishings producer, F and G respectively, were chosen from the Leverhulme (1994­
1997) sample (see Reid and Smith, 2000a;’Reid, 1999; Smith, 1997a).
To illustrate the diversity of the seven enterprise profiles, Table 5.1 presents 
summary data on the age, product, SIC code classification, legal status, size (as measured 
by FTEs, turnover and assets), level of firm-specific turbulence and performance 
measured by the subjective measure of long run performance. It is difficult to class small 
firms as purely manufacturing or service firms based on Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. Most small firms operate across a range of classification 
codes. According to Table 5.1 enterprise profiles A and C are solely involved in 
manufacturing and B and F are solely service-based firms. The three cases D, E and G
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generate turnover from manufacturing products and providing services. Long-lived small 
firms from the Leverhulme (1985-1988) and the Telephone Survey 1991 samples are 
more mature. In this subsample of seven enterprise profiles, firms originating from these 
parent samples are older. Case profile A, a manufacturer of plastic injection mouldings, 
from the Leverhulme (1985-1988) sample, is the oldest firm (at 41 years old) whereas 
enterprise profile G, a manufacturer of soft furnishings, from the Leverhulme (1994- 
1997) sample is thirteen years old, the youngest firm in this sub-sample. Most of the 
enterprises are private companies except for profiles B and G. Evidence suggests that 
most small firms change legal form from the sole proprietorship form, to the partnership 
and private limited company forms, over their lifetime, (cf. Reid, 1998; Freedman and 
Godwin, 1992). In terms of scale, as measured by full-time equivalent employees, 
profiles B and C are the smallest firms in this subsample with 10 FTEs whereas firm F is 
the largest with 60 FTEs. With regard to turnover case profile D, the merchandiser of 
bulk bags, had the largest turnover (£4m stg.) whereas case profile G, the soft furnishings 
producer, had the smallest turnover at £224,000stg. at constant 2001 prices. The asset
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base is low primarily for service-based firms (B, D, E, and F) whereas it is high for 
manufacturers (A, C, and G). Much of the asset base of the service firms is perhaps 
intangible (e.g. goodwill, human capital).
This sub-sample of enterprise profiles has undertaken a number of key 
organisational changes over the life of their firms. Firm-specific turbulence ranges from 
a level of eight (i.e. the average in the entire sample) for case profiles A to a level of 
fifteen for case profile E. Thus, this sub-sample has undergone a lot of change over their 
lives, either to survive or to grow on their business. The flexibility of these small firms in 
responding to organisational change is examined (see Chapter 8). Further, the 
applicability of a real options line of reasoning (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; McGrath, 
1997, 1999; Luehrman, 1997, 1998) in adjusting to signs of organisational change can be 
investigated for the three most important organisational changes instigated by each of 
these enterprise profiles. It is hypothesised in Volume I, Chapter 8 that the entrepreneur 
can raise the flexibility of the small firm and thereby enhance the long run prospects of 
the small firm by adopting such an approach.
High performers and low performers according to the long run performance score 
are represented in the sample. This indicator of performance ranges from a below 
average score of 61 for case profile F to an above average score of 90 for case profile G. 
Relative performance based on this subjective measure of performance can be compared 
to other objective measures of performance. The underlying determinants of the 
subjective measure of performance for each enterprise profile can also be examined. This 
should provide information on the factors, which foster the survival of the long-lived 
small firms in the sample.
Each enterprise profile is presented using a common approach to enable rich case- 
by-case analysis. The evidence is grouped into five analytical categories, namely, 
characteristics of the market, performance, internal organisation, organisational change 
and end games for comparative purposes. The analytical categories where chosen to 
illustrate key aspects of the quantitative results found in Parts IV-V in Volume I. The 
qualitative data available lends itself to an analysis of certain features of the quantitative 
results. Changes in the scale of the firm over its life, as measured by FTEs and turnover 
and a ratio of these measures, labour productivity, are examined to illuminate the results
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obtained from the estimation of Gibrat’s model in Chapter 5. General characteristics of 
the firm’s market, its competitive strategy and its internal organisation create a picture of 
the long-lived small firm in a similar manner to the quantitative results presented in 
Chapters 5 and 7 in Volume I. They also capture some of the findings of Volume I, 
Chapter 9, which presents evidence on simultaneities between size, performance and 
these variables. As mentioned above, the performance of the long-lived small firm 
approximated using the objective measures and the subjective measure of performance is 
discussed conveying the points, which were raised in Chapter 6. Key organisational 
change undertaken by the firm over its life is examined to illustrate the results of Chapter 
8. We focus on the level of firm-specific turbulence experienced by these firms over 
their life, their flexibility in making organisational change and the applicability of real 
options logic in analysing the adjustment process. Finally, end-games are examined to 
illustrate the process of ‘passing of the baton’ in family firms or features of other end­
games such as a trade-sale or management buyout. This illuminates the description of 
end-games presented in Chapter 7, Volume I. Proceeding now to examine each of the 
enterprise profiles in turn.
Profile A: Processing of Rubber and Plastics
Enterprise profile A manufactured plastic injection mouldings on a bespoke basis 
since it was established in 1960. This private company was managed by two brothers at 
the time of interview. At this point, firm A was 41 years old. The brothers took over the 
running of the business from their father, its founder, in 1974. The two generations (i.e. 
father and sons) were employed in the business for approximately ten years prior to 1974. 
In 1964, the eldest son entered the business and in 1967, the youngest son joined the firm. 
Idiosyncratic knowledge on the operation of this business was transferred from father to 
son over this period. It is presumed that the interests of the two sons and their father, 
who founded the business, were aligned before the business was transferred or the ‘baton 
was passed’ to the sons.
The chief aim of the business at inception was growth rather than an overriding 
concern for profitability. Growth was traded off for increased profitability, according to 
the owner-managers. It is observable from Table 5.2, that turnover rose considerably in
66
real terms (constant 2001 prices) over the first ten years of trading. Turnover more than 
doubled while the headcount of the firm increased marginally, thus labour productivity 
rose considerably. By 1985 (after 25 years of trading) real turnover had dropped 
considerably (so also had the headcount of firm A and labour productivity in real terms). 
This had turned upward by 1988 though never achieving the levels of real turnover 
generated in 1970 (£7million stg. in constant 2001 prices).
The business, according to the owner-managers, had reach a long run equilibrium 
level of employment and turnover of 36 fulltime equivalent employees and £2.2 million 
(in constant 2001 prices) in sales respectively, after twenty-eight years of trading. In the 
year of interview firm A earned turnover of £1.7 million (in constant 2001 prices) with 30 
FTE employees (see Table 7.2). Firm A’s labour productivity had declined slightly, from 
£61,11 lstg turnover per FTE at 28 years, to £56,667stg turnover per FTE in 2001, the 
year of interview. A reduction in the market rate of growth (or value of) sales is a 
potential reason for this decline in labour productivity. Firm A adjusted its headcount 
downwards in size an effort to maintain labour productivity but it perhaps needs to 
downsize further to attain higher levels of efficiency.
Table 5.2: Scale of Profile A
Year Turnover 
(£000stg) 
(£000stg 2001)
FTEs Labour 
Productivity 
(£000stg/FTE) 
(£000stg 2001/FTE)
Assets 
(£000stg) 
(£000s tg 2001)
At start-up (1960) 350 40 9 1
3,514 89 14
After 5years (1965) 500 46 11 -
5,849 127
After 10 years (1970) 750 42 18 -
7,015 167
After 25 years (1985) 480 26 18 112
879 34 205
Maturity (after 28 years) 1,200 36 33 254
2,198 61 412
After 41 years (2001)
1,700 30 57 1,000
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Finn A was principally involved in manufacturing. It produced plastic injection 
mouldings to customer specifications. The products produced were very large in number 
because they varied by colour, size, finish of plastic etc. These products could be grouped 
into seven similar types of products (increased from three in 1985), namely shower 
curtain rings, curtain pole rings, brackets, finials, carry handles, plastic tumblers, custom 
mouldings and shower tray waste outlets. The three principal product groups were cany' 
handles (12% of sales in 2001), curtain pole finials (12% of sales in 2001) and curtain 
rings (9% of sales in 2001).
Market Characteristics
At start-up firm A served customers in the Scottish market. By the time of 
interview the firm had extended its market reach and now focused on the UK market. 
Firm A also supplies particular products to international markets. The firm competes 
head-to-head with rivals in the UK market. In this market, it has four major and three 
minor rivals. The number of major rivals has not changed overtime but significant 
growth occurred in the number of minor or fringe competitors. In the principal market 
for carry handles firm A has a 25% share of the market. This has developed considerably 
since inception
Competition was described as strong but weak in some aspects. The owner- 
managers’ feel that the business is “wow there to be shot at” or a target for new entrants. 
Entry was easy in the mid-eighties as capital requirements were low. According to one of 
the brothers, “air machines were cheaply bought and could be operated in a garage”. 
Newer machines are much more expensive. Thus, high capital requirements represent a 
significant barrier to entry in the current market. The business is not capacity 
constrained. In response to substantial increases in demand the firm A could lease more 
machines.
The products of firm A and the competitive offerings of its rivals are similar. 
Though some buyers in the trade were highly expert, technical differences between the 
firm’s products and those of its rivals were thought to be too small for customers to 
notice. Firm A has not differentiated its products from technical standpoint overtime. In 
the early years of trading products were differentiated by offering customers aid in 
designing their product, for example, by providing colours of the season or alternative
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finishes to the plastic. However, at the time of interview firm A mainly competed on two 
dimensions namely, price and delivery. The products are now standard and are sold at 
low prices. Product differentiation is achieved by managing its inventory and by 
providing quick delivery of goods to customers.
As a consequence, Firm A typically supplies customers at the low end of the market 
(i.e. standard products at a low price). Firm A moved into this market position slowly 
and according to the owner-managers they are now “a market leader” in this position. 
The products are not niche based. This explains firm A’s narrow competitive strategy 
space and wider market extent. Firm A’s is also relatively larger size as measured by 
FTEs and turnover, in comparison with other mature small firms in the sample. Highly 
differentiated products are valuable in niche markets. Smaller firms survive in these 
markets because they do not attract competition from larger rivals. However, firm A is 
competing against larger rivals in a wider market (i.e. supplying national and 
international markets) using a less differentiated strategy and is thus larger in size. 
Performance
At the time of the interview, firm A made £15O,OOOstg in profits (a rate of 
profitability of 15%, measured by net profits per pound of assets). The firm was set up 
on a shoestring 41 years ago. The start-up capital was £l,OOOstg (£14,058stg. in constant 
2001 prices). Assets grew seventy fold over the life of the firm and are now one million 
pounds sterling (see Table 5.2). In absolute terms, this asset base is relatively large given 
that more than half the long-lived small firms in the sample had assets of less than 
£150,000stg. It represents a significant wealth enhancing effect for this family firm and 
for the local economy as a whole.
To finance the start-up of the business the founder mainly used private equity (see 
Reid, 1993). The gearing ratio of the firm was close to zero at start-up. It borrowed 
some funds from the bank and used hire purchase agreements but the firm did not rely on 
this source of finance. Over time increasing debt was considered to expand the premises 
and plant and equipment of the firm. The hiring of new employees and increasing 
inventory was also considered. This was guaranteed using life policies and heritable 
securities. At the time of interview, firm A had retired all its debt. It was financed solely
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by family equity. This suggests a clear preference for sources of financing that minimise 
intrusion into the business.
Figure 5.1 presents the performance ratings of the owner-managers of firm A for 
each item on the multi-dimensional scale. An understanding of the attributes, which 
underlie performance, increases our knowledge of influences on firm A’s long run 
survival. Attributes which received a rating above 75 included growth, customer loyalty, 
access to buyers, technology, cashflow, cost control, quality, product/service mix, 
diversification and operational efficiency. These are the primary determinants of firm 
A’s performance. The owner-managers juggle these items in pursuing its high volume 
low cost strategy. These items reflect four of the five constructs underlying firm 
performance that is internal organisation, business strategy, industry structure and rivalry 
and the nature of buyers and suppliers. Attributes which received a rating below 50, 
included market research, buyer’s willingness to pay and regulation. These factors 
negatively influence the long-run performance of firm A. Eleven items received a neutral 
rating. These included environmental items (i.e. rival’s innovation, new entrants, 
substitutes, competition) and financial items (i.e. debt, capital requirements, credit 
policy).
The rating of the attributes shows learning by firm A’s of its drivers of long run 
performance. These are linked not only to the financials of the business but also its core 
strategy. The owner-managers stated that their operational efficiency primarily fostered 
their survival. In their words, “7 b be able to run the machines 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week, gives it the edge in output and cost efficiency". The product mix of firm A 
was identified next. Firm A created a portfolio of products with different underlying 
demand features. As the demand for one product dipped firm A could concentrate on 
others for which demand was rising. The flexibility to change products overtime ensured 
their survival. According to the one of the brothers, “They lost main customers every few 
years so they then changed their product mix Customer loyalty was also identified as 
important. Loyal customers are firm A’s bread and butter business. Mail shots gained 
the firm two customers which ordered goods from the firm ever since. Even if these do 
not represent the top-buying customers, they are constant source of income and cashflow.
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Overall Score 65
Figure 5.1: Subjective Performance Ratings for Profile A
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This indicator of the long run prospects of the firm provides some structure to the 
juggling act, which these owner-managers undertake on a daily basis to achieve or 
maintain performance standards in order to survive. The overall score received by firm A 
for was 65, which was slightly below the average of 67. By way of comparison with 
objective measures of performance Firm A achieved a higher level of absolute net profits 
than the average in the sample of £39,97 lstg., a lower level of asset growth than the 
average of 210 times and a lower rate of profitability than the average in the sample of 
33%.
Internal Organisation
At start-up the administrative organisation of firm A was highly evolved. It 
engaged in eight functional activities at inception including financial accounting, training 
of personnel, production, sales, market research, product maintenance, strategic planning 
and innovation. This was above the average in the sample of five functional activities. 
This was perhaps a function of the relative large initial start-up size of 40 full-time 
equivalent employees, which afforded a greater division of labour. The administrative 
organisation did not evolve largely over time. Firm A engaged in one further activity.
The administrative organisation was extended with the advent of PCs. Computers were
\
used in production and administration from 1986 onwards.
The owner-managers of firm A stated that the firm was innovative at inception 
through engaging in new marketing techniques. Over its life firm A developed 
approximately eight new products, which enabled it to raise its profits and to grow 
market share. To gain these rewards Firm A needed to exploit the innovations quickly in 
the market. The firm also made important process innovations over its life modifying 
many of its processes in major ways. These process innovations were chiefly derived 
from within the firm. The firm’s rivals engage in a similar level of process innovation. 
This places the firm under some competitive pressure from time to time to become more 
efficient.
The business uses nine forms of information technology, which is above the 
average in the sample of 7.17 forms. The most advanced of these include: e-mail, 
website, internet access and electronic databases. The owner-managers believed that 
these were important to the business. They had infiltrated many of the daily routines of
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the business including planning, monitoring performance, improving operational 
efficiency, market research, administration and managing dealings with buyers and 
suppliers.
The industry experienced a lot of technical change over the life of firm A. This was 
initiated by newly emerging innovators in the industry. Generally firm A was successful 
in implementing new technologies.
Organisational Change
Firm A undertook eight main changes over its life, which is on par with the average 
level of firm-specific turbulence in the sample of long-lived small firms. These are 
illustrated on the firm’s A lifeline presented in Figure 5.2. The timing of some changes 
clustered. For example changes in market niches, product ranges and capacity occurred 
at the same time (i.e. these changes are perhaps related). The asset base changed at the 
same time as firm A changed its market positioning (i.e. firm A had to invest in new 
expensive machines to become a low cost leader). There was a lot of change in the 
operations of the firm in the mid to late eighties when real turnover fell considerably. 
Having overcome this period of turbulence firm A has maintained a steady course. From 
the changes listed in Figure 5.2 the owner-managers viewed changes in the product 
range, assets and cashflow as crucial. These pivotal points are described in turn below in 
order of importance.
Figure 5.2: Key Organisational Change of Firm A
Market Niches Assets
Father Technical Cashflow Product Range Market
Retired Capacity Positioning
1974 1978 1980 1985 1988
The product range of firm A changed in 1985 as the existing ranges became old 
fashioned. The company started from a plumbing business and initially manufactured 
shower curtain rings from plastic injection mouldings. However, it was recognised in the 
mid-eighties that this product range was unlikely to sustain the long-run survival of the
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business. In the early eighties, demand for existing product ranges was declining. Sales 
were growing, but at a diminishing rate, despite increasing investments in marketing to 
increase sales and prolong the life of these product lines. Firm A monitored demand and 
used these investments in marketing to test whether the decline in the demand for shower 
curtain rings and other product offerings was just a temporary phenomenon. However, 
the fell in demand continued. The size of the market declined further as the number of 
firms competing in this market grew. The products of rivals were becoming more 
fashionable. Firm A had to choose between continuing to produce product ranges for 
which the market was declining, and becoming increasingly competitive, or to change 
product ranges in line with tastes.
Firm A had watched these precipitating influences of change unfold over a two-year 
period. To survive in the market place it decided in 1985 to change its product range. 
The brothers decided to change their strategy and compete on costs with new products. 
Early investments were made in marketing the new products to assess demand and to 
increase sales. Demand increased following entry into new market niches offering new 
products at low price. To offer the products at lower cost, they needed to increase the 
operational efficiency of the production process. However, they waited before making 
any irreversible investments of this nature. Two years later profitability rose. At this 
juncture, firm A invested in new technology to raise the marginal productivity of the 
capital and labour employed by the business. By staging the consequential adjustments, 
firm A minimised its investment until uncertainties were resolved. This raised its option 
value to withdraw at minimal cost if this new niche foiled to show profitability. By 
adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach firm A was able to revise its strategy as circumstances 
unfolded.
The exercise of the real option to change firm A’s product range set in motion 
another chain of options. Firm A invested in the asset base of the business through 
purchasing expensive new technology capable of producing large volumes of output at 
low cost. Firm A consciously tried to maintain a technological advantage over its rivals, 
in terms of its machinery and equipment. The asset base changed in minor ways between 
1974 and 1988 as the firm altered its production from low to high volume batches. In this 
period, firm A purchased second hand equipment to upgrade its existing technology from
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firms which were closing down. However, in 1988 a significant investment was made in 
new technology.
The precipitating influences of this change were similar to those mentioned above, 
with respect to the changes in product range. Two years prior to investing in the new 
technology, firm A was aware that it would need to invest in this new machinery to raise 
profits. One year prior to investing in the new machinery firm A’s turnover was growing 
and demand had increased after the pursuit of a high volume low cost strategy. Any 
uncertainties, which firm A had perceived with respect to trends in demand and tastes, 
were resolved. However, to capture any fiirther growth in demand firm A needed to 
increase operational efficiency and control costs.
Firm A exercised the real option to purchase the new machinery. They installed 
new machines, which were more controllable, required less maintenance and were more 
reliable. All the machines were logged onto a monitoring system. Once these new 
machines were installed firm A’s costs fell and profitability increased instantly (i.e. zero 
months). Firm A exploited the growth in demand as its capacity to produce large 
volumes cheaply had increased. Firm A was much more operationally efficient.
A year after the installation of the new machinery, firm A had grown the business 
as much as it could naturally and set out to increase production by investing more heavily 
in marketing. The initial investment in new machinery provided firm A with two fiirther 
options: 1) to increase capacity further (i.e. by growing the business), 2) to achieve higher 
levels of operational efficiency. The production of higher volumes would lead to fiirther 
cost reductions (i.e. economies of scale). These consequential adjustments were staged 
also. Firm A initially captured whatever growth or demand was present in existing 
markets to achieve higher volumes and immediate changes in costs and profitability. 
Sub-sequentially to grow on the business firm A invested in marketing. This enabled 
firm A to maximise economies of scale and to sustain a low cost advantage. These 
actions showed the firm’s commitment to its high volume low cost strategy. By staging 
commitments to high volume low cost strategy firm A increased its option to withdraw or 
to continue to invest.
The third most important organisational change, or pivotal point, identified by firm 
A, was a change in cashflow management in 1980. Following the introduction of the first
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generation of automatic machines in 1978, firm A was producing larger volumes of 
stocks and supplying customers with larger batches of goods. Although sales had 
radically increased, the cashflow of the business was unchanged. By filling additional, or 
larger volume, customer orders, the profits of the firm A rose. However, the firm was 
cash constrained, as higher cashflow was needed to finance the extra throughput. The 
credit policy of the firm was not adequate. Creditors now owed them substantial sums of 
money. The extension of credit is an important source of differentiation when firms are 
competing on costs. Firm A did not want to risk losing new customers. It was able to 
withstand the increased burdens on cashflow for two years using private equity or 
retained earnings. In this time it built up relationships with these new customers and 
created other forms of switching costs. Thereby influencing the uncertainty and risk in 
its own environment. After this point, firm A tightened its credit policy slowly such that 
customers were not aware of an immediate tightening of this service. This improved the 
management cashflow. However, it was a temporary measure, which increased the 
operational efficiency of firm A. Three and a half years later firm A raised external 
finance. Firm A altered its credit policy initially rather than raising external finance. A 
change in credit policy is a tactical decision, which can be revised easily as opposed to 
external forms of finance such as invoice discounting or factoring. Thus, it offered the 
firm A greater flexibility.
The owner-managers proceeded cautiously in instigating organisational change 
testing changes in demand for new product ranges and staging adjustments to 
organisational change. The flexibility of Firm A in responding to environmental change 
is captured by the measures in Table 5.3. It seems that the firm A was not agile in 
responding to precipitating causes of changes in product range, with an average agility 
score of 0.57 (<1). The absolute number of consequential adjustments was higher than 
the number of precipitators. Agility was less than the average for the sample of 0.87. 
Certainly, firm A adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach before instigating organisational 
change and in instigating the ‘consequential adjustments’. Average precipitator time and 
average adjustment time was larger for firm A than the average for all firms in the 
sample. Firm A engaged in planned investments once uncertainties were resolved. It
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monitors contingencies in its environment and uses marketing experiments to analyse 
demand. This approach is consistent with a real options approach.
Table 5.3: The Flexibility of Firm A
Change Number of
Precipitating
factors
Precipitating
Time
(months)
Number of 
Consequential 
Adjustments
Adjustment
Time
(months)
Agility Speed
Product
Range 4 24 8 24 0.5 48
Assets 5 24 9 18 0.55 42
Cashflow 3 12 4 42 0.75 54
Average 4 20 7 24.7 0.57 48
All Firms 5 16 7 17 0.87 22
End Game
The brothers do expect the business to continue to trade into the future. However, 
they are unsure what the end game strategy will be at this stage. They stated, “either a 
family member would take over the running of the business or the firm will be sold''. 
They envisaged that they would continue to run the firm in its current stance for another 
seven years. Family succession from the second generation to the third generation is 
likely but not definite (see Beckhard and Dyer, 1983). The business has met the 
expectations of the owner-managers. They stated that their father was “interested in 
developing a business for the family”. This was certainly achieved. Another source of 
satisfaction was control over generating their means of earning a living.
Profile B: Hospital Supplies
Enterprise Profile B wholesale distributes specialist medical products to General 
Practitioners, hospitals, case operating theatres (e.g. nebulisers), mothers (e.g. baby 
monitors, thermometers etc.) and home carers (e.g. body fat meters, blood pressure 
meters etc.). Firm B was launched onto an unsuspecting N.H.S. hospital supplies market 
in 1978 by a husband and wife team. Almost one generation (twenty-three years) later, 
the husband and wife team (or partnership) were considering potential end games for firm 
B, after an initial unsuccessful attempt to transfer the daily operation of the business to 
their daughter.
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The husband and wife team set out to create a business with survival prospects. 
They envisaged that the business would be bigger than it was at the time of interview, but 
along the same lines. The level of turnover increased over the life of the firm in nominal 
terms but less so in real terms. After trading for eight years, the partners believed that the 
business had reached a long run equilibrium level of employment and turnover with 16 
fulltime equivalent employees and £1.7 million stg. of turnover, (at constant 2001 prices), 
respectively (see Table 5.4). At the time of interview, firm B generated sales of £1.4 
million stg. (constant 2001 prices) with 10 FTEs, £140,000stg in turnover per FTE. By 
adjusting its headcount downwards firm B raised the labour productivity of the firm 
considerably to levels much higher than typical values (£64,427stg. per FTE) in the 
sample of long-lived small firms. Adopting this strategy enabled firm B to achieve 
higher levels of performance at this mature stage in its lifecycle and perhaps increase the 
relative human capital of the workforce of firm B. Assets were accumulated over the first 
seven years of trading. After this point their value at approximately £200,000 sterling 
(constant 2001 prices) was maintained.
Table 5.4: Scale of Profile B
Year Turnover 
(£000stg) 
(EOOOstg 2001)
FTEs Labour 
Productivity 
(£000stgZFTE) 
(£000stg 2001/FTE)
Assets
(£000stg)
(£00 0s tg 2001)
At start-up (1978) 190 2 95 12
659 330 38
After 5years (1983) 600 16 38
1224 76
After 7 years (1985) 430 exc. VAT 14 31 100
788 56 183
Maturity (after 7.5 years) 1,000 16 63
1,771 111
After 10 years (1988) 1,000 12 83
1,621 135
After 23 years (2001)
1,400 10 140 200
Principally, firm B engaged in the wholesale distribution of specialist medical 
products. In 1985, 80% of sales were generated in medical wholesaling, 15% in surgical 
instrument servicing and 5% in research and development. The firm supplied
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approximately 15 product groups, (e.g. filtration products, nebulisers etc.). In 1988 the 
business abandoned instruments servicing and shifted to new products. At the time of 
interview firm B’s product line was more focussed. The firm generated 100% of its sales 
from medical wholesaling. The two principal product groups were critical case sendees 
(90% of sales) and nebulisers (10% of sales). The firm normally sells medical supplies in 
bundles. It bundles similar products together and sells them at a bundled price.
Market Characteristics
Firm B has served the Scottish market since inception. The market reach of firm B 
is constrained to thirty delivery points, which has consequences for growth and capacity 
expansion. Normally firm B operates at fifty percent of this capacity. The firm competes 
head-to-head with six major and six minor rivals in a niche market (i.e. a contested niche 
market). The number of major rivals has fallen considerably overtime. Successful 
players (including firm B) in the competitive battle between rivals have grown in size. 
The number of fringe competitors, or minor rivals, has remained more or less constant 
overtime.
Firm B has a small share of approximately 2.5% of its principal market but in some 
market niches its market share is as high as 20%. Given that the firm is a niche player, 
the business is protected largely from fierce competition. With fewer players in this 
market competitive tactics are now less corrupt. Firm B lost some business in the past 
due to the predatory pricing tactics adopted by firms, which have now exited the market. 
However, as this market niche is still contested the owner-managers of firm B described 
competition in this niche market as intense in every aspect. The niche is perhaps subject 
to hit and run competition.
The products of the firm and those of its rivals are different. The purchasers of the 
products are fairly expert about the product and draw on personal experience as well as 
technical information available in specialist publications, trade journals etc. The owner- 
managers claimed that their products were, and have always been, ‘better’ than those of 
rivals.
Firm B sells products typically to customers at the middle of the market (i.e. 
medium quality products at a medium price). At inception, the firm concentrated on the 
top end of the market (i.e. premium products at premium prices). Once the employees of
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firm B had acquired an adequate level of technical knowledge on the primary benefits of 
the products supplied they began to serve the needs of customers in the middle of the 
market. Firm B competes on four dimensions (just below the average of 4.5 methods), 
namely price, quality, after sales service and delivery. It therefore competes in a niche 
market with a mildly differentiated competitive strategy. This perhaps explains the fact 
that it is slightly below average in size (13.5 FTEs) for a long-lived small firm.
Performance
Firm B earned £l,OOOstg in profits (a rate of profitability of 0.5%, measured by net 
profits per pound of assets) in the last trading year. This was low in comparison with 
previous years. Normally, the firm earns approximately £65,000 in profits (a rate of 
profitability of 33%). This indicates the level of variation, which can exist in calibrating 
long-run performance using rate of profitability as a measure of performance. The book 
value of assets grew four-fold since inception. This represents growth in the tangible 
asset base but does not take intangible assets into account, which could be sizeable in a 
service-based firm, like firm B. Firm B’s premises are located in a major urban centre. 
This represents the main physical asset of the firm.
At start-up firm B had difficulties establishing the idea that a market existed for the 
services it supplies and also in producing financial statements for the proposed business 
(e.g. cashflow statements). To finance the start-up of the business the founders borrowed 
funds from the bank guaranteed using personal guarantees and heritable securities. The 
gearing ratio of the firm was 40 (12,000/300) at inception. Over the life of the firm, 
increasing debt was considered to expand the premises, the plant and equipment of the 
firm or to increase inventory levels. In the early years of its operation, firm B 
experienced cashflow difficulties as a result of delinquent debtors, over-investment, 
inadequate credit policy and insufficient overdraft facilities. At the time of interview, 
firm B had two forms of debt, a bank overdraft and invoice discounting to the value of 
£100,000stg. Other than debt finance the firm is financed by private equity. Firm B has 
not sourced any outside equity finance.
Figure 5.3 presents the owner-managers’ performance ratings for each scale item on 
the multi-dimensional scale. Attributes which received a rating above 75 included 
suppliers, access to buyers, technology, quality, diversification and skills. Thus, the key
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determinants of its performance are its suppliers, channel access, product quality, product 
range, knowledge and technology. Attributes, which received a rating below 50, included 
cashflow, credit policy and competition. These aspects reduce the small firms 
performance. Characteristics of this mature small firm’s environment received “neutral” 
ratings (=50) (e.g. rival’s innovation, substitutes, new entrants, regulation etc.). These 
did not pose a significant threat to the long run prospects of the small firm.
In commenting on firm B’s long run performance, the husband and wife team stated 
that their suppliers primarily fostered their survival. The suppliers of firm B identified 
product ranges and brands for distribution. These products met customer’s needs and 
were superior to the competitor’s product offerings. Channel access was next in 
importance. In the words of the owner-managers, “to be able to see whom you want" is 
vital to the growth and survival of their business. Gaining channel access was becoming 
more difficult in firm B’s market place. A diversified portfolio of products was 
important. To survive in firm B’s market small firms must demonstrate a willingness to 
change products and learn about new products rapidly.
The overall score received by the firm was 63, which was below the average of 67. 
By way of comparison with objective measures of performance firm B achieved a lower 
level of absolute net profits than the average in the sample of £39,97lstg. in the last 
trading year, a lower level of asset growth than the average of 210 times and a lower rate 
of profitability than the average in the sample of 33%. The owner-managers did state that 
the level of profits earned in the last trading year was atypical and normally the firm have 
a rate of profitability of about 33% equivalent to the average firm in the sample.
According to the owner-managers, the business largely met their expectations. 
They expressed some reservations because they “had hoped to be much larger, perhaps 
two or three times larger1'. The struggle to survive was a source of constraint on further 
growth.
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Figure 5.3: Subjective Performance Ratings for Profile B
Overall Score: 63
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Internal Organisation
For a business with few employees at start-up the internal organisation of this firm 
was highly evolved. The firm performed nine activities internally, namely financial 
accounting, training of personnel, production, sales, market research, product 
maintenance, strategic planning, legal matters and innovation. This was well above the 
average of five activities performed internally at inception by the typical long-lived small 
firm in the sample. Few extensions were made to the administrative organisation of the 
firm as it grew in size. Computers were used in administration from 1987 onwards. The 
firm made significant investments in the training of staff. According to the owner- 
managers investing in the human capital of the firm is very important to its survival. 
Long-standing employees complement the firm.
At inception, Firm B was innovative, supplying a diversified portfolio of products. 
Firm B launched more than twenty new products since start-up. The firm experienced 
some difficulties in launching new products. Reliance on sales representatives was the 
weakest point of the business. Their interests were not aligned with the interests of the 
owner-managers. Rivals were also engaged in product innovation and this placed 
significant competitive pressure on the firm. Patents, copyrights, trademarks aided in the 
protection of product innovations in the wholesale distribution of medical supplies. 
Technical knowledge of the benefits of new product was also invaluable. The rapid 
exploitation of new product innovations was required. Firm B also made significant 
process innovations, modifying a few of their processes in major ways. These process 
innovations were initiated within the firm.
The business uses eleven forms of information technology above the average of 
7.17 forms in the sample of long-lived small firms. The most sophisticated of these 
include: e-mail, website, internet access, digital cameras and electronic databases. These 
were perceived as very important to the business of firm B. Information technology is 
used in the performance of a number of routines within the firm including planning, 
monitoring performance, improving operational efficiency, market research, designing 
new products, administration and managing dealings with buyers and suppliers. Firm B 
was one of the first firms in the market to use a website in distributing medical supplies.
83
Firm B’s products are grouped together in centres (GP, hospital, home care, baby etc.) for 
distribution via the web.
The medical supplies industry experienced a lot of technical change over the life of 
the firm. Suppliers normally initiate this technical change. Generally, firm B was 
successful in implementing new technologies.
Organisational Change
Firm B experienced ten main changes over its life, above the average level of 
firm-specific turbulence of eight in the sample of mature small firms. Figure 5.4 
illustrates the types and timing of key organisational changes on a lifeline for firm B. 
Changes in firm B’s product ranges and its market positioning were ongoing throughout 
the life of the firm. Further, the timing of changes in the technical side of the business 
and in the market niches served by firm B seem to bunch together. Out of the main 
changes listed, the owner-managers viewed changes in the market niches served, and 
product ranges supplied, as crucial. These are described below in order of importance.
Figure 5.4: Key Organisational of Firm B
Product ranges
Market positioning 
(Ongoing)
Technical 
Location 
Market niches
Technical 
Market Niches Innovation
Market Niches 
Assets
1981 19 57 1993 2C 01
A major change in the market niches served by the Firm B occurred in 1987. A 
rival company entered firm B’s market with identical product groups. This was the chief 
precipitating influence of change. Firm B recognised its limitations. This rival had more 
resources to serve customers in their niche. The owner-managers of firm B in analysing 
the scenario decided to withdraw from this market niche and exercise the option to
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reposition its product offerings to serve the needs of customers in the top end of the 
market. Following this the firm achieved further growth.
Changes in product ranges of firm B were undertaken continuously throughout its 
life, but this did not negate the importance of this form of change. For example, between 
1997 and 1998 the firm started to supply new product offerings. Firm B became the 
exclusive dealer for a main line of filters. Furthermore, firm B launched a new line of 
surgical gloves. The owner managers stated, “We went in cold and it worked’ . This 
generated £300,000stg. worth of new business with a rate of profitability of eighteen 
percent. Profitability is the primary precipitating influence of change in product range. 
Firm B is alert to opportunities to introduce profitable lines. After instigating a change in 
product range consequential adjustments normally follow in growth, entry into further 
new niches, profitability, sales and cash-flow. According to the owner managers, they 
will develop a new product range again this year.
Firm B needs to be speedy in responding to new opportunities in the market. The 
precipitating and adjustment time is a matter of months, on average approximately 4 and
4.5 months, respectively. Alertness to opportunities to introduce new product lines which 
customers desire is also important. Firm B takes action after identifying just one 
precipitating influence of change rather than adopting ‘a wait and see’ strategy. High 
quality real time information is important to assess the affect of undertaking a specific 
change in product range or entry into a new market niche. While resolving uncertainties 
is valuable, the short precipitator time suggests that the quick introduction of new product 
lines is necessary to gain improvements in performance. If new opportunities or options 
are ripe they should be exercised immediately. The agility of firm B is low, average of 
0.29 < 1. This is because the absolute number of adjustments is high relative to the 
number of precipitators, which are few in number. In comparison with the average 
number of adjustments in the sample of long-lived small firms, Firm B makes fewer 
consequential adjustments. Thus, the level of irreversible investments is low. Firm B 
undertakes consequential adjustments speedily. This quick reaction time and low level of 
irreversible commitments offers firm B greater flexibility to revise its strategy if required.
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Table 5.5: Flexibility Measures for Profile B
Change Number of
Precipitating
Influences
Precipitating
Time
Number of
Consequential
Adjustments
Adjustment
Time
Agility Speed
Market
Niches 1 2 2 6 0.5 8
Product
Range 1 6 5 3 0.2 9
Average 1 4 3.5 4.5 0.29 8.5
All Firms 5 16 7 17 0.87 22
End Game
On their retirement, the husband and wife team wished to transfer the business 
onto the next generation, their daughter. To ease the passing of the baton their daughter 
took over the running of the business for a trial period of one year. Unfortunately, during 
this year sales slumped. This took the founders by surprise. They had not catered for, or 
thought, about this eventuality. According to the owner-managers, “their daughter did 
not have the personality for clinching sales deals”. As a consequence, the founders have 
ruled out family succession. The owner-managers were sceptical about the viability of a 
trade-sale as an end game. The significant asset of the business was intangible (i.e. the 
goodwill of the business). At the time of the interview, the owner-managers did not 
believe that a market existed for the goodwill of the business. One potential strategy they 
were considering involved the sale of the physical assets of business (i.e. the site and 
premises).
Another possibility is an employee buyout of firm B. The owner-managers 
believed that some of the employees of the firm were competent to operate firm B. This 
option was successful in the past. At maturity (in 1986) firm B divested of its surgical 
autoclaving and maintenance activities. This section of the business was acquired 
through a low cost buyout by members of the workforce of the firm (a very competent 
manager of that unit). This manager switched the focus of this business (repairing 
medical equipment and sterilising them) towards developing countries where there was a 
market for these services. Given the success of the previous buyout, this is possibly a 
feasible option. The owner-managers of firm B had a strong community ethos and belief
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in supporting enterprises in the local economy. From their viewpoint, this would be the 
preferred route.
Profile C: Bespoke Cardboard Packaging
Enterprise profile C is a manufacturer of bespoke corrugated cardboard packaging. 
The firm produces small batches of cardboard packaging to customer specifications 
rather than high volumes. The founder of this enterprise liked to think that they were 
problem solvers, designing new forms of packaging to meet specialist needs. He was a 
trained engineer, with a postgraduate degree and previous corporate experience. He 
established this private company, twenty-four years earlier (nearly one generation), in 
1977. Since then, the founder set up two new businesses (i.e. a business portfolio) 
producing coasters and learning aids using cardboard (e.g. sundial’s, numeracy aids).
The owner-manager founded this business as an alternative to unemployment rather 
than with an overriding concern for the rate of profitability of the firm. At the time, the 
owner-manager was thinking more about feeding and educating his family rather than 
any other concerns. Typically, in the small firm’s literature this would be regarded as a 
negative motive for setting up a business (Storey, 1994). The long run survival of firm C 
does not lend support to this argument. Small firm survival is linked to more pecuniary 
motives such as growth and rate of return (see Reid and Smith, 2000a). The high level of 
education of the founder may have had a role to play. The entrepreneur envisaged the 
business as providing a better service than anyone else. According to the entrepreneur, 
the firm would trade with integrity; never advertise or look for business. The owner- 
manager wanted to build a reputable firm. Other than this the founder had no formal plan 
for the business.
At the time of interview, the founder’s son (i.e. the second generation), was also 
employed by firm C, as an owner-manager. Firm C was believed to be mature. Turnover 
grew tenfold in nominal terms over the first ten years of trading while the level of 
employment doubled. Afier fifteen years of trading (in 1992), the firm had reached a 
long run equilibrium employment level of 14 fulltime equivalent employees and a long 
run equilibrium level of turnover of £751,000stg. at constant 2001 prices (see Table 5.6). 
At the time of interview, firm C employed 10 full-time equivalent employees and
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generated turnover of £500,000stg. (constant 2001 prices). Firm C maintained labour 
productivity or the level of turnover generated per FTE since 1992 at about £50,000stg. 
(constant 2001 prices) however the headcount of the business was reduced from 14 FTEs 
to 10 FTEs over this period (see Table 5.6). Thus, it seems firm C is reducing its 
headcount to maintain a certain level labour productivity or performance (see Volume I 
Chapter 9).
The total number of products produced was large as they were manufactured to 
customer specifications and therefore varied by size, colour, finish etc. These products 
could be grouped into thirty similar types of products (increased from 3 in 1985). The 
three principal product groups were 0201s1 (34% of sales), palent pads (23% of sales), 
and dye cuts (15% of sales). Even though dye cuts represent a small percentage of sales 
this product group generates eighty percent of firm C’s added value.
Table 5.6: Scale of Profile C
Year Turnover 
(£000stg) 
(£000stg 2001)
FTEs Labour 
Productivity 
(£000stg/FTE) 
(£000stg 2001/FTE)
Assets 
(£000stg) 
(£000stg 2001)
At start-up (1977) 50 6.5* 8 50
188 29 188
After 5years (1982) 250 10 25
533 53
After 8 years (1985) 250 8.5 29 300
412 48 550
After 10 years (1987) 500 12 42
850 71
After 11 years (1988) 360 12 30 175
584 49 284
Maturity (1992) 600 14 43
751 54
After 24 years (2001)
500 10 50 1,000
*lots of causal labour at start-up e.g. students etc.
1 Rectangular slotted container
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Market Characteristics
Firm C serves a niche market, which is largely not contested except by four fringe 
competitors. It supplies bespoke cardboard packaging to customers within an urban 
region of Scotland. Though its market reach has not changed largely since inception, it 
was perhaps more local earlier in the life of the firm. Firm C’s share of the world market 
for bespoke cardboard packaging is tiny (under 1%), but in its principal market firm C’s 
share is much higher, as there are no other suppliers of particular products groups. As the 
niche is largely uncontested, competition was described as generally weak but strong in 
some aspects. One dimension, on which competition intensity has increased slightly 
since inception, is price.
Firm C is capacity constrained. The business normally operates at about two-thirds 
(65%) of this capacity. The owner-manager was concerned about the level of excess 
capacity in the corrugated cardboard packaging industry. He explained, “The level of 
excess capacity in manufacturing in general-was precipitating the level of excess capacity 
in the industry’’’ (i.e. fewer goods to be boxed). Globalisation is also affecting firm C as 
more and more potential manufacturers of products, which demand cardboard packaging 
are now locating in Japan, USA, Germany. The packaging of the products of these 
manufacturers is no longer undertaken in the United Kingdom, as it is not practical to do 
so. The size of the market for cardboard packaging is being eroded as a result. The 
growth in the plastics industry, a substitute for cardboard packaging, is a further 
contributor to the decline in market size. Most firms in the industry are feeing a threat 
from substitutes, except German producers, where the cardboard manufacturers 
prevented the producers of plastic packaging from entering their market and eroding their 
market share.
The products produced by firm C are similar to the products of other players in the 
bespoke cardboard packaging market. According to the founder of firm C, their designs 
are superior in comparison with competitor’s product offerings. Firm C employs the 
founder’s skills in engineering, to generate designs, to satisfy the needs of clients. The 
customer is not technically minded per se, but may have in mind a few technical features 
that the product should have. The designs have become more sophisticated over time. 
The founder and employees of firm C accumulated experience in the design of their
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product through creating alternative cardboard packaging solutions for customers. This 
represents a significant entry barrier.
Firm C sells products typically to customers “<2/ the top end of a commodity 
market', a phrase coined by the entrepreneur (i.e. the firm sells high quality products at a 
high price). Price is not an issue in this market segment. Customers are insensitive to 
price changes. According to the founder, the cost of being out of stock is the customer’s 
greatest fear. The owner manager stated, “4 £10,000 instrument can be in a box worth a 
few quid which reduces price sensitivity". Most of the customer’s goods are over­
specified. In this niche market, finn C competes based on five dimensions; quality, 
volume, after-sales service, new product development and delivery. This is just above 
the average of 4.5 dimensions in the sample of long-lived small firms. Most of their 
business is generated from referrals. The firm has repositioned its product offerings since 
inception. At start-up firm C served customers at the bottom of the market, selling 
mainly flat pack cardboard packaging. Competition was intense in this market and 
consequently firm C began to establish a reputation for producing more premium forms 
of cardboard packaging. Firm C aimed to deliver greater value to their clientele. Firm C 
has not grown largely in size since start-up. It does not compete with the large players. 
Instead it is has cultivated a niche market by differentiating its product offering and 
selling this within a narrow geographic market in Scotland.
Performance
Firm C reported a loss of £22,500stg (Le. a rate of profitability of -2%) in the last 
trading year. This was below the average rate of profitability firm C reported in 1985 of 
25%. The rate of profitability reported in 1985 was perhaps over-stated, as this rate was 
much higher than the net profits per pound of net assets recorded by firm C at the time. 
In 1985 assets worth £300,000stg earned £25,000stg in profits, a rate of profitability of 
8.3%. This illustrates the difficulties in obtaining accurate self-reported net profit figures 
in interviews with small firms.
Assets were accumulated gradually in the early years of trading. At the time of 
interview, assets were valued at five (5.31) times their value in real terms at inception 
(£188,000stg.). The asset base of the firm at the time of interview was £1 million stg., 
which is considerable relative to half of the sample, which had an asset base of less than
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£150,000stg. The personal wealth of the founder and his family had grown significantly 
through engaging in entrepreneurial activities.
Firm C was financed at start-up by external finance and personal equity. The funds 
loaned from the bank were guaranteed using personal guarantees, life policies and 
floating charges. Firm C retired debt in the first ten years of trading. At the time of 
interview, it had no form of debt. It was solely financed from private equity, suggesting a 
clear preference for this form of finance.
Figure 5.5 presents the performance ratings of the owner-managers of firm C for 
each item on the multidimensional scale. Attributes which received a rating above 75 
included suppliers, cashflow, credit policy, market positioning, quality, market research, 
differentiation and product mix. As observable from Figure 5.5, a number of attributes 
received a rating of 75 such as skills and filling product gaps, operational efficiency and 
location etc. Firm C juggles these scale items to survive in the long run. The items, 
which received a performance rating >75 reflect the underlying determinants of the 
added value generated by firm C.
Attributes, which received a rating of less than 50, were few in number but included 
substitutes and regulation. The founder did express concern about the threat posed by 
plastic packaging to the long-term viability of the cardboard packaging industries. Other 
aspects of the small firms market environment received neutral ratings (e.g new entrants, 
access to buyers, competition etc.) and did not pose a large threat to the long run 
prospects of firm C.
The owner-managers stated that the quality of their products and service plus their 
reliability and integrity as producers primarily fostered their survival. The overall long 
run performance score received by the firm C was 72, which was above the average of 67 
for the sample of long-lived small firms. Therefore, firm C was a high performing firm 
according to the long-run performance indicator. This is less evident from an 
examination of the objective measures of performance above, particularly the rate of 
profitability. The asset base grew five fold, which is lower than the average of 210 times 
for the sample of long-lived small firms. However in terms of monetary value (£lm stg.) 
its assets are significantly higher than that of over half the sample. This firm started with
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Figure 5.5: Subjective Performance Rating for Profile C
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a much larger asset base of £188,000stg. at constant 2001 prices. The latter is perhaps an 
indicator of superior performance.
Internal Organisation
At inception, seven functions namely, financial accounting, training of personnel, 
production, sales, market research, product maintenance and strategic planning were all 
performed internally. This highly evolved administrative organisation did not change 
largely. In 1980 the firm engaged in product design and innovation, that is, at 3 years of 
age. Similar to the rest of its cohort of mature small firms, firm C began to use 
computers in production and administration nine years after inception (in 1986).
The primary innovation of the small firm was the entrepreneurial event. At 
inception, the founder launched a cardboard packaging company, which supplied 
relatively higher quality products than were available in the market at the time. From 
then on firm C engaged in near to market innovations (i.e. customised cardboard 
packaging designs). The founder stated that firm C failed to capture an adequate level of 
rewards from its product innovations. Firm C was still waiting to capture these. Given 
excess capacity in the congrugated cardboard industry, to survive firm C needs to develop 
new products using its machinery and equipment. This has led firm C to set up two new 
businesses using the existing inputs and machinery. As it happens, Firm C’s reputation 
as a design house places competitive pressure on competitors in the industry. The design 
innovations for firm C are protected using copyright.
Most of firm C’s innovative efforts concentrate on features of the product design 
rather than on process innovations. Suggestions from employees of firm C lead the firm 
to modify a few of their processes in minor ways. According to the owner manager, the 
firm “builds on other people’s ideas”.
Information technology is now an important resource of the business and is used, 
specifically, in improving operational efficiency, the design of new products, and 
administration. Firm C uses seven forms of information technology. The most advanced 
of these include: e-mail, internet access, electronic databases and computer aided design. 
Even though information technology is important in speeding up the design and 
production of new products, older production methods are also important. According to 
the owner-manager, the use of information technology may not be the best method, as
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sense of touch is also important. He recognises the advantages, but also the limitations of 
this technology.
The congrugated cardboard packaging industry experienced a lot of technical 
change over the life of firm C. Newly emerging innovators from Germany, Japan and 
USA are constantly improving the machinery used for production in this industry. 
Generally, the firm has been successful in implementing these technologies.
Organisational Change
Firm C made thirteen key organisational changes in its operations since inception, 
which is higher than the average level of firm-specific turbulence (of eight key changes) 
experienced by long-lived small firms in the sample. This firm is perhaps chopping and 
changing to grow the firm as long run performance is a convex fimction of firm-specific 
turbulence. The forms of key organisational changes and the timing of these changes are 
illustrated in Figure 5.6. Out of these main changes the owner-managers viewed changes 
in product innovation, line of business and diversification as vital. These are described in 
order of importance below.
Figure 5.6: Key Organisational Changes of Firm C
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Product innovation by firm C took many different forms. Alterations were made 
in the materials used in manufacturing and design of product. For example, the founders 
developed new types of presentation boxes, which used dyed cardboard boxes. These 
innovations were near to the market. The innovations were precipitated by the
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emergence of new niches and customers demanding different types of packaging. 
According to the founder “Demand is required before new innovation takes place... 
Clientele come to the factory with the item to be boxed and the firm designs a box which 
fits.” Firm C was required to design solutions promptly. The intellect of the entrepreneur 
in the early years of trading, and in recent years the intellect of his son, drove new 
designs. With backgrounds in engineering, the founder and his son both have an extra 
interest in improving the design of the product.
In the early years, firm C designed products without the use of information 
technology. When the founder realised that firm C was highly regarded as a design house 
he invested in a computer aided design system (CAD) to increase the speed of design. A 
“wait and see” strategy was adopted before making irreversible commitments in new 
technology. As a result of the investment in computer aided design technologies the 
operational efficiency of firm C increased. New designs were copyright protected and 
they generated a lot of extra sales through referrals.
Firm C initiated change in its line of business in 1986. This was precipitated by a 
decline in the size of the market. Traditionally, firm C served the needs of smaller 
customers. However, the turnover from this source decreased because a new policy of 
single sourcing blocked channel access. As a result of this change in policy, smaller 
customers were supplied through one of the major dealers. These major dealers sourced 
products from firm C. Orders fell from these major dealers. Excess capacity precipitated 
the owners to produce new product lines. The founder and his son had the intellect and 
knowledge of the machinery to adopt the equipment and materials to produce different 
types of product lines (e.g. coasters). New opportunities were emerging to produce 
different types of products using cardboard. This was demand induced. The products 
were produced to customer specification. This process began one month prior to the 
change in business line. Following this diversification of the product portfolio the firm’s 
sales increased and its mix of customers changed. After one year, the firm began to 
invest in different types of machinery to produce these new product lines. Thus, firm C 
only made irreversible commitments in machinery until they had establish that a demand 
existed for these new products.
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Firm C desired to grow and make increasing use of the capacity of the firm. The 
founder was aware for about ten years prior to developing related businesses that the 
potential was there (i.e. new niches were emerging), but firm C had not exercised this 
option in the past. To optimise the use of capacity, firm C exercised the option to 
diversify. The value of waiting was at its lowest so the timing was ripe to exercise the 
option. Two new companies were founded to produce products such as numerical 
learning aids and sundials etc. These new products are related to existing products in that 
similar inputs are used in the production of these products (i.e. growth through related 
diversification). The son now manages firm C and the founder runs the new businesses. 
Since they started these new businesses the technology of the firm and their customer 
base has changed. These changes occurred over time. The firm is still waiting for 
expected increases in profitability.
Table 5.6: Flexibility Measures for Profile C
Change Number of
Precipitating
Factors
Precipitating
Time
Number of
Consequential
Adjustments
Adjustment
Time
Agility Speed
Innovation 3 18 4 12 0.75 30
Line of
business 4 1 4 12
1 13
Diversification 4 120 “Tl 12 1 1 132
Average 3 46 4 12 0.92 58
All Firms 5 16 7 17 0.87 22
Firm C was very agile in responding to precipitating influences of change (agility 
approximately equal to one) relative to other mature small firms in the sample. It held 
the option to diversify into related lines of business in its portfolio for a number of years 
(10 years) before initiating the right to exercise this option. Average precipitator time 
and speed are longer than average as a result. The average consequential adjustment time 
was much lower. Most consequential adjustments were immediate. Product solutions 
had to be found promptly. The firm waits, however, before making irreversible 
investments of in new technology and machinery until it is certain that there is sufficient 
demand for new product lines etc.
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End Game
The founders son is now actively involved in the running of the business. This is 
one of the few cases in the sample, where family succession is certain. The business will 
be transferred to the second generation. The baton is being passed slowly from lather to 
son. The son has a similar background in engineering as the founder. The son also has a 
relevant postgraduate degree (i.e. an MBA). The interest of the founder and his son are 
closely aligned and idiosyncratic knowledge in operating the business is being transferred 
at present on a daily basis.
Profile D: Merchants and Manufacturers of Bulk Bags
In its early years of trading, enterprise profile D solely manufactured bulk bags. 
However, at the time of interview, firm D was chiefly involved in merchandising the 
same product imported from manufacturers in Turkey and China. The variable costs of 
producing bulk bags at firm D’s manufacturing facility were now much higher, than those 
of competitors located in East European and Asian countries (e.g. Turkey and China). 
Labour costs were much lower in these countries than in Scotland. Firm D was unable to 
compete with these rivals, thus it reduced its manufacturing facility considerably and 
switched to merchandising bulk bags. Sixty percent of sales are now generated from the 
merchant side of the business and forty percent from in-house manufacturing.
The entrepreneur founded this private company in 1984 and managed the firm until 
1992. At this point, the founder retired from the business and two managers, employees 
of the firm D at the time, purchased a share of the firm and took over the daily running of 
the business. The founder participated in the operation of the business on an advisory 
capacity (as a director) until 1999, and is still a major shareholder in the business.
At a level of turnover of £4 million stg. the owner-managers believed that the 
business had reached a long run equilibrium value of sales. Even though the volume of 
sales has increased in recent years, turnover has plattooed. This is because the price per 
each unit has fallen, as a consequence of intense competition from producers in East 
European and Asian counties. In 1994, there was 93 fulltime equivalent employees in the 
firm producing £4.2 million in turnover (see Table 5.8) or £54,000 stg. (constant 2001 
prices) turnover per FTE employee. At time of interview, 53 employees in the firm
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produced £4 million stg. in turnover. Therefore labour productivity has risen 
considerably to £75,000 stg. per FTE employee. This is above the average level of labour 
productivity of £64,427stg. per FTE employee in the sample of long-lived small firms. 
Firm D adjusted its headcount downwards to reduce costs and to become more 
operationally efficient. As production is moved fiirther eastwards, the number of FTEs 
employed by the firm should fall fiirther, in an attempt to raise firm D’s level of 
operational efficiency and its long run prospects.
Twenty varieties of bulk bags are produced and sold. The bulk bags are high 
performance woven polypropylene bags used for carrying heavy loads of powders and 
granules such as chemicals, minerals, fertilizers, grains and other bulkier products such as 
coal and potatoes. They are designed to hold large quantities from 500kg to 2,000kg. 
The designs of bags are standard. Thus, the product offering of East European and Asian 
producers and firm D are identical.
Table 5.8: Scale of Profile D
Year Turnover 
(EOOOstg) 
(EOOOstg 2001)
FTEs Labour 
Productivity 
(£000stg/FTE) 
(EOOOstg 2001/FTE)
Assets 
(EOOOstg) 
(EOOOstg 2001)
At start-up (1984) 175 10 18 5
340 34 10
After 1 years (1985) 200 29 7 50
366 13 92
After 4 years (1988) 1,600 57 28 385
2,594 46 624
After 5years (1989) 1,600 70 23 -
2,407 34
After 10 years (1994) 4,200 93 45 -
5,051 54
After 17 years (2001)
4,000 53 75 900
Market Characteristics
Firm D principally supplies bulk bags to the UK market, although an increasing 
proportion of its turnover is generated from the sale of bulk bags in international markets. 
Firm D is moving westwards, to North American and European markets, in the sale, and 
eastwards in the production, of bulk bags. Firm D competes head-to-head with rivals for
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customers in these markets. Competition has become more intense over time. In the 
manufacture of bulk bags, there are 20 major competitors (increased by fifteen) in Europe 
and 35 minor competitors (increased by twenty). Similar numbers exist in merchandising 
bulk bags. Previously, competitors emphasised product quality, whereas price 
competition is now extremely intense. Within the European market, firm D has a market 
share of approximately fifteen percent, which has grown considerably since inception. 
This estimate is based on the firm D’s knowledge of the market as a member of the 
European Flexible Intermediate Bulk Container Association.
Firm D argues that it is not capacity constrained. On the distribution side capacity 
is limited only by cost. Of course, in manufacturing firm D has a limited capacity. The 
production facility normally operates at one hundred percent of capacity. As stated 
above, the products of firm D and the offerings of its competitors are similar. Standard 
products are identical but firm D does service specialised customer needs if requested. 
The products have become more sophisticated over time. However, firm D’s specialist 
products are becoming more standard. Competitors are now beginning to target firm D’s 
niche market (e.g. small volume specialised orders). Customers of Firm D’s products 
vary in their technical know-how from experts, who can determine by their own 
judgement the technical quality of the product, to the relatively uninformed customers 
who need guidance and information about the key technical features of the firm’s 
product. Switching costs were generally high for customers with specialist needs.
Firm D supplies products typically to customers in the middle of the market (i.e. 
medium quality products at a medium price). It competes on eight dimensions in its 
principal market namely price, quality, after sales service, new product development, 
tying up suppliers, marketing, customer relations and delivery. This is well above the 
average of 4.5 dimensions in the sample of long-lived small firms. Thus firm D is trying 
to differentiate its service from that of competitors, particularly in specialist niche 
markets. It has adjusted downwards in size over time in servicing the needs of customers 
in this niche market.
Performance
At the time of interview, firm D had recorded net profits of £90,000stg in the last 
trading year (a rate of profitability of 10%). This level of profitability was lower than the
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rate of 24% recorded in 1985. The book value of assets grew nearly ninety fold (89%) 
since inception. At a value of £900,000stg, asset accumulation by firm D was 
considerably higher than over half the mature small firms in the sample frame, which had 
a book value of assets less than £150,000. This augments the wealth of the founder and 
the current owner-mangers of the business.
To finance the start-up of firm D, the founder borrowed funds (£10,000stg. at 
constant 2001 prices) from the bank and the Scottish Development Agency. This funding 
was secured by floating charges (i.e. securities on plant equipment, stocks etc.). The 
gearing ratio of the firm was close to 0.5 in 1985 and 0 in 1988. Over the life of the firm, 
raising external finance was considered to expand the premises and the plant and 
equipment of firm D. The hiring of new employees and increasing inventory was also 
considered. At the time of interview, firm D had three forms debt, namely, a bank 
overdraft; a bank loan and hire purchase agreements (e.g. on vehicles). Firm D was also 
financed by outside equity finance. This represents 22% of total equity (i.e. the founders 
shareholding).
The performance ratings of owner-managers of firm D for each item on the multi­
dimensional scale are presented in Figure 5.7. Attributes, which Firm D rated highly 
(ratings > 75) included suppliers, growth, customer loyalty, substitutes, regulation, 
technology, cashflow, capital requirements, location, quality, differentiation, 
product/service mix, diversification, skills and operational efficiency. Some 
environmental items such as regulation, substitutes, and technology received high ratings 
as opposed to neutral ratings. To compete in international markets these factors are 
perhaps more important determinants of small firm performance. Attributes, which 
received a rating below 50, included new entrants and buyer’s willingness to pay (or 
“Buyers WTP”) referring to the intense price competition in the industry and growth in 
the number of competitors.
In commenting on their performance ratings the owner-managers stated that the 
flexibility to diversify into merchandising, the continuation of the backup production 
facility (i.e. to improve coordination and minimise transactions costs) and the skills and 
knowledge to be able to control the quality of their suppliers service through on site visits
100
primarily fostered their survival (i.e. through monitoring and transfer of knowledge). 
Elements of this strategy are explained further below.
The overall score received by firm D was 67, equivalent to the average level of 
performance of long-lived small firms in the sample. By way of comparison with 
objective measures of performance, firm D achieved a higher level of absolute net profits 
than the average in the sample of £39,97lstg. in the last trading year, a lower level of 
asset growth than the average of 210 times and a lower rate of profitability than the 
average in the sample of 33%. Its level of assets at £900,000 stg. are well above the 
average in the sample and its turnover grew eleven fold in real terms over the life of the 
firm to £4m stg. (also well above the average of £834,111 stg. in 2001). The latter shows 
signs of superior performance. It is difficult to form a clear judgement on the consistency 
of the objective and subjective measures of performance in this case.
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Figure 5.7: Subjective Performance Rating for Profile D
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Overall Score: 6 7
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Internal Organisation
At inception eight junctions were performed internally including accounting, staff 
training, production, sales, market research, product maintenance, strategic planning and 
innovation. This was above the average of five activities. Even at this early stage, the 
internal organisation of Firm D was highly evolved. With ten foil-time equivalent 
employees working for the firm at inception, this perhaps lacilitated a greater division of 
labour at this stage. The administrative organisation of the firm was extended in 1991 
with the introduction of a catering facility, and in 1992, with the use of computers in 
production and administration. The relative importance of functional activities in firm D 
is evolving as the manufacturing facility is being downsized and the sales and distribution 
functions are being extended.
Firm D launched innovative products at inception. This entrepreneurial event was 
main innovative activity of the firm. Since start-up finn D developed approximately 
fifteen new products, which enabled the firm to raise its profitability and grow market 
share. Competitors engage in a little product innovation. At times, this places Firm D 
under intense competitive pressure to develop superior products and to become more 
efficient. Firm D made slight changes in the operation of the firm, modifying a few of 
their processes in minor ways. These process innovations chiefly were initiated by 
suggestions from customers. All their manufacturing facilities are accredited with ISO 
9002 and firm D has its own in-house testing apparatus.
Firm D uses eight forms of information technology, just above the average of seven 
in the sample of long-lived small firms. The most advanced of these include: e-mail, 
internet access, website and PCs. Information technology is believed to be very 
important to firm D and is used in performing a number of functions within the firm 
including planning, monitoring performance, improving operational efficiency, market 
research, product design, administration and managing dealings with buyers and 
suppliers.
The industry has experienced a lot of technical change over the life of firm D. 
Acknowledged leaders in the industry initiated technical change. Generally, firm D has 
been successful in putting these technologies into operation.
103
Organisational Change
Firm D engaged in a lot of trimming of its activities over its life. On average firm 
D undertook ten key organisational changes, which is above the average level of firm- 
specific turbulence undertaken by long-lived small firms in the sample. From Volume I 
Chapter 8 we found that firm-specific turbulence is a convex function of performance. It 
seems that high performers are engaging in a lot of trimming to grow on the firm whereas 
low performers are chopping and changing just to survive. Firm D received an average 
performance score so it is perhaps chopping and changing to survive and perhaps achieve 
greater growth.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the types and timing of key organisational changes instigated 
by Firm D during its life (i.e. a lifeline). Most of the organisational changes occurred 
relatively earlier in the firm’s lifecycle (in 1991) and following changes in ownership (in 
1992). The key organisational changes clustered at this time except for ongoing changes 
in product ranges, market niches and capacity. Out of the main changes identified, 
changes in ownership, the asset base and the firm’s line of business were thought to be of 
higher relative importance. These are described in turn below.
Figure 5.8: Key Organisational Changes of Firm D
Product ranges 
Market Niches 
Capacity 
(ongoing)
Line of I 
Manag 
Ass
Diversil
business
ement
ets
ication
MBO
Cashflow
Investment
1991 1992
The founder of firm D wished to exercise the option to withdraw from the business 
(i.e. semi-retirement). To exercise this option, the founder took a planned approach. He
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began to develop the management skill base of firm D two years prior to retirement. He 
hired one manager two years prior to the management buyout (MBO) explicitly for this 
purpose. This manager joined the firm with the expressed intention to partake in the 
running and ownership of the business. The other manager worked in firm D for many 
years prior to the MBO. A management buyout was the preferred end game for the 
founder and for the personal development of the current management within firm D. The 
existing management had the skills to grow on the firm and the founder wanted to keep 
an “oar in the business” and did so up until 1999. If the management had not taken over 
the business, the founder believed that there would possibly have been an offer from a 
competitor.
The two managers who purchased shares in the business exercised a number of 
options to grow on the business. Increased profits were sacrificed initially for increased 
growth. The level of investment in firm D increased immediately. The new owner- 
managers increased the growth rate of firm D over the first three years of operation. 
Sales, inventory and cashflow increased. This was converted into higher profits five 
years later. At this stage, firm D had gained access to a range of new buyers. The owner- 
managers exercised cost controls reducing the headcount of firm D, raising relative 
productivity of capital through investments in new technology and increasing operational 
efficiency of production and sales techniques. As a result of intense competition in 
manufocturing, the new owner-managers exercised the option to enter the merchandising 
of bulk bags. The management style of firm D also changed. These adjustments were 
implemented over a five year period and some of them are ongoing.
In 1991 the opportunity arose to purchase firm D’s premises, which was owned by 
the Scottish Development Agency. The agency were selling the factory outlets in the 
industrial estate in which firm D was located following a reorganisation of its operations. 
Only two businesses in the industrial estate purchased properties. The founder of the 
business purchased one of these properties. Firm D had the necessary finance to 
purchase the property. It was viewed as an investment, which would also increase the 
value of the business (e.g. a nest egg on retirement). The ability to control its own rental 
payments was also an important precipitator of this key organisational change. A loan 
was obtained from the bank to purchase the premises. Part of this property was rented
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out to two other businesses on the date of purchase. Two years following the purchase 
these set of tenants vacated the property. This provided firm D with a lot of additional 
capacity and offered it the option to use this additional capacity to store inventory etc.
A change in firm D’s line of business (i.e. from manufricturing to distribution) was 
precipitated by increased competition. As explained earlier, the market for bulk bags 
became very price competitive as new entrants in Eastern Europe and Asia could produce 
identical products at a significantly lower price (i.e. they had lower labour costs). Firm D 
recognised that a real option to wholesale distribute bulk bags manufactured by producers 
in Eastern Europe and Asia existed. Opportunities for fiirther growth in sales were 
present in this segment of the market. Increased profits could be achieved through acting 
as an intermediary between these East European and Asian producers and customers in 
Europe and North America. The customers of firm D do not want to deal with firms in 
China directly and are willing to pay for the services of an intermediary. Firm D 
exercised the option to merchandise bulk bags and became sales agents for the low cost 
producers in the east. The firm satisfies the demand of customers by importing bulk bags 
cheaply and selling these to clients. The owner-managers were aware that if they hadn’t 
exercised the option to enter the merchandising of bulk bags that there was an increasing 
risk that customers would switch to other low cost suppliers. As it happens, none of the 
firm’s competitors in the U.K adopted a similar strategy. However, by providing this 
service firm D has a competitive advantage over its rivals, as it is able to offer bulk bags 
at very low cost.
On a phased basis firm D reduced its manufacturing facilities. By keeping some 
remnants of a manufacturing facility, firm D could cope with unforeseen contingencies 
such as delays in delivery etc. Further, through adopting a “wait and see” approach 
before divesting of its manufacturing facilities, the owner-managers were able to test the 
viability of engaging in merchandising. This increased firm D’s options to withdraw 
from this segment. The owner-managers often visit manufacturers in China to assess the 
quality of their products and their manufacturing facilities. This resolves uncertainties 
(e.g. information asymmetries and opportunistic behaviour) about the quality of imported 
bags. Other consequential adjustments included a reduction in the headcount of the firm
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as manufacturing was downsized. Firm D also gained access to a new mix of suppliers 
and customers. Sales, cash-flow and profitability rose.
Table 5.9: Flexibility Measures for Profile P
Change Number of
Precipitating
factors
Precipitating
Time
(months)
Number of 
Consequential 
Adjustments
Adjustment
Time
(months)
Agility Speed
Ownership 3 24 15 60 0.2 84
Assets 4 3 4 24 1 27
Line of
Business 6 6 12 24 0.5 30
Average 4 11 10 36 0.42 47
All Firms 5 16 7 17 0.87 22
On average, firm D’s agility score was less than 1 (0.42), implying that it had a low 
level of agility. The number of consequential adjustments was high relative to the 
number of precipitators for changes in ownership and in the line of business. Firm D 
acted quickly and responded with agility to the opportunity to purchase its premises. For 
the other key organisational changes firm D adopted a “wait and see” strategy staging its 
resource commitments until uncertainties were resolved and putting alternative solutions 
in place in case of unforeseen contingencies. This provided firm D with the flexibility to 
withdraw if required.
End Game
This enterprise profile demonstrates the varied end game strategies, which could be 
adopted transferring the business from one generation to the next, whether the baton is 
passed on within the family, or to existing managers, or to an outsider. Particularly, the 
MBO illustrates how the founder managed the transfer of ownership. Initially, the 
founder sought out a competent employee and recruited a manager to take over the daily 
operations of the business. To ensure the smooth transition of the baton to the managers, 
the founder continued to hold a stake in the business and stayed on as an advisor for 
seven years. At the time of interview, the two directors expected the business to continue 
to trade into the future. They were unsure what the end game strategy would be at this 
stage. Either a family member would take over the running of the business or the firm 
would be sold. The directors are quite young yet. One of their sons displayed some 
interest in running the business. He was employed in the business while at college. The
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directors continue to run the business to increase its value on trade-sale. The business has 
met the expectations the owner-managers. So far they had seen a fair amount of growth 
and the possibilities for further growth are still there. Both directors still receive quite a 
bit of satisfaction from running the firm.
Profile E: Contract Caterer
Firm E was established in 1979 to provide contract-catering services. This private 
company started in a small way, catering for working lunches, but the entrepreneur 
sought to grow the company into a substantial business. At the time of interview, the 
scope of the firm E’s clientele varied widely. Firm E provides the catering for corporate 
functions in local universities and financial firms. It supplies the catering for the crew of 
ships. The firm works in partnership with a local authority to serve the catering needs of 
the authority. Moreover, firm E provides catering services for private functions such as 
wedding banquets, buffets etc.
Firm E was 22 years old at the time of interview (almost one generation). It 
generated sales of £l,600,000stg. (constant 2001 prices) with 60 full time equivalent 
employees or £27,000stg. per full-time equivalent employee. Turnover increased in real 
terms over the life of the firm but the headcount of firm E increased also. Most of firm 
E’s staff are hired on a part-time basis. This may explain the low level of labour 
productivity relative to other long-lived small firms in the sample. Firm E has eighty 
part-time employees and twenty full-time employees. In any case the low level of labour 
productivity suggests that firm E needs to adjust its headcount downwards to raise its 
performance.
The total number of products produced by firm E is large, as meals are cooked to 
customer specifications. These products could be grouped into six similar types of 
products namely, wines & spirits, service, bakery, hot plates, cold plates and desserts. 
Hot dishes and wines and spirits each represent approximately 30% of firm E’s turnover. 
The remaining 40% comprises of the other product groupings.
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Table 5.10: Scale of Profile E
Year Sales 
(EOOOstg) 
(EOOOstg 2001)
FTEs Labour 
Productivity 
(£000stg/FTE) 
(EOOOstg 2001/FTE)
Assets 
(EOOOstg) 
(EOOOstg 2001)
At start-up (1979) 25
76
1 25
76
0
After 5years (1984) 200
389
10 20
39
After 10 years (1989) 1,000
1,504
45 22
33
After 12 years (1991) 1,200
1,558
36 33
43
After 22 years (2001) 1,600 60 27 150
Market Characteristics
Firm E principally provides catering services for customers in Britain although it 
has some clients in international markets. Firm E’s market reach has increased 
significantly over time as it mainly served customers in local markets at inception. Firm 
E competes head-to-head with rivals in its principal market. Competition was described 
as strong but weak in some aspects yet its intensity has increased over time. Firm E has 
three major and hundreds of minor rivals. Two of the three major rivals are very large 
companies or “the big guys” in the words of the owner-manager.
The number of major players has fallen over time but the number of fringe 
competitors has remained unchanged. According to the owner-manager, one major rival, 
which exited the market, was top of the market between 1920 and 1970 and then lost 
popularity and was forced to exit the market (i.e. no longer trendy). As a result the 
owner-manager is aware of the precarious nature of his position in the market.
In the principal market for hot meals, firm E’s market share is minuscule, under 1%. 
The market share of firm E grew considerably since inception, but is still very small. 
Firm E’s capacity to grow market share is not constrained. The products of firm E and 
the product offerings of its rivals are different. The products have become more 
differentiated over time. Firm E sells products, typically, to customers at the top end of 
the market (Le. high quality products at a premium price). In this up-market position firm 
E competes on six dimensions, namely, price, quality, new product development, 
delivery, marketing and long-term relations with competitors. This indicates that finn E
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has a broad competitive strategy space. Firm E differentiates it service from the 
competitive offering of other firms in the market. The firm is cultivating a niche in the 
top end of the market. The strategy is labour intensive given the large headcount of Firm 
E.
Performance
Firm E earned £35,000stg. in profits in the last trading year (a rate of profitability of 
23%). This rate of profitability may be much lower if intangible assets were included in 
the denominator (i.e. in the book value of assets). Firm E has very few physical assets 
(£150,000stg.). The firm uses the premises of corporations and the homes of private 
individuals free of charge to supply its services. The firm’s primary physical assets are 
the vehicles used for transporting the food. Firm E began with no physical assets thus 
the asset base grew one hundred and fifty thousand fold since inception. This solely 
represents growth in the tangible asset base rather than intangible assets, which could be 
sizeable for a service-based firm, like firm E where a lot of its business is generated 
through referrals.
At the time of interview firm E had two forms of debt namely, a bank overdraft and 
a bank loan. Greater indebtedness is negatively related to survival at inception, see Reid, 
(1991). However, later in the small firms lifecycle there can be a number of optimal 
forms of capital structure, see Reid (2003). Other than these two sources of finance, firm 
E is funded by private equity.
Figure 5.9 presents the performance ratings of the owner-manager of firm E for 
each item on the multi-dimensional scale. Attributes which have raised the long run 
prospects of firm E (rating>75) included suppliers, competition, customer loyalty, access 
to buyers, technology, regulation, cashflow, credit policy, location, quality,
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Figure 5.9: Subjective Performance rating for Profile E
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product/service mix, differentiation, advertising and diversification. These are the 
attributes, which firm E juggles to survive in the industry. Most of the other scale items 
received a neutral rating except for capital requirements, new entrants and rival’s 
innovation. These received a rating of zero and negatively influence the long run 
prospects of the small firm. In commenting on these ratings, the owner-manager stated 
that the quality of their service (which offers value for money), their reputation (ability to 
actually perform the service) and trust with employees primarily, fostered their survival.
The overall score received by the Firm E was 70, which is above the average of 
67 in the sample of long-lived small firms. It is difficult to compare the long run 
performance score based on the owner-managers’ self-appraisals with objective 
performance measures. Objective performance criteria do not account for the value of 
the intangible assets of the business. Whereas the tangible asset base (of £150,000stg.) 
has increased over the life of the firm, it is below the average absolute value of assets in 
the sample of £330,425. The rate of profitability of Firm E is also below the average rate 
of profitability in the sample of 33%.
Internal Organisation
Firm E began with a very simple administrative structure as a one-man outfit. The 
founder of the business performed the accounting, production and sales functions. The 
administrative structure evolved slowly over a four-year period. Product innovations in 
meals were ongoing since inception. In the second year of operations the owner-manager 
trained personnel. By the fourth year of trading, the simple structure had evolved and 
firm E engaged in three fiirther activities, namely, market research, strategic planning and 
after sales service. At this stage, there were approximately ten full-time equivalent 
employees working in the firm which enabled a greater division of labour.
It was only six years ago that firm E used computers in the general administration 
of the business. However information technology is now used widely within the 
business. Firm E has seven forms of information technology, a similar number to that of 
the typical long-lived small firm in the sample. The most advanced of these include: e­
mail and a website. The owner-manager perceives information technology as important. 
Firm E uses information technology in administration, planning, monitoring performance,
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improving operational efficiency, market research and managing dealings with buyers 
and suppliers.
Firm E mainly engaged in near to market innovations developing about twenty new 
products and services since inception (e.g. new dishes, management of corporate and 
private events etc.) Primarily, firm E engaged in process innovations. The founder 
altered many of their processes in major ways to increase operational efficiency. For 
example, attractively presented meals are now delivered, warm and on time for serving at 
the location of the function. Firm E provides drinks, serving staff, a location for the 
event etc. In many cases, new staff carrying in knowledge initiated these process 
innovations.
The industry has encountered a lot of technical change over the life of the firm. 
Forces outside the industiy initiated this change. Firm E generally was successful in 
implementing new technologies.
Organisational Change
Firm E engaged in a lot of restructuring over its life. On average firm E undertook 
fifteen key organisational changes, which is above the average level of firm-specific 
turbulence, undertaken by long-lived small firms in the sample, of eight key 
organisational changes. Finn E received a high performance score so it is perhaps 
reorganising to achieve greater growth given that firm-specific turbulence is a convex 
function of performance (see Volume I, Chapter8). The fifteen key organisational 
changes are presented in Figure 5.10. A number of key organisational changes clustered 
in 1991 and 1995. Firm E was experiencing a lot of firm-specific turbulence at these 
points. Most of the turbulence has occurred in the latter years of firm E’s life (i.e. the 
past 10 years). From the list of organisational changes the owner-manager viewed 
changes in management style, cashflow and number of outlets as fundamental. These are 
described in order of importance below.
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Figure 5.10: Key Organisational of Firm E
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The owner-manager of firm E used to supervise the activities of all staff (i.e. a 
hierarchical style of management). By monitoring staff in this manner, the entrepreneur 
acted as a foreman rather than a manager. As the headcount of firm E increased, the 
supervision of staff became a full-time job. Three years prior to exercising the option to 
change the governance style of firm E, the owner-manager found that he was spending 
too much time following up on employees work rather than planning for growth and 
touting for business (i.e. marketing). This hindered the exercise of options to grow. The 
increasing headcount count, the desire for growth, and the misallocation of the owner- 
managers time monitoring employees precipitated this organisational change. To 
illustrate the gravity of the problem, the owner-manager pointed to the rising headcount 
in firm E. At the time of interview, firm E employed 100 staff members, twenty full-time 
and eighty part-time.
At present, the owner-manager entrusts employees to conduct their work efficiently 
and responsibly (i.e. empowerment). The owner-manager does not waste his energy 
following up on the work of employees any more. According to the owner-manager, “If 
you train someone to do something you expect them to do the job. There is an element of 
trust involved.” If the employee fails to keep this trust (i.e. to do their job correctly) the
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owner-manager fires them. As a result, the employees who remain with the firm build on 
this trust and work more as a team.
Since adopting this style of management, the owner manager has been more careful 
about the type of staff that he hires and retains. Prior to initiating this change in 
management style, there was an equal number of full-time and part-time workers 
employed in the firm E. Now there are more part-time employees. The owner-manager 
pays staff more, but this is not the main incentive to work for firm E (i.e. workers are 
empowered). Relatively, employees skills have increased as workers with a higher level 
of human capital are retained. Operational efficiency improved, as the owner-manager of 
firm E is more concerned with the general management (i.e. process innovations, 
planning for growth etc.) and employees are working more effectively. More time has 
been invested in marketing. Firm E has entered new market niches and has achieved 
growth in profits, sales, capacity and cashflow. The financial structure of the firm E has 
altered. The positive signs of such consequential adjustments were visible just twelve 
months after changing the owner-managers management style.
A cash-flow crisis occurred in 1997. In the space of three months firm E’s type of 
customer changed from small clients to large clients. As expressed by the owner 
manager, “ Contracts were no longer £1,000 but £20,000”. Without the means to receive 
payment for invoices upfront, firm E did not have the cashflow to conduct the work. The 
extension of credit is an important source of differentiation and firm E did not have 
enough cashflow to finance this credit policy. The founder of firm E was aware that he 
needed to finance the credit or risk losing the client’s business. To solve this firm E 
exercised the option to enter into a cash flow agreement with the bank where they would 
provide money for invoices immediately (i.e. invoice discounting services) and manage 
payment from clients for a fee of £15,O0Ostg per annum. This enabled the firm to 
purchase inputs for large orders. There was a downside to this solution. Firm E lost 
complete control over its relations with its customers. Mistakes have occurred where 
clients had been accused of non-payment in writing by the banks when in fact the client 
did pay. According to the owner-manager, ‘Tom could lose customers over this”. When 
this agreement operates correctly, it fosters good relations with suppliers as they are 
guaranteed payment for inputs purchased. It has allowed the firm to grow further gaining
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access to customers and new niches, which were otherwise outside its reach previously. 
Firm E could now compete for the custom of larger clients. One year later, firm E 
showed signs of increased profit, sales and cashflow.
Growth in the volume of output and sales precipitated the opening of a new outlet to 
distribute products. To compete effectively firm E needed a stronger presence in the 
market and greater capacity to produce high volume orders and distribute their products 
efficiently. Firm E purchased the outlet in another urban location in Scotland. A second 
outlet provided firm E with access to more buyers. After exercising the option to open 
the second outlet the owner-manager hired a manager to run the new outlet. Operational 
efficiency improved. Firm E was better positioned to exercise options to grow on the 
business.
Table 5.11: Flexibility Measures for Profile E
Change Number of
Precipitating
factors
Precipitating
Time
(months)
Number of
Consequential
Adjustments
Adjustment
Time
(months)
Agility Speed
Management
style 5 60 12 12 0.42 72
Cashflow 6 3 9 12 0.67 15
Number of 
outlets 7 12 9 0 0.78 12
Average 6 25 10 8 0.63 33
All Firms 5 16 7 17 0.87 22
On average, firm E’s agility score was less than 1 (0.63), implying that it had a 
low level of agility. The number of consequential adjustments was high relative to the 
number of precipitators particularly with regard to changes in management style. The 
founder of firm E acted quickly once he exercised a real option, rather than staging its 
resource commitments. However, firm E waited for real time information in responding 
to precipitating influences of change. Firm E had resolved any uncertainties prior to 
instigating the change, enabling him to act quickly. The three main changes instigated by 
firm E permitted it to exercise further options to grow on the business. In this way, Firm 
E also raised the flexibility of the business.
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End Game
The founder expects the business to continue to trade into the future. He was unsure 
what the end game strategy would be adopted but he expressed a preference for an 
employee to take over the running of the business (i.e. a management buy out). The 
founder continues to run the business for the enjoyment. The business has met the 
expectations of the founder. He stated, “I still find it a challenge”. He still wants to grow 
on the business.
Profile F: Corporate Design
Firm F provides corporate design and communication services for corporate 
customers. The entrepreneur, who lias been the main driving force of the business, 
founded the firm in 1979. In 1990, the entrepreneur left the business to work in the 
England for six years. His partners continued to run the business. When the entrepreneur 
returned, the business was reconstituted (i.e. the clients and the technology base of the 
business changed significantly). Firm F still retained the original goodwill, although 
there have been a number of changes in the partners of the firm over time.
The founder set up the business to make a living and to receive a good return for the 
capital and effort invested in firm F. This is viewed as a positive motive for setting up a 
firm, see Storey (1994). The entrepreneur did plan for the first three years of the business 
and sought to grow the company. He envisaged the firm more than doubling in size over 
the first three years to approximately ten employees including the directors. He didn’t 
feel that the business would grow beyond twenty full-time employees. According to the 
owner-manager, “This size would be comfortable and manageable”.
After three years of trading, the entrepreneur believed the business had attained a 
long run equilibrium level of employment with eighteen fulltime equivalent employees 
and gross sales of £1.4million (constant 2001 prices). At the time of interview, firm F 
generated sales of £1 million (constant 2001 prices) with an equivalent number of 
employees. Fulltime equivalent employment did not grow above 18 FTEs. Firm F scaled 
down its activities (i.e. lower turnover, lower headcount) considerably between 1994 and 
1996 when the entrepreneur was working in England. The value of services also fell 
considerably during this period as a result of the widespread adoption of digital
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technology. Further, a partner left the business in 1996 taking a great deal of work with 
him. According to the entrepreneur, the firm was much smaller following this incident 
but happier and more viable. By 2001, labour productivity, FTEs and turnover were on 
an upward spiral yet again. However, firm F never recaptured its level of labour 
productivity at inception ($91,000stg. per FTE).
The firm’s activities had a high creative content, and involved producing images 
and various forms of documentary reports for its clients. Examples include corporate 
logos, annual reports, brochures, displays for exhibitions, newsletters and magazines. 
The owner-manager grouped these products into four main services, namely, graphics 
design (60% of sales), website design (35%), communication (2.5%) and consultancy 
(2.5%). Clients range from sole traders (e.g. local legal practices) to large corporations 
(e.g. a UK bus company).
Table 5.12: Scale of Profile F
Year Sales 
(£000stg) 
(£OOOstg 2001)
FTEs Labour 
Productivity 
(£00©stg/FTE) 
(SOOOstg 2001/FTE)
Assets
(£000stg)
(£000stg2001)
At start-up (1979) 180 2 90 8
247 124 11
At maturity (1982) 750 18 43 -
1,373 76
After 5years (1984) 1,500 17 88 -
1,743 103
After 10 years (1989) 1,000 17 59
1,504 88
After 15 years (1994) 310 ~1~\ 44 20
480 69 31
After 16 years (1995) 345 9 38 45
401 45 52
After 17 years (1996) 356 5 71 18
404 81 20
After 22 years (2001) 1,000 18 56 80
Market Characteristics
Firm F competes head-to-head with rivals in the Scottish market. It faces increased 
competition from ten major and many minor rivals. Competition was hostile and 
described as intense in every aspect. It has increased significantly since inception. When 
firm F was set up there were only two or three players in the market who were as
118
sophisticated. In any case, firm F’s market share is small, under 1% in the firm’s 
principal market for graphic design.
The products of firm F and the competitive offerings of its rivals were similar for 
the most part. However, in some niche markets firm F’s products varied due to use of 
different technologies or specialised equipment. Firm F sells its products typically to 
customers in the middle to top ends of the market (Le. high quality products at a medium 
price). It was easier to charge premium prices in the past. “/w recent years customers 
know and expect more'\ stated the owner-manager. Firm F still has clients from twenty 
years ago, so there is some customer loyalty. The firm competes with rivals based on 
five dimensions, namely, price, quality, after sales service, tying up suppliers and 
marketing. This is just above the average of 4.5 dimensions in the sample of long-lived 
small firms. The firm is differentiating its product offering to cultivate a market niche. 
Its headcount is above the average of 13.5 FTEs in the sample of long-lived small firms, 
which perhaps explains its wider market reach.
Performance
At the time of interview, firm F earned £60,000stg. in profits in the last trading year 
(a rate of profitability of 75%). This is much higher than the sales margin of 6%. The 
rate of profitability may be much lower if intangible assets were included in the 
denominator (i.e. in the book value of assets). Firm F has very few physical assets 
(£80,000stg.). Firm F began with £ll,000stg. in equipment (constant 2001 prices). 
Thus, the asset base grew six times since inception. This solely represents growth in the 
tangible asset base rather than intangible assets, which could be sizeable for a service- 
based firm, like firm F where a lot of its business is generated through goodwill.
It is not unknown for firm F to report such high rates of profitability. In 1994 it 
reported net profits of £112,000stg., a rate of profitability of 560% and a sales margin of 
36%. It estimates were more conservative for 1995. It reported net profits of £48,000stg, 
a rate of profitability of 92% and a sales margin of 13%. However again in 1996, it 
reported net profits of £202,000stg., a rate of profitability of 1122% and a sales margin of 
57%. The low value of tangible assets and perhaps the failure to distinguish profits from 
income may explain these figures. Certainly, it illustrates the difficulties in gauging 
performance using objective measures in a small firms context.
119
At the time of interview, firm F had three forms of debt namely, a bank overdraft, a 
bank loan and leasing agreements. Reid (1991) found that greater indebtedness is 
negatively related to small firm survival at inception. This may not be the case later in 
the small firms lifecycle. Many forms of capital structure could be appropriate at this 
stage, see Reid (2003). Other than these two sources of finance, firm F is funded by 
private equity.
Figure 5.11 presents the subjective performance ratings of the owner-manager of 
firm F for each scale item. Attributes which received a rating above 75 included 
suppliers, customer loyalty, cost control, operational efficiency, skills and monitoring. 
This is a professional services firm whose skills, knowledge and reputation is its primary 
source of value. Attributes, which received a rating below 50, included the competition, 
buyer’s willingness to pay, new entrants, cashflow, debt and capital requirements. 
Mismanagement of the financial side of the business can severely undermine its 
performance as well as growth in competition.
In commenting on the performance ratings the owner-manager stated that the firm 
F’s skills, cost control and operational efficiency primarily fostered the survival of the 
firm. “Skills and experience inter-mingled or in other words expertise was most 
important”, stated the owner-manager. The human capital of firm F combined with its 
flexibility aided the firm in weathering downturns. Firm F also runs a tight ship. 
According to the owner-manager the firm doesn’t have any real leaks in profitability and 
it keeps within budget. “Even in base periods they ensure they don’t get too deep into a
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Figure 5.11: Subjective Performance 
rating of Profile F
Overall Score: 61
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hole”, explained the owner-manager. Firm F offers the full range of services. Its staff 
performs tasks in an efficient manner. They work in teams but can access a broad range 
of knowledge. This enables them to serve big and small customers.
The overall score received by Firm F was 61, which is below the average of 67, 
for long-lived small firms in the sample. This score contrasts with its performance based 
on objective measures of performance. Firm F’s recorded rate of profitability is 
considerably above the average in the sample of 33%. Its level of asset growth is below 
average. In fact as stated above, firm F has few tangible assets. The firm trades on its 
goodwill. This is not valued in traditionally accounting measures of performance.
Internal Organisation
At inception, the administrative organisation of firm F was highly evolved. Seven 
functions, namely, financial accounting, training of personnel, production of service, 
sales, maintenance, strategic planning and legal matters were all performed internally. At 
the time of interview, firm F also engaged in market research and information 
technologies (PCs, website etc.) were integrated into the functions of the firm.
The graphic design industry experienced a lot of technical change over the life of 
firm F, particularly with the emergence of new technology (i.e. digital technology). 
Generally the firm was successful in implementing these technologies. The business uses 
eleven forms of information technology. According to the owner manager, “We cannot 
work without it. Everything we do is digital". Thus, information technologies are very 
important to Firm F. The most advanced forms of I.T. used by firm F include e-mail, a 
website, ISDN/ADSL, telephone/video conferencing and electronic databases. Within 
the administrative organisation I.T. is used in networking, planning, monitoring 
performance, improving operational efficiency, market research, administration, design, 
external presentations and in managing dealings with buyers and suppliers.
Firm F was innovative at inception, mainly through offering new services (i.e. 
understanding the clients needs). It took two years to build up experience following the 
entrepreneurial event. Firm F also faced difficulties in the recruitment of staff. However, 
since inception the entrepreneur stated that firm F developed nearly five new services. 
These enabled firm F to raise profits and grow market share. Product innovations of 
rivals place firm F under a lot of competitive pressure. Copyright and trademarks protect
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innovations in the industry. Firm F made important process innovations modifying many 
of their processes in major ways. These process innovations chiefly were derived from 
new staff carrying in knowledge. Their rivals engage in a little process innovation. This 
also forces firm F to become more efficient.
Organisational Change
On average, firm F undertook twelve key organisational changes, which is above 
the average level of firm-specific turbulence, undertaken by long-lived small firms in the 
sample, of eight key organisational changes. Firm F received a low performance score of 
61, so the firm is perhaps chopping and changing to survive in a very hostile environment 
given that firm-specific turbulence is a convex function of performance. The twelve key 
organisational changes are presented in Figure 5.12. Firm F was experiencing a lot of 
firm-specific turbulence at three points in time in firm F’s life. The early years of trading 
and the early nineties were the most turbulent times for firm F. From the list of 
organisational changes, the owner managers viewed changes in technology, ownership 
and management style of high relative importance. These are described in turn below in 
order of significance placed on these changes by the founder.
Figure 5.12: Key Organisational Changes of Firm F
Capacity Ownership Line of Business
Inputs Legal form Technical
Market positioning Location
Management
Innovation
Market niches 
Service range
1980 1990 1993
The graphic design industry as a whole was subject to the impact of a major 
precipitating factor, namely, the emergence of digital technology. Rivals could produce 
more output with new techniques. Orders were less time intensive. Firm F’s biggest 
upheaval was adapting to digital technology - a step that was not taken without lengthy 
planning. While competitors were boosting their profits through the use of the new 
technology, the founder initiated a three-step plan to decide whether to take it onboard.
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He was acutely aware of the potential for failing to successfully adopt the new 
technology.
The owner-manager invested one month in researching the market and the demands 
of their suppliers and trading partners for it. Then, firm F conducted a pilot test with 
digital software on three specially built websites. Finally, firm F hired a new team of 
people to deal specifically with that side of the business, see Judge (2002). While 
confident at this stage that the technology would prove successfiil with their clients they 
were astute enough to put Plan B in place. The entrepreneur in question said, “We forged 
close links with other companies such as programming firms and internet service 
providers so that they could be sure that if the firm went cold on the digital technology 
those of their clients that were interested could still be serviced by someone elsef see 
Judge (2002). Here, the entrepreneur takes actions like staging commitments and 
planning routes back from failed experiments, which is consistent with a real options 
interpretation. As a consequence of the adoption of digital technology, Firm F entered 
new market niches in 1996. The capacity of the firm increased immediately and the rate 
of profitability per unit fell. There was an instant change in firm F’s mix of customers 
and the fimctions of management.
The ownership of the firm changed in 1990 as the entrepreneur (or founder) was 
head-hunted to work for a company in England. Firm F altered the legal form of the 
business from a partnership to a private company with limited liability status. While the 
entrepreneur left the business to work in the England for six years, his partners continued 
to run the business. Limited liability status protected the liability of the entrepreneur 
against any potentially negligent action of the partners (i.e. now shareholders). This 
reduced the entrepreneur’s risk and enabled the entrepreneur to retain a fifty percent share 
holding in the business. This was a wise strategy as the entrepreneur could exercise the 
option to return as owner-manager while also providing himself with a source of income 
and a property right. The business was reconstituted when he chose to exercise this 
option.
Following the change in legal form, the general management of Firm F altered 
(e.g. meetings were more formal). Formal meetings enhanced the owner-manager’s 
ability to predict change or identify precipitators of change (e.g. pooling of trade
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intelligence). Limited liability status influenced firm F’s credit rating and its ability to 
raise finance. A flat hierarchy existed but there was a tendency to deepen this. All staff 
had written job descriptions. The employees of the Firm F had a stronger understanding 
of their role. There were staff appraisal meetings. This enhanced efficiency (in terms of 
cost control and operational efficiency).
Table 5.13: Flexibility Measures for Firm F
Change Number of
Precipitating
Factors
Precipitating
Time
(months)
Number of
Consequential
Adjustments
Adjustment
Time
(months)
Agility Speed
Technical 1 0 5 36 0.2 36
Ownership 1 0 4 0 0.25 0
Management 1 0 4 1 0.25 1
Average 1 0 4 12 0.23 12
All Firms 5 16 7 17 0.87 22
In adapting to organisational change, the entrepreneur stated, “Whenever an 
opportunity presents itself we do not knock it, but always prepare thoroughly to satisfy 
ourselves the risk is worth it, and to be sure if things go wrong the effect will not be too 
damaging. We don’t rush headlong into anything”. Firm F stages its commitment to real 
options only making irreversible investments when uncertainties are resolved. 
Particularly, in cases that there is a greater downside risk to the financial position of the 
firm (e.g. investment in digital technology). The level of agility is low (approximately 
0.2) as firm F undertakes organisational change after identifying the first precipitator. 
After early signs of change, firm F acts in ways to explore options for change, putting 
contingency plans in place, undertaking market experiments etc. This sets in motion a 
chain of real options. The method adopted by firm F is consistent with a real options 
approach.
End Game
The entrepreneur expects the business to continue to trade into the fiiture. The 
owner-manager of finn F is unsure what end game would be adopted at this stage, but a 
preference was indicated for the transfer of ownership of the firm to an employee. He 
wanted a business, which could be passed onto the staff. Twenty-two years later the 
owner-manager continues to operate the firm to provide him with employment. The
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business has met the expectations of the founder. He stated, “2Z is better than a real job. 
I get up each morning and I want to do better. The job is interesting and stimulating”.
Profile G: Soft Furnishings
Firm G manufactures made to order curtains and soft furnishings to a high standard 
for professional and domestic buyers. The entrepreneur founded this firm in 1988 and 
developed the business from employing three to thirteen full-time equivalent employees 
generating turnover of £224,000stg. Firm G is a sole proprietorship operating from a 
business premises and was one of the youngest firms (13 years old) in the sample of long- 
lived small firms at the time of interview.
The entrepreneur believed that firm G has not yet reached a long-run equilibrium 
value of turnover and employment. Turnover and full-time equivalent employment have 
been on an upward spiral since inception (i.e. Both measures grew three-fold). However 
increases in the level of turnover have not been large enough to lead to increases in 
labour productivity (i.e. level of turnover per FTEs), see Table 5.14. At the time of 
interview labour productivity was half its level in real terms than at five years of trading. 
Labour productivity at £17,000stg per FTE at the time of interview was considerably 
below the average level of labour productivity of £64,427stg. per FTE. in the sample of 
mature small firms. This suggests that firm G needs to adjust its headcount downwards 
to raise its level of operational efficiency.
Firm G sources materials from an extensive worldwide network of suppliers and 
coordinates, measures, manufactures, and fits a wide range of products. Sourcing 
materials from this network of suppliers enables firm G to guarantee quality whilst 
maintaining a competitive pricing policy. A full swatch service is provided for the 
perusal of customers where they can select fabrics and complimentary linings and 
trimmings in the showroom on site. Firm G produces many products to customer 
specifications, for example, chair covers, duvets, pillows, cushions, roman blinds, 
curtains, bedspreads, head pelmets and small chairs. The variety of products can be 
grouped into three similar types of products namely, soft furnishings (80% of turnover), 
upholstery (5% of turnover) and fittings (10% of turnover).
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Table 5.14: Scale of Profile G
Year Sales 
(£000stg) 
(£000stg 2001)
FTEs Labour 
Productivity 
(£000stgZFTE) 
(£000stg 2001/FTE)
Assets 
(£O0Ostg) 
(£000stg 2001)
At start-up (1988) 35 3 12 1
60 20 5
After 5 years (1993) 142* 5 28
178 36
After 6 years (1994) 150 6.5 23 7
180 28 8
After 7 years (1995) 153 7 22 16
178 25 19
After 8 years (1996) 153 7.5 20 > 40
173 23 45
After 10 years (1998) 150 8 19
165 21
After 13 years (2001)
224 13 17 80
Market Characteristics
Firm G principally serves clients in the Scottish market. Amongst their customers 
they count domestic users, a number of interior designers, who themselves have a range 
of high profile customers and a large department store which has shops in many cities in 
Scotland. Firm G has enjoyed substantial growth by providing an extremely high quality 
service in a specialised market (i.e. a contested niche). Firm G competes with other 
similar workrooms and with small “one person” outfits that operate from home with low 
overheads. It also faces different competitors in the workroom than in the showroom, 
which retails fabrics. Clients of the showroom are domestic buyers in the local region. 
Firm G could distinguish between four major rivals (two in the work room and two in the 
show room) and only three minor rivals in the workroom but a lot in the showroom. The 
entrepreneur is not concerned with the actions of minor rivals. In feet minor rivals 
cooperate with firm G in their role as customers and in their role as suppliers of inputs for 
the workroom (i.e. co-opetition).
In the principal market for high quality soft furnishings in Scotland, firm G’s 
market share is less than 10%. Competition was described as strong but weak in some 
aspects. The intensity of competition has remained the same over time. The business is
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capacity constrained. It operates at approximately ninety percent of this capacity under 
normal business conditions. As the products in the workroom are identical to that of 
rivals, firm G and its competitors often subcontract orders to rivals if their workrooms are 
too busy. According to the owner-manager, “Ifyou cannot beat them join then?'. Firm G 
often subcontracts large volume orders but conducts the more intricate work in their own 
workroom so that they can control the quality of this more stringently. This reduces 
agency costs and limits the transfer of idiosyncratic knowledge.
Firm G sells their products typically to customers at the top end of the market (i.e. 
high quality products at a premium price). Clients were unable to purchase products of 
such high quality in retail outlets. At inception, the owner-manager underestimated her 
skill as a seamstress. As the owner-manager learned of her skill over time, firm G 
repositioned itself to clearly serve the needs of customers in this niche. The firm 
competes based on six dimensions namely price, quality, new product development, after 
sales service^ delivery and marketing. This is above the average in the sample of 4.5 
dimensions. In servicing this niche market, the firm has increased in scale over time. 
However, the firm remains a small-scale operation.
Performance
Firm G earned £44,000stg. in profits (a rate of profitability of 55%) in the last 
trading year. This rate of profitability may be much lower if intangible assets were 
included in the denominator (i.e. in the book value of assets). Firm G has very few 
physical assets (value of £8O,OOOstg. in 2001). A similar pattern is found if firm G’s rate 
of profitability earlier in its life is examined. Firm G’s rate of profitability in 1994 was 
71%. At this time it earned net profits of £5,000stg. on assets valued at £7,000stg. In 
1995 its rate of profitability was high also at 59% (i.e. It earned net profits of £9,500stg. 
on assets valued at £16,000stg.) Over time firm G’s net profits rose in real terms. 
However, the figures for the rate of profitability of firm G do not spark confidence in this 
performance measure because of the failure to account for the value of the intangible 
asset base in the denominator. Firm G began with £8,000stg. worth of equipment 
(constant 2001 prices). The asset base grew nine-fold since inception. This solely 
represents growth in the tangible asset base rather than intangible assets, which could be 
sizeable for a firm like firm G where a lot of its business is generated through goodwill.
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At the time of interview firm G had one form of debt, namely a hire purchase 
agreement. It has not sourced any outside equity finance. Other than this source of 
finance, firm G is funded by private equity illustrating that long-lived small firms have a 
clear preference for this source of finance (see Reid, 2001).
The owner-manager in rating firm G’s performance on each item comprising the 
multidimensional scale gave most attributes except suppliers, growth, substitutes, new 
entrants, market research, advertising and monitoring a rating of 100 (see Figure 5.13, 
which presents the performance ratings of firm G for each scale item). These items 
represent threats and areas where the owner-manager felt there was room to improve. 
The overall score received by the firm was 90, which was the maximum performance 
score in the sample of long-lived small firms. In this case the owner-manager perhaps 
over estimated the firm’s performance. Smith (1999) did find that firms in the early stage 
of their lifecycle were prone to exaggerate their own strengths and to underestimate the 
threats from rivals and other factors external to the firm. It potentially shows poor 
understanding of the primary determinants of the firm’s performance.
Commenting on the performance ratings, the owner-manager stated that the skills 
of the firm primarily fostered its survival. A lot of time is devoted to the training and 
development of staff. The diversification into the retail of fabric also helped the firm to 
weather downturns. The final factor, which the owner-manager pointed to was her own 
determination to drive the business forward.
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Figure 5.13 Subjective Performance Rating for Profile G
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Internal Organisation
At inception, the internal organisation of this firm was highly evolved. Eight 
functions such as accounting, training of personnel, production, sales, market research, 
after sales service, strategic planning and innovation were all performed internally. Two 
extensions were made to the administrative organisation. The retail of fabrics in the 
showroom was undertaken in 1990. In 1998 computers were purchased and used in the 
general administration of the business. At the time of interview, there were broadly three 
layers of hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy, the owner-manager was responsible for 
the development of the business. An operations manager, an administration and accounts 
member of staff and a delivery and collection member of staff supported the owner- 
manager at the next level of the hierarchy. There was eleven workroom staff at the 
bottom layer of the hierarchy.
Firm G was innovative through its development of new products and services. 
Over its life firm G developed more than twenty new products and services (100+). 
These enabled the firm to raise profits and grow market share. However, the product 
innovations of rivals placed them under some competitive pressure. Firm G made 
important process innovations modifying many of their processes in major ways. These 
process innovations were initiated by a diagnostic report produced by Investors in People 
Programme and are discussed further below.
The business uses eight forms of information technology, slightly above the average 
of seven forms of I.T. in the sample. The most advanced included: e-mail, a website, 
internet, electronic databases (e.g. SAGE). These are important to their business and are 
used in planning, monitoring performance, improving operational efficiency, market 
research, administration and managing dealings with buyers and suppliers.
The industry experienced a lot of technical change over the life of the firm. An 
acknowledged leader in the industry initiated this change. Generally, the firm was 
successful in implementing these technologies.
131
Organisational Change
On average, firm G undertook nine key organisational changes, which is just 
above the average level of firm-specific turbulence of eight key organisational changes 
undertaken by long-lived small firms in the sample. Firm G received a high performance 
score of 90 implying that the firm is chopping and changing to grow in a very hostile 
environment given that firm-specific turbulence is a convex function of performance. 
The nine key organisational changes are presented in Figure 5.14. From the list of 
organisational changes identified, the owner-manager viewed changes in technology, 
diversification and management style of higher relative importance. These three changes 
are described in turn below in order of the significance placed on these changes.
Figure 5.14: Key Organisational Change for Profile G
Product Ranges 
(Ongoing)
Line of Business 
Diversification
Capacity
Technical Cashflow
Innovation
Assets Management Style
1990 1997 195►8 1999 2000
The technical side of the business changed with an upgrade in technology from 
single needle to automatic needle. This was precipitated by increased demand. Firm G 
received larger contracts. To grow further and to raise profitability, firm G needed to 
increase the operational efficiency of its operations. With this in mind, firm G exercised 
the option to purchase new sewing machines. The owner-manager of firm G wished to 
ensure that the implementation of the new technology would successfully increase 
operational efficiency. This precipitated the sole proprietor to examine the efficiency of 
existing organisational routines and processes. She decided that the staff needed more 
space to conduct their work efficiently. To achieve this the entrepreneur undertook three 
further adjustments. First, the storeroom was cleared. This provided staff with more
132
space to work. The existing table space was extended and rearranged to make the most 
efficient use of this space. Firm G also purchased a new iron. The automatic machines 
improved the quality and presentation of the work. This resulted in further increases in 
demand, which positively influenced sales, profits and cashflow. The workforce’s level 
of motivation and efficiency increased with improved working conditions. Relative skills 
of employees improved following training on the new machinery. Firm G was now able 
to compete for larger contracts from new types of customers. Headcount increased to 
cope with larger contracts.
Firm G exercised the option to diversify through retailing fabric after loosing two 
large customers within the space of nine months. These two customers ceased trading. 
Firm G was highly dependent on the orders of these customers. These contracts 
represented seventy five percent of the annual output of the workroom. Sales, cashflow 
and profits fell significantly. The entrepreneur knew that firm G had to diversify to 
survive. Firm G exercised the option to open a showroom, which retailed fabric. Firm G 
started a marketing campaign for this showroom. The customers of the showroom were 
different. They are mainly domestic customers in the local region. Sales in the 
showroom were small in volume but it was mainstay business and complemented the 
workroom. It reduced firm G’s exposure to poor performing customers but did not 
eliminate it. In general, only 10-15% of turnover is generated from the showroom. The 
remainder is generated from the workroom. It took three and a half years for the 
customer base to grow again and for the firm to return to profitability. The business 
struggled for five years in total. The sales in the show room helped them through this 
difficult time. This is an example of a fallback strategy to minimise downside risk in 
event of customers ceasing to trade. It reduces the dependency of turnover on the 
workroom. The recovery period of firm G may have been shorter if the owner-manager 
had the foresight to open the showroom at start-up.
Firm G competes in a niche market, which demands a high quality service and 
responsiveness to ever changing customer requirements. The entrepreneur acknowledges 
that if the firm is to succeed and grow it requires a flexible and highly skilled workforce. 
As firm G grew in size (i.e. headcount increased) the owner-manager was aware that 
changes in the organisational structure (i.e. layers of hierarchy etc.) of the firm were
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required to increase operational efficiency and the flexibility of the workforce. New and 
existing staff needed a structured training system. At this point, the owner-manager was 
the main point of contact. The owner-manager was prioritising day-to-day operations 
rather than delegating this role to a manager. The entrepreneur took a careful and 
planned approach in changing her style of management. Firm G obtained external advice 
on the organisational structure of firm G by joining a programme called Investors in 
People. Advisors analysed the existing structures of the business and produced a report. 
Currently, the Firm G is implementing the recommendations of this report.
Firm G has broken down the operations of the business in terms of skill areas and 
has developed a skills matrix, through which each and every member of staff, regardless 
of whether they are part-time or full-time, is being developed. Performance appraisals 
with staff take place on a six monthly basis. These represent an opportunity for the 
owner-manager to discuss the progress and development needs of each staff member.
Within the context of the business, firm G has some highly skilled members of 
staff who in turn develop other members of staff. There is a strong sense of teamwork 
and a willingness to develop each other. The organisation has moved from having a 
distinct dependence on certain members of staff with key skills, who if off sick would 
hold up production until their return, to having a for more flexible workforce dependent 
on no one member of staff. According to the owner-manager, this has enabled the 
growth to date and will be a critical success factor in serving further anticipated growth.
The skill matrix is a simple but extremely effective way of articulating the skill 
needs of the business and its future development needs. For example, firm G may require 
a minimum of three staff members to make roman blinds. From the skill matrix the firm 
is aware that only two staff members are trained in this task. The firm is a vulnerable 
position unless at least one other staff member is trained in this task. In this way, the 
matrix enables the firm to identify the gaps and put in place development actions to 
overcome these.
Once the new organisational structure was put in place, the owner-manager was 
able “to work more on the business than in the business”. The entrepreneur invested 
more time on market research, training staff and improving the skill level of employees. 
The employees have greater responsibility but with this came more accountability (i.e.
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empowerment). Working towards the standards set by the Investors in People 
Programme gave the organisation the structure and focus to change employee behaviour. 
Firm G recognises the benefits derived from the journey to date have been considerable 
in terms of growth in turnover, skill levels of staff and customer satisfaction.
Table 5.15: Flexibility Measures for Profile G
Change Number of
Precipitating
Factors
Precipitating
Time
(Months)
Number of 
Consequential 
Adjustments
Adjustment
Time
(Months)
Agility Speed
(Months)
Technical 8 24 16 60 0.5 84
Diversification 6 12 n 42 0.55 54
Management 9 66 10 0 .0.9 66
Average 7 34 12 34 0.62 68
All Firms 5 16 7 17 0.87 22
In adapting to organisational change the entrepreneur takes a planned approach 
Firm G stages its commitment to real options. The average level of agility is less than 
one (0.62) as firm G undertakes a higher absolute number of consequential adjustments 
relative to the number of precipitators of change. Firm G adopts a “wait and see” 
approach before implementing organisational change. The firm investigates the 
precipitating causes of change for optimal solutions (e.g. studying work processes in the 
work room, seeking external advice). Once the founder has an understanding of all the 
variables precipitating change she structures her response. The consequential 
adjustments or commitments are staged.
End Game
The owner-manager continues to run the business to provide her with employment. 
The business has exceeded her hopes for it as it achieved a lot of growth (i.e. from 
sewing curtains at home). The owner-manager finds it a challenge. According to the 
owner-manager, ‘Tom need to be multi-skilled to survive as at times you need to change 
direction”. The owner-manager expects the business to continue to trade into the future. 
The entrepreneur was unsure which end game was likely to be adopted but a trade-sale 
was suggested. This firm is young (approaching half a generation) in comparison to 
other firms in the sample of long-lived small firms. An end game is not the primary 
concern of the business at this stage.
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5.2 Conclusions
The seven enterprise profiles illustrate the diversity of the long-lived small firms 
in the sample. The qualitative observations on the enterprise profiles enliven the 
quantitative results presented in volume I. The enterprise profiles are presented in a 
common format to enable the reader to compare the analytical categories across the cases. 
To aid in this regard, this Section concludes this Chapter by presenting a cross-site 
analysis of the enterprise profiles.
Table 5.16 presents information on changes in scale of enterprise profiles A to G. 
Annual growth rates over a five-year period and over the life of the firms are calculated 
for FTEs, real turnover and real labour productivity (at constant 2001 prices). Annual 
growth rates in real assets at constant 2001 prices over the life of the firm are also 
computed. In general, we find that turnover and full-time equivalent employment grows 
considerably faster in the early years of trading than in the latter years. Annual growth 
rates over the first five years of trading are generally higher than annual rates over the life 
of the firm. This supports empirical evidence presented in Volume 1, Section 5.25. The 
enterprise profiles (A, B, D) adjust the headcount of the firm downwards to maintain or 
raise labour productivity in the latter years of trading. However, in four out of seven 
profiles (A, B, E, G) labour productivity fell over the life of the firm. Real asset growth 
was substantial mainly in manufacturing firms (A, D, G) except for one services based 
firm, profile E, the contract caterer.
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Table 5.16: Changes in Scale of Firms A to G
Firm A B C D E F G
5yrs life Syrs Zi/e Syrs life life Syrs /{fe Syrs life 5yrs life
FTE Growth 3% -0.6% 140% 17% 11% 2.2% 38% 25% 180% 268% 160% 36% 13% 26%
Real Turnover 13% -1% 17% 5% 37% 7% 1.5% 63% 82% 91% 91% 14% 39% 21%
Growth
Labour Productivity 9% -0.9% -15% -3% 17% 0.3% -12% 7% -10% -3% -8% -2% 16% -1%
Growth
Real Asset Growth 172% 18.5% 18% 524% 682k% 29% - 115%
Note:
Growth is calculated on a) a per annual basis for the first five years of trading and b) on a per annual basis for the number of years the firm was trading. 
All monetary figures used in calculation of the growth rates were measured in 2001 constant prices including labour productivity growth
Table 5.17 presents information on the market characteristics of enterprise 
profiles A to G. Relatively smaller sized firms (as measured by FTEs) tend to have a 
broader competitive space and cultivate niche markets (B, C, G) to survive whereas 
larger sized firms have to compete head-to-head with competitors on fewer dimensions 
(in some cases) in hostile markets (A, D and E) (see Table 5.17). The market reach of 
larger firms was extended over time. Larger small firms such as profiles A, D, E tend to 
serve primarily the UK market but they also have some international customers. The 
converse is true of relatively smaller small firms. They supply the Scottish market or 
regional markets within Scotland (see Table 5.17). Furthermore, most of the long-lived 
small firms in this sub-sample serve the needs of customers in the middle to top ends of 
the market. Their product offerings tend to be similar to those of competitors in this end 
of the market and as a result competition is either intense or strong but weak in some 
aspects (i.e. strong price or quality competition but weak on aspects such as delivery 
etc.). They face competition from over three major competitors and many more minor 
competitors in the fringe of their market niche. In general, the market share of this sub­
sample of long-lived small firms is low (i.e. under 1%) as a result.
138
Table 5.17: Market Characteristics of Firms A to G
Firm A B C D E F G
Main Market U.K. Scotland Regional U.K. U.K. Scotland Scotland
Competition Head to head Niche Niche Head to head Head to head Head to head Contested
# Major rivals 4 6 0 20 3 10
niche
4
# Minor rivals 3 6 4 35 100’s 100’s 3
Intensity of Strong but Intense Weak but Intense Strong but Intense Strong but
Competition 
Market share
weak
25% 2.5%
strong 
Under 1% 15%
weak
Under 1% Under 1%
weak
<10%
Product Similar Different Similar Similar Different Similar Identical
Differentiation 
Size of 2 dimensions. 4 dimensions. 5 dimensions 8 dimensions 6 dimensions 5 dimensions 6 dimensions
competitive 
strategy space 
Market position Low end Middle Top end Middle Top end Mid/Top Top end
Generally, long-lived small firms, which engage in manufacturing, have much 
larger asset bases than long-lived survivors engaged in services (see Table 5.1). Failure 
to value the intangible asset base of the business, a sizeable component of the resources 
of service firms explains this phenomenon. This has significant consequences in 
comparing the performance of long-lived small firms using conventional measures such 
as asset growth rates and rates of profitability etc. Measures of the rate of profitability 
presented in Table 5.18 for profiles F and G are extremely high at 75% and 55%. Both of 
these firms have low tangible asset bases. However, goodwill, which may be a sizeable 
component of the intangible asset base, is not accounted for in the calculation of these 
figures. If it is reasonable to assume that the value of the goodwill increases as the firm 
ages, the inaccuracies of conventional measures of performance such as the rate of 
profitability increases as the small firm ages. This is particularly the case for long-lived 
service firms.
In self-appraising the long run prospects of the firm owner-managers rate items 
highly, which reflect the strengths of the firm and rate weaknesses or threats lowly. The 
items characterise the underlying dimensions of the performance of the long-lived small 
firms or the variables, which the owner manager juggles to earn a living on a daily basis. 
Environmental items tended to receive neutral ratings except for firm D, which competed 
on international markets. Table 5.18 presents the list of items which received a high 
performance rating (i.e. >75) and those which received a low performance rating (<50) 
for profiles A to G. Factors which tend in general to foster survival in the majority of 
cases include suppliers, quality, customer loyality, technology, cashflow, product mix, 
diversification, operational efficiency, skills and product differentiation. Factors, which 
inhibit firm survival in the long run, in the majority of cases, include new entrants and 
buyers willingness to pay. A clear one-to-one correspondence in the performance 
ranking of firms was not found between the objective measure of performance (i.e. rate of 
profitability) and this subjective measure of performance (i.e. the long run performance 
indicator). This does not negate the subjective measure of performance because a 
number of difficulties in capturing the performance of the firm using objective measures 
of performance were also found.
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Table 5.18: Long-term Prospects of Firms A to G
Firm A B C D E F G
Rate of 15% 0.5% -2% 10% 23% 75% 55%
profitability
Long run 65 63 72 67 70 61 90
performance
Items which G, CL, Abuy, S, Abuy, T, Q, S, CF, CP, MP, S, G, CL, Sub, S, C, CL, Abuy, T, S, CL, CC, OE, G, CL, R, T,
foster survival T, CF,CC, Q, 
Pmix, Divers 
and OE
Divers, and Sk Q, MR, diff. 
and Pmix
R,T, CF, CR, 
L, Q, diff, 
Pmix, divers, 
Sk and OE
R,CF,CP,L,Q, 
Pmix, diff., Ad. 
and divers.
Sk. and Mon. CF, CR, L, Q, 
diff, Pmix, 
divers., Sk,
OE, FPG, CC,
MP, CP, D,
CF, RI, Abuy, 
BWTP, mon. 
and MR
Items which 
inhibit survival
MR, BWTP, 
andR
CF, CP and C Sub and R NEand
BWTP
CR, NEand RI. C, BWTP, NE, 
CF, DandCR
NE
Notes:
Items which foster survival: S = suppliers, G = growth, C = competition, BWTP = buyer’s willingness to pay, CL = customer loyality, Abuy = access to
buyers,Sub = substitutes, NE = New Entrants, T= technology, RI = rival’s innovation, R = regulation, CF = cashflow, D = 
debt, CP = credit policy, CR = capital requirements, MP - market positioning, L = location, CC = cost control, Q = quality, 
MR = market research, Diff.= differentiation, Ad = Advertising, PMix = product/service mix, Divers. = Diversification, OE 
= operational efficiency, Sk= skills, Mon = Monitoring, FPG = Filling product groups.
Items which inhibit survival: S = suppliers, G - growth, C = competition, BWTP = buyer’s willingness to pay, CL = customer loyality, Abuy = access to
buyers, Sub = substitutes, NE = New Entrants, T= technology, RI = rival’s innovation, R = regulation, CF = cashflow, D = 
debt, CP = credit policy, CR = capital requirements, MP = market positioning, L = location, CC = cost control, Q = quality, 
MR = market research, Diff.= differentiation, Ad - Advertising, PMix = product/service mix, Divers. = Diversification, OE 
= operational efficiency, Sk= skills, Mon = Monitoring, FPG = Filling product groups.
Long run performance: Self appraised indicator of performance of the firm over the long haul which ranges from 0 to 100.
The internal organisational structure of these small firms was highly evolved at 
inception except for profile E which started with one employee, the owner-manager (see 
Table 5.19). At start-up, the latter only preformed 4 activities but this increased over 
time to 9 activities on par with the scope of the administrative organization of the other 
case profiles. Small firms which were older underwent a technical revolution with the 
use of PCs in their business in the mid to late nineteen eighties (i.e. a cohort effect). All 
the firms perceived information technology to be important. They owned over seven 
forms of information technology and these were found to support at least three of the 
operations of the small firms. The primary innovation of these small firms occurred at 
inception with the entrepreneurial event. Yet many of the firms (B, C, E, G) created 
twenty or more new products or services since inception. Most of their product 
innovations were near to market and prompted by the requests of customers. Enterprise 
profiles E and G undertook a number of process innovations over the life of the firm to 
improve the quality of service provided to clients and to increase the operational 
efficiency of work practices. All the firms operated in industries which had experienced 
a lot of technical change since inception.
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Table 5.19: Internal Organisation of Firms A to G
Firm A B C D E F G
Extent of internal 8 activities 9 activities 7 activities 8 activities 4 activities 7 activities 8 activities
org.at start-up
Extent of internal org. 9 activities 10 activities 10 activities 10 activities 9 activities 9 activities 11 activities
at interview
Product Innovation 8 products > 20 products > 20 products 15 products 20 products 5 services > 20 products
Process Innovation Important Significant Slight Slight Significant Important Important
Forms of IT. 7 11 7 8 7 11 8
Uses of IT. 6 7 3 7 6 10 5
Technical Change Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Most of the case profiles undertook a lot of organisational change (greater than 
the average of eight) over the life of their firm as approximated by the measure of firm- 
specific turbulence (see Table 5.20). Some were chopping and changing to survive 
others was trying to grow on the business or a mixture of both. Key changes which were 
identified by two or more firms as one of the three most important changes in the running 
of their firm included changes in management style, ownership, technology, cashflow, 
line of buiness, assets, diversification and product range. None of the firms had an 
average agility score greater than 1, indicating that each firm had to make a considerable 
number of adjustments in response to precipitators of change. Firm C is the only firm 
which had an agility score higher than the average in the sample of 0.87 (see Table 5.20). 
As regards speed of adjustment, enterprise profiles F and B responded to change faster 
than the average time of 22 months whereas profiles A, C, D, E, and G took considerably 
longer in responding to precipitators of change.
The logic of real options was useful in explaining how firms respond to 
organisational change (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Luehrman, 1997, 1998; McGrath, 
1997, 1999). Most firms adopt a ‘wait and see’ strategy to resolve uncertainties before 
making irreversible investment decisions (MacDonald and Seigal, 1986). Some adopt a 
more planned approach than others or tiy to test the influence of the change through 
market research experiments. They implement smaller and tactical adjustments first, 
which are easier to reverse until uncertainties are resolved. They put secondary plans in 
place to minimise downside risk in event of abandonment of planned change. They try to 
alter their own environment to reduce uncertainties.
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Table 5.20: Characteristics of Key Organisational Changes of Firms A to G
Finn A B C D E F G
Finn specific 
Turbulence
8 10 13 10 15 12 9
Key Change 1 Product range Market Niches Innovation Ownership Management
Style
Technology Technology
Key Change 2 Assets Product range Line of 
business
Assets Cash-flow Ownership Diversification
Key Change 3 Cashflow - Diversification Line of 
Business
Number of 
outlets
Management
Style
Management
Style
Avg.Precipitator 4 1 3 4 6 1 7
Avg.Precip.Time 20 4 46 11 25 0 34
Avg. Adjustment 7 3.5 4 10 10 4 12
Avg. AdjustTime 24.7 4.5 12 36z 8 12 24
Avg. Agility 0.57 0.29 0.92 0.42 0.63 0.23 0.62
Avg. Speed 48 8.5 58 47 33 12 68
As the owner-managers of these firms approach thirty years of age they are 
considering end-games for the firm. All the cases believe that the business can continue 
to trade into the future. A wide variety of end game strategies were illustrated. Family 
succession was only identified as a possibility in two cases (A and C) (see Table 5.21). 
Successful cases of family succession where idiosyncratic knowledge was transferred 
from father to son and unsuccessful cases where certain aspects of the idiosyncratic 
knowledge could not be transferred were discussed above. In family succession the 
interest of siblings and the parents are clearly aligned prior to the transfer of ownership. 
Similarly there seems to be a close alignment in the interests of the founder and his 
employees in a management buyout. There was a distinct preference for a 
management/employee buyout over the trade-sale of the business to a rival competitor or 
an outsider (see Table 5.21). Owner-managers approaching retirement age either train 
existing management to take over the running of the business or recruit managerial talent 
in the labour market. The owner-manager mentors the employees as a father mentors a 
son or daughter in the running of the business. Another interesting feature of the cases is 
that these long-lived small firms can change ownership a number of times, not only 
within the one family but also from one family to an employees family etc (see profile 
D). Changes in ownership are seen as a key source of organisational change for the firm. 
The new owner sets out to grow and rejuvenate the firm.
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